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Perhaps symbolized by the election of Donald Trump and Brexit, a general consensus seems to have emerged that democracy is in crisis. A burgeoning literature, both academic and popular, has identif...

The political role of the military and its impact on the emergence, persistence and consolidation of new democracies has generated a large body of scholarship. In the light of military coups in a number of Third Wave democracies such as Ecuador (2000), Thailand (2006 and 2014), Honduras (2006) and Mali (2012), the return to electoral competition in a number of military-dominated regimes, and the military’s pivotal role during the Arab Spring, this research has recently focused on the forms, reasons and consequences of military contestation on democratic development. This special issue contributes to this recent scholarship by analysing both the potentially beneficial as well as the deleterious implications of military contestation on democratic transitions, quality and persistence in different world regions. This article introduces the special issue by providing a broader context for the four individual contributions and relates their findings to the recent theoretical and empirical literature on ...

Latin America experienced recurring episodes of populism, and of military reaction against populists, during the twentieth century, frequently ending in coups d’etat. In the twenty-first century, military coups appear to have died out even as populist regimes returned during the third wave of democracy. This paper examines military contestation in populist regimes, both left and right, and how it has changed in the contemporary period. Combining fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Latin American presidencies (1982–2012) and four focused case analyses, we find that military contestation in contemporary populist regimes is driven by radical presidential policies that threaten or actually violate the institutional interests of key elites, among them the military, which in turn is facilitated by the interplay of political, social, economic, and international conditions. Counterintuitively, two of these conditions, the presence of rents and regime capacity for mass mobilization, operate in th...

Institutionalizing civilian control over the military is a crucial challenge for newly democratized nations. This paper aims to answer the question under which conditions civilian control can be established after the transition to democracy, and under which conditions civilian control fails. To answer this question, we draw on original data on civil–military relations in 28 new democracies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America and run a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis. We find that no single explanatory factor can be considered necessary for the success or failure of civilian control in new democracies, but identify a number of sufficient variable combinations to explain the development of civil–military relations after the transition to democracy.

The main purpose of modern militaries is the management of organized violence to defend society against external threats. Since the end of World War II, however, militaries have increasingly been c...

Democratic control of the military addresses one of the most pressing, relevant and broadly discussed problems in the history of social order and political organization: how can the unarmed elected representatives of the people establish, maintain and exert dominance over the military, an organization that due to its overwhelming coercive capabilities potentially is a constant threat to social order and stability. Democratic control, however, comprises more than the mere absence of a military take-over of the government. It also requires that elected decision-makers have effective authority and oversight over defense and military policy; that the mechanisms, instruments and institutions that ensure democratic control over defense and military policy work effectively; and that military subordination under democratic civilian leadership is achieved without undermining the military’s social function. This chapter provides an overview of the scholarship on these aspects of democratic control in both established and new democracies, and surveys its different analytical perspectives and recent empirical findings.

In 1987, South Korea made the transition to electoral democracy after three decades of military rule. Democratic institutions started working sufficiently quickly after the end of authoritarian rule and civilian presidents succeeded in pushing the military out of politics by the mid-1990s. However, effective civilian control of defense and military policy was a long way to come and was only realized more than a decade after the transition with the establishment of the National Security Council. This chapter traces the development of civilian control over South Korea’s defense and military policy since the transition to democracy in 1987 to the end of President Lee Myung-bak’s term in office in 2012. It argues that the slow but ultimately successful establishment of civilian control over defense and military policy was the result of a protracted power struggle between civilian presidents and the military leadership who, despite contrary preferences, were reluctant to engage in open civil-military conflict, not least because of the ongoing security threat posed by North Korea. Democratization and the ‘Northern Threat’ also had tremendous impact on the country’s military effectiveness. Even though the transition to democracy did not fundamentally alter the threat situation in relation to North Korea, it did provide the political momentum to modernize defense and security policy, to strengthen the institutions necessary for an effective defense and military policy, and to ensure that the military remains well-funded, well-staffed, and well-equipped.

Establishing civilian control of the military is an important challenge for new democracies. Surprisingly, however, there is no established conceptual framework for understanding what civilian control entails and how exactly weak or absent civilian control impinges upon democratic quality. This article addresses these lacunae, developing a new concept of civilian control for emerging democracies. It proposes to understand civilian control as the situation in which civilians have decision-making power in all relevant political matters. Differentiating civilian control as consisting of five decision-making areas, this new concept allows for a nuanced analysis of civilian control and comparative analysis. It also provides a comprehensive framework for systematically assessing the impact of incomplete civilian control on the various dimensions of liberal democracy.

It is consensus in the democratization literature that civilian control of the military is a necessary ingredient for democracy and democratic consolidation. However, there is considerable disagreement on what civilian control of the military exactly entails and there is a lack of solid theoretical arguments for how weak or absent civilian control affects democratic governance. Furthermore, a considerable portion of the research literature is captured by the fallacy of coup-ism, ignoring the many other forms in which military officers can constrain the authority of democratically elected political leaders to make political decisions and get them implemented. This article addresses these lacunae by providing a new conceptual framework for the analysis of civil–military relations in emerging democracies. From democracy theory it derives a definition of civilian control as a certain distribution of decision-making power between civilian leaders and military officers. Based on this definition, the authors dev...

Successful institutionalization of civilian control of the military is a necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy. This is particularly relevant for East Asia, where the military used to be a key player in the previous authoritarian regimes. This article analyzes the changes, advances, and setbacks in achieving civilian control in five countries that have made the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule: Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. The empirical analysis is built on a conception of civilian control that distinguishes three areas of political decisionmaking: political recruitment and overall public policymaking, national defense, and internal security. The study shows that only in Taiwan and South Korea have civilians succeeded in curtailing military influence in politics. In contrast, in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, the military has shown itself more or less resilient in guarding its prerogatives in the postauthoritarian era. This seriously impedes the democratically elected authorities' effective power to govern in these countries and has led to democratic deterioration in Thailand and the Philippines. The article highlights three arguments to account for the profound difference between the cases: historical legacies of authoritarian rule and the path of democratic transition, the internal security role of the military, and the relationship between development and democratic consolidation.

The presidential elections of 1987 reinstated democracy in South Korea after three decades of military rule. The election, however, did not result in a clear break with the authoritarian past. Newly elected President Roh Taewoo was a retired army general who had been a leading member of the old regime. The process of democratic deepening and consolidation over the following two decades, however, has made Korea one of the most successful examples of democratic transition in Asia (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012c). Furthermore, democratization has led to dramatic changes in civil— military relations. In the mid-1990s, Kim Young-sam, Roh’s successor to the presidency and the first genuine civilian president since 1961, stripped the military of its remaining political power and had the leaders of the prior military regime put on trial. Since then, the military has been confined to the political sidelines and Kim’s successors have established institutions to define and control defense and military policy.

In December 1990, civil protests against the regime of President General Hossain Mohammad Ershad brought an end to almost 14 years of military rule in Bangladesh. In the two decades since Ershad’s downfall, there have been regular elections and power has alternated between the center-right Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Khaleda Zia, the center-left Awami League (AL) of Sheikh Hasina Wajed, and various non-party caretaker governments (CTG).1 Nevertheless, democracy failed to consolidate. Rather, the hyper-centralization of political authority under the Westminster-style parliamentary system and the zero-sum nature of Bangladeshi politics has left the country’s political system a fragile, foundationally weak democracy (Datta, 2004), or an ‘elective dictatorship’ (Cameron, Blanaru, & Burns, 2006; Croissant & Schachter, 2010). In addition, elite conflict and the political divide between BNP and AL, the rise of extremist Islamic forces in recent years, and the ‘hartal’ culture2 of street politics and political violence have transformed politics into a zero-sum game (Islam, 2006).

The focus of this book is on the contours, causes, and consequences of civilian control of the military in democratizing Asia. Based on our reading of democratic theory, we have identified civil—military relations as a crucial component for the consolidation and deepening of nascent democracies: only if the military is under the firm control of civilians who are subject to the democratic process can democratic institutions function properly. Even though proofing a political regime against military coup d’etats is certainly an important aspect of establishing civilian control, it is not simply a set of measures and techniques intended to prevent a military coup. Instead, civilian control is a much broader concept that we have defined as being the situation in which civilians possess effective political decision-making power in all relevant political matters. Following from this definition, we differentiated five decision-making areas in civil—military relations: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization. To explain why the establishment of civilian control succeeds or fails in new democracies, we developed an explanatory model in which civilians make strategic use of structural, institutional, and ideational resources in order to reduce the military’s ‘opportunity and disposition’ (Finer, 1962) to resist or prevent the institutionalization and enforcement of civilian authority over each of the five decision-making areas.

In the 25 years since President Ferdinand Marcos was ousted from office in February 1986, democracy in the Philippines has remained unconsolidated. In fact, democratic quality deteriorated so severely under President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001–2010) that Freedom House took the country off its list of ‘electoral democracies’ (Freedom House, 2011a). Democratic defects include ‘anarchical’ elections (McCoy, 1994), political violence, a weak state, and deficient rule of law. To some extent reminiscent of Thailand (see Chapter 8), widespread dissatisfaction with the political institutions and political elites have sparked mass protests against the government in recent years.

On 15 July 1987, the government of the Republic of China (ROC) lifted martial law, ending 40 years of emergency rule and initializing democratization. Today, 25 years later, Taiwan is a consolidated democracy, supported by a lively civil society and a strong consensus on democratic values in both the elites and the mass public (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012c). Furthermore, Taiwan has been spared the civil—military disruptions that shook other third-wave democracies in Asia. Rather, civilians have institutionalized civilian control over the National Army (the official name of the Republic of China armed forces); though gradual and protracted, this process was largely free of open conflict. Despite some remaining problems in defense policy-making, today, Taiwan’s military is under the robust control of the elected civilian authorities.

In Thailand, the military has been involved in politics for most of the twentieth century. It ruled the country either through personal dictators or within the framework of institutionalized military rule from the 1930s to 1973, with only a brief interregnum from 1944 to 1947 (Yawnghwe, 1997). In the 1970s, a process of political transformation began that culminated in Thailand’s transition to democracy in May 1992. Under the new democratic rules, the military’s political role became more complex. The Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) refrained from direct political involvement and focused on protecting the monarchy as well as furthering their own corporate and security interests. At the same time, the military remained a political force through its linkages, both as an institution and as individuals, to the new elites of party politics, to the monarchy and to its political network and associated institutions (Chai-anan, 1997). Therefore, in order to properly understand civil—military relations after May 1992, the complexities of the political role of the monarchy and its links to civilian and military elites must be accounted for. Democratization and civilian control were to be realized only to the extent that they did not threaten the position of the ‘network monarchy’ (McCargo, 2005) or the ideas that underpinned its power (Hewison & Kengkij, 2010: 180). This became obvious during the premiership of Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–2006), whose government attempted to sever the relationship between the military and the monarchy.