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Urbanization is occurring rapidly in Melanesia at 3-4 percent per annum. Due to unaffordable land and housing in formal urban areas, new migrants settle on marginal land without formal legal titles (‘informal settlements’). These settlements are growing and new settlements are emerging within and on the outskirts of towns and cities across Melanesia, at a rate that outpaces efforts to serve them. Settlements in the Melanesian capitals of Suva, Port Vila, Honiara, and Port Moresby comprise 20 percent-45 percent of the city population and at current urbanization rates will be between 30 percent and 65 percent by 2023. Information about informal settlements is scarce. This report provides a rapid review of water and sanitation services in the informal settlements in and around the capital cities of Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea.

Between 2000 and 2005 infrastructure made a modest net contribution of less than one percentage point to the improved per capita growth performance of the Central African Republic (CAR), despite high expenses in the road sector. Raising the country's infrastructure endowment to that of the region's middle-income countries could boost annual growth by about 3.5 percentage points. Assuming that the inefficiencies are fully captured, comparing spending needs against existing spending and potential efficiency gains leaves an annual funding gap of $183 million per year. By far the largest gap exists in transport. The CAR has the potential to close this gap by raising additional public funding for infrastructure from increased fiscal receipts of various kinds. Furthermore, the CAR has not captured as much private finance for infrastructure (measured as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, or GDP) as many of its neighbors. This scope for improvement, coupled with the prospect of an economic rebound and prudent policies, could lift the country from it fragile state back to and beyond the prosperity standards it once enjoyed.

Beginning in the late 1980s many developing countries turned to the private sector to provide basic infrastructure and utility services, such as highways, railroads, water, wastewater, electricity, gas, and telecommunications. Recent studies suggest that private involvement often benefited customers and reduced government fiscal problems without harming employees or enriching private providers excessively. There were enough high-profile failures, however, to discredit this reform in many quarters. Private involvement is likely to be more successful if it generates real efficiency gains rather than simply transferring costs among parties, if the systems of regulating the private companies are politically sensitive as well as technically competent, if the costs and constraints of private capital are not excessive, and if we are willing to adopt more modest and gradual schemes in difficult circumstances.

The signing of a concession contract for the Buenos Aires water and sanitation system in December 1992, attracted worldwide attention, and caused considerable controversy in Argentina. It was one of the worlds largest concessions, but the case was also interesting for other reasons. The concession was implemented rapidly, in contrast with slow implementation of privatization in Santiago, for example. And reform generated major improvements in the sector, including wider coverage, better service, more efficient company operations, and reduced waste. Moreover, the winning bid brought an immediate 26.9 percent reduction in water system tariffs. Consumers benefited from the systems expansion and from the immediate drop in real prices, which was only partly reversed by subsequent changes in tariffs, and access charges. And these improvements would probably not have occurred under public administration of the system. Still, the authors show information asymmetries, perverse incentives, and weak regulatory institutions could threaten the concessions sustainability. Opportunities for the company to act opportunistically - and the regulator, arbitrarily - exist, because of politicized regulation, a poor information base, serious flaws in the concession contract, a lumpy and ad hoc tariff system, and a general lack of transparency in the regulatory process. Because of these circumstances, public confidence in the process has eroded. The Buenos Aires concession shows how important transparent, rule-based decision-making is to maintain public trust in regulated infrastructure.