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This paper is an extended summary account of my recently completed book manuscript on the history of democratic theory in American political science. The focus is on the internal discursive evolution of the democratic vision in the discipline and on the concepts of state, pluralism, and liberalism as the axis of paradigmatic transformations in that vision. The primary emphasis is on the period from the early nineteenth century to World War Two, but an Epilogue considers later developments and casts contemporary democratic theory against this historical background. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theme of motion is prominent throughout Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. In the chapter on the real advantages that American society derives from the government of democracy, Tocqueville makes the following observation: "When one passes from a free country into another that is not, one is struck by a very extraordinary spectacle: there, all is activity and movement; here, all seems calm and immobile." Whether the activity and movement-the motion-of the people be a confused clamor, a thousand voices, a gathering of neighbors, an assembling of citizens, Tocqueville identifies this activity as one of the great benefits of democratic government. "This agitation, constantly reborn, that the government of democracy has introduced into the political world, passes afterwards into civil society. I do not know if, all in all, that is not the greatest advantage of democratic government, and I praise it much more because of what it causes to be done than for what it does" (DA I.2.6). The success of a democracy rests in large part on the motion of the people. Their active participation in township government, political and civil associations, jury service, and commerce provides opportunities for the people to learn to govern themselves and participate in a meaningful way in the governing process. Yet this constant motion of the people also has disadvantages that have an impact on many facets of the lives of those living in a democracy. For example the continual movement of the people breaks or relaxes the bond with prior generations. The individualism that originates in democratic societies can also lead to selfishness. To reflect further on the topic of the challenge that the motion of the people in a democracy presents, I propose first to explain how motion is present in Democracy in America, discuss how the motion of the people makes a positive contribution to democracy, identify the challenges that accompany this agitation in society, consider the ensuing consequences if the motion of the people is threatened, and finally to explore what type of balance can be struck between motion and rest in a democratic society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criticizing US neglect of Latin America has become a popular exercise in US journals and newspapers. Indeed, when reviewing the recent political crises throughout the region as well as the ‘turn to the left’ that has taken place at least in South America, US actions and reactions may seem erratic or entirely ignorant. By analyzing the US role during recent political turbulences in South America, the paper takes issue with this attempt to explain US behavior by simply pointing towards some general stance of neglect. In contrast, it is argued that the complex processes of crisis, continuity and change in South America imply contradictory incentives and limits to a US government that frames its activities as guided by the democratic ideal and yet cannot renounce its specific national preferences in the name of democracy’s intrinsic value. The frame constituted by democratic rhetoric appears as, at the same time, constraining and enabling US policies towards South America: While the dual goal ‘democracy promotion and protection’ clearly constrains the range of justifiable (re-) actions, its normative indecisiveness opens important margins for the pursuit of particularistic prefer-ences. When taking into account the concrete settings in the different ‘target’ countries, US actions, reactions and inactions can be explained quite well without assuming some general inattention that proves overly simplifying. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contends that regime instability in countries with presidential form of government is more likely under multiparty system, when institutional design is biased for one party and when partisan players are unilaterally impatient. It offers a model of endogenous institutional breakdown in presidential regimes. The model present empirical puzzles such as the historical survival of presidentialism in the U.S. and its breakdown in Latin America since the 1980s.