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Using two nationally representative datasets from household surveys conducted in India in 2005 and 2012, the present paper examines the causal effect of gender in private school choice. We argue that the gender of the child is potentially endogenous in India because parents continue to have children until they have a son. To redress this potential endogeneity, we exploit the variation in private school choice among 7-18 year olds born to the same parents within the same household in an attempt to minimize both child-invariant and child-varying household-level omitted variable bias. We then explore the nature of female (dis)advantage across different types of households, communities and years with a view to assess the role of parental preferences in this respect and also its change. Significant female disadvantage exists in both survey years, though the size of this disadvantage varies across sub-samples and years. Female disadvantage is significantly higher among younger (relative to eldest) girls and also in northern and northwestern (relative to western) regions, but it is lower among girls from poor (relative to rich) households, Christian (relative to Hindu high caste) households, and those with more educated mothers. We infer that the observed within-household variations in female disadvantage across sub-samples reflect variations in non-altruistic parental preferences linked to deeply held cultural norms (for example, sons acting as old-age security and the exogamy of girls), access to schools and other public goods, thus posing considerable challenges to securing 'education for all.'

We propose a model of parental altruism in relation with child habit formation, where children are unaware of their developing habits while young, and become cognizant of them only on growing up. We show that an altruistic mother (i) maintains the amount of income transferred to her child lower than the child would desire and (ii) reduces further income transfer upon an exogenous increase in the child's performance of a particular habit. The child, when grown, may end up grateful for the small income transfer if the mother is sufficiently rich and altruistic: when evaluated by the realized habitual preferences, a small income transfer leads to greater child welfare than the greater income transfer preferred by the child would have generated. This implies that parents from richer families, ceteris paribus, tend to guard against their children's profligacy.

This paper develops a model of child custody based on an incomplete-contract approach to the allocation of property rights. Because of the presence of transaction costs in marriage, altruistic parents cannot contract upon the investments they make into their children, but can reduce the resulting inefficiencies by determining ex ante the parent who would be allocated custody in case they divorce. We show that: (i) the optimal allocation of custodial rights depends on both preferences and technological factors; (ii) custodial rights can be allocated either to the parent who values the benefits from child welfare more or, viceversa, to the parent with the lowest valuation; (iii) if one parent?s investment is significantly more important than the other parent?s investment, then sole custody is preferred to joint custody and it should be allocated to the parent whose investment is relatively more important; and (iv) if the importance of the parents? investments is sufficiently similar and if the differences in parents? valuations of child quality are large, then joint custody is optimal with the lowvaluation parent receiving a relatively greater share, because the other parent would invest in the child anyway while the low-valuation parent would be endowed with greater bargaining power. The implications of these results are then interpreted in the context of current custody laws, discussed in relation to empirical estimates of some of the parameters underlying the optimal custody rule, and used to question the skepticism surrounding prenuptial contracts.

The intersection of the standard altruism hypothesis with the quite strong evidence that bequests tend to be equal suggests that inter-vivos transfers should be strongly compensatory. Yet the available evidence is not in congruence with this implication. It has therefore been inferred that the motive underlying inter-vivos transfers is not parental altruism. In this paper we present an argument showing why parents who are equally altruistic toward their children optimally transfer more to the child whose earnings are higher. We show that rather than being orthogonal to parental altruism, counter-compensating transfers emanate from such altruism. A key point in the analysis is that parents and children are interlinked in a rich web of (vertical and possibly horizontal) transfers, reverse transfers, direct transfers, and indirect transfers.

The large amount of equal division of bequests by parents who otherwise would have compensated the earning differences among their children is attributed to the cost associated with unequal bequests. This paper identifies a source of this cost and explains why equal bequests to children whose earnings differ, and parental altruism toward these children, are not mutually exclusive.