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Democratic backsliding and autocratisation tendencies raise the question of what liberal democracy can do to defend itself. Of particular concern are populists, who are often perceived to have an ambiguous commitment to the principles of liberal democracy. The defence of liberal democracy has often been conceived in legal terms, for example, with party bans and propaganda restrictions. However, legal means are criticized for being elitist because they are directed against irrational and emotionally driven masses and because they allegedly violate the very values that they are supposed to protect by limiting the democratic freedom of some groups. Instead, critics have proposed cultural and socio-economic means as non-elitist and non-exclusionary alternatives more in line with the values of democracy. This article discusses whether the employment of cultural and socio-economic means against groups – in casu populists – who are perceived as a challenge to liberal democracy can avoid the charge of elitism and exclusion by analysing whether these means are consistent with the publicity constraint. It finds that the use of education and money to defend democracy against such groups relies on a form of elitism and exclusion similar to the one that the defence by legal means is charged with. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The organisation of populist radical right parties significantly shapes their long-term electoral success. Within this party family, great organisational variation can be found, with the "Alternative for Germany" (AfD) representing a least-likely case: in terms of candidate selection (CS), it ranks much higher on democracy scales than the other Bundestag parties. This paper explores the reasons for this high level of intra-party democracy (IPD) by focusing on three explanatory dimensions: ideology, institutionalisation, and party unity. Methodologically, we apply multivariate analyses of representative quantitative data collected among AfD members in CS prior to the 2017 federal election. The results show that high political dissatisfaction and low levels of institutionalisation are important drivers of inclusive CS procedures. Overall, the article provides a deeper understanding of the underlying attitudes for the AfD's inclusive IPD, and offers substantial theoretical and empirical implications for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the empirical relationship between local economic conditions, social capital, and individual characteristics on the one hand and satisfaction with democracy on the other hand, using detailed information from the German Socio-Economic Panel. In contrast to previous literature, we focus on economic conditions at the state level instead of the national one. We find that local economic conditions, proxies of social capital, and individual characteristics (e.g., risk attitude, reciprocity, past unemployment experience) are important correlates of satisfaction with democracy and that some heterogeneity between genders, West and East Germany, and people with and without college degree exists in the data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I compare Christopher Lasch's thought to specific features that research in political science attributes to contemporary populism. Lasch openly favoured a historical form of populism but is rarely considered when current forms of populism are discussed. The research literature characterizes populism as superficially tied to democracy while undermining it, as committed to the moral binary of people and elites, and as intellectually "thin" because it does not engage with the complex theories that ground other ideologies. These characters make populism incoherent and inimical to democracy. Lasch manifests all three characters while connecting them to a sustained worldview. Humans' awareness of death is the core feature that makes them rational, ethical and equal. Attempts to dilute that awareness are inimical to the equality at democracy's basis. Experts and professionals encourage this dilution by promising remedies and progress. Democracy depends on ordinary people who resist elites and their complex phraseologies. Résumé: Je compare la pensée de Christopher Lasch aux caractéristiques spécifiques que la recherche en sciences politiques attribue au populisme contemporain. Lasch a ouvertement favorisé une forme historique de populisme, mais il est rarement pris en compte lorsque l'on discute des formes actuelles de populisme. La littérature caractérise le populisme comme étant superficiellement lié à la démocratie tout en la minant, comme étant engagé dans la binaire morale du peuple et des élites, et comme étant intellectuellement « mince » parce qu'il ne s'engage pas dans les théories complexes qui fondent d'autres idéologies. Ces personnages rendent le populisme incohérent et hostile à la démocratie. Lasch manifeste ces trois caractères tout en les reliant à une vision du monde durable. La conscience de la mort chez les humains est la caractéristique essentielle qui les rend rationnels, éthiques et égaux. Les tentatives de dilution de cette conscience vont à l'encontre de l'égalité qui est à la base de la démocratie. Les experts et les professionnels encouragent cette dilution en promettant des remèdes et des progrès. La démocratie dépend des gens ordinaires qui résistent aux élites et à leurs phraséologies complexes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of World Medical & Health Policy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper explores a little-studied side of populist radical right (PRR) mainstreaming: if and to what extent these parties are considered to be legitimate democratic players by voters. Using survey data from Italy, we find that both Brothers of Italy (FdI) and the League are perceived as threats to democracy by specific groups of voters, although the former raises more widespread concern than the latter. Additionally, this perception is not uniform at the mass level. Surprisingly, an uneven pattern also characterises the reciprocal views of the two PRR parties: FdI is considered to be a threat to democracy by the League's sympathisers, but the opposite does not occur. This suggests that even in contexts where PRR politics has been normalised for decades, as in Italy, different PRR parties can be perceived very differently by voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How much do citizens support artificial intelligence (AI) in government and politics at different levels of decision‐making authority and to what extent is this AI support associated with citizens' conceptions of democracy? Using original survey data from Germany, the analysis shows that people are overall sceptical toward using AI in the political realm. The findings suggest that how much citizens endorse democracy as liberal democracy as opposed to several of its disfigurations matters for AI support, but only in high‐level politics. While a stronger commitment to liberal democracy is linked to lower support for AI, the findings contradict the idea that a technocratic notion of democracy lies behind greater acceptance of political AI uses. Acceptance is higher only among those holding reductionist conceptions of democracy which embody the idea that whatever works to accommodate people's views and preferences is fine. Populists, in turn, appear to be against AI in political decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to the contemporary problematic of populism and associated reactionary right-wing politics, this paper argues for a greater analytic focus on the role of schools and teacher expertise in understanding the social relations of populism. This conceptual paper builds a conjunctural conceptualisation of populism that understands it as an invariable political modality of modern democracies, mobilised to different political ends. Extending this analysis, I explore the ways in which schools and teacher expertise lie at the heart of the populist tension between the 'expert' and the 'layperson'. The social relationships to knowledge and knowledge-making institutions are fundamental to populism as well as the hierarchies of being understood (or not) as a 'knower' capable of truth-claims in modern liberal democracies. I conclude by arguing the need to engage in the social relations of 'popular' and 'expert' knowledge claims and the politics that underlie them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political group formation in the European Parliament (EP) after European elections is a core feature of supranational party politics. The research objective of this article is to scrutinise democratic practices and the role of values, more specifically gender equality, in this political group formation. Complementing extant literature, this article engages with gendered political group formation as a dynamic process consisting of three intertwined layers, which are assessed by analysing formal and informal institutions around democracy and gender. The article draws on a unique data set of 130 interviews with MEPs, political group and parliamentary staff conducted in 2018–2020. The key findings of the article show that gender plays a role in each layer of political group formation, yet there are clear differences between political groups. By deciphering the reasons behind these differences, the article enhances the understanding of the political dynamics and struggles within the political groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a rising number of countries, populist parties participate in coalition governments. While there exists a consensus that populism is incompatible with core tenets of liberal democracy on a conceptual level, we know much less about whether or not the participation of populist parties in government constitutes a threat to liberal democracy in practice. We study the impact of populist parties in coalition governments using a novel dataset of more than 2000 laws that were under review at the Austrian Constitutional Court between 1980 and 2021. We provide evidence that the court did not find laws passed by governments that included a populist party unconstitutional more often than those passed by non‐populist governments. Our findings indicate that the Austrian Freedom Party did moderate its policy while in office. The results imply that it is necessary to distinguish policy positions in party manifestos and party rhetoric from policies actually implemented by governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how mainstream news organizations in Brazil have tweeted about Jair Bolsonaro, investigating to what extent they may (voluntarily or not) amplify the visibility of populist leaders. We also scrutinize the levels of audience engagement with posts mentioning the President. Our empirical design comprises a content analysis of 128,096 tweets published throughout 2019 by Folha de S. Paulo, O Estado de S. Paulo, and O Globo. The results reveal that such newspapers focused on controversies and negative issues involving Bolsonaro, while posts addressing public policies did not achieve high visibility or engagement. The article also discusses to what degree the newspapers may be taking advantage of users' preferences for content with populist features to reinforce their watchdog role and boost audience ratings. Our findings also contribute to understanding how populist leaders and media organizations can build a mutually beneficial relationship, even though they publicly claim to oppose each other. Finally, the paper suggests new hypotheses to be explored, such as the argument that quality papers may be loosening the division between news and opinion when using social media to satisfy audience niches in polarized environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, the rapid emergence of new political leaders capturing growing social discontent with populist promises has highlighted elements of the internal fragility of democracy. Schumpeter predicts such fragility in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, where, in analyzing thse "competitive struggle for the popular vote," he makes two assumptions that reverse the classical model of rational decision-making: the limited use of "conscious rationality" by voters and the potential unfairness of political leaders. These two elements introduce systematic distortions into the process of collective decision-making in democracy, suggesting a possible explanation for the rise of populism. Based on delegation, representative democracy must function despite the small amount of intellectual effort that most citizens put into forming their political opinions. Ideologies have historically functioned as implicit heuristics, allowing citizens to evaluate political facts, shape their expectations, and simplify political reasoning; as such, they have been the tools used by parties to give credibility to their programs while at the same time affiliating and polarizing the electorate. While they continue to serve as anchors for defining political identity, today's ideologies are fragmented and therefore less effective in supporting long-term programs and retaining voters; thus, keeping voters close to their political affiliation requires massive use of the media, and for emerging parties lacking strong identitarian values, a short-term political offer becomes less risky than formulating long-term political strategies. At the same time, the decline of classical ideologies makes any political commitment to long-term perspectives hardly credible to the electorate. This leads to an adverse selection process in which populist programs have a better chance of success than long-term policy programs. As a result, the role of the political leader as an entrepreneur is severely weakened. The competition for votes becomes unfair (since it is not based on the quality or plausibility of policy results), while at the same time the process of polarization disrupts the elements of mediation. The result is a process of democratic backsliding that can ultimately lead to a loss of trust in democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By differentiating the dynamics of leader democracy from those of populist leadership, this paper provides a political-sociological theoretical framework that can identify the ideal-types of the personalisation of leadership in advanced democracies. In the first part, the article develops the main features of leader democracy from the perspective of democratic elitism, highlighting how process does not entail a partyless democracy. The second part focuses on the disintermediation process in populist leadership, which is presented as a particular form of plebiscitary politics. The proposed theoretical framework diverges from the stream of the literature on populism, which tends to equate populist leadership with charismatic leadership. Furthermore, the article points out the substantial differences between the personalisation of the populist and charismatic leadership styles by comparing the key issues of populism and charisma in the processes of personalisation thus proposing an interpretative framework to resolve the contradictions among the dominant interpretative frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Modern Italian Studies is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How do we theorize the unexpected global trend of democratic regression? Building upon recent literature on backsliding, we offer a new conceptualization of the notion of democratic authoritarianism, denoting the use of democratic-looking institutions for the expansion of authoritarian forms of power across different regime types, democratic and authoritarian. Whereas existing accounts of autocratization focus overwhelmingly on the executive, we outline democratic authoritarianism as a broader process involving mechanisms of institutional and ideational capture, which may be initiated and implemented by executives, legislatures, judiciaries as well as non-state organizations, often acting in tandem. Our notion of democratic authoritarianism can explain autocratization in states with both strong and weak elected executives; it recognizes the role of anti-pluralist ideologies and civil society organizations in enabling autocratization. We illustrate our argument through a comparative analysis of contemporary South Asia, which we argue illustrates different variants of democratic authoritarianism. Through detailed case studies of India and Pakistan since 2014, we show that South Asia is significant for understandings of autocratization, notably, the range of instruments deployed and the different stages of democratic authoritarianism, the interplay between state and societal institutions, and the limits of commonly suggested remedies, notably empowering the judiciary and civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study tests the explanatory strength of the party-centered theory of electoral campaign professionalism. The theory was previously subject to testing in various types of elections during the first decade of the new millennium, covering Germany, Austria, Sweden, and Finland. Nevertheless, empirical research in this field has been on hold for almost a decade, obstructing the development of the theory during a time when politics and political campaigns have taken new paths. In this article, the theory is revisited, presenting results from a unique time series study covering 48 party campaigns between 2009 and 2019 in three consecutive European parliamentary elections in two multiparty democracies, Sweden and Finland. Our results provide weak support for the party-centered theory of campaign professionalism in the form it was originally operationalized. Only a centralized party organization and a large support base with a catch-all strategy were found to be statistically significant predictors of campaign professionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research dealing with citizens' preferences for different conceptions of democracy has grown and diversified greatly. This has resulted in a highly fragmented field in which empirical evidence cannot easily be integrated into a consistent larger picture. This systematic review takes stock of this research to uncover the roots of existing inconsistencies and to show how future research can avoid them. It maps three decades of research regarding conceptualizations and measurement approaches that have been chosen to study citizens' preferences for democracy. By systematically carving out the variation in the chosen approaches, the review shows why existing research can hardly add up to a clear diagnosis regarding what kind of democracy citizens prefer. A critical discussion based on this review highlights that cumulative research will require a stronger conceptual and methodological integration between different strands in the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neoliberalism and authoritarianism are intimately connected, as is demonstrated by the existence of a growing body of literature on 'authoritarian neoliberalism'. This article provides a taxonomy of authoritarian neoliberalism and claims that it appears in three varieties – technocracy, populist nationalism, and traditional authoritarianism. Also, it proposes both an overview of the varieties and an analysis of three states as case studies. States are investigated as actors which strongly contribute to the neoliberal project amidst a more complex process of multilocalized and variegated neoliberalizations, which have to be incorporated into the comparative research. First, Italy is studied as a consolidated Western democracy which has been often governed by technocrats, independent, non-party professionals who have recurrently been in power since the 1990s, and within the frame of an increasingly technocratic European Union. Second, the paper concentrates on Hungary, a semi-peripheral Central European country which has become an epitome of a populist nationalism with increasingly authoritarian traits. Third, the paper focuses on Kazakhstan, a former Soviet Union republic with no significant experience of liberal democracy before independence, and a key example of the 'traditional authoritarian' variety. The three varieties, however, are sometimes combined and coexisting, and their evolution will be decisive for the future of capitalism and liberal democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What happens to the anti-establishment sentiments of pro-incumbent voters for a populist force that is in government and thus controls the political system? This article examines this question utilizing the case of Turkey, a country in which a populist force has been in power for more than a decade. By analyzing populist attitudes among a nationally representative sample, we demonstrate that while the voters of the incumbent populist party (AKP) are less likely, compared to everyone else, to hold populist sentiments, the same voters are also substantially more likely to endorse conspiracy theories that center on malign foreign powers. This finding is relevant beyond Turkey, because it demonstrates that populist forces might be able to maintain popular support and thus stay in power for a long stretch of time by employing government propaganda to fuel an antagonism against conspiratorial foreign and global forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Desafíos is the property of Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Senora del Rosario and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Editorials are a political force used by news media to fulfil its watchdog function in fragile democracies like the Philippines. However, they also serve as a platform to invite a more positive reading of strongman administration. Against the backdrop of media populism, the article will problematize how the Fourth Estate articulates its political stance by examining the tensions and complexities in editorials. It will highlight the ways the media deals with subjects and stories surrounding Rodrigo Duterte. Through an analysis of editorials of four leading dominant news outlets (Bulletin, Inquirer, Rappler, and Star), three meta-thematic categories of media frames are uncovered. First, character degradation frames delineate how the media denounces the ties of Duterte with other political actors, particularly the Marcoses and China's Xi. Second, pro-establishment frames echo the optimistic mantra of the government amid crisis. And third, non-editorial frames exhibit the failure of media to publish watchdog-inspired editorials. Each of these categories has underlying frames that are indicative of the democratic potential, or lack thereof, of news media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populism – which positions a 'true people' in opposition to a corrupt elite – is often contrasted with liberalism. This article initially outlines the incompatibility between populism and normative theories of political liberalism. It argues that populism is an unreasonable form of politics by liberals' standards because: it unfairly excludes those who are not deemed to be part of the true 'people'; and it is objectionably anti-pluralist in the way that it assumes unity amongst the 'people'. Despite this, it is hard to derive specific duties to contain or challenge populism per se from a liberal perspective, though such a duty might be present for some forms of contemporary right-wing populism that combine populism with illiberal goals. Underpinning this view is a belief that many populist movements articulate grievances that are at least somewhat legitimate. The article concludes by arguing that there might be circumstances where a populist movement could, against this backdrop of injustice, advance the liberal cause. However, this is not because there are ways of dissolving the tension between political liberalism and populism, but because political liberals might be justified in violating the regulatory norms that they believe ought to govern politics in some, exceptional, circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European democracies have experienced drastic changes in electoral competition. Voter support for insider parties that have traditionally governed has declined while support for radical and populist parties has increased. Simultaneously, citizens' declining political trust has become a concern, as confidence in political institutions and actors is low across numerous countries. Interestingly, the linkage between political trust and support for insider parties has not been empirically established but deduced from the fact that outsider parties are often supported by dissatisfied citizens. We address this gap adopting both an institutional- and an actor-centered approach by investigating whether trust in parliaments and in parties is associated with the electoral performance of insider parties on the aggregate level. Combining different data sources in a novel way, we apply time-series cross-section models to a dataset containing 30 countries and 137 elections from 1998 to 2018. Our results show that when political trust is low, particularly institutional trust, insider parties receive less electoral support. Hence, we provide empirical evidence that decreasing levels of political trust are the downfall of insider parties, thereby opening a window of opportunity for challenging outsider parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Right-wing populism in Poland faces multiple challenges with respect to Religious Education. This is a complex issue, given it is not only about school education supporting pro-democratic positions in the modern generation of students, but also the fact that today's populists have participated in long-term and complex educational processes of a similar nature. In this sense, the aim of this article is to seek an answer to the question of how Religious Education in Poland—with all of its theoretical and cognitive background rooted in the Christian vision of God and human and the world—can contribute to the elimination of the alliance of the right-wing populist perspectives from the dominant religion of the nation. The article will explain how practical educational opportunities will help students to understand the political strategy of populists, decipher their presentations and approaches, and so shape a positive attitude towards democracy as a desired ideological system within government and social life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technocratic cabinets and expert, non-political ministers appointed in otherwise partisan cabinets have become a common reality in recent decades in young and older democracies, but we know little about how citizens see this change and what values, perceptions and experiences drive their attitudes towards technocratic government. The article explores the latter topic by drawing on recent comparative survey data from nine countries, both young and consolidated democracies from Europe and Latin America. Two individual-level characteristics trigger particularly strong support for the replacement of politicians with experts: low political efficacy and authoritarian values. They are complemented by a third, somewhat weaker factor: corruption perception. At the macro level, technocracy appeals to citizens of countries where the quality of democracy is deficient and where technocratic cabinets are a part of historical legacy. Surprisingly, civic activism and, partially, satisfaction with democracy enhance technocratic orientation, indicating such attitudes are not expressions of alienation or depoliticisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Archives of Criminology / Archiwum Kryminologii is the property of Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Legal Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this research constructivist grounded theory was used to explore the style and content of 300 posts on the subject of democracy on the Facebook pages of the main political parties in Poland. Analysis of the data, collected from 2016 to mid-2017, resulted in the construction of two typologies that identify distinct rhetorical and thematic types of popular political discourse. In stark contrast to previous forecasts of the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy in Eastern Europe, Polish netizens' conceptualisation of democracy is often procedural, tribal and majoritarianist. Furthermore, a comparison of such social media posts with diverse pronouncements of leading politicians reveals that popular discourse on democracy is largely generated and shaped top-down by the country's political elite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relation between journalists and politicians in liberal democracies is traditionally conceptualized as highly institutionalized, based on mutual dependence, and grounded in a shared culture of jointly respected role relations. While this conceptualization provides a fruitful framework to understand the relation between mainstream journalists and politicians, it falls short in explaining the way outsider politicians such as Beppe Grillo, Donald Trump, Thierry Baudet, or Nigel Farage address the mainstream media. Thus, this article rethinks the relation between journalists and politicians in the light of the Western political-media environment in the 2010s, where the rise of authoritarian populism, the fragmentation of media audiences, and the fading boundaries around the journalistic profession have substantially changed media–politics relations. This article aims to make a theoretical contribution by conceptualizing the relation between outsider politicians and mainstream journalists as an ongoing negotiation over legitimacy. Central in this conceptualization is a classification of five strategies which outsider politicians use to delegitimize mainstream journalists: attacking their character, connecting them with other institutions which are seen as illegitimate, attacking their ethical standards, challenging the claim that journalists work in the public interest, and questioning the beneficial consequences of their work. The consequences of these delegitimation strategies are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The EU's identity is said to shape its role as a 'normative actor' promoting universal democratic values, including to its neighbourhood. Yet a competing civilizationist version of European identity – increasingly invoked on the radical right – frames Europe as representing 'Judeo-Christian' values in opposition to non-European cultures, especially Islam. This paper argues that these identity variations shape divergent responses to foreign policy challenges, by showing the growing influence of civilizationist discourse on European attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian arena. The paper focuses on Austria's 2017–2019 ÖVP-FPÖ coalition to identity links between rising civilizationist politics and significant policy shifts regarding the Israeli-Palestinian arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Marmara University Social Sciences Institute / Öneri is the property of Marmara University, Institute of Social Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Several Radical Right (RR) parties have called for referendums challenging European institutions, unpopular elites, and immigration, but do their voters support the use of referendums in general and do Radical Left (RL) voters also share preferences for these instruments? Combining data on twenty-six European countries from the 2012 ESS and the 2017 Polpart survey, we demonstrate that both RR and RL voters score higher on referendum support than moderate voters, with RR voters scoring the highest. However, the differences between voter groups are more characteristic of Western than Eastern European countries and the link between RR voting and referendum support is weaker in countries where these parties are more electorally successful. In a second analysis on five Western European countries from the 2017 Polpart Survey, we investigate individual-level explanations for the association between radical voting and referendum support, demonstrating that anti-elitism is the most important attitude linking RR voters to referendum support whereas income redistribution is the most important attitude linking RL voters to referendum support. Even when controlling for all possible explanations, we find that radical voters are still more favorable towards direct democracy than moderate voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By considering the Facebook activity of 52 party leaders during national election campaigns held in 18 Western democracies that went to the polls between 2013 and 2017, we study users' engagement with popularization and with populist leaders. Applying negative binomial hierarchical models on original data of party leaders' Facebook pages, we find that elements of popularization in leaders' posts are associated with an increase in users' acknowledgement (number of likes), decreases in redistribution (number of shares), while they do not affect discursive interactions (number of comments). Our research also shows that, irrespective of their content, messages published by populist leaders are more capable of increasing both acknowledgement and redistribution, while they do not generate more comments than those published by non-populists. Finally, we find that when populist leaders adopt popularization as a communicative style, they do not achieve any extra gain vis-a-vis non-populist actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Great Recession started in the late 2000s, the European Union (EU) has experienced an acute crisis that has triggered internal divisions among EU members. Three factors can help shed light on this tendency towards political fragmentation: economics and finance, culture, and territory. Each of these reveals a specific 'geography', in terms of policies and narratives, of the current malaise regarding the EU project and the limits of the Union in addressing issues important for the domestic debates of its members. Such discontent, as well as anti-EU sentiment, fuels strong political reactions including populism and anti-elitism that could further fragment the EU in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A crisis of representation has precipitated a surge in support for populist radical right (PRR) parties that challenge the existing model of representative democracy. Simultaneously, institutional reforms across Western Europe have sought to improve the input-legitimacy of local democracy with a proliferation of direct and participatory democratic methods. This paper investigates the extent to which PRR parties advance a populist democratic agenda when in leadership of the executive at the local level of government. Previous work on the subject of PRR parties in power has neglected the sub-national perspective, despite the increasing congruence between populist demands for a more direct linkage of politics to the people and this institutional environment. An exploration of three cases of PRR party-led local government in Italy, Austria and Switzerland enables a comparison of their governing behaviour, its ideological content and democratic consequences, through qualitative content analysis of referendums, policies and council resolutions. This paper finds they do little to promote popular sovereignty through participatory forms of governance at the expense of representative democracy in local government. However, when in local government environments with higher executive autonomy, PRR parties emphasise a more direct (plebiscitarian) linkage between the executive and the 'people', who are increasingly represented in nativist terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That political parties are in a deep crisis is nothing new. The number of works foreseeing the decline of representative democracy is copious. However, studies that empirically examine the relationship between support for anti-political-establishment parties and liberal democracy are almost a rara avis. This article tries to fill a gap in the literature by answering this essential, and notably current, research question. In order to do so, it makes use of an original dataset looking at 28 European countries from 1950 until 2017. Our results show that the relationship between the share of votes for anti-establishment parties and the level of liberal democracy is negative and significant: that is, the higher the strength of these parties, the lower the level of liberal democracy. This study definitively sheds some new light on the perils of populist parties for the survival of liberal democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, an assessment of the sovereignism- populism linkage is offered, moving from the main findings emerged in the contributions to this special issue. The sovereignism- populism linkage is seen as a challenge for comparative politics: on the one hand, the copious literature already developed, particularly in the specific field of populist parties, offers a broad set of findings and stimuli. On the other hand, the huge application (and the abuse) of the concept of populism, which has been associated to a number of very different phenomena, make the discussion on its relationships with cognate concepts more and more difficult. The article offers a first attempt to review the knowledge on the sovereignism-populism linkage, defining a new space for the empirical analysis, and refreshing the research agenda, in particular regarding some classical themes in comparative politics like the 'sustainability' of political elites and the crisis of representative institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between Party Democracy and Citizen Democracy: As a response to the perceived legitimacy crisis that threatens modern democracies, local government has increasingly become a laboratory for democratic renewal and citizen participation. This article studies whether and why local party chairs support democratic innovations fostering more citizen participation. More specifically, we analyse the relative weight of ideas, interests and institutions in explaining their support for citizen-centred democracy. Based on the Belgian Local Chairs Survey in 2018 (albeit restricting our analysis to Flanders), the central finding is that ideas matter more than interests and institutions. Ideology is alive and kicking with regard to democratic innovation, with socialist and ecologist parties and populist parties being most supportive of participatory arrangements. By contrast, interests and institutions play, at this stage, a minor role in explaining support for participatory innovations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the recent rise of populist tendencies and their meaning in contemporary democracies within the EU, including Eastern Europe. It stresses the importance of two interrelated and interconnected processes that provide a fertile ground for the emergence of different types of populism – crisis of parliamentary multi-party democracy and pressures of supranational integration and globalisation. Populism has the ambition to address both, to solve the political crisis and defend national sovereignty against globalism by personifying politics as a way of concentrating power. This means a tendency toward a (semi)-authoritarian (but still competitive) regime and state-led capitalism. In addition, new allies and protectors in an emerging new, multi-polar global order and outside of the EU and Western sphere are sought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are populist parties bad for representative democracy or are they filling a representative gap? While it has been broadly established that the emergence and success of populist parties is not merely a sign of protest, there is still a sparsity of empirical investigations into whether these parties represent hitherto under- or unrepresented social groups or whether they offer a policy profile that was in demand but not present. Using Pitkin's concepts of symbolic, descriptive and substantive representation, this article opens up the dimensions in which populist parties might challenge or aid democratic representation. It then places the articles in the Special Issue 'Populist Representation of, by and for the People?' along these dimensions and highlights their specific contributions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Commentators routinely describe "populism" as vague. Some argue that the early US populists, who coined the modern usage, were not populists. We disagree and identify this common conceptual core: the "people" in a moral battle against "elites." The core definition fits all cases of populism: those on the left and right, those in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. In addition to this minimal common core, we identify strongly suggested and frequently correlated non-core characteristics. These include the people's homogeneity and exclusivity, direct rule, and nationalism, as well as a single leader, vilification of vulnerable out-groups, and impatience with deliberation. The US Populist Party and Spain's Podemos Party fit the core definition but have few of the other characteristics. The core can be good for democracy, we argue, while the associated characteristics are often dangerous. Populism in opposition can be good for democracy, while populism in power carries great risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the gap between perceptions of seeing referendums as an important democratic principle, versus perceiving how referendums are used in practice. We term this the "referendum disappointment" gap. We find support for referendums as a democratic principle is strongest among those most disaffected from the political system, and that the disaffected are more likely to perceive they are not given a say via referendums. We also find context-specific effects. Disappointment was greater in countries with higher corruption and income inequality. We also find higher disappointment among right-populist voters, those who distrusted politicians, and among people who viewed themselves at the bottom of society. Overall, these patterns reflect disappointment with democracy among sections of society who have a sense of not being heard that conflicts with how they expect democracy should work in principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically reviews key interdisciplinary research on populism, focusing specifically on its various conceptualisations and the debates occurring within scholarship on its complex relationship with communication, democracy, and truth. These issues have been prone to haphazard analysis, with calls for a more nuanced treatment of the democratic implications of populism. The burgeoning interest in populism, inspired by recent populist success in Europe and North America, has increased focus on the communicative dimensions of populism. Despite this, the paradoxical fact remains that although central to the rise and success of populist actors, research on populist communication has been relatively scarce. It is argued here that populism must be studied from an interdisciplinary perspective and research must privilege its affective, communicative, and performative dimensions. Communication research as a result should not be treated as peripheral, but rather core to understanding populism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Five Star Movement (M5S) formed the Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group when it first elected its members in the European Parliament (EP) in 2014. Two and a half years later, the M5S sought, without success, to leave the Eurosceptics and join the Liberal group. This attempted a change of transnational affiliation is puzzling: why has the M5S tried to leave the Eurosceptic group to ally with the most Europhile group in the EP? How could this U-turn be explained? Relying on several different data – the EUANDI party data set, official EP data, and original interviews with members of the EP – this article provides a systematic answer to these questions. We test three general hypotheses on group membership in the EP, using the M5S as a case study. We show that neither policy congruence nor the pursuit of office fully explains the M5S's observed or attempted alliances. We suggest, instead, that 'domestic politics' is the key driver of the M5S's behaviour in the EP. Political group membership is functional to the Movement's strategic objectives at home. This article shows that national-level explanations of transnational affiliation need to be given more consideration, and highlights the 'second-order' importance of the EU arena with respect to 'first-order' national strategic objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hungary’s political backsliding, which has transformed it from a former frontrunner of liberal democracy in the post-communist region to an illiberal and/or authoritarian state, has puzzled political scientists. As a contribution to understanding the problem of Viktor Orbán’s leadership and the regime change, we apply Stephen Skowronek’s concept of ‘reconstructive leadership’. The politics of reconstruction, with an emphasis on the introduction of new standards of legitimacy and the mobilisation of support for new modes of governance, leaves ample room for appreciating the role of political leadership. Through an analysis of three policy areas (constitution-making, macroeconomic and immigration policy) related to Orbán’s efforts at reconstruction, we argue that the Hungarian case underscores the formative role of agency even more than in Skowronek’s original conception. Reviewing possible criticisms of Skowronek’s perspective and some recent literature about ‘discursive institutionalism’, we argue that the Hungarian case makes a vital correction to the Skowronekian concept, suggesting the value of taking a more constructivist approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research on citizen process preferences has highlighted three different models of decision making: representation, participation and stealth democracy. However, the meanings of the two alternatives to the prevailing representative model have not been fully explored. What do citizens have in mind when distinguishing between participatory and stealth models of democracy? Using survey data from several Western European countries, the article explores one distinction within preferences for each of the models: the preference for more referendum-based versus dynamic responsiveness-based solutions on the participatory side and for expert-based versus business-based solutions on the stealth side. The article ends by exploring the impact of left-right ideology and education upon these preferences. The explanatory power of the variables is greater for understanding the internal distinction of the stealth model than the participatory one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracies are experiencing historic disruptions affecting how people engage with core institutions such as the press, civil society organizations, parties, and elections. These processes of citizen interaction with institutions operate as a democratic interface shaping self-government and the quality of public life. The electoral dimension of the interface is important, as its operation can affect all others. This analysis explores a growing left-right imbalance in the electoral connection between citizens, parties, elections, and government. This imbalance is due, in part, to divergent left-right preferences for political engagement, organization, and communication. Support on the right for clearer social rules and simpler moral, racial and nationalist agendas are compatible with hierarchical, leader-centered party organizations that compete more effectively in elections. Parties on the left currently face greater challenges engaging citizens due to the popular meta-ideology of diversity and inclusiveness and demands for direct or deliberative democracy. What we term connective parties are developing technologies to perform core organizational functions, and some have achieved electoral success. However, when connective parties on the left try to develop shared authority processes, online and offline, they face significant challenges competing with more conventionally organized parties on the right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although populism has many references and various definitions as an elusive and ambiguous concept, this article approaches it as a political strategy which has the potential to destabilize democracy in some ways. This approach enables a broader comprehension of populism rather than confining it to certain ideological tenets or a few undisputed populist movements. This study attempts to reveal the logic of this political strategy through a tripartite analysis which consists of the sense of democracy inherent in populism, its way of thinking and reasoning, and the political circumstances which enable and strengthen populism. It is argued that the analysis performed here can offer an outline of the ground on which the struggle against the features of populism, that threatens democracy, can be carried out. Finally, in the light of the aforementioned analysis and some ideas which are borrowed from the works of Habermas and Mouffe to a large extent, it is aimed to re-read democracy in order to deal with the populist challenge in liberal democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Governments led by nonpartisan, ‘technocratic’ prime ministers are a rare phenomenon in parliamentary democracies, but have become more frequent since the late 1980s. This article focuses on the factors that lead to the formation of such cabinets. It posits that parliamentary parties with the chance to win the prime ministerial post will only relinquish it during political and economic crises that drastically increase the electoral costs of ruling and limit policy returns from governing. Statistical analyses of 469 government formations in 29 European democracies between 1977 and 2013 suggest that political scandals and economic recessions are major drivers of the occurrence of technocratic prime ministers. Meanwhile, neither presidential powers nor party system fragmentation and polarisation have any independent effect. The findings suggest that parties strategically choose technocrat‐led governments to shift blame and re‐establish their credibility and that of their policies in the face of crises that de‐legitimise their rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars in recent decades have discussed the emergence of a new leader-dominated party type, variously described as ‘personal’, ‘personalistic’ and ‘personalist’. However, there has been no original comparative research examining whether (and how) such parties resemble one another organizationally and whether they constitute a distinct organizational type. This article does so by comparing the parties of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy and Clive Palmer in Australia. Based on interviews with those in the parties and party documents, we find our cases share two distinctive organizational features: (1) the founder-leader’s dominance of the party and perceived centrality to its survival and (2) the relationship between the party and members saw active members discouraged and organization at the local level was extremely limited/non-existent. Building on this analysis, we then propose three criteria for identifying other personal parties and point to the existence of a possible subtype. We conclude that the emergence of personal parties requires us to reconsider our understanding of contemporary party organizations in advanced democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]