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Background: Three clusters of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) linked to a tour group from China, a company conference, and a church were identified in Singapore in February, 2020., Methods: We gathered epidemiological and clinical data from individuals with confirmed COVID-19, via interviews and inpatient medical records, and we did field investigations to assess interactions and possible modes of transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). Open source reports were obtained for overseas cases. We reported the median (IQR) incubation period of SARS-CoV-2., Findings: As of Feb 15, 2020, 36 cases of COVID-19 were linked epidemiologically to the first three clusters of circumscribed local transmission in Singapore. 425 close contacts were quarantined. Direct or prolonged close contact was reported among affected individuals, although indirect transmission (eg, via fomites and shared food) could not be excluded. The median incubation period of SARS-CoV-2 was 4 days (IQR 3-6). The serial interval between transmission pairs ranged between 3 days and 8 days., Interpretation: SARS-CoV-2 is transmissible in community settings, and local clusters of COVID-19 are expected in countries with high travel volume from China before the lockdown of Wuhan and institution of travel restrictions. Enhanced surveillance and contact tracing is essential to minimise the risk of widespread transmission in the community., Funding: None., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Identifying the source of an outbreak facilitates its control. Spatial methods are not optimally used in outbreak investigation, due to a mix of the complexities involved (e.g., methods requiring additional parameter selection), imperfect performance, and lack of confidence in existing options. We simulated 30 mock outbreaks and compared 5 simple methods that do not require parameter selection but could select between mock cases' residential and workplace addresses to localize the source. Each category of site had a unique spatial distribution; residential and workplace address were visually and statistically clustered around the residential neighborhood and city center sites respectively, suggesting that the value of workplace addresses is tied to the location where an outbreak might originate. A modification to centrographic statistics that we propose-the center of minimum geometric distance with address selection-was able to localize the mock outbreak source to within a 500 m radius in almost all instances when using workplace in combination with residential addresses. In the sensitivity analysis, when given sufficient workplace data, the method performed well in various scenarios with only 10 cases. It was also successful when applied to past outbreaks, except for a multisite outbreak from a common food supplier., (© The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.)

Background: Singapore remains vulnerable to worldwide epidemics due to high air traffic with other countries This study aims to measure the public's awareness of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) and Avian Influenza A (H7N9), identify population groups who are uninformed or misinformed about the diseases, understand their choice of outbreak information source, and assess the effectiveness of communication channels in Singapore., Methods: A cross-sectional study, comprising of face-to-face interviews, was conducted between June and December 2013 to assess the public's awareness and knowledge of MERS and H7N9, including their choice of information source. Respondents were randomly selected and recruited from 3 existing cohort studies. An opportunistic sampling approach was also used to recruit new participants or members in the same household through referrals from existing participants., Results: Out of 2969 participants, 53.2% and 79.4% were not aware of H7N9 and MERS respectively. Participants who were older and better educated were most likely to hear about the diseases. The mean total knowledge score was 9.2 (S.D ± 2.3) out of 20, and 5.9 (S.D ± 1.2) out of 10 for H7N9 and MERS respectively. Participants who were Chinese, more educated and older had better knowledge of the diseases. Television and radio were the primary sources of outbreak information regardless of socio-demographic factors., Conclusion: Heightening education of infectious outbreaks through appropriate media to the young and less educated could increase awareness.

Background: Hospital usage and service demand during an Infectious Disease (ID) outbreak can tax the health system in different ways. Herein we conceptualize hospital surge elements, and lessons learnt from such events, to help build appropriately matched responses to future ID surge threats., Methods: We used the Interpretive Descriptive qualitative approach. Interviews (n = 35) were conducted with governance and public health specialists; hospital based staff; and General Practitioners. Key policy literature in tandem with the interview data were used to iteratively generate a Hospital ID Surge framework. We anchored our narrative account within this framework, which is used to structure our analysis., Results: A spectrum of surge threats from combinations of capacity (for crowding) and capability (for treatment complexity) demands were identified. Starting with the Pyramid scenario, or an influx of high screening rates flooding Emergency Departments, alongside fewer and manageable admissions; the Reverse-Pyramid occurs when few cases are screened and admitted but those that are, are complex; during a 'Black' scenario, the system is overburdened by both crowding and complexity. The Singapore hospital system is highly adapted to crowding, functioning remarkably well at constant near-full capacity in Peacetime and resilient to Endemic surges. We catalogue 26 strategies from lessons learnt relating to staffing, space, supplies and systems, crystalizing institutional memory. The DECIDE model advocates linking these strategies to types of surge threats and offers a step-by-step guide for coordinating outbreak planning and response., Conclusions: Lack of a shared definition and decision making of surge threats had rendered the procedures somewhat duplicative. This burden was paradoxically exacerbated by a health system that highly prizes planning and forward thinking, but worked largely in silo until an ID crisis hit. Many such lessons can be put into play to further strengthen our current hospital governance and adapted to more diverse settings.

Influenza-like illness (ILI) case definitions, such as those from the European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, World Health Organization (WHO) and United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, are commonly used for influenza surveillance. We assessed how various case definitions performed during the initial wave of influenza A(H1N1) pdm09 infections in Singapore on a cohort of 727 patients with two to three blood samples and whose symptoms were reviewed fortnightly from June to October 2009. Using seroconversion (≥ 4-fold rise) to A/California/7/2009 (H1N1), we identified 36 presumptive influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 episodes and 664 episodes unrelated to influenza A(H1N1)pdm09. Cough, fever and headache occurred more commonly in presumptive influenza A(H1N1)pdm09. Although the sensitivity was low (36%), the recently revised WHO ILI case definition gave a higher positive predictive value (42%) and positive likelihood ratio (13.3) than the other case definitions. Results including only episodes with primary care consultations were similar. Individuals who worked or had episodes with fever, cough or sore throat were more likely to consult a physician, while episodes with Saturday onset were less likely, with some consultations skipped or postponed. Our analysis supports the use of the revised WHO ILI case definition, which includes only cough in the presence of fever defined as body temperature ≥ 38 °C for influenza surveillance.

We describe incidence and risk factors for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection in healthcare personnel during the June-September 2009 epidemic in Singapore. Personnel contributed 3 serologic samples during June-October 2009, with seroconversion defined as a ≥4-fold increase in hemagglutination inhibition titers to pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Of 531 participants, 35 showed evidence of seroconversion. Seroconversion rates were highest in nurses (28/290) and lowest in allied health staff (2/116). Significant risk factors on multivariate analysis were being a nurse (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] 4.5, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.0-19.6) and working in pandemic (H1N1) 2009 isolation wards (aOR 4.5, 95% CI 1.3-15.6). Contact with pandemic (H1N1) 2009-infected colleagues (aOR 2.5, 95% CI 0.9-6.6) and larger household size (aOR 1.2, 95% CI 1.0-1.4) were of borderline significance. Our study suggests that seroconversion was associated with occupational and nonoccupational risk factors.

Background: From June 22 through June 25, 2009, four outbreaks of infection with the pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus occurred in Singapore military camps. We report the efficacy of ring chemoprophylaxis (geographically targeted containment by means of prophylaxis) with oseltamivir to control outbreaks of 2009 H1N1 influenza in semiclosed environments., Methods: All personnel with suspected infection were tested and clinically isolated if infection was confirmed. In addition, we administered postexposure ring chemoprophylaxis with oseltamivir and segregated the affected military units to contain the spread of the virus. All personnel were screened three times weekly both for virologic infection, by means of nasopharyngeal swabs and reverse-transcriptase-polymerase-chain-reaction assay with sequencing, and for clinical symptoms, by means of questionnaires., Results: A total of 1175 personnel were at risk across the four sites, with 1100 receiving oseltamivir prophylaxis. A total of 75 personnel (6.4%) were infected before the intervention, and 7 (0.6%) after the intervention. There was a significant reduction in the overall reproductive number (the number of new cases attributable to the index case), from 1.91 (95% credible interval, 1.50 to 2.36) before the intervention to 0.11 (95% credible interval, 0.05 to 0.20) after the intervention. Three of the four outbreaks showed a significant reduction in the rate of infection after the intervention. Molecular analysis revealed that all four outbreaks were derived from the New York lineage of the 2009 H1N1 virus and that cases within each outbreak were due to transmission rather than unrelated episodes of infection. Of the 816 personnel treated with oseltamivir who were surveyed, 63 (7.7%) reported mild, nonrespiratory side effects of the drug, with no severe adverse events., Conclusions: Oseltamivir ring chemoprophylaxis, together with prompt identification and isolation of infected personnel, was effective in reducing the impact of outbreaks of 2009 H1N1 influenza in semiclosed settings., (Copyright 2010 Massachusetts Medical Society.)

Background: All influenza pandemic plans advocate pandemic vaccination. However, few studies have evaluated the cost-effectiveness of different vaccination strategies. This paper compares the economic outcomes of vaccination compared with treatment with antiviral agents alone, in Singapore., Methodology: We analyzed the economic outcomes of pandemic vaccination (immediate vaccination and vaccine stockpiling) compared with treatment-only in Singapore using a decision-based model to perform cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses. We also explored the annual insurance premium (willingness to pay) depending on the perceived risk of the next pandemic occurring., Principal Findings: The treatment-only strategy resulted in 690 deaths, 13,950 hospitalization days, and economic cost of USD$497 million. For immediate vaccination, at vaccine effectiveness of >55%, vaccination was cost-beneficial over treatment-only. Vaccine stockpiling is not cost-effective in most scenarios even with 100% vaccine effectiveness. The annual insurance premium was highest with immediate vaccination, and was lower with increased duration to the next pandemic. The premium was also higher with higher vaccine effectiveness, attack rates, and case-fatality rates. Stockpiling with case-fatality rates of 0.4-0.6% would be cost-beneficial if vaccine effectiveness was >80%; while at case-fatality of >5% stockpiling would be cost-beneficial even if vaccine effectiveness was 20%. High-risk sub-groups warrant higher premiums than low-risk sub-groups., Conclusions: The actual pandemic vaccine effectiveness and lead time is unknown. Vaccine strategy should be based on perception of severity. Immediate vaccination is most cost-effective, but requires vaccines to be available when required. Vaccine stockpiling as insurance against worst-case scenarios is also cost-effective. Research and development is therefore critical to develop and stockpile cheap, readily available effective vaccines.

Introduction: Singapore was substantially affected by three 20th Century pandemics. This study describes the course of the pandemics, and the preventive measures adopted., Materials and Methods: We reviewed and researched a wide range of material including peer-reviewed journal articles, Ministry of Health reports, Straits Settlements reports and newspaper articles. Monthly mortality data were obtained from various official sources in Singapore., Results: The 1918 epidemic in Singapore occurred in 2 waves--June to July, and October to November--resulting in up to 3500 deaths. The 1957 epidemic occurred in May, and resulted in widespread morbidity, with 77,000 outpatient attendances in government clinics alone. The 1968 epidemic occurred in August and lasted a few weeks, with outpatient attendances increasing by more than 65%. The preventive measures instituted by the Singapore government during the pandemics included the closure of schools, promulgation of public health messages, setting up of influenza treatment centres, and screening at ports. Students, businessmen and healthcare workers were all severely affected by the pandemics., Conclusions: Tropical cities should be prepared in case of a future pandemic. Some of the preventive measures used in previous pandemics may be applicable during the next pandemic.

Tropical cities such as Singapore do not have well-defined influenza seasons but have not been spared from influenza pandemics. The 1918 epidemic in Singapore, which was then already a major global trading hub, occurred in 2 waves, June-July, and October-November, and resulted in > or = 2,870 deaths. The excess mortality rate was higher than that for industrialized nations in the Northern Hemisphere but lower than that for less industrialized countries in Asia and Africa. The 1957 epidemic occurred in May and resulted in widespread illness. The 1968 epidemic occurred in August and lasted a few weeks, again with widespread illness. Tropical cities may be affected early in a pandemic and have higher mortality rates. With the increase in travel and trade, a future pandemic may reach a globally connected city early and spread worldwide. Preparedness and surveillance plans must be developed to include the megacities of the tropical world.

We used a deterministic SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed) meta-population model, together with scenario, sensitivity, and simulation analyses, to determine stockpiling strategies for neuraminidase inhibitors that would minimize absenteeism among healthcare workers. A pandemic with a basic reproductive number (R0) of 2.5 resulted in peak absenteeism of 10%. Treatment decreased peak absenteeism to 8%, while 8 weeks' prophylaxis reduced it to 2%. For pandemics with higher R0, peak absenteeism exceeded 20% occasionally and 6 weeks' prophylaxis reduced peak absenteeism by 75%. Insufficient duration of prophylaxis increased peak absenteeism compared with treatment only. Earlier pandemic detection and initiation of prophylaxis may render shorter prophylaxis durations ineffective. Eight weeks' prophylaxis substantially reduced peak absenteeism under a broad range of assumptions for severe pandemics (peak absenteeism > 10%). Small investments in treatment and prophylaxis, if adequate and timely, can reduce absenteeism among essential staff.

With the increasing concern of an imminent influenza pandemic, Singapore and many other countries have been developing preparedness plans. Influenza affects an estimated 20 percent of the population of Singapore annually, and local outbreaks can last for more than 12 weeks and occur at different periods of the year. The 1968 pandemic in Singapore had a clinical attack rate of about 20 percent and resulted in infections with fever that lasted up to five days. However, absenteeism from work due to seasonal influenza-like illnesses was estimated to be less than one day per person in Singapore. The next pandemic in Singapore is predicted to cause an average of 1,105 deaths and 3,338 hospitalisations, while a severe pandemic will cause more healthcare damage. Preventive strategies include national public health initiatives, vaccination, anti-viral therapy, and hygiene measures. To develop effective preparedness plans, it is important for healthcare workers to understand the disease's epidemiology, outcomes, and treatment and prevention strategies available.

Background: The main objective of this study is to apply autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models to make real-time predictions on the number of beds occupied in Tan Tock Seng Hospital, during the recent SARS outbreak., Methods: This is a retrospective study design. Hospital admission and occupancy data for isolation beds was collected from Tan Tock Seng hospital for the period 14th March 2003 to 31st May 2003. The main outcome measure was daily number of isolation beds occupied by SARS patients. Among the covariates considered were daily number of people screened, daily number of people admitted (including observation, suspect and probable cases) and days from the most recent significant event discovery. We utilized the following strategy for the analysis. Firstly, we split the outbreak data into two. Data from 14th March to 21st April 2003 was used for model development. We used structural ARIMA models in an attempt to model the number of beds occupied. Estimation is via the maximum likelihood method using the Kalman filter. For the ARIMA model parameters, we considered the simplest parsimonious lowest order model., Results: We found that the ARIMA (1,0,3) model was able to describe and predict the number of beds occupied during the SARS outbreak well. The mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) for the training set and validation set were 5.7% and 8.6% respectively, which we found was reasonable for use in the hospital setting. Furthermore, the model also provided three-day forecasts of the number of beds required. Total number of admissions and probable cases admitted on the previous day were also found to be independent prognostic factors of bed occupancy., Conclusion: ARIMA models provide useful tools for administrators and clinicians in planning for real-time bed capacity during an outbreak of an infectious disease such as SARS. The model could well be used in planning for bed-capacity during outbreaks of other infectious diseases as well.