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The Monetary Choice Questionnaire (MCQ) is a widely used behavioral task that measures the rate of delay discounting (i.e., k), the degree to which a delayed reward loses its present value as a function of the time to its receipt. Both 21- and 27-item MCQs have been extensively validated and proven valuable in research. Different methods have been developed to streamline MCQ scoring. However, existing scoring methods have yet to tackle the issue of missing responses or provide clear guidance on imputing such data. Due to this lack of knowledge, the present study developed and compared three imputation approaches that leverage the MCQ's structure and prioritize ease of implementation. Additionally, their performance was compared with mode imputation. A Monte Carlo simulation was conducted to evaluate the performance of these approaches in handling various missing responses in each observation across two datasets from prior studies that employed the 21- and 27-item MCQs. One of the three approaches consistently outperformed mode imputation across all performance measures. This approach involves imputing missing values using congruent non-missing responses to the items corresponding to the same k value or introducing random responses when congruent answers are unavailable. This investigation unveils a straightforward method for imputing missing data in the MCQ while ensuring unbiased estimates. Along with the investigation, an R tool was developed for researchers to implement this strategy while streamlining the MCQ scoring process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Widespread vaccination is necessary to minimize or halt the effects of many infectious diseases, including COVID-19. Stagnating vaccine uptake can prolong pandemics, raising the question of how we might predict, prevent, and correct vaccine hesitancy and unwillingness. In a multinational sample (N = 4,452) recruited from 13 countries that varied in pandemic severity and vaccine uptake (July 2021), we examined whether short-sighted decision-making as exemplified by steep delay discounting—choosing smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards—predicts COVID-19 vaccination status. Delay discounting was steeper in unvaccinated individuals and predicted vaccination status over and above demographics or mental health. The results suggest that delay discounting, a personal characteristic known to be modifiable through cognitive interventions, is a contributing cause of differences in vaccine compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If the tendency to discount rewards reflects individuals' general level of impulsiveness, then the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards should be negatively correlated: The less a person is able to wait for delayed rewards, the more they should take chances on receiving probabilistic rewards. It has been suggested that damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) increases individuals' impulsiveness, but both intertemporal choice and risky choice have only recently been assayed in the same patients with vmPFC damage. Here, we assess both delay and probability discounting in individuals with vmPFC damage (n = 8) or with medial temporal lobe (MTL) damage (n = 10), and in age- and education-matched controls (n = 30). On average, MTL-lesioned individuals discounted delayed rewards at normal rates but discounted probabilistic rewards more shallowly than controls. In contrast, vmPFC-lesioned individuals discounted delayed rewards more steeply but probabilistic rewards more shallowly than controls. These results suggest that vmPFC lesions affect the weighting of reward amount relative to delay and certainty in opposite ways. Moreover, whereas MTL-lesioned individuals and controls showed typical, nonsignificant correlations between the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards, vmPFC-lesioned individuals showed a significant negative correlation, as would be expected if vmPFC damage increases impulsiveness more in some patients than in others. Although these results are consistent with the hypothesis that vmPFC plays a role in impulsiveness, it is unclear how they could be explained by a single mechanism governing valuation of both delayed and probabilistic rewards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Steep delay discounting is associated with problems such as addiction, obesity, and risky sexual behavior that are frequently described as reflecting impulsiveness and lack of self-control, but it may simply indicate poor cognitive functioning. The present investigation took advantage of the unique opportunity provided by the Human Connectome Project (N=1,206) to examine the relation between delay discounting and 11 cognitive tasks as well as the Big Five fundamental personality traits. With income level and education statistically controlled, discounting was correlated with only four of the 11 cognitive abilities evaluated, although the rs were all small (<.20). Importantly, the two discounting measures loaded on their own factor. Discounting was not correlated with Neuroticism or Conscientiousness, traits related to psychometric impulsiveness and self-control. These findings suggest that steep delay discounting is not simply an indicator of poor cognitive functioning or psychometric impulsiveness but an important individual difference characteristic in its own right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discounting refers to decreases in the subjective value of an outcome with increases in some attribute of that outcome. The attributes most commonly studied are delay and probability, with far less research on effort and social discounting. Although these attributes all represent costs that reduce subjective value, it is as yet unclear how the extent to which they do so is related at the individual level. Accordingly, the present study examined the degree to which individual participants discounted hypothetical monetary rewards on each of four discounting tasks in which the delay, probability, effort, and number of people with whom the money was to be shared were manipulated. At the group level, larger amounts were discounted less steeply than smaller amounts when delay and effort were varied, whereas larger amounts were discounted more steeply when probability and number of people were varied. At the individual level, the correlational pattern was examined using exploratory factor analysis. A six-factor structure (with separate factors for delay and effort, and two factors each for social and probability discounting) described the relations among indifference points. At a more molar level, a two-factor structure, which corresponded to the direction of the observed magnitude effects, described the relations among area-under-the-curve measures of discounting in the eight conditions resulting from crossing two monetary amounts with the four cost factors. We conclude that despite sharing some similarities, individual and group differences in discounting involving the different types of costs reflect mostly separate processes and traits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Exposure to traumatic events is surprisingly common, yet little is known about its effect on decision making beyond the fact that those with post-traumatic stress disorder are more likely to have substance-abuse problems. We examined the effects of exposure to severe trauma on decision making in low-income, urban African Americans, a group especially likely to have had such traumatic experiences. Method: Participants completed three decision-making tasks that assessed the subjective value of delayed monetary rewards and payments and of probabilistic rewards. Trauma-exposed cases and controls were propensity-matched on demographic measures, treatment for psychological problems, and substance dependence. Results: Trauma-exposed cases discounted the value of delayed rewards and delayed payments, but not probabilistic rewards, more steeply than controls. Surprisingly, given previous findings that suggested women are more affected by trauma when female and male participants' data were analyzed separately, only the male cases showed steeper delay discounting. Compared with nonalcoholic males who were not exposed to trauma, both severe trauma and alcohol-dependence produced significantly steeper discounting of delayed rewards. Conclusions: The current study shows that exposure to severe trauma selectively affects fundamental decision-making processes. Only males were affected, and effects were observed only on discounting delayed outcomes (i.e. intertemporal choice) and not on discounting probabilistic outcomes (i.e. risky choice). These findings are the first to show significant differences in the effects of trauma on men's and women's decision making, and the selectivity of these effects has potentially important implications for treatment and also provides clues as to underlying mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study compared the two most prominent procedures for measuring delay discounting, the Adjusting-Amount procedure and the Monetary Choice Questionnaire (MCQ). Of interest was whether the two procedures measure the same construct. Results obtained from two online samples recruited using the Prolific (N = 150) and MTurk (N = 243) platforms revealed generally similar results for both procedures. Regardless of the procedure, the sample, the reward amount, and whether the discounting measure used was theoretically based (i.e., log k) or was atheoretical (i.e., area under the curve, proportion of choices of the delayed reward option), the degree of discounting on the Adjusting-Amount procedure was highly correlated with the degree of discounting on the MCQ, consistent with the hypothesis that both procedures assess the same construct. • We compared the two most prominent procedures for measuring discounting to determine whether they measure the same construct. • We also compared theoretical and atheoretical discounting measures as well as participants recruited from two online platforms. • Regardless of procedure, measure, and sample, degree of discounting on the Adjusting-Amount procedure was highly correlated with the degree of discounting on the MCQ. • The results suggest that both procedures measure the same construct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on delay discounting and inter-temporal choice has yielded significant insights into decision making. Although research has focused on delayed gains, the discounting of losses is potentially important in precisely those areas where the discounting of gains has proved informative (e.g., substance use and abuse). Participants in the current study completed both a questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed gains and an analogous questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed losses. For almost all participants, the likelihood of choosing the delayed gain decreased with increases in the wait until it would be received. In contrast, when losses (i.e., payments) were involved, different participants showed quite different patterns of choices. More specifically, although the majority of the participants became increasingly likely to choose to pay later as the delay was increased, some participants appeared to be debt averse, in that they were more likely to choose the immediate payment option when the delay was long than when it was brief. These debt-averse participants also were more likely to choose to wait for a larger delayed gain than other participants and scored lower on Impulsiveness than those who showed the typical pattern of discounting delayed losses. Taken together, these results suggest that in the case of delayed gains, people differ only quantitatively (i.e., in how steeply they discount), whereas in the case of delayed losses, people differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively, contrary to the common assumption that a single impulsivity trait underlies choices between immediate and delayed outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People discount the value of delayed and uncertain outcomes, and how steeply individuals discount is thought to reflect how impulsive they are. From this perspective, steep discounting of delayed outcomes (which fails to maximize long-term welfare) and shallow discounting of probabilistic outcomes (which fails to adequately take risk into account) reflect the same trait of impulsivity. Despite the fact that a hyperboloid function describes the discounting of both delayed and probabilistic outcomes, there is considerable evidence that the two kinds of discounting involve different processes as well as separate impulsivity traits. Several manipulations differentially affect delay and probability discounting, and correlational studies show that how steeply one discounts delayed rewards is relatively independent of how steeply one discounts probabilistic rewards. Moreover, people's discounting of delayed money and health outcomes are uncorrelated as are discounting of real, consumable rewards and hypothetical money. These results suggest that even within delay discounting, there may be multiple 'impulsivities,' each of which may be important for understanding a different aspect of decision making. Taken together, the pattern of findings reviewed here argues for a more nuanced view of impulsivity than that which is usually assumed in discounting research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The value of an outcome is affected both by the delay until its receipt (delay discounting) and by the likelihood of its receipt (probability discounting). Despite being well-described by the same hyperboloid function, delay and probability discounting involve fundamentally different processes, as revealed, for example, by the differential effects of reward amount. Previous research has focused on the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards separately, with little research examining more complex situations in which rewards are both delayed and probabilistic. In 2 experiments, participants made choices between smaller rewards that were both immediate and certain and larger rewards that were both delayed and probabilistic. Analyses revealed significant interactions between delay and probability factors inconsistent with an additive model. In contrast, a hyperboloid discounting model in which delay and probability were combined multiplicatively provided an excellent fit to the data. These results suggest that the hyperboloid is a good descriptor of decision making in complicated monetary choice situations like those people encounter in everyday life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intertemporal choices require trade-offs between short-term and long-term outcomes. Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) damage causes steep discounting of future rewards (delay discounting [DD]) and impoverished episodic future thinking (EFT). The role of vmPFC in reward valuation, EFT, and their interaction during intertemporal choice is still unclear. Here, 12 patients with lesions to vmPFC and 41 healthy controls chose between smaller-immediate and larger- delayed hypothetical monetary rewards while we manipulated reward magnitude and the availability of EFT cues. In the EFT condition, participants imagined personal events to occur at the delays associated with the larger-delayed rewards. We found that DD was steeper in vmPFC patients compared to controls, and not modulated by reward magnitude. However, EFT cues downregulated DD in vmPFC patients as well as controls. These findings indicate that vmPFC integrity is critical for the valuation of (future) rewards, but not to instill EFT in intertemporal choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Remembering and imagining specific, personal experiences can help shape our decisions. For example, cues to imagine future events can reduce delay discounting (i.e., increase the subjective value of future rewards). It is not known, however, whether such cues can also modulate other forms of reward discounting, such as probability discounting (i.e., the decrease in the subjective value of a possible reward as the odds against its occurrence increase). In addition, it is unclear whether there are age-related differences in the effects of cueing on either delay or probability discounting. Accordingly, young and older adult participants were administered delay and probability discounting tasks both with and without cues to imagine specific, personally meaningful events. As expected, cued episodic imagining decreased the discounting of delayed rewards. Notably, however, this effect was significantly less pronounced in older adults. In contrast to the effects of cueing on delay discounting, personally relevant event cues had little or no effect on the discounting of probabilistic rewards in either young or older adults; Bayesian analysis revealed compelling support for the null hypothesis that event cues do not modulate the subjective value of probabilistic rewards. In sum, imagining future events appears only to affect decisions involving delayed rewards. Although the cueing effect is smaller in older adults, nevertheless, it likely contributes to how adults of all ages evaluate delayed rewards and thus, it is, in fact, about time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]