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This article explores the implications of transitions to democracy for the economic policymaking process in developing countries. Democracy is supposed to give citizens oversight of their political leaders, while providing leaders with electoral incentives to respect citizens' preferences. Consequently, a shift from authoritarian to democratic rule ought to alter policymaking. Using the case of Brazilian trade policy, this article examines changed versus consistent patterns of post-transition interest aggregation, political participation, and economic goal-setting. Contrary to expectations of a notably enlarged role for the legislative houses, the study finds that Brazil's executive still dominates trade policymaking. However, significant and increasingly transparent interest aggregation occurs within the federal executive. Moreover, policy capture by sectoral special interests has decreased, while non-traditional civil society participants have gained some influence, and trade policy outcomes now are arguably more public-regarding. We find that Brazil's trade policy process has been incrementally democratized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]