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Many animals, including humans, must make decisions when outcomes involve risk and/or ambiguity. To explore the evolutionary roots of decision making when outcomes are unknown, we modified the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) for use with tufted capuchin monkeys ( Sapajus [Cebus] apella ), creating the Primate Analogue Risk Task (PART). Using both the BART and the PART, we first compared human performance across the two tasks using analogous parameters. Humans' performance on the two tasks was positively correlated. Next, we tested capuchin monkeys' performance on the PART to assess their decision-making strategies in the context of ambiguity. Secondarily, although it was not the main goal of the study, this allowed us to look at species differences between capuchins' and humans' performance. Finally, we investigated the influence of prior experience on human and capuchin decision-making behavior. Neither capuchins nor humans behaved differently following an unsuccessful trial compared to a successful trial. We found individual differences in capuchin monkeys' choice behavior, though as a whole they demonstrated a pattern of reward maximization over time. Finally, as a species, capuchins had lower PART risk scores than humans. This paradigm presents a useful way to assess behavior in a context with uncertain outcomes using a comparative approach. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

In the past decade, there has been a surge of interest in using games derived from experimental economics to test decision-making behaviour across species. In most cases, researchers are using the games as a tool, for instance, to understand what factors influence decision-making, how decision-making differs across species or contexts, or to ask broader questions about species' propensities to cooperate or compete. These games have been quite successful in this regard. To what degree, however, do these games tap into species' economic decision-making? For the purpose of understanding the evolution of economic systems in humans, this is the key question. To study this, we can break economic decision-making down into smaller components, each of which is a potential step in the evolution of human economic behaviour. We can then use data from economic games, which are simplified, highly structured models of decision-making and therefore ideal for the comparative approach, to directly compare these components across species and contexts, as well as in relation to more naturalistic behaviours, to better understand the evolution of economic behaviour and the social and ecological contexts that influenced it. The comparative approach has successfully informed us about the evolution of other complex traits, such as language and morality, and should help us more deeply understand why and how human economic systems evolved. This article is part of the theme issue 'Existence and prevalence of economic behaviours among non-human primates'.

Human decision-making is often swayed by irrecoverable investments even though it should only be based on future-and not past-costs and benefits. Although this sunk cost effect is widely documented and can lead to devastating losses, the underlying psychological mechanisms are unclear. To tease apart possible explanations through a comparative approach, we assessed capuchin and rhesus monkeys' susceptibility to sunk costs in a psychomotor task. Monkeys needed to track a moving target with a joystick-controlled cursor for variable durations. They could stop at any time, ending the trial without reward. To minimize the work required for a reward, monkeys should have always persisted for at least 1 s, but should have abandoned the trial if that did not yield a reward. Capuchin monkeys and especially rhesus macaques persisted to trial completion even when it was suboptimal, and were more likely to complete the trial the longer they had already tracked the target. These effects were less pronounced, although still present, when the change in expected tracking duration was signalled visually. These results show that sunk cost effects can arise in the absence of human-unique factors and may emerge, in part, because persisting can resolve uncertainty.

We review and analyze evidence for an evolutionary rooting of human economic behaviors and organization in non-human primates. Rather than focusing on the direct application of economic models that a priori account for animal decision behavior, we adopt an inductive definition of economic behavior in terms of the contribution of individual cognitive capacities to the provision of resources within an exchange structure. We spell out to what extent non-human primates' individual and strategic decision behaviors are shared with humans. We focus on the ability to trade, through barter or token-mediated exchanges, as a landmark of an economic system among members of the same species. It is an open question why only humans have reached a high level of economic sophistication. While primates have many of the necessary cognitive abilities (symbolic and computational) in isolation, one plausible issue we identify is the limits in exerting cognitive control to combine several sources of information. The difference between human and non-human primates' economies might well then be in degree rather than kind., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Comparative approaches to experimental economics have shed light on the evolution of social decision-making across a range of primate species, including humans. Here we replicate our previous work looking at six pairs of capuchin monkeys' (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) responses to scenarios requiring both coordination (Assurance Game) and anti-coordination (Hawk-Dove Game). This then provides a foundation for assessing their responses to two additional games, one with a scenario of beneficial cooperation with a temptation to defect (Prisoner's Dilemma) and one with an environment requiring changing strategies within short temporal proximity (Alternating Economic Game). We additionally explored the effects of exogenous oxytocin on decision-making. Oxytocin did not affect decisions in any of our games. Results from the first two games largely replicated our previous findings. Responses to the Prisoner's Dilemma were more varied than was seen in previous games, with pairs respectively cooperating, defecting, and failing to establish stable strategies. Such variability indicates that this game may be a good assay for individual differences in social decision-making. Finally, capuchins were able to flexibly switch between their previously established strategies within each of the different games, even when the games were presented within the same session, requiring strategy adjustments within short temporal proximity. These results build on earlier findings showing that capuchins can alter decision-making strategies as the context demands, which is likely essential for decision-making in naturally occurring contexts., (© 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.)

This study investigated the effect of cost-benefit salience on simulated criminal punishment judgments. In two vignette-based survey experiments, we sought to identify how the salience of decision costs influences laypeople's punishment judgments. In both experiments (N 1  = 109; N 2  = 398), undergraduate participants made sentencing judgments with and without explicit information about the direct, material costs of incarceration. Using a within-subjects design, Experiment 1 revealed that increasing the salience of incarceration costs mitigated punishments. However, when costs were not made salient, punishments were no lower than those made when the costs were externalized (i.e., paid by a third party). Experiment 2 showed the same pattern using a between-subjects design. We conclude that, when laypeople formulate sentencing attitudes without exposure to the costs of the punishment, they are prone to discount those costs, behaving as if punishment is societally cost-free. However, when cost information is salient, they utilize it, suggesting the operation of a genuine, albeit labile, punishment preference. We discuss the implications of these findings for psychological theories of decision making and for sentencing policy, including the degree of transparency about the relevant costs of incarceration during the decision process., (© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

Human decision making in situations of inequity has long been regarded as a competition between the sense of fairness and self-interest, primarily based on behavioral and neuroimaging studies of inequity that disfavor the actor while favoring others. Here, we use functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments to study refusals and protests using both favoring and disfavoring inequity in three economic exchange games with undercompensating, nearly equal, and overcompensating offers. Refusals of undercompensating offers recruited a heightened activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). Accepting of overcompensating offers recruited significantly higher node activity in, and network activity among, the caudate, the cingulate cortex, and the thalamus. Protesting of undercompensating fixed offers activated the network consisting of the right dlPFC and the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and midbrain in the substantia nigra. These findings suggest that perceived fairness and social decisions are the results of coordination between evaluated fairness norms, self-interest, and reward.

How do primates, humans included, deal with novel problems that arise in interactions with other group members? Despite much research regarding how animals and humans solve social problems, few studies have utilized comparable procedures, outcomes, or measures across different species. Thus, it is difficult to piece together the evolution of decision making, including the roots from which human economic decision making emerged. Recently, a comparative body of decision making research has emerged, relying largely on the methodology of experimental economics in order to address these questions in a cross-species fashion. Experimental economics is an ideal method of inquiry for this approach. It is a well-developed method for distilling complex decision making involving multiple conspecifics whose decisions are contingent upon one another into a series of simple decision choices. This allows these decisions to be compared across species and contexts. In particular, our group has used this approach to investigate coordination in New World monkeys, Old World monkeys, and great apes (including humans), using identical methods. We find that in some cases there are remarkable continuities of outcome, as when some pairs in all species solved a coordination game, the Assurance game. On the other hand, we also find that these similarities in outcomes are likely driven by differences in underlying cognitive mechanisms. New World monkeys required exogenous information about their partners' choices in order to solve the task, indicating that they were using a matching strategy. Old World monkeys, on the other hand, solved the task without exogenous cues, leading to investigations into what mechanisms may be underpinning their responses (e.g., reward maximization, strategy formation, etc.). Great apes showed a strong experience effect, with cognitively enriched apes following what appears to be a strategy. Finally, humans were able to solve the task with or without exogenous cues. However, when given the chance to do so, they incorporated an additional mechanism unavailable to the other primates - language - to coordinate outcomes with their partner. We discuss how these results inform not only comparative psychology, but also evolutionary psychology, as they provide an understanding of the evolution of human economic behavior, and the evolution of decision making more broadly.

There is much debate about how humans' decision-making compares with that of other primates. One way to explore this is to compare species' performance using identical methodologies in games with strategical interactions. We presented a computerized Assurance Game, which was either functionally simultaneous or sequential, to investigate how humans, rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys used information in decision-making. All species coordinated via sequential play on the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, indicating that information about the partner's choice improved decisions. Furthermore, some humans and rhesus monkeys found the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous game, even when it was the first condition presented. Thus, Old World primates solved the task without any external cues to their partner's choice. Finally, when not explicitly prohibited, humans spontaneously used language to coordinate on the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, indicating an alternative mechanism for converting a simultaneous move game into a sequential move game. This phylogenetic distribution implies that no single mechanism drives coordination decisions across the primates, while humans' ability to spontaneously use language to change the structure of the game emphasizes that multiple mechanisms may be used even within the same species. These results provide insight into the evolution of decision-making strategies across the primates.

There is great interest in the evolution of economic behavior. In typical studies, species are asked to play one of a series of economic games, derived from game theory, and their responses are compared. The advantage of this approach is the relative level of consistency and control that emerges from the games themselves; however, in the typical experiment, procedures and conditions differ widely, particularly between humans and other species. Thus, in the current study, we investigated how three primate species, capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees, and humans, played the Assurance (or Stag Hunt) game using procedures that were, to the best of our ability, the same across species, particularly with respect to training and pretesting. Our goal was to determine what, if any, differences existed in the ways in which these species made decisions in this game. We hypothesized differences along phylogenetic lines, which we found. However, the species were more similar than might be expected. In particular, humans who played using "nonhuman primate-friendly" rules did not behave as is typical. Thus, we find evidence for similarity in decision-making processes across the order Primates. These results indicate that such comparative studies are possible and, moreover, that in any comparison rating species' relative abilities, extreme care must be taken in ensuring that one species does not have an advantage over the others due to methodological procedures.

Human behavior is not always consistent with standard rational choice predictions. Apparent deviations from rational choice predictions provide a promising arena for the merger of economics and biology [1-6]. Although little is known about the extent to which other species exhibit these seemingly irrational patterns [7-9], similarities across species would suggest a common evolutionary root to the phenomena. The present study investigated whether chimpanzees exhibit an endowment effect, a seemingly paradoxical behavior in which humans tend to value a good they have just come to possess more than they would have only a moment before [10-13]. We show the first evidence that chimpanzees do exhibit an endowment effect, by favoring items they just received more than their preferred items that could be acquired through exchange. Moreover, the effect is stronger for food than for less evolutionarily salient objects, perhaps because of historically greater risks associated with keeping a valuable item versus attempting to exchange it for another [14, 15]. These findings suggest that many seeming deviations from rational choice predictions may be common to humans and chimpanzees and that the evaluation of these through a lens of evolutionary relevance may yield further insights in humans and other species.