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This article applies grounded theory and epistemological, teleological, ontological, and methodological (ETOM) lenses to describe the prevalent contemporary theories of the centre of gravity concept, originated by Carl von Clausewitz. These include the theories of John Warden, Joe Strange & Richard Iron, Antulio Echevarria II, Milan Vego, Dale Eikmeier, and Jacob Barfoed. The article then compares the theories across 14 deduced theoretical aspects and produces a comparison matrix, that can be used as an analytical tool, and discusses implications as guidance for further research and doctrine development. The article argues that the term "centre of gravity" is polluted, and that the application of the term in military planning and doctrines requires careful attention to the specific theory being applied, so that logical consistency and clear, accurate communication is achieved. Alternatively, the concept may be removed from doctrine altogether, renovated with inclusion of a new unpolluted term, or reconstructed with removal of the centre of gravity, leaving a "critical factor analysis" concept behind. This article also provides a level of granularity to the debate about the concept, that renders critics like Paparone & Davis Jr and Zweibelson partly irrelevant and can provide a more nuanced and qualitative basis for future discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The redirection of military strategy towards counter-guerrilla warfare in the 1950s and the United States' positioning as the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere after World War II enriched the Colombian National Army's doctrine. This article examines the background that enabled implementing the military concept of air mobility -prevalent worldwide in those years-in the Colombian Army's military doctrine to complement the troops' ground maneuver performance. To this end, the article analyzes the 1962 Lazo Plan and the 1969 EJC 3-10 regulation to establish their conceptual advances, American influence, and the circumstances that prompted these new elements, such as Colombia's participation in the Korean War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Any nation's combat doctrine describes how it will approach and behave in combat with the enemy, regardless of whether this behavior has been explicitly stated in the military strategy or is merely hypothetical at this point and will be handled in accordance with the yellow and red danger circle principle in the future. Regarding the Iraqi military strategy The Iraqi military combat doctrine was unable to meet the demands of the security situation after 2003 and up until the occupation of Mosul and the other cities in western Iraq in June 2014 for a number of reasons that were identified in the research, the most significant of which was that it was defensive based on the reaction to a specific and limited action in the beginning it's up, this research identified a number of factors that contributed to the Iraqi military combat doctrine's inability to meet the demands of the security environment, the most significant of which was that it was defensive in nature and initially based on a reaction to a single, limited action. As a result, the enemies were able to identify and predict the Iraqi response, which allowed the terrorists to maneuver and further their criminal objectives. As a result, the prior battle doctrine of the Iraqi armed forces did not clearly define the initiative and preemption against the enemy. With low morale and a high level of irritation and hostility, the military establishment was left with an unacceptable reality, few options, and a limited amount of time, particularly given the insurgents' advance on Baghdad. Following the development of the popular mobilization and the issue of the religious authority in Najaf Ashraf, for the fatwa jihad kifaeai, a number of government actions and decisions in favor of change were taken. And support a combat doctrine that can engage the enemy by changing the combat doctrine from defensive, going to be a reaction to a proactive offensive, and at that, victories came after victories, reaching the final elimination of ISIS and declaring victory against it at the end of 2017, the research delves into the impact and influence In those victories by evaluating the outcomes of the change in the Iraqi combat doctrine and the prospects for that now an option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The need for the development and adoption of outer space doctrine becomes more and more evident. Daily space operations are conducted in a doctrinal void, and this void makes it difficult to predict how well-regulated space activities will be in current conditions and how sustainable it will be. Moreover, the tragic events of the present (pandemic outbreak) have shown that the world, despite all its adaptability, is not ready for such a scenario. Therefore, the issue of sustainability of all systems is relevant. The sustainability of outer space activities is no exception. Long-term sustainable space activities require a common approach to policy, theory and doctrine. This article describes how to achieve this balance. In spite of novelty of the processes described in this paper, they will be useful for establishing ideas on policy, theory, and doctrine in order to enable a coherent strategy for the development of space activities.

Since 1991, the Kazakhstani military and security apparatus has been seeking to define the primary threats it faces in the post-Soviet world and develop the capabilities needed to counter them. This article discusses the latest iteration of this process by analyzing Kazakhstan's security challenges, their reflection in its 2017 Military Doctrine, and, using Ministry of Defense training and exercise descriptions, its Ground Forces' success in developing the prescribed capabilities. By linking together the logic of threats, doctrine, and Ground Forces training, this article assesses that Nur-Sultan is preparing to counter a variety of amorphous threats, largely from within the bounds of its traditional security concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Military doctrine assures a nation's survival. Yet even when faced with a security threat that requires change, militaries rarely innovate but instead adhere to old doctrines that enhance autonomy, reduce uncertainty and claim resources. Existing theories cannot explain an important case of peacetime military innovation when the U.S. Air Force adopted Battlefield Air Interdiction to support the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. A revised theory of peacetime military innovation through inter-service cooperation resulting from external and internal threats explains not only why innovation occurred with Battlefield Air Interdiction but also why such successful cases are so rare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The need for the development and adoption of outer space doctrine is becoming more and more evident. Daily space operations are conducted in a doctrinal void, and this void makes it difficult to predict how well-regulated space activities will be in current conditions and how sustainable it will be. Moreover, the tragic events of the present (pandemic outbreak) have shown that the world, despite all its adaptability, is not ready for such a scenario. Therefore, the issue of sustainability of all systems is relevant. The sustainability of outer space activities is no exception. Long-term sustainable space activities require a common approach to policy, theory and doctrine. This article describes how to achieve this balance. In spite of novelty of the processes described in this paper, they will be useful for establishing ideas on policy, theory, and doctrine in order to enable a coherent strategy for the development of space activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For most of the post-Cold War era, modernization for NATO has meant a reduced role for nuclear weapons and an enhanced role for crisis management policy and politico-diplomatic partnership. This NATO approach advanced cohesion among allies, some of which were politically uncomfortable with if not borderline opposed to nuclear deterrence. Allied comfort is now under siege, however. Russian military doctrine threatens the early use of nuclear weapons, and states such as Iran and North Korea expose fault lines in the nuclear arms control regime that in recent years has sought to further the full abolition of nuclear weapons. NATO finds itself challenged by the twin requirements of ensuring credible deterrence and meeting the concerns of Alliance members who thought reliance on nuclear weapons was a thing of the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Gherasimov Doctrine 2.0" represents a new concept who introduced for the first time theoretical justification for operations in military theaters. The foundation for implementing this theoretical concept was the "creation of a self-sufficient grouping of troops based on force elements of one of the branches of the Russian Armed Forces possessing high mobility and the capability to make the greatest contribution to executing assigned missions." This strategy implied necessity to develop a new military planning database for 2021-2025, upon which the whole system of Russian defense documentation will be based, as a fundamental change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the evolution of the current British military joint intelligence doctrine. We argue that military intelligence doctrine is dogged by an intrinsic tension between the ethos and expectations of military doctrine and those of the professional practice of intelligence. We further argue not only that prior iterations of UK joint intelligence doctrine failed to effectively deal with this intelligence doctrine dilemma, but also that measures in the current doctrine to address this problem directly created their own problems. Moreover, as a result, otherwise sound innovations in the current UK intelligence doctrine have proven unsuitable to wider diffusion in more recent intelligence doctrine such as the new NATO intelligence doctrine which, otherwise, draws extensively on its British precursor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent peace operations 1 demonstrated that traditional principles of peacekeeping require a significant interpretation to serve the needs of UN peacekeeping. There is a clear mismatch between doctrine and current practices. Furthermore, as many analysts point out, one underlying problem in peace operations lies in the lack of an overall strategy because any action in operations is as worthy as it supports the overall strategic objective. The authors argue that the current UN system is not capable to produce and maintain strategies, hence, strategic theory and doctrine can be useful in closing the gap between what is being asked and what UN peace operations can deliver. In this context, this paper examines the UN structure and peace operations from the perspective of strategy and doctrine. It provides proposals for each level of UN structure through the lens of strategic theory and discusses six main conceptual themes that need to be clarified in a new doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade, Western military doctrines concerned with matters of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency have emphasised the requirement for properly ‘understanding’ the social, political and cultural environments in which those militaries may operate; the so-called human and socio-political ‘terrain’. This has led to a number of advancements and initiatives designed to facilitate the way that militaries may enhance that understanding. One of those initiatives has been the emergence from within the British military of a doctrine - JDP 04 ‘Understanding’ - designed for that purpose. Using that doctrine and other subsequent publications as a template, this article will examine the utility of ‘understanding’ for those commanders seeking to match military activities with political ends. It proposes that while any advances in understanding the operating environment are to be applauded, the ‘understanding’ of greatest importance is that relating to the feasibility of the strategic objectives at hand. If those objectives lack inherent feasibility, then the development of subordinate forms of understanding, particularly in relation to the socio-political dynamics of target societies, will likely only serve to slow the process of failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rommel’s approach to command and his relationship with the German army’s doctrine remain subjects of lively debate. Analysis of his career prior to 1940 shows he was a highly respected figure at the centre of the army’s officer training system. Consideration of his approach during the crossing of the Meuse in May 1940 demonstrates consistency with his actions at Caporetto in 1917. Far from proving his unorthodoxy, however, comparison of this approach with the army’s official manuals suggests Rommel acted fully in accordance with doctrine. This highlights a tension within that doctrine between independence of action and wilfulness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the shelves of the Israeli defense establishment lie many documents defining Israel's defense concept and painting a relatively clear and consistent picture of the IDF's strategy and doctrine - although two recent documents, the National Security Council's draft defense concept and "IDF Strategy," which is signed by the IDF Chief of Staff, indicate a new trend. Perhaps the recent documents bespeak the awareness that in its last six major campaigns, the IDF has operated repeatedly according to patterns that were inconsistent with the written defense concept at that time. Indeed, there is a broad common denominator between Operation Accountability (1993), Operation Grapes of Wrath (1996), the Second Lebanon War (2006), Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009), Operation Pillar of Defense (2012), and Operation Protective Edge (2014). This article will probe the second, unwritten Israeli doctrine that was applied in practice in these six campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue contains articles contributing to the understanding of the role military doctrine plays in strategic theory and practice. The authors scrutinize the function and development of doctrine, the use of force and the role of doctrine, alliances and doctrine, and small states and doctrine. The contributions are related to the wider scholarly and practical context of how doctrine is developed and implemented. The authors use functional, cultural and institutional explanations in their articles. They also give practical recommendations regarding how to increase the effectiveness of the doctrine development process, and the effectiveness of doctrine itself in relation to the use of force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organization theorists have long argued that the management of uncertainty is a major motive of organizational behavior. Military organizations must deal with very high levels of uncertainty. Some uncertainty comes from the international political environment that gives the Military organizations life; some arises from the possibility of direct intervention by formal authorities upon whom the organization depends for critical resources; some emerges from the mixed motives of organizational participants; some arises from the fact that Military organizations do not get much realistic practice; and some arises from the very nature of combat. Doctrine is one of the many ways that militaries address these uncertainties. But doctrine writers make tradeoffs among these problems, tradeoffs that are themselves reflective of the politics of the moment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The word ‘doctrine’ has been part of military terminology for more than 100 years. Even though the word is ubiquitous in modern military literature, it is still ambiguous and tends to put very different ideas into readers’ mind. In order to make the concept less vague and thus more useful, this paper explores the historical and pragmatic origin of the concept, and points out some of its potential pitfalls. The main message of the article is that, although it can be extremely hard to make a viable doctrine, it is worth the effort. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article we analyse to what degree the three functions of doctrine proposed by Harald Høiback – doctrine as a tool of operations, a tool of education, and a tool of change – have driven defence transformation in two Scandinavian states, Norway and Sweden. We conclude that doctrine, both allied and national, has had some impact on defence transformation in both countries: through the operations in Afghanistan, through education both at the branch level and joint level, and through organizational adaption to (first) the US ‘RMA paradigm’ and (later) to the subsequent ‘COIN paradigm’. However, other factors, such as threat perception and defence spending, have also played an important role. It also remains to be seen whether the changes are ephemeral or of a more permanent nature. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article, we address the often ignored issue of quality standards for doctrine. In doing so, we contribute to the existing literature on military doctrine, since much of previous research has focused on outlining the effects of doctrine or the causes of particular doctrinal content, rather than how we should measure its quality. The predominant way of understanding quality of doctrine is based on the rationalist understanding of doctrine as a force multiplier. However, rationalist aims do not necessarily tell us anything about the contents of doctrine. Hence, a doctrine can be seemingly of high quality, but ultimately impede or lead armed forces astray. Rather than focusing on the utilitarian side of doctrine, we suggest that doctrine should mainly be understood as articles of faith or a belief system. And thus the quality of doctrine becomes inextricably linked to military norms and military identity. Writing doctrine thus becomes part of ritual, rather than reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that US military doctrine, and by extension that of most Western militaries, missed an opportunity in the period following the Cold War to rediscover the many types of military strategies employed to good effect before the industrial-age wars of the twentieth century. This missed opportunity resulted in Coalition forces having to relearn many of those strategies through costly trial and error in Iraq and Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once dismissed by many outside observers, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has undergone an impressive transformation over the past two decades, emerging as one of the world’s premier air forces. As it continues to modernize, it is focused on becoming a ‘strategic air force.’ PLAAF strategists suggest this means it should play a decisive role in protecting Chinese national interests, field modern capabilities commensurate with China’s standing as a major power, and enjoy the institutional status befitting its role as a ‘strategic service,’ an important consideration given the historical dominance of the ground force in China’s military. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the classic sense, war meant a number of military campaigns in which at least two parties consisting of large masses of people and fighting equipment were in opposition on issues of sovereignty, territory, resources and power and clashed directly in order to impose will or a certain behavior by force. After the Peace of Westphalia, warfare has passed through several stages of evolution and now we witnesses 4th generation and even 5th generation warfare. The Revolution in Military Affairs has generated new forms of combat, new weapon systems and equipment, new military techniques and technologies and requires a permanent revaluation of military doctrines and operational concepts. Although war tended towards a non-violent confrontation, characterized by high-tech and information, between two or more entities in order to meet economic interests, the emergence of hybrid war put back on the agenda the territorial defense and classic action combined with unconventional means and techniques which have a strong psychological impact on the public opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the literature on the emergence of the principles of war in British military thought there has been a failure to examine the reaction of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force to the appearance of the first list of principles in the army’s 1920 Field Service Regulations. By considering correspondence, articles, books, field manuals, and staff college lecture scripts, this article demonstrates that there was a debate on the principles of war between the world wars which involved all three armed services. The acceptance of the principles into the doctrine of each of the services represented a fundamental shift away from Jomini and the final acceptance of Clausewitzian approaches to the theory of war. The debate also contributed significantly to the emergence of a ‘common language’ between the services, thus laying the basis for a tri-service ‘strategic culture’ which was attuned to the challenges of joint operations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article exploits the previously unused private papers of the General Headquarters doctrine writers to examine the process by which the British Expeditionary Force’s combat doctrine was produced and the influences upon it. It also reveals SS.198, a hitherto unknown manual from the autumn of 1917, which illustrates Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig’s influence upon doctrine writing at the time of the controversial Third Ypres offensive. It concludes that the doctrinal process raises serious questions about the notion of a consistent ‘learning curve’ within the BEF. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper examines British combined arms tactics in the last three months of 1918, via a case study of Third Army. It argues that, although some formations were capable of using sophisticated combined arms tactics well, others were not, and the application of such methods remained more diverse than some recent research has suggested. The diversity of approach was rooted not only in objective external factors, but also in the fact that pre-war regular officers continued to dominate the army of 1918. Their culture, rooted in the attitudes of the nineteenth century or even earlier, militated against the coherent dissemination and application of a single doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract: The defense sector is generally known to be simultaneously conservative and enthusiastic about novel technologies. Uptake of new technologies by the military may differ depending on the perceived impact of new technologies. Introduction of technological changes can sustain or disrupt doctrine and (promoters of) new technologies may be met with less or more resistance respectively. We analyzed dynamics in naval innovation cases to investigate how different types of technological change became associated with either sustaining or disruptive doctrinal innovations. In order to analyze dynamics in the cases, an analytical framework was developed which highlighted a set of factors shaping naval innovation processes. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Military science goals and content, from empiric to art and eventually to science, cannot be settled as they are continuously improving while paying their contribution to the armed combat development; in this context, human thinking is the only one capable of investigating, analyzing and extrapolating them thus leading to new abstract concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article had its genesis in a background study for the development of a new Australian Army counter-insurgency doctrine. Archival research showed that the Australian counter-insurgency doctrine employed in such post-1945 conflicts as Burma, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam originated in the jungle campaigns of the South West Pacific Area during World War II. The historical record also showed that the Army's counter-insurgency doctrine, as with its World War II-jungle warfare doctrine, was a pragmatic amalgam of Australian experience and British doctrine. The article traces this process through the development of a series of doctrine manuals. It also considers the contribution of key individuals to both counter-insurgency theory and practice. This distinctively Australian approach to the development of doctrine was responsible for producing a highly successful manual, The Division in Battle: Pamphlet No. 11, Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (DIB 11), which the Army used during its involvement in Vietnam. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]