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We develop a macroeconomic theory of the division of household tasks between servants and own work and how it is affected by automation in households and firms. We calibrate the model for the U.S. and apply it to explain the historical development of household time use and the distribution of household tasks from 1900 to 2020. The economy is populated by high-skilled and low-skilled households and household tasks are performed by own work, machines, or servants. For the period 1900-1960, innovations in household automation motivate the decline of the servant economy and the creation of new household tasks motivates an almost constant division of household time between wage work and domestic work. For the period 1960-2020, innovations in firm automation and the implied increase of the skill premium explain the return of the servant economy. We show the robustness of results to the introduction of time trends in skilled-labor supply and the consideration of endogenous demand for leisure. With counterfactual experiments we address the effects of task-dependent disutility of work and of innovations in servant efficiency (the Gig economy). We provide supporting evidence for inequality as a driver of the return of the servant economy in a regional panel of U.S. metropolitan statistical areas for the period 2005-2020.

In this paper, I propose a life cycle model of occupational choice with endogenous health behavior, aging, and longevity. Health-demanding work leads to a faster accumulation of health deficits and is remunerated with a hazard markup on wages. Health deficit accumulation is also influenced by unhealthy consumption and health care expenditure. I calibrate the model for a 20 year old average American in 2010 and show the following results, among others. Health-demanding work is ceteris paribus preferred by male, young, and healthy individuals with a relatively low level of education. Health demanding work has a negligible effect on health behavior because income and health investment effects largely offset each other, implying that health effects can be attributed almost fully to the direct health burden of work. Better medical technology induces low-skilled individuals to spend a greater part of their life in health-demanding work and thus increases the health gradient of education. High wealth endowments protect against unhealthy occupational choices. I show robustness of the results in an extension of the model with regard to endogenous retirement.

In this paper, we develop a life cycle model in which health and longevity are threatened by infectious and chronic diseases. The model captures that the susceptibility and severity of infectious diseases depend on the accumulated health deficits (immunosenescence) and that the life history of infections affects the accumulation of chronic health deficits (inammaging). Individuals invest in their health to slow down health deficit accumulation and take measures to protect themselves from infectious diseases. We calibrate the model for an average American and explore how health expenditure, life expectancy, and the value of life depend on individual characteristics, medical technology, and the disease environment. We then use counterfactual computational experiments of the U.S. epidemiological transition 1860-2010 to show that the decline of infectious diseases caused a substantial decline of chronic diseases and contributed more to increasing life expectancy than advances in the treatment of chronic diseases. Finally, we use the model to investigate behaviour and long-term health outcomes in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. We predict that the pandemic will shorten the life expectancy of middle-aged people almost as much as that of older people because of inammaging and the self-productivity of health deficits.

Empirical evidence for the U.S. suggests that the consumption of intoxicants increases in association with the socio-economic deprivation of the middle-class. To explore the underlying mechanisms, we set up a task-based labor market model with endogenous mental health status and a health care system. The decline of tasks that were historically performed by the middle class and the associated decline in relative wages and socio-economic status increases the share of mentally ill middle class workers. Mentally ill workers can mitigate their hardships by the intake of illicit drugs or by consuming health goods. We argue that explaining the drug epidemic of the U.S. middle class requires an interaction of socio-economic decline and falling opioid prices. One factor in isolation is typically insufficient. Our analysis also points to a central role of the health care system. In our model, extending mental health care could motivate the mentally ill to abstain from illicit drug consumption.

In this paper, I combine economic theories of health behavior and addiction in order to explain the phenomenon of anorexia nervosa and its impact on health and longevity. Individuals consume normal goods and foods and can work off excess calories with physical exercise. There exists a healthy body mass index and deviations from it increasingly cause health deficits due to obesity or underweight. There exists also a subjective target weight and being heavier than target weight causes a loss of utility from body image. Individuals for whom the utility loss from missing target weight is large exert more weight control, i.e. they eat less and exercise more. Anorexia is initiated in individuals who are particularly successful in weight control and prone to addiction. Addiction to weight control motivates anorexic individuals to perpetually adjust their target weight downwards and to eat less and exercise more. With declining weight, health deficits accumulate faster and mortality risk rises. I calibrate the model to a reference American with bmi 28. Due to weight loss addiction, the bmi gradually declines to a level of 15 and causes a loss of 21 years of life expectancy at the age of 20.

A core mechanism of unified growth theory is that accelerating technological progress induces mass education and, in interaction with child quantity-quality substitution, a decline in fertility. Using unique new data for 21 OECD countries over the period 1750-2000, we test, for the first time, the validity of this core mechanism of unified growth theory. We measure a country's technological progress as patents per capita, genetic-distance weighted foreign patents, and investment in machinery, equipment and intellectual property products. Controlling for other confounders like income, mortality, the gender wage gap, indicators for child labor, compulsory schooling, and time- and countryfixed effects, we establish a strong positive impact of technological progress on investments in education and a strongly negative one on fertility. Using two-stage regressions, we assess the child quantity-quality substitution that can be motivated by technological change. We estimate that a 10 percent increase of enrollment in primary and secondary school is associated with a decline of the general fertility rate by 3 to 4 percent.

We investigate health and aging before and after retirement for specific occupational groups. We use five waves of the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and construct a frailty index for elderly men and women from 10 European countries. Occupational groups are classified according to low vs. high education, blue vs. white collar color, and high vs. low physical or psychosocial job burden. Controlling for individual fixed effects, we find that, regardless of the used classification, workers from the first (low status) group display more health deficits at any age and accumulate health deficits faster than workers from the second (high status) group. We instrument retirement by statutory retirement ages (“normal” and “early”) and find that the health of workers in low status occupations benefits greatly from retirement, whereas retirement effects for workers in high status occupations are small and frequently insignificant. We also find that workers from low status occupations always have higher health deficits, i.e. we find evidence for an occupational health gradient that widens with increasing age, before and after retirement.

We discuss public pension systems in a multi-period overlapping generations model with gerontologically founded human aging and a special focus on occupation-specific morbidity and mortality. We examine how distinct replacement rates for white-collar and blue-collar workers and early retirement policies could be designed to provide a fair and aggregate welfare-enhancing public pension system. Calibrating the model to Germany, we find that a pension system that equalizes relative pension contributions and the relative present-discounted value of expected benefits across occupational groups calls for a significant increase in replacement rates of blue-collar workers. If the statutory retirement age is sufficiently high or the life expectancy gap across occupations is sufficiently large, fair pensions raise aggregate welfare and should feature early retirement incentives.

A core mechanism of unified growth theory is that accelerating technologicalprogress induces mass education and, in interaction with child quantity-quality substitution, a decline in fertility. Using unique new data for 21 OECD countries over theperiod 1750-2000, we test, for the first time, the validity of this core mechanism of unified growth theory. We measure a country's technological progress as patents per capita, genetic-distance weighted foreign patents, and investment in machinery, equipment and intellectual property products. Controlling for other confounders like income, mortality, thegender wage gap, indicators for child labor, compulsory schooling, and time- and country-fixed effects, we establish a strong positive impact of technological progress on investmentsin education and a strongly negative one on fertility. Using two-stage regressions, we assess the child quantity-quality substitution that can be motivated by technological change. We estimate that a 10 percent increase of enrollment in primary and secondary school isassociated with a decline of the general fertility rate by 3 to 4 percent.

"The job of a 'measure' or an 'index' is to distill what is particularly relevant for our purpose,and then to focus specifcally on that... That is not an easy task." Sen (1989). And that is precisely our aim. In this paper, a measurement for multidimensional exposure to Stephan Klasen is developed for the first time ever. We use our exposure measure to test theoretical predictions on its effects on worldview, life perspectives, and various welfare measures. In our sample, the exposure degree to Stephan Klasen varies signifcantly, with a slight majority identified as "exposed" according to our frst-of-its-kind Multidimensional Stephan Klasen Exposure Index. Our results show that being exposed to Stephan Klasen increases: 1) tolerance overall (and in particular towards macroeconomists, statisticians and people wearing socks with sandals), 2) preference of postdocs over PhDs in times of scarcity, 3) self-perceived wealth, and 4) a person's consciousness towards global problems such as inequality, poverty, and climate change. Furthermore, we show that specifc habits such as signing emails with initials, social media usage, and brushing teeth can partly explain the Stephan Klasen effect. The data allow us to draw some highly relevant policy conclusions. We conclude that while caution on the causal interpretation of our estimates is needed, our exercise confirms years of qualitative evidence which has unequivocally indicated the multidimensional benefits of being exposed to Stephan Klasen.

We investigate the regional distribution of the COVID-19 outbreak in Germany. We use a novel digital mobility dataset, that traces the undertaken trips on Easter Sunday 2020 and instrument them with regional accessibility as measured by the regional road infrastructure of Germany's 401 NUTS III regions. We identify a robust negative association between the number of infected cases per capita and accessibility by road infrastructure, measured by the average travel time to the next major urban center. What has been a hinderance for economic performance in good economic times, appears to be a benevolent factor in the COVID-19 pandemic: bad road infrastructure. Using road infrastructure as an instrument for mobility reductions we assess the causal effect of mobility reduction on infections. The study shows that keeping mobility of people low is a main factor to reduce infections. Aggregating over all regions, our results suggest that there would have been about 63,000 infections less on May 5th, 2020, if mobility at the onset of the disease were 10 percent lower.

In this paper, we investigate health and aging before and after retirement for specific occupational groups. We use five waves of the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) dataset and construct a frailty index for elderly men and women from 10 European countries. We classify occupation by low vs. high education, blue vs. white collar color, and by high vs. low physical or psychosocial job burden. Controlling for individual fixed effects, we find that, regardless of the used classification, workers from the first (low status) group display more health deficits at any age and accumulate health deficits faster than workers from the second (high status) group. We instrument retirement by statutory retirement ages ("normal" and "early") and find that the health of workers in low status occupations benefits greatly from retirement, whereas retirement effects for workers in high status occupations are small and frequently insignificant. We also find that workers from low status occupations accumulate health deficits faster after retirement, i.e. we find evidence for an occupational health gradient that widens with increasing age, before and after retirement.

In this paper we investigate the impact of technological change on inequalityin the presence of a landed elite using a standard unified growth model. We measure inequality by the ratio between land rent and wages and show that, before the onset of the fertility transition, technological progress increased inequality directly through land-biased technological change and indirectly through increasing population growth. Thefertility transition and the child quantity-quality trade-off eventually disabled the Malthusian mechanism, and technological progress triggered education and benefited workers. If the elasticity of substitution between land and labor is sufficiently high, the rent-wage ratio declines such that inequality is hump-shaped in the very long run. We use the publication of new farming book titles as a measure of technological progress in agriculture, and provide evidence for technology-driven inequality in Britain between 1525 and 1895. We confirm these results for a panel of European countries over the period 1265-1850 using agricultural productivity as a measure of technology. Finally, using patents in the period 1800-1980, we find a technology-driven inequality reversal around the onset of the fertility transition.

The fetal origins hypothesis has received considerable empirical support, both within epidemiology and economics. The present study compares the ability of two rival theoretical frameworks in accounting for the kind of path dependence implied by the fetal origins hypothesis. We argue that while the conventional health capital model is irreconcilable with fetal origins of late-in-life health outcomes, the more recent health deficit model can generate shock amplification consistent with the hypothesis. In order to discuss human health over the life cycle from conception to death, we develop a theory of ontogenetic growth in utero and during childhood, unify it with the theory of adult aging, and discuss the transmission of early-life shocks to late-life health deficit accumulation.

We integrate time-inconsistent decision making due to hyperbolic discounting into a gerontologically founded life cycle model with endogenous aging and longevity. Individuals can slow down aging and postpone death by health investments and by reducing unhealthy consumption, conceptualized as smoking. We show that individuals continuously revise their original plans to smoke less and invest more in their health. Consequently, they accumulate health deficits faster and die earlier than originally planned. This fundamental health consequence of time-inconsistency has not been addressed in the literature so far. Because death is endogenous, any attempt to establish the time-consistent first-best solution by manipulating the first order conditions through (sin-) taxes and subsidies is bound to fail. We calibrate the model with U.S. data for an average American in the year 2010 and estimate that time-inconsistent health behavior causes a loss of about 5 years of life. We show how price policy can nudge individuals to behave more healthy such that they actually realize the longevity and value of life planned at age 20.

We analyze the effects of R&D-driven automation on economic growth, education, and inequality when high-skilled workers are complements to machines and low-skilled workers are substitutes for machines. The model predicts that innovation-driven growth leads to an increasing population share of college graduates, increasing income and wealth inequality, and a declining labor share. We use the model to analyze the effects of redistribution. We show that it is difficult to improve income of low-skilled individuals as long as both technology and education are endogenous. This is true irrespective of whether redistribution is financed by progressive wage taxation or by a robot tax. Only when higher education is stationary, redistribution unambiguously benefits the poor. We show that education subsidies affect the economy differently depending on their mode of funding and that they may actually reduce education. Finally, we extend the model by fair wage concerns and show how automation could induce involuntary low-skilled unemployment.

The fetal origins hypothesis has received considerable empirical support, both within epidemiology and economics. The present study compares the ability of two rival theoretical frameworks in accounting for the kind of path dependence implied by the fetal origins hypothesis. We argue that while the conventional health capital model is irreconcilable with fetal origins of late-in-life health outcomes, the more recent health deficit model can generate shock amplification consistent with the hypothesis. We also develop a theory of ontogenetic growth in utero and during childhood, unify it with the theory of adult aging, and discuss the transmission of early-life shocks to late-life health deficit accumulation.

In this paper, I propose an economic theory that addresses the epidemic character of opioid epidemics. I consider a community in which individuals are heterogenous with respect to the experience of chronic pain and susceptibility to addiction and live through two periods. In the first period they consider whether to treat pain with opioid pain relievers (OPRs). In the second period they consider whether to continue non-medical opioid use to feed an addiction. Non-medical opioid use is subject to social disapproval, which dependents negatively on the share of opioid addicts in the community. An opioid epidemic is conceptualized as the transition from an equilibrium at which opioid use is low and addiction is highly stigmatized to an equilibrium at which opioid use is prevalent and social disapproval is low. I show how such a transition is initiated by the wrong belief that OPRs are not very addictive. Under certain conditions there exists an opioid trap such that the community persists at the equilibrium of high opioid use after the wrong belief is corrected. Refinements of the basic model consider the recreational use of prescription OPRs and an interaction between income, pain, and addiction.

We study biological aging of elderly U.S. Americans born 1904-1966. We use thirteen waves of the Health and Retirement Study and construct a health deficit index as the number of health deficits present in a person measured relative to the number of potential deficits. We find that, on average, Americans develop 5 percent more health deficits per year, that men age slightly faster than women, and that, at any age above 50, Caucasians display significantly less health deficits than African Americans. We also document a steady time trend of health improvements. For each year of later birth, health deficits decline on average by about 1 percent. This health trend is about the same across regions and for men and women, but significantly lower for African Americans compared to Caucasians. In non-linear regressions, we find that regional differences in aging follow a particular regularity, akin to the compensation effect of mortality. Health deficits converge for men and women and across American regions and suggest a life span of the American population of about 97 years.

Women in developing countries face challenges in terms of managing their menstrual hygiene. Oftentimes they do not possess the right means nor materials nor have access to the right facilities. Using a newly released dataset for Burkina Faso and propensity score matching, we provide for the first time evidence of a strong causal impact of advanced menstrual hygiene management on work attendance. Access to advanced menstrual hygiene management materials (disposable sanitary pads) reduces work absenteeism of women by about 21 percentage points. When we stratify the sample by religious affiliation, we find the treatment effect to be insignificant for Christian women and strong and significant for Muslim women.

We investigate how the season of birth affects human health and aging. For this purpose, we use five waves of the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) dataset and construct a health deficit index for 21 European countries. Results from log-linear regressions suggest that, on average, elderly European men age faster when they were born in spring and summer (compared to autumn). At given age, they have developed about 3.5 percent more health deficits. The bulk of the season effect is neither mediated through body height nor through education. In a subsample of Southern European countries, where the seasonal variation of sunlight is smaller, the season of birth plays an insignificant role for health in old age. In a subsample of Northern countries, in contrast, the season or birth effect gets larger. At given age, elderly Northern European men born in spring have developed on average 8.7 percent more health deficits than those born in autumn. In non-linear regression we find that the season effect increases with age suggesting that the speed of aging is also influenced by the season of birth.

We propose a model of aging and health deficit accumulation model with an infinite time horizon and a steady state of constant health. The time of death is uncertain and endogenous to lifestyle and health behavior. This setup can be conceptualized as a strive for immortality that is never reached. We discuss adjustment dynamics and show that the new setup is particularly useful to understand aging of the oldest old, i.e. of individuals for which morbidity and mortality have reached a plateau. We then show how the existence of a steady state can be used to perform comparative dynamics exercises analytically. As an illustration we investigate the effects of more expensive health investment and of advances in medical technology on optimal short run and long run health behavior.

In this paper we set up an overlapping generations model of gerontological founded human aging that takes the interaction between R&D-driven medical progress and access to health care into account. We use the model to explore potential futures of human health and longevity. For the baseline policy scenario of health care access, the calibrated model predicts substantial future increases in health and life expectancy, associated with rising shares of health expenditure in GDP. Freezing the expenditure share at the 2020 level by rationing access to health care severely reduces potential gains in health, longevity and welfare. These losses are greatest in the long run due to reduced incentives for medical R&D. For example, rationing is predicted to reduce potential gains of life-expectancy at age 65 by about 4 years in the year 2050. Generally, and perhaps surprisingly, young individuals (i.e. those who save the most health care contributions through rationing) are predicted to suffer the greatest losses in terms of life expectancy and welfare.

In this paper I discuss overweight and obesity and their repercussions on health deficit accumulation and longevity in a life cycle model. Individual decisions are conceptualized as the partial control of impulsive desires of a short-run self (the limbic system) by a rationally forward-looking long-run self (the prefrontal cortex). The short-run self-strives for immediate gratification through consumption of food and other goods. The long-run self reflects the consequences of eating behavior on weight gain and health, exercises to lose weight, invests money to improve health and saves for health expenditure in old age. Not conceding to short-run desires, however, entails an idiosyncratic utility cost of self-control. The model is calibrated to match food expenditure, exercise, and other choices of an average U.S. American. The results suggest that imperfect self-control reduces average lifetime by up to five years. I use the model to analyze the role of self-control, income, food prices, energy density, and medical progress in explaining obesity and to develop a test on whether obesity is driven by excessive desire for food or lack of self-control.

There exists a steady trend at which later born cohorts, at the same age, are healthier than earlier born cohorts. We show this trend by computing a health deficit index for a panel of 14 European Countries and six waves of the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). We find that for each year of later birth, health deficits decline by on average 1.4 - 1.5 percent with insignificant differences between men and women, between countries, and over time. We argue that this trend approximates the rate of medical progress, broadly defined. The steady progress implies substantial delays of human aging. For example, the level of health deficits experienced at age 65 by individuals born 1920 is predicted to be experienced at age 85 by individuals born 1945. The potential health gains are not fully appropriated by individuals of low socio-economic status. Their health deficits decline at about the same rate but from a higher level, which means that we find long-run persistence of health inequality.

Married people live longer than singles but how much of the longevity gap is causal and what the particular mechanisms are is not fully understood. In this paper we propose a new approach, based on counterfactual computational experiments, in order to asses how much of the marriage gap can be explained by income pooling and public-goods sharing as well as collective bargaining of partners with different preferences and biology. For that purpose we integrate cooperative decision making of a couple into a biologically founded life-cycle model of health deficit accumulation and endogenous longevity. We calibrate the model with U.S. data and perform the counterfactual experiment of preventing the partnership. We elaborate four economic channels and find that, as singles, men live 8.5 months shorter and women 6 months longer. We conclude that about 25% of the marriage gain in longevity of men can be motivated by economic calculus while the marriage gain for women observed in the data is attributed to selection or other (non-standard economic) motives.

In this paper I propose a time-consistent method of discounting hyperbolically and apply it to three canonical environmental problems: (i) optimal renewable resource use, (ii) the tragedy of the commons, (iii) economic growth and pollution. I then compare results with those for conventional exponential discounting using the normalization that both methods provide the same present value of an infinite constant flow. I show that, irrespective of potentially high initial discount rates, time-consistent hyperbolic discounting leads always to a steady state of maximum yield, or, if the environment enters the utility function, a steady state where the Green Golden Rule applies. While (asymptotic) extinction is a real threat under exponential discounting it is impossible under time-consistent hyperbolic discounting. This result is also confirmed for open access resources. In a model of economic growth and pollution, hyperbolic discounting establishes the Golden Rule of capital accumulation and the Modified Green Golden Rule. October 2017

We analyze how childhood hunger affects human aging for a panel of European individuals. For this purpose, we use six waves of the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) dataset and construct a health deficit index. Results from log-linear regressions suggest that, on average, elderly European men and women developed about 20 percent more health deficits when they experienced a hunger episode in their childhood. The effect becomes larger when the hunger episode is experienced earlier in childhood. In non-linear regressions (akin to the Gompertz-Makeham law), we obtain greater effects suggesting that health deficits in old age are up to 40 percent higher for children suffering from hunger. The wedge of health deficits between hungry and and non-hungry individuals increases absolutely and relatively with age. This implies that individuals who suffered from hunger as children age faster.

We analyze human aging, understood as health deficit accumulation, for a panel of European individuals. For that purpose, we use four waves of the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE dataset) and construct a health deficit index. Results from log-linear regressions suggest that, on average, elderly European men and women develop about 2.5 percent more health deficits from one birthday to the next. In non-linear regression (akin to the Gompertz-Makeham model), however, we find much greater rates of aging and large differences between men and women as well as between countries. Interestingly, these differences follow a particular regularity (akin to the compensation effect of mortality). They suggest an age at which average health deficits converge for men and women and across countries.

In this paper I unify the economic theories of addiction and health deficit accumulation and develop a life cycle theory in which individuals take into account the fact that the consumption of addictive goods reduces their health and longevity. I distinguish two types of addiction: perfect and common. Individuals with perfect addiction perfectly control their addiction. Individuals with common addiction, though otherwise rational and forward looking, fail to fully understand how their addiction develops. I argue that the life cycle consumption pattern predicted for common addiction is more suitable for motivating empirically observable patterns of addictive goods consumption. I take the case of smoking as unhealthy behavior, calibrate the model with U.S. data, and apply it in order to investigate the life cycle patterns of smoking and quitting smoking and the socioeconomic gradients of unhealthy consumption and longevity.

It is a well known fact that economic development and distance to the equator are positively correlated variables in the world today. It is perhaps less well known that as recently as 1500 C.E. it was the other way around. The present paper provides a theory of why the “latitude gradient” seemingly changed sign in the course of the last half millennium. In particular, we develop a dynamic model of economic and physiological development in which households decide upon the number and nutrition of their offspring. In this setting we demonstrate that relatively high metabolic costs of fertility, which may have emerged due to positive selection towards greater cold tolerance in locations away from the equator, would work to stifle economic development during pre-industrial times, yet allow for an early onset of sustained growth. As a result, the theory suggests a reversal of fortune whereby economic activity gradually shifts away from the equator in the process of long-term economic development.

In this paper, I explore in an overlapping generations framework, a mechanism motivating a neurobiological poverty trap. Poverty causes stress and depression in individuals susceptible to depression. Poor and depressed individuals discount the future at a higher rate and invest less in the human capital of their children than mentally healthy or rich individuals. This gene-environment interaction generates a vicious cycle in which poor individuals inherit not only susceptibility to depression but also stress and poverty. I show that a successful one-time intervention has the power to permanently eliminate the neurobiological poverty trap.

This study presents a new view on the association between education and longevity. In contrast to the earlier literature, which focused on inefficient health behavior of the less educated, we investigate the extent to which the education gradient can be explained by fully rational and efficient behavior of all social strata. Specifically, we consider a life-cycle model in which the loss of body functionality, which eventually leads to death, can be accelerated by unhealthy behavior and delayed through health expenditure. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their return to education. The proposed theory rationalizes why individuals equipped with a higher return to education chose more education as well as a healthier lifestyle. When calibrated for the average male US citizen, the model motivates about 50% percent of the observable education gradient by idiosyncratic returns to education, with causality running from education to longevity. The theory also explains why compulsory schooling has comparatively small effects on longevity and why the gradient gets larger over time through improvements in medical technology.

In this paper, we show, using a panel of developed countries, that there is a long-run negative association between church attendance and total factor productivity (TFP) with predictive causality running from declining church attendance to increasing factor productivity. According to our preferred estimate, about 18% of the increase in TFP from 1950 to 1990 is caused by declining religiosity. In order to explain this phenomenon, we integrate into standard R&D-based growth theory a micro-foundation of individual cognitive style, which is either intuitive-believing or reflective-analytical. Under the assumption that R&D productivity is positively influenced by a reflectiveanalytical cognitive style, we find that secularization leads to an increasing labor share in R&D and gradually increasing productivity growth. We use these insights to reflect on trends in religiosity and R&D-based growth in the very long run, from Enlightenment to the present day.

It has been argued that hyperbolic discounting of future gains and losses leads to time-inconsistent behavior and thereby, in the context of health economics, not enough investment in health and too much indulgence of unhealthy consumption. Here, we challenge this view. We set up a life-cycle model of human aging and longevity in which individuals discount the future hyperbolically and make time-consistent decisions. This allows us to disentangle the role of discounting from the time consistency issue. We show that hyperbolically discounting individuals, under a reasonable normalization, invest more in their health than they would if they had a constant rate of time preference. Using a calibrated life-cycle model of human aging, we predict that the average U.S. American lives about 4 years longer with hyperbolic discounting than he would if he had applied a constant discount rate. The reason is that, under hyperbolic discounting, experiences in old age receive a relatively high weight in life time utility. In an extension we show that the introduction of health-dependent survival probability motivates an increasing discount rate for the elderly and, in the aggregate, a u-shaped pattern of the discount rate with respect to age.

Recent empirical research has shown that output and GDP per capita in the aftermath of natural disasters are not necessarily lower than before the event. In many cases, both are not significantly affected and, surprisingly, sometimes they are found to respond positively to natural disasters. Here, we propose a novel economic theory that explains these observations. Specifically, we show that GDP is driven above its pre-shock level when natural disasters destroy predominantly durable consumption goods (cars, furniture, etc.). Disasters destroying mainly productive capital, in contrast, are predicted to reduce GDP. Insignificant responses of GDP can be expected when disasters destroy both, durable goods and productive capital. We extend the model by a residential housing sector and show that disasters may also have an insignificant impact on GDP when they destroy residential houses and durable goods. We show that disasters, irrespective of whether their impact on GDP is positive, negative, or insignificant, entail considerable losses of aggregate welfare.

This paper integrates into public economics a biologically founded, stochastic process of individual ageing. The novel approach enables us to investigate the interaction between health and retirement policy in order to quantitatively characterize the optimal joint design of the social insurance system today and in response to future medical progress, and its implications for health inequality. Calibrating our model to Germany, we find that currently the public health and pension system is approximately optimal. Future progress in medical technology calls for a potentially drastic increase in health spending that typically shall be accompanied with a lower pension savings rate and a higher retirement age. Medical progress and higher health spending is predicted to lead to more health inequality.

This paper exploits the unexpected decline of deaths from cardiovascular diseases since the 1970s as a large positive health shock that affected predominantly old-age mortality; i.e., the fourth stage of the epidemiological transition. Using a differences-in-differences estimation strategy, we find that U.S. states with higher levels of cardiovascular-disease mortality prior the 1970s experienced greater increases in adultlife expectancy and higher education enrollment. Our estimates suggest that the cardiovascular revolution caused an increase in life expectancy of 1.5 years and an increase in education enrollment of 9 percentage points, i.e. 52 percent of the observed increase from 1960 to 2000.

For most of human history there existed a well-educated and innovative elite whereas mass education, market R&D, and high growth are phenomena of the modern period. In order to explain these phenomena we propose an innovation-driven growth model for the very long run in which the individual-specific return to education is conceptualized as an compound of cognitive ability and family background. This allows us to establish a locally stable steady state at which family background determines whether an individual experiences education and a locally stable steady state at which education is determined by cognitive ability. Compulsory schooling can move society from elite education to mass education. An interaction between education and life expectancy explains why the education period gets longer with ongoing economic development. Embedding this household behavior into a macro-economy we can explain different paths to modern growth: According to the Prussian way, compulsory education is implemented first and triggers later on the onset of market R&D and modern growth. According to the British way, market R&D and the take off to growth is initiated without mass education, which is triggered later by technical progress and economic development.

In this paper, I suggest a novel explanation for a hump-shaped ageconsumption profile, based on human aging. The model integrates health in the utility function and utilizes recent estimates on the effects of health on the marginal utility of consumption. The parsimonious model has a closed-form solution for the age of peak consumption and the consumption level at that age relative to initial consumption. A calibration of the model with data from gerontology produces an empirically plausible hump in consumption.

This paper integrates a simple theory of identity choice into a framework of endogenous economic growth to explain how secularization can be both cause and consequence of economic development. A secular identity allows an individual to derive more pleasure from consumption than religious individuals, leading secular individuals to work harder and to save more in order to experience this pleasure from consumption. These activities are conducive to economic growth. Higher income makes consumption more affordable and increases the appeal of a secular identity for the next generation. An extension of the basic model investigates the Protestant Reformation as an intermediate stage during the take-off to growth. Another extension introduces intergenerationally dependent religious preferences and demonstrates how a social multiplier amplifies the speed of secularization.

We generalize a trade model with firm-specific heterogeneity and R&D-based growth to allow for an endogenous education decision of households and an endogenously evolving population. Our framework is able to explain cross-country differences in living standards and trade intensities by the differential pace of human capital accumulation among industrialized countries. Consistent with the empirical evidence, scale matters for relative economic prosperity as long as countries are closed, whereas scale does not matter in a fully globalized world. Interestingly, however, the average human capital level of a country influences its relative economic prosperity irrespective of its trade-openness. While being consistent with the empirical evidence, our framework has the additional advantage that steady-state growth of income does not hinge on the unrealistic assumption of an ever expanding population.

This paper provides a closed-form solution for the health capital model of health demand. The results are exploited in order to prove analytically the comparative dynamics of the model. Results are derived for the so called pure investment model, the pure consumption model and a combination of both types of models. Given the plausible assumptions that (i) health declines with age and that (ii) the health capital stock at death is lower than the health capital stock needed for eternal life, it is shown that the optimal solution always implies eternal life. This outcome occurs independently from the initial stock of health, the impact of health on productivity, and the importance of health for utility and it is robust against the introduction of a finite age-dependent rate of health depreciation.

We set up a unified growth model with gender-specific differences in tastes for consumption, fertility, education of daughters and sons, and consider the intra-household bargaining power of spouses. In line with the empirical regularity for less developed countries, we assume that mothers desire to have no more children than fathers and to invest no less in education per child. We then show that female empowerment has the potential to promote the transition from a state of high fertility, low education, and sluggish economic growth towards a state of low fertility, high education, and fast economic growth if the child quantity-quality preferences of spouses differ substantially. In this case targeted policies to empower women have the potential to constitute a successful development strategy. We demonstrate the robustness of this finding with respect to endogenously evolving bargaining power and division of child-rearing time within the household.

We investigate the effects of demographic change and human capital accumulation on trade and productivity of domestic firms. In so doing we integrate a micro-founded education and fertility decision of households into a model of international trade with firm heterogeneity. Our framework leads to four testable implications: i) the export share of a country increases in the education level of its population, ii) the export share of a country decreases in the birth rate of its population, iii) the average profitability of firms increases in the education level of a country, iv) the average profitability of firms decreases in the birth rate of a country. We find that all four implications are supported by empirical evidence for a panel of OECD countries from 1960 to 2010. Our results suggest that investments in human capital accumulation, especially in higher education, are an important determinant of a country's international competitiveness. Furthermore, falling birth rates need not be a serious concern with respect to productivity and international competitiveness of countries.

Unified growth theory predicts that the timing of the fertility transition is a key determinant of contemporary comparative development, as it marks the onset of the take-off to sustained growth. Neoclassical growth theory presupposes a take-off, and explains comparative development by variations in (subsequent) investment rates. The present analysis integrates these two perspectives empirically, and shows that they together constitute a powerful predictive tool vis-a-vis contemporary income differences.

This study presents a novel view on education and health behavior of individuals constrained by aging bodies. The aging process, i.e. the accumulation of health deficits over time, is built on recent insights from gerontology. The loss of body functionality, which eventually leads to death, can be accelerated by unhealthy behavior and delayed through health expenditure. The proposed theory rationalizes why better educated people optimally choose a healthier lifestyle, that is why they spend more on health and indulge less in unhealthy behavior. The model is calibrated for the average male US citizen. In the benchmark case a di erence of the return to education that motivates one year more of education motivates also about 8 percent less unhealthy behavior and 5 percent more health expenditure and thus explains half a year gain of longevity. Progress in medical technology explains why the education gradient gets larger over time.

This paper integrates imperfect self-control into the standard model of endogenous growth. Individuals are conceptualized as dual-selves consisting of a long-run planner and a short-run doer. The long-run self can partly control the short-run self´s strife for immediate gratification. It is shown that the solution is structurally equivalent to the one of the standard endogenous growth model as long as self-control is sufficiently strong. Within a certain range of self-control an investment subsidy can be useful in order to reduce consumption and to increase investment, growth, and welfare of the long-run self. A consumption tax, perhaps surprisingly, is counterproductive. It induces individuals with limited self-control to consume even more.

This paper provides the exact analytical solution for the standard model of endogenous growth when consumers have present-biased preferences and make time-inconsistent savings plans, which they revise continuously. It is shown that long-run growth is not necessarily lower under present-biased preferences. In fact, an equivalence result holds. If hyperbolical discounting provides the same present value of a constant infinite income stream as standard exponential discounting, then the equilibrium rate of economic growth is also the same under both discounting methods. In this sense present-bias and the entailed time-inconsistency of savings plans are harmless for economic growth. The result is robust to the introduction of non-homothetic utility and a variable elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption.

In this paper we examine the long-run relationship between religiosity and income using retrospective data on church attendance rates for a panel of countries from 1925 to 1990. We employ panel cointegration and causality techniques to control for omitted variable and endogeneity bias and test for the direction of causality. We show that there exists a negative long-run relationship between the level of religiosity, measured by church attendance, and the level of income, measured by the log of GDP per capita. The result is robust to alternative estimation methods, potential outliers, sample selection, different measures of church attendance, and alternative specifications of the income variable. Long-run causality runs in both directions, higher income leads to declining religiosity and declining religiosity leads to higher income.