Search

In their natural environment, animals often make decisions crucial for survival, such as choosing the best patch or food, or the best partner to cooperate. The choice can be compared to a gamble with an outcome that is predictable but not certain, such as rolling a dice. In economics, such a situation is called a risky context. Several models show that although individuals can generally evaluate the odds of each potential outcome, they can be subject to errors of judgment or choose according to decision‐making heuristics (simple decision rules). In non‐human primates, similar errors of judgment have been reported and we have recently shown that they also use a decisional heuristics when confronted with a risky choice in an exchange task. This suggests a common evolutionary origin to the mechanisms underlying decision‐making under risk in primates. However, whether the same mechanisms are also present in more distantly related taxa needs to be further investigated. Other social species, like corvids, are renowned for their advanced cognitive skills and may show similar responses. Here, we analyse data on corvids (carrion crows, hooded crows, common ravens and rooks) tested in a risky exchange task comparable to the one used in non‐human primates. We investigated whether corvids could exchange according to the odds of success or, alternatively, whether they used a heuristic similar to the one used by non‐human primates. Instead, most corvids chose a course of action (either a low or high exchange rate) that remained constant throughout the study. In general, corvids' mean exchange rates were lower compared to non‐human primates, indicating that they were either risk‐adverse or that they do not possess the cognitive capabilities to evaluate odds. Further studies are required to evaluate the flexibility in exchange abilities of these birds in exchange abilities of these birds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many studies investigate the decisions made by animals by focusing on their attitudes toward risk, that is, risk-seeking, risk neutrality, or risk aversion. However, little attention has been paid to the extent to which individuals understand the different odds of outcomes. In a previous gambling task involving 18 different lotteries (Pelé, Broihanne, Thierry, Call, & Dufour, 2014), nonhuman primates used probabilities of gains and losses to make their decision. Although the use of complex mathematical calculation for decision-making seemed unlikely, we applied a gradual decrease in the chances to win throughout the experiment. This probably facilitated the extraction of information about odds. Here, we investigated whether individuals would still make efficient decisions if this facilitating factor was removed. To do so, we randomized the order of presentation of the 18 lotteries. Individuals from 4 ape and 2 monkey species were tested. Only capuchin monkeys differed from others, gambling even when there was nothing to win. Randomizing the lottery presentation order leads all species to predominantly use a maximax heuristic. Individuals gamble as soon as there is at least one chance to win more than they already possess, whatever the risk. Most species also gambled more as the frequency of larger rewards increased. These results suggest optimistic behavior. The maximax heuristic is sometimes observed in human managerial and financial decision-making, where risk is ignored for potential gains, however low they may be. This suggests a shared and strong propensity in primates to rely on heuristics whenever complexity in evaluation of outcome odds arises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The ability to wait for a reward is a necessary capacity for economic transactions. This study is an age-related investigation of children’s ability to delay gratification in an exchange task requiring them to wait for a significant reward. We gave 252 children aged 2–4 a small piece of cookie, then offered them an opportunity to wait for a predetermined delay period before exchanging it for a larger one. In a first experiment, the children had to exchange the initial food item for rewards two, four or eight times larger. Results showed that children aged 3–4years old sustained longer time lags for larger rewards than for smaller rewards. This effect was not found in 2-year-old subjects. In a second experiment, a reward 40 times larger than the initial piece was offered to determine the maximum waiting time that children could sustain. All age groups increased their performances. Older children were more successful at waiting, but some children as young as 2years old were able to tolerate delays of up to 16min. Older children who chose to give up waiting earlier than their known capacity demonstrated anticipation skills which had not been seen in younger children, showing that they had anticipated an increase in the time lag, and that they had considered both time and reward value when making their decision. Despite the age effect, we did not establish any limits for delaying gratification in children. This study may have educational implications for dealing with behavioral misconduct, which is known to be related to impulsivity control in young children. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]