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Risky decision making for others is ubiquitous in our societies. Whereas financial decision making for oneself induces strong concern about the worst outcome (maximin concern) as well as the expected value, behavioral and neural characteristics of decision making for others are less well understood. We conducted behavioral and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments to examine the neurocognitive underpinnings of risky decisions for an anonymous other, using decisions for self as a benchmark. We show that, although the maximin concern affected both types of decisions equally strongly, decision making for others recruited a more risk-neutral computational mechanism than decision making for self. Specifically, participants exhibited more balanced information search when choosing a risky option for others. Activity of right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ, associated with cognitive perspective taking) was parametrically modulated by options' expected values in decisions for others, and by the minimum amounts in decisions for self. Furthermore, individual differences in self-reported empathic concern modified these attentional and neural processes. Overall, these results indicate that the typical maximin concern is attenuated in a risk-neutral direction in decisions for others as compared to self. We conjecture that, given others' diverse preferences, deciding as a neutral party may cognitively recruit such risk-neutrality.

Distributive justice concerns the moral principles by which we seek to allocate resources fairly among diverse members of a society. Although the concept of fair allocation is one of the fundamental building blocks for societies, there is no clear consensus on how to achieve "socially just" allocations. Here, we examine neurocognitive commonalities of distributive judgments and risky decisions. We explore the hypothesis that people's allocation decisions for others are closely related to economic decisions for oneself at behavioral, cognitive, and neural levels, via a concern about the minimum, worst-off position. In a series of experiments using attention-monitoring and brain-imaging techniques, we investigated this "maximin" concern (maximizing the minimum possible payoff) via responses in two seemingly disparate tasks: third-party distribution of rewards for others, and choosing gambles for self. The experiments revealed three robust results: (i) participants' distributive choices closely matched their risk preferences-"Rawlsians," who maximized the worst-off position in distributions for others, avoided riskier gambles for themselves, whereas "utilitarians," who favored the largest-total distributions, preferred riskier but more profitable gambles; (ii) across such individual choice preferences, however, participants generally showed the greatest spontaneous attention to information about the worst possible outcomes in both tasks; and (iii) this robust concern about the minimum outcomes was correlated with activation of the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ), the region associated with perspective taking. The results provide convergent evidence that social distribution for others is psychologically linked to risky decision making for self, drawing on common cognitive-neural processes with spontaneous perspective taking of the worst-off position., Competing Interests: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Decision under ambiguity (uncertainty with unknown probabilities) has been attracting attention in behavioral and neuroeconomics. However, recent neuroimaging studies have mainly focused on gain domains while little attention has been paid to the magnitudes of outcomes. In this study, we examined the effects of the sign (i.e., gain and loss) and magnitude of outcomes on ambiguity aversion and the additivity of subjective probabilities in Ellsberg's urn problem. We observed that (i) ambiguity aversion was observed in both signs, and (ii) subadditivity of subjective probability was not observed in negative outcomes.

Decision-making under uncertainty has been studied in psychiatry, economic psychology, and neuroeconomics. Psychiatric patients (e.g., drug addicts) often show low degrees of aversion to potential danger. Investigation into neuropsychological processing underlying decision under uncertainty is important for medical treatments of neuropsychiatric disorders. In economic decision theory, choices under uncertainty with and without known probabilities of outcomes have been discriminated. Regarding decision-making under uncertainty with known probabilities (risk), Kahnemann-Tversky's prospect theory revealed that people tend to avoid uncertainty in potential gains (i.e., risk-aversion in a gain-frame); on the contrary, prefer uncertainty in potential losses (i.e., risk-seeking in a loss-frame). Regarding choices between possible gains with known and unknown probabilities, Ellsberg demonstrated that, in a gain-frame, people tend to avoid uncertainty with unknown probabilities, more dramatically than uncertainty with known probabilities. This can be explained by risk/uncertainty aversion in the gain-frame, suggesting that uncertainty with known and unknown probabilities (i.e., risk and Knightian uncertainty, respectively) may possibly be processed by similar neuropsychological processing in the gain-frame. However, in spite of accumulating evidence in neuroimaging and neuroeconomic studies, it is still unknown whether probability and Knightian uncertainty in the loss-frame are mediated by similar neuropsychological processes as well. We propose that distinct neuropsychological processes may mediate potential losses with known and unknown probabilities, based on recent findings in neuroeconomics and our experiment. Importance of examining subjects' degree of Knightian uncertainty aversion for the prediction/treatment of drug addicts' risky behavior (e.g., needle-sharing) is also discussed.

Recent research on animal behavior suggests that group decision-making may not be uniquely human. Based on Tinbergen's (1963) "four questions," this paper proposes that linking biological- and social-science approaches is important to a better understanding of human group decisions. Toward this end, we first review some recent findings on collective behavior by social insects (ants and honeybees in particular). We then argue that several fundamental processes (e.g., positive feedback, nonlinear responses to social frequency information, and use of quorums) commonly underlie human and non-human group decision-making under uncertainty, while key prerequisites for the emergence of collective intelligence may be more vulnerable to social nuances in human contexts. We sketch some future research directions to promote cross-fertilizations between the two fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]