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As ecologic, social, and economic conditions continue to facilitate the emergence and transmission of infectious diseases, local health department workers' willingness to respond will remain vital to the United States' ability to recognize and respond to new and emerging disease threats. As demonstrated by heavy occupational morbidity and mortality associated with the 2014 Ebola outbreak, infectious disease response can pose serious risks to the health workforce and presents many ethical and logistical challenges. To explore willingness to respond to an infectious disease outbreak among local health departments-the hub of the public health emergency preparedness system-we conducted focus groups with 46 local health department staff attending 2 national conferences. We examined perspectives from our participants on how local health department employees learn about and articulate their professional commitment to the department, the ways in which local health department leaders support local health department employees in responding to an outbreak, and how local health department staff articulate their responsibilities to their families. We conclude with a proposal for how a web of ethical commitments likely influences willingness to respond. These commitments and their relationship to willingness to respond should be explored further.

According to the Institute of Medicine, the local health department workforce is at the hub of the public health emergency preparedness system. A growing body of research has pointed to troubling attitudinal gaps among local health department workers, a vital response cohort, regarding willingness to respond to emergent infectious disease threats, ranging from naturally occurring pandemics to bioterrorism events. A summary of relevant literature on the empirical evidence, ethical norms, and legal standards applicable to the willingness of public health professionals to respond to an infectious disease emergency is presented. Recommendations are proposed for future work to be done to bring the relevant empirical, ethical, and legal considerations together to develop practical guidance for the local response to infectious disease emergencies.

Objectives: The aim of this study was to characterize the public health emergency perceptions and willingness to respond (WTR) of hospital-based pediatric staff and to use these findings to propose a methodology for developing an institution-specific training package to improve response willingness., Methods: A prospective anonymous web-based survey was conducted at the Johns Hopkins Hospital, including the 180-bed Johns Hopkins Children's Center, between January and March 2009. In this survey, participants' attitudes/beliefs regarding emergency response to a pandemic influenza and a radiological dispersal device (RDD or "dirty bomb") event were assessed., Results: Of the 1,620 eligible pediatric staff 246 replies (15.2 percent response rate) were received, compared with an overall staff response rate of 18.4 percent. Characteristics of respondent demographics and professions were similar to those of overall hospital staff. Self-reported WTR was greater for a pandemic influenza than for an RDD event if required (84.6 percent vs 75.1 percent), and if asked, but not required (74.4 percent vs 64.5 percent). The majority of pediatric staff were not confident in their safety at work (pandemic influenza: 51.8 percent and RDD: 76.6 percent), were far less likely to respond if personal protective equipment was unavailable (pandemic influenza: 33.5 percent and RDD: 21.6percent), and wanted furtherpre-event preparation and training (pandemic influenza: 89.6 percent and RDD: 82.6 percent). The following six distinct perceived attitudes / beliefs were identified as having institution-specific high impact on response willingness: colleague response, skill mastery, safety getting to work, safety at work, ability to perform duties, and individual response efficacy., Conclusions: Children represent a uniquely vulnerable population in public health emergencies, and pediatric hospital staff accordingly represent a vital subset of responders distinguished by specialized education, training, clinical skills, and disaster competencies. Even though the majority of pediatric hospital staff report WTR, nearly 15 percent for a pandemic influenza emergency and 25 percent for an RDD event would not respond if required. Other institutions can apply the methodology used here to identify particularly influential response willingness modifiers for pediatric care providers. These insights can inform customized preparedness training for pediatric healthcare workers, through identification of high-impact attitudes/beliefs, and training initiatives focused on addressing these modifiers.

Background: Hospital-based providers' willingness to report to work during an influenza pandemic is a critical yet under-studied phenomenon. Witte's Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) has been shown to be useful for understanding adaptive behavior of public health workers to an unknown risk, and thus offers a framework for examining scenario-specific willingness to respond among hospital staff., Methods: We administered an anonymous online EPPM-based survey about attitudes/beliefs toward emergency response, to all 18,612 employees of the Johns Hopkins Hospital from January to March 2009. Surveys were completed by 3426 employees (18.4%), approximately one third of whom were health professionals., Results: Demographic and professional distribution of respondents was similar to all hospital staff. Overall, more than one-in-four (28%) hospital workers indicated they were not willing to respond to an influenza pandemic scenario if asked but not required to do so. Only an additional 10% were willing if required. One-third (32%) of participants reported they would be unwilling to respond in the event of a more severe pandemic influenza scenario. These response rates were consistent across different departments, and were one-third lower among nurses as compared with physicians. Respondents who were hesitant to agree to work additional hours when required were 17 times less likely to respond during a pandemic if asked. Sixty percent of the workers perceived their peers as likely to report to work in such an emergency, and were ten times more likely than others to do so themselves. Hospital employees with a perception of high efficacy had 5.8 times higher declared rates of willingness to respond to an influenza pandemic., Conclusions: Significant gaps exist in hospital workers' willingness to respond, and the EPPM is a useful framework to assess these gaps. Several attitudinal indicators can help to identify hospital employees unlikely to respond. The findings point to certain hospital-based communication and training strategies to boost employees' response willingness, including promoting pre-event plans for home-based dependents; ensuring adequate supplies of personal protective equipment, vaccines and antiviral drugs for all hospital employees; and establishing a subjective norm of awareness and preparedness.

In April 2009, the World Health Organization announced the emergence of a novel influenza A(H1N1-09) virus and in June 2009 declared the outbreak a pandemic. The value of military structures in responding to pandemic influenza has become widely acknowledged in recent years. In 2005, the Israeli Government appointed the Ministry of Defense to be in charge of national preparedness and response for a severe pandemic influenza scenario. The Israeli case offers a unique example of civilian-defense partnership where the interface between the governmental, military and civilian spheres has formed a distinctive structure. The Israeli pandemic preparedness protocols represent an example of a collaboration in which aspects of an inherently medical problem can be managed by the defense sector. Although distinctive concepts of the model are not applicable to all countries, it offers a unique forum for governments and international agencies to evaluate this interface within the context of pandemic influenza.

Effective Department of Defense (DoD) response to pandemic influenza requires robust and well-exercised plans at the installation level. This article describes proceedings and key findings from a half-day "train-the-trainer" pandemic influenza tabletop exercise for Tri-Service installation public health emergency officers (PHEOs) at the August 2008 Force Health Protection conference. Exercise participants were expected to facilitate the execution of a pandemic influenza exercise at their respective installations within 6 months of attendance. On a 6-month follow-up survey (N= 50), 68% indicated their installations had since created a new pandemic influenza plan or revised an existing one, whereas 44% indicated that their installation had since conducted a pandemic influenza exercise. Chief reported barriers to conducting installation-level pandemic influenza exercises included competing priorities, followed by time, personnel, and budget limitations. Relevant policy implications for installation-level pandemic influenza readiness include access to higher level plans, strategic utilization of assets to optimize surge capacity, and cross-training of personnel.

Objectives: We conducted a survey of corporate preparedness for pandemic influenza among biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies in Montgomery County, Maryland, to determine the level of preparedness for this industry and geographic region., Methods: The survey, based on the HHS Business Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist, established whether a company had a preparedness plan specific to pandemic influenza, the contents of its plan, or its reasons for a lack of a plan., Results: A total of 50 companies participated in the survey. Of these, 40 did not have any type of preparedness plan, 3 were drafting plans, 6 had general preparedness plans that could be applied to an influenza pandemic, and only 1 company had a preparedness plan specifically designed to address pandemic influenza., Conclusions: Biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies in this geographic region are currently not well prepared for pandemic influenza. Public health officials should offer more help, possibly in the form of a model small business preparedness plan, and collaboration between companies should be encouraged to foster sharing of preparedness plans.

Background: Current national preparedness plans require local health departments to play an integral role in responding to an influenza pandemic, a major public health threat that the World Health Organization has described as "inevitable and possibly imminent". To understand local public health workers' perceptions toward pandemic influenza response, we surveyed 308 employees at three health departments in Maryland from March-July 2005, on factors that may influence their ability and willingness to report to duty in such an event., Results: The data suggest that nearly half of the local health department workers are likely not to report to duty during a pandemic. The stated likelihood of reporting to duty was significantly greater for clinical (Multivariate OR: 2.5; CI 1.3-4.7) than technical and support staff, and perception of the importance of one's role in the agency's overall response was the single most influential factor associated with willingness to report (Multivariate OR: 9.5; CI 4.6-19.9)., Conclusion: The perceived risk among public health workers was shown to be associated with several factors peripheral to the actual hazard of this event. These risk perception modifiers and the knowledge gaps identified serve as barriers to pandemic influenza response and must be specifically addressed to enable effective local public health response to this significant threat.

State and local health departments continue to face unprecedented challenges in preparing for, recognizing, and responding to threats to the public's health. The attacks of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing anthrax mailings of 2001 highlighted the public health readiness and response hurdles posed by intentionally caused injury and illness. At the same time, recent natural disasters have highlighted the need for comparable public health readiness and response capabilities. Public health readiness and response activities can be conceptualized similarly for intentional attacks, natural disasters, and human-caused accidents. Consistent with this view, the federal government has adopted the all-hazards response model as its fundamental paradigm. Adoption of this paradigm provides powerful improvements in efficiency and efficacy, because it reduces the need to create a complex family of situation-specific preparedness and response activities. However, in practice, public health preparedness requires additional models and tools to provide a framework to better understand and prioritize emergency readiness and response needs, as well as to facilitate solutions; this is particularly true at the local health department level. Here, we propose to extend the use of the Haddon matrix--a conceptual model used for more than two decades in injury prevention and response strategies--for this purpose.

Background and Objectives During an evolving public health crisis, news organizations disseminate information rapidly, much of which is uncertain, dynamic, and difficult to verify. We examine factors related to international news coverage of H1N1 during the first month after the outbreak in late April 2009 and consider the news media's role as an information source during an emerging pandemic. Methods Data on H1N1 news were compiled in real time from newspaper websites across twelve countries between April 29, 2009 and May 28, 2009. A news sample was purposively constructed to capture variation in countries' prior experience with avian influenza outbreaks and pandemic preparation efforts. We analyzed the association between H1N1 news volume and four predictor variables: geographic region, prior experience of a novel flu strain ( H5N1), existence of a national pandemic plan, and existence of a localized H1N1 outbreak. Results H1N1 news was initially extensive but declined rapidly ( OR = 0·85, P < .001). Pandemic planning did not predict newsworthiness. However, countries with prior avian flu experience had higher news volume ( OR = 1·411, P < .05), suggesting that H1N1 newsworthiness was bolstered by past experiences. The proportion of H1N1 news was significantly lower in Europe than elsewhere ( OR = 0·388, P < 0·05). Finally, coverage of H1N1 increased after a first in-country case ( OR = 1·415, P < .01), interrupting the pattern of coverage decline. Conclusions Findings demonstrate the enhanced newsworthiness of localized threats, even during an emerging pandemic. We discuss implications for news media's role in effective public health communication throughout an epidemic given the demonstrated precipitous decline in news interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]