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Forensic scientists around the world are adopting new technology platforms capable of efficiently analysing a larger proportion of the human genome. Undertaking this analysis could provide significant operational benefits, particularly in giving investigators more information about the donor of genetic material, a particularly useful investigative lead. Such information could include predicting externally visible characteristics such as eye and hair colour, as well as biogeographical ancestry. This article looks at the adoption of this new technology from a privacy perspective, using this to inform and critique the application of a Privacy Impact Assessment to this emerging technology. Noting the benefits and limitations, the article develops a number of themes that would influence a model Privacy Impact Assessment as a contextual framework for forensic laboratories and law enforcement agencies considering implementing forensic DNA phenotyping for operational use., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Use of DNA in forensic science will be significantly influenced by new technology in coming years. Massively parallel sequencing and forensic genomics will hasten the broadening of forensic DNA analysis beyond short tandem repeats for identity towards a wider array of genetic markers, in applications as diverse as predictive phenotyping, ancestry assignment, and full mitochondrial genome analysis. With these new applications come a range of legal and policy implications, as forensic science touches on areas as diverse as 'big data', privacy and protected health information. Although these applications have the potential to make a more immediate and decisive forensic intelligence contribution to criminal investigations, they raise policy issues that will require detailed consideration if this potential is to be realised. The purpose of this paper is to identify the scope of the issues that will confront forensic and user communities., (Copyright © 2017 The Chartered Society of Forensic Sciences. All rights reserved.)

In 2008, the European Court of Human Rights, in S and Marper v the United Kingdom, ruled that a retention regime that permits the indefinite retention of DNA records of both convicted and non-convicted ("innocent") individuals is disproportionate. The court noted that there was inadequate evidence to justify the retention of DNA records of the innocent. Since the Marper ruling, the laws governing the taking, use, and retention of forensic DNA in England and Wales have changed with the enactment of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). This Act, put briefly, permits the indefinite retention of DNA profiles of most convicted individuals and temporal retention for some first-time convicted minors and innocent individuals on the National DNA Database (NDNAD). The PoFA regime was implemented in October 2013. This paper examines ten post-implementation reports of the NDNAD Strategy Board (3), the NDNAD Ethics Group (3) and the Office of the Biometrics Commissioner (OBC) (4). Overall, the reports highlight a considerable improvement in the performance of the database, with a current match rate of 63.3%. Further, the new regime has strengthened the genetic privacy protection of UK citizens. The OBC reports detail implementation challenges ranging from technical, legal and procedural issues to sufficient understanding of the requirements of PoFA by police forces. Risks highlighted in these reports include the deletion of some "retainable" profiles, which could potentially lead to future crimes going undetected. A further risk is the illegal retention of some profiles from innocent individuals, which may lead to privacy issues and legal challenges. In conclusion, the PoFA regime appears to be working well, however, critical research is still needed to evaluate its overall efficacy compared to other retention regimes., (Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

DNA collection from family members of the missing is a tenet for missing persons' and mass fatality investigations. Procedures for consenting family members are disparate, depending on the context supporting the reason for sample collection. While guidelines and best practices have been developed for handling mass fatalities and for identification of the missing, these guidelines do not address standard consent practices for living family members of potential victims. We examined the relevant U.S. laws, international guidelines and best practices, sampled consent forms currently used for DNA collection of family members, and drafted model language for a consent form to communicate the required and recommended information. We modeled the consent form on biobank consenting practices and tested the consent language among students and the general population for constructive feedback and readability. We also asked respondents to consider the options for DNA collection and either hypothetically agree or disagree. The model language presented here highlights information important to relay in consent processes and can serve as a foundation for future consent practices in mass fatalities and missing persons' investigations., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Pursuant to federal statutes and to laws in all fifty states, the United States government has assembled a database containing the DNA profiles of over eleven million citizens. Without judicial authorization, the government searches each of these profiles one-hundred thousand times every day, seeking to link database subjects to crimes they are not suspected of committing. Yet, courts and scholars that have addressed DNA databasing have focused their attention almost exclusively on the constitutionality of the government's seizure of the biological samples from which the profiles are generated. This Note fills a gap in the scholarship by examining the Fourth Amendment problems that arise when the government searches its vast DNA database. This Note argues that each attempt to match two DNA profiles constitutes a Fourth Amendment search because each attempted match infringes upon database subjects' expectations of privacy in their biological relationships and physical movements. The Note further argues that database searches are unreasonable as they are currently conducted, and it suggests an adaptation of computer-search procedures to remedy the constitutional deficiency.

In this article, we discuss the implications of a recent European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decision about the use of retained DNA profiles in criminal cases. Met with polar but equal passion from both the privacy lobby and law enforcement, this case has opened concerns regarding ethics in the nascent science of DNA profiling. Although the technology is touted as the most exciting breakthrough since fingerprinting in crime solving, there are questions regarding its use. The case decided by the ECHR intensified the debate on privacy, state control of information, and the public's right to be safe. New proposals in response, however, raise more questions than they sought to answer, ranging from unfettered data mining to the pitfalls in risk prediction.

DNA plays an indispensable role in modern law enforcement, and courts uniformly find that DNA extraction statutes targeting criminals satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Courts differ on which Fourth Amendment test--totality of the circumstances or special needs--ought to be employed in this context. This Note concludes that courts should apply Samson v. California's less stringent totality of the circumstances test to analyze DNA extraction statutes in order to maintain the integrity of the special needs test.

The authors examine the two main attitudes toward genetics: Exceptionalism and Undervaluation. They firstly pose the basis of the matter from the scientific point of view and then verify how these two attitudes really work in the different fields where human genetics finds relevant applications, dealing with the questions arising from the unique characteristics of genetic data that is shared among the whole bio-group. Then some judicial cases related to the conflicts arising when genetic data are stored in repositories, whatever the aims and reasons, are presented and discussed. The matter is then considered from the criminal law perspective, in the light of the new possible implications of DNA fingerprinting in criminal investigations. Finally, some general considerations on opposing Exceptionalism/Undervaluation viewpoints and the real reason for making up new rules are presented.

Technology has provided state and federal governments with huge collections of DNA samples and identifying profiles stored in databanks. That information can be used to solve crimes by matching samples from convicted felons to unsolved crimes, and has aided law enforcement in investigating and convicting suspects, and exonerating innocent felons, even after lengthy incarceration. Rights surrounding the provision of DNA samples, however, remain unclear in light of the constitutional guarantee against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and privacy concerns. The courts have just begun to consider this issue, and have provided little guidance. It is unclear whether the laws governing protected health information are applicable to the instant situation, and if so, the degree to which they apply. DNA databanks are not uniformly regulated, and it is possible that DNA samples contained in them may be used for purposes unintended by donors of the samples. As people live their lives, they leave bits of their DNA behind. They cannot be assured that these tiny specimens will not be taken or used against their will or without their knowledge for activities such as profiling to measure tendencies such as thrill-seeking, aggressiveness, or crimes with threatening behavior. Existing racial or ethnic discrimination and profiling may also encompass genetic discrimination and profiling, creating societal class distinctions. This article will explore the constitutionality of collecting genetic materials, the ethics of such activities, and balance the social good in solving crime and deterrence against the individual's security, liberty, and privacy.

Foes of the United States have demonstrated their ability to strike at the heart of this country. Fear of renewed attacks and a desire for greater national security have now prompted many to call for improvements in the national personal identification system. In particular, the possibility of a national identification card containing the carrier's DNA information is being seriously considered. However, this raises difficult questions. Would such a card system, and the extraction of individuals' DNA it entails, violate the 4th Amendment of the Constitution? This article will shows that such a card system could in fact be found to be constitutional under the law of privacy as it stands today.

The computerised databases of genetic fingerprints are laboratory tools and by extension law enforcement tools, for which the European Union has defined the applications. As these genetic profiles give no information on specific hereditary characteristics, these bases have been established in order to respect the rights and fundamental liberties of each individual. Compatible at the international level, nobody contests today their rewards in the fight against crime.

This article shows the main advantages and drawbacks of the genetic analysis used by magistrates and police officers. Analyze a cellular trace on the scene of a crime, seek a paternity are some applications.

This note explores the possibility of release of an individual's DNA analysis to any person who requests it through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), after an individual's post-aircraft accident DNA profile has been developed by the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI). It analyzes whether the request would fall under the FOIA's 552(b)(6) exemption, which weighs a person's privacy interest against any public interest in such information, or if the release would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."