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Curiosity during learning increases information-seeking behaviors and subsequent memory retrieval success, yet the mechanisms that drive curiosity and its accompanying information-seeking behaviors remain elusive. Hints throughout the literature suggest that curiosity may result from a metacognitive signal—possibly of closeness to a not yet accessible piece of information—that in turn leads the experiencer to seek out additional information that will resolve a perceptibly small knowledge gap. We examined whether metacognition sensations thought to signal the likely presence of an as yet unretrieved relevant memory (such as familiarity or déjà vu) might be involved. Across two experiments, when cued recall failed, participants gave higher curiosity ratings during reported déjà vu (Experiment 1) or déjà entendu (Experiment 2), and these states were associated with increased expenditure of limited experimental resources to discover the answer. Participants also spent more time attempting to retrieve information and generated more incorrect information when experiencing these déjà vu-like states than when not. We propose that metacognition signaling of the possible presence of an as yet unretrieved but relevant memory may drive curiosity and prompt information-seeking that includes further search efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central feature of our waking mental experience is that our attention naturally toggles back and forth between "external" and "internal" stimuli. In the midst of an externally demanding task, attention can involuntarily shift internally with no clear reason how or why thoughts momentarily shifted inward. In the case of external attention, we are typically exploring and encoding aspects of our external world, whereas internal attention often involves searching for and retrieving potentially relevant information from our memory networks. Cognitive science has traditionally focused on understanding forms of internal and external attention separately, leaving a mystery about what sparks the seemingly automatic shifts between the two. Specifically, what shifts attentional focus from being outward‐directed to being inward‐directed? We present a candidate mechanism: Familiarity‐detection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent laboratory study by Cleary and Claxton [2018. Déjà vu: An illusion of prediction. Psychological Science, 29(4), 635–644. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0956797617743018] documented a relationship between déjà vu and feelings of premonition. During instances of retrieval failure, participants reported stronger feelings of prediction during déjà vu than non-déjà vu states, despite displaying no actual predictive ability in such instances. The present study further explored the link between déjà vu reports and feelings of prediction. Although feelings of prediction were more likely to occur during reports of déjà vu than non-déjà vu, they were not the sole defining feature of déjà vu, accounting for just over half of all reported déjà vu states. Instances of déjà vu that were accompanied by feelings of prediction were associated with greater feelings of familiarity than instances that were not. This was shown by a greater likelihood of reporting that the scene felt familiar and also by a higher rated intensity of the feeling of familiarity elicited by the scene when it did feel familiar. Though the present study was mainly descriptive in characterising the interrelations between déjà vu, feelings of prediction, and familiarity, the full pattern points toward the possibility that high familiarity intensity may contribute to the feeling of prediction during déjà vu. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Déjà vu is beginning to be scientifically understood as a memory phenomenon. Despite recent scientific advances, a remaining puzzle is the purported association between déjà vu and feelings of premonition. Building on research showing that déjà vu can be driven by an unrecalled memory of a past experience that relates to the current situation, we sought evidence of memory-based predictive ability during déjà vu states. Déjà vu did not lead to above-chance ability to predict the next turn in a navigational path resembling a previously experienced but unrecalled path (although such resemblance increased reports of déjà vu). However, déjà vu states were accompanied by increased feelings of knowing the direction of the next turn. The results suggest that feelings of premonition during déjà vu occur and can be illusory. Metacognitive bias brought on by the state itself may explain the peculiar association between déjà vu and the feeling of premonition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Déjà vu-like experiences can be elicited experimentally. • Induced Déjà vu is not associated with epileptiform abnormalities in intracranial EEG. • Induced familiarity during recall failure is an important opportunity for memory research. • Virtual reality has promise for human intracranial and memory studies. • Subjective experiences during seizures are an opportunity for consciousness research. Roughly two-thirds of all people report having experienced déjà vu—the odd feeling that a current experience is both novel and a repeat or replay of a previous, unrecalled experience. Reports of an association between déjà vu and seizure aura symptomatology have accumulated for over a century, and frequent déjà vu is also now known to be associated with focal seizures, particularly those of a medial temporal lobe (MTL) origin. A longstanding question is whether seizure-related déjà vu has the same basis and is the same subjective experience as non-seizure déjà vu. Survey research suggests that people who experience both seizure-related and non-seizure déjà vu can often subjectively distinguish between the two. We present a case of a person with a history of focal MTL seizures who reports having experienced both seizure-related and non-seizure common déjà vu, though the non-seizure type was more frequent during this person's youth than it is currently. The patient was studied with a virtual tour paradigm that has previously been shown to elicit déjà vu among non-clinical, young adult participants. The patient reported experiencing déjà vu of the common non-seizure type during the virtual tour paradigm, without associated abnormalities of the intracranial EEG. We situate this work in the context of broader ongoing projects examining the subjective correlates of seizures. The importance for memory research of virtual scenes, spatial tasks, virtual reality (VR), and this paradigm for isolating familiarity in the context of recall failure are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Déjà vu is the striking sense that the present situation feels familiar, alongside the realization that it has to be new. According to the Gestalt familiarity hypothesis, déjà vu results when the configuration of elements within a scene maps onto a configuration previously seen, but the previous scene fails to come to mind. We examined this using virtual reality (VR) technology. When a new immersive VR scene resembled a previously-viewed scene in its configuration but people failed to recall the previously-viewed scene, familiarity ratings and reports of déjà vu were indeed higher than for completely novel scenes. People also exhibited the contrasting sense of newness and of familiarity that is characteristic of déjà vu. Familiarity ratings and déjà vu reports among scenes recognized as new increased with increasing feature-match of a scene to one stored in memory, suggesting that feature-matching can produce familiarity and déjà vu when recall fails. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Recognition without identification (RWI) is old–new discrimination among recognition test items that go unidentified. Recently, the effect has been shown in situations that require pre-experimental connections between unidentified studied items and their test cues, such as when the test cues are general knowledge questions and the unidentified studied items are their answers, or when the test cues are pictures of celebrities and the unidentified studied items are their names. In these cases, RWI demonstrates a peculiar relationship with tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) experiences: Participants give higher recognition ratings when in a TOT state than when not, even though studying an item does not increase the probability of a TOT state for that item. The present study extends these findings to the recognition of scene information. We demonstrate a scene RWI effect with scenes when scene names cannot be retrieved, and replicate the previously reported relationship between TOT states and RWI. In addition, we show that the relationship between RWI and reported TOT states also occurs between RWI and reported déjà vu states with the test scenes. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Déjà vu occurs when one feels as though a situation is familiar, despite evidence that the situation could not have been experienced before. Until recently, the topic of déjà vu remained largely outside of the realm of mainstream scientific investigation. However, interest in investigating the nature of déjà vu is growing among researchers of cognitive processes. In some cases, déjà vu may be understood within the context of research on human recognition memory. Specifically, déjà vu may sometimes result from familiarity-based recognition, or recognition that is based on feelings of familiarity that occur without identification of their source. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Episodic memory may essentially be memory for one’s place within a temporally unfolding scene from a first-person perspective. Given this, pervasively used static stimuli may only capture one small part of episodic memory. A promising approach for advancing the study of episodic memory is immersing participants within varying scenes from a first-person perspective. We present a pool of distinct scene stimuli for use in virtual environments and a paradigm that is implementable across varying levels of immersion on multiple virtual reality (VR) platforms and adaptable to studying various aspects of scene and episodic memory. In our task, participants are placed within a series of virtual environments from a first-person perspective and guided through a virtual tour of scenes during a study phase and a test phase. In the test phase, some scenes share a spatial layout with studied scenes; others are completely novel. In three experiments with varying degrees of immersion, we measure scene recall, scene familiarity-detection during recall failure, the subjective experience of déjà vu, the ability to predict the next turn on a tour, the subjective sense of being able to predict the next turn on a tour, and the factors that influence memory search and the inclination to generate candidate recollective information. The level of first-person immersion mattered to multiple facets of episodic memory. The paradigm presents a useful means of advancing mechanistic understanding of how memory operates in realistic dynamic scene environments, including in combination with cognitive neuroscience methods such as functional magnetic resonance imaging and electrophysiology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The experiences associated with remembering, including metamemory feelings about the act of remembering and attempts at remembering, are not often integrated into general accounts of memory. For example, David Rubin (2022) proposes a unified, three-dimensional conceptual space for mapping memory states, a map that does not systematically specify metamemory feelings. Drawing on Rubin's model, we define a distinct role for metamemory in relation to first-order memory content. We propose a fourth dimension for the model and support the proposal with conceptual, neurocognitive, and clinical lines of reasoning. We use the modified model to illustrate several cases, and show how it helps to conceptualize a new category of memory state: autonoetic knowing , exemplified by déjà vu. We also caution not to assume that memory experience is directly correlated with or caused by memory content, an assumption Tulving (1989) labeled the doctrine of concordance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]