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Die Anlage in Aktien spielt in der bankbasierten Ökonomie Deutschlands eine weitaus geringere Rolle als in den marktbasierten USA. Das sich hierin widerspiegelnde anders geartete Risikoverhalten ist nur vor dem Hintergrund unterschiedlicher kultureller Kontexte zu verstehen. Die Deutschen sind in ihrem Anlageverhalten stark sicherheitsorientiert, wobei sie ein - wie sich gezeigt hat, nicht immer begründetes - großes Vertrauen in ihre Bankberater haben. Offenbar treten in Deutschland Renditeerwartungen gegenüber einem gesellschaftlich eingeübten und allgemein akzeptierten Verhaltensmuster zurück. Despite a global homogenisation of financial markets, some characteristic national structures of private investors' behaviour have been preserved. The underlying persistence of observable differences is due to the embeddedness of these markets in historical, institutional and cultural frameworks. Thus, the perception of fi nancial risk is a function of culturally inherited social norms and conventions attached to different fi nancial risk-taking domains. Private investors' behaviour is guided by heterogeneous versions of rationality, thus explaining why households in bank-based systems like Germany provide banks with 'patient capital' even at the price of lower return expectations.

Verbraucherpolitische Maßnahmen müssen dort ansetzen, wo sich Verbraucher nicht selbst schützen können. Notwendige Bedingung für eine effektive Gestaltung verbraucherpolitischer Maßnahmen ist daher das Wissen um das tatsächliche Verhalten von Verbrauchern. Gerade im Bereich beratungsintensiver Finanzdienstleistungen, in dem der Informationsaustausch zwischen Verbraucher und Berater eine zentrale Rolle einnimmt, ist die Kenntnis der Schwächen des Informationsverhaltens von Verbrauchern essentiell. Das Paradigma der Verhaltensökonomie ist in der Lage, reales, beschränkt rationales Verbraucherverhalten und die damit einhergehenden Probleme aufzuzeigen. Das Paradigma wird daher herangezogen, um die für beratungsintensive Finanzdienstleistungen wesentlichen Konsequenzen beschränkt rationalen (Informations-)Verhaltens von Verbrauchern theoretisch zu analysieren und so Problemfelder zu identifizieren, die bei der Gestaltung verbraucherpolitischer Ansätze berücksichtigt werden sollten. Consumer policy should protect consumers where they cannot protect themselves. Therefore, the knowledge of actual consumer behavior is a necessary condition for the effective design of measures involving consumer policy. Particularly when dealing with financial services that mainly rely on advice giving and taking, it is essential to know about the weaknesses of consumers' information behavior. The paradigm of Behavioral Economics uncovers boundedly rational consumer behavior as well as the corresponding problems. It is therefore employed in this article to theoretically analyze important consequences, boundedly rational behavior has in the financial advice giving and taking context, and to thereby identify problems, which should be considered in the design of measures involving consumer policy.

The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned, when fees are used by financial institutions to steer advice. We experimentally investigate whether voluntary contract components can reduce the conflict of interest and increase truth telling of advisors. We compare a voluntary payment upfront, an obligatory payment upfront, a voluntary bonus afterwards, and a three-stage design with a voluntary payment upfront and a bonus after. Across treatments, there is significantly more truthful advice when both clients and advisors have opportunities to reciprocate. Within treatments, the frequency of truthful advice is significantly higher when the voluntary payment is large.

We present evidence of the impact of buy-side analysts on the behavior and performance of fund managers. Using data provided by a large global asset manager, we relate buy-side analysts' recommendations to fund transactions on a daily basis. Our results show that buy-side analysts have a significant influence on trading decisions: Fund managers almost certainly follow recent recommendation revisions in their trades. Fund flows and sell-side recommendations matter as well, but to a lesser extent. Positive abnormal returns to buy-side analysts' revisions are also reflected in the performance of mutual fund trades: trades triggered by buy-side recommendations have higher returns than other trades.

We investigate the effects of both trust and sociability for stock market participation, the role of which has been examined separately by existing finance literature. We use internationally comparable household data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe supplemented with regional information on generalized trust from the World Value Survey and on specific trust to financial institutions from Eurobarometer. We show that trust and sociability have distinct and sizeable positive effects on stock market participation and that sociability is likely to partly balance the discouragement effect on stockholding induced by low generalized trust in the region of residence. We also show that specific trust in advice given by financial institutions represents a prominent factor for stock investing, compared to other tangible features of the banking environment. Probing further into various groups of households, we find that sociability can induce stockholding among the less well off in Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland where stock market participation is widespread. On the other hand, the effect of generalized trust is strong in countries with limited participation and low average trust like Austria, Spain, and Italy, offering an explanation for the remarkably low participation rates of the wealthy living therein.

We merge administrative information from a large German discount brokerage firm with regional data to examine if financial advisors improve portfolio performance. Our data track accounts of 32,751 randomly selected individual customers over 66 months and allow direct comparison of performance across self-managed accounts and accounts run by, or in consultation with, independent financial advisors. In contrast to the picture painted by simple descriptive statistics, econometric analysis that corrects for the endogeneity of the choice of having a financial advisor suggests that advisors are associated with lower total and excess account returns, higher portfolio risk and probabilities of losses, and higher trading frequency and portfolio turnover relative to what account owners of given characteristics tend to achieve on their own. Regression analysis of who uses an IFA suggests that IFAs are matched with richer, older investors rather than with poorer, younger ones.

People often disregard the need for individual savings for old-age although a decreasing rate of birth and an increasing life expectancy make it necessary to save additional money for retirement by using private or occupational pensions. Due to a lack of financial literacy and a variety of products it is important that people consult financial intermediaries like banks and insurance companies which support their savings plans. We apply the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis to explain whether people of different socioeconomic attributes contact diverse financial intermediaries and which motives promote this consultancy. To answer those and other questions on differences in consulting behavior of financial intermediaries Probit regressions are used. We find that income, low risk aversion and the presence of banks in the local surrounding have a large impact on oldage savings behavior. Our results differ across intermediary groups. They have important policy implications as better financial literacy and enhanced consulting activities may cause less old-age poverty and more trust in the financial system.

In the experimental scenario several agents repeatedly invest in n (n>2) state-specific assets. The evolutionarily stable and equilibrium (Blume and Easley, 1992) portfolio for this situation requires to distribute funds according to the constant probabilities of the various states. The different treatments endow none, one, three, or all subjects in groups of eight investors each with probability information. Will investments follow the theoretical benchmark or the 1=n-heuristic of equal investments in all assets? Further, will agents with probability information be asked and paid for advice on how to invest? Although investment does not converge as predicted, portfolios of informed agents reflect the probabilities of states, and even uninformed agents do not invest according to the 1=n-heuristic. Advice is demanded and readily paid for. Surprisingly, clients do not always follow the recommendation. Competition among advisors reduces their fees as expected.

Using data on U.S. Treasury dealer positions from 1990 to 2006, we find evidence of a significant role for dealers in the intertemporal intermediation of new Treasury security supply. Dealers regularly take into inventory a large share of Treasury issuance so that dealer positions increase during auction weeks. These inventory increases are only partially offset in adjacent weeks and are not significantly hedged with futures. Dealers seem to be compensated for the risk associated with these inventory changes by means of price appreciation in the subsequent week.

Vor dem Hintergrund der für die Kreditinstitute voraussichtlich zum 1.11.2007 anzuwendenden europäischen Richtlinie über Märkte in Finanzinstrumenten sowie ihrer entsprechenden Durchführungsbestimmungen stellt sich die Frage, welche Anforderungen für die Anlageberatung der Kreditinstitute schon heute bestehen. Dabei ist in den letzten zwanzig Jahren eine stetige Stärkung des Anlegerschutzes sowohl in der Gesetzgebung als auch in der Rechtsprechung zu beobachten. Richtungweisend waren das Bond-Urteil von 1993 sowie die Einführung des Wertpapierhandelsgesetzes 1994, welche die Bedeutung der Anlageberatung nicht nur für den Kleinanleger, sondern darüber hinaus auch für die Integrität der Kapitalmärkte insgesamt berücksichtigen. Vorrangig geht es darum, das zwischen (Klein-)Anleger und Kreditinstitut bestehende Informationsgefälle zu beseitigen und ersteren zu einer sachgerechten Anlageentscheidung zu befähigen. Dabei soll zugleich eine faktische Verlagerung des Anlagerisikos auf die Kreditinstitute vermieden und insgesamt ein Gleichgewicht der Kräfte erreicht werden. Der Bedeutung der Anlageberatung wird auch in der neuen Richtlinie zur Ablösung der ertpapierdienstleistungsrichtlinie von 1993 Rechnung getragen, indem selbige die Anlageberatung zur Hauptdienstleistung aufwertet und mit umfangreichen Pflichten insbesondere auch in der Dokumentation ausstattet. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden daher die Haftungsgrundlagen sowie die Anforderungen an Kreditinstitute in der Anlageberatung thematisiert, die sich aus Rechtsprechung und Gesetzgebung ergeben. Da zum Zeitpunkt der Veröffentlichung dieser Arbeit einerseits die Bestimmungen zur Durchführung der Richtlinie über Märkte in Finanzinstrumenten auf europäischer Ebene verabschiedet wurden und andererseits die Umsetzung in deutsches Recht begonnen hat, wurden diese Punkte in der vorliegenden Ausgabe entsprechend aktualisiert.

In this paper, we use the Wall Street Journal poll of FX forecasts to analyze how the group of forecasters form their expectations. One focus is whether forecasters build rational expectations. Furthermore, we analyze whether the group of forecasters can be regarded as homogeneous or heterogeneous. The results from our regressions strongly suggest that some forecasters combine different models of exchange rate forecasting, while others rely solely on one model. We also find evidence that some forecasters underly a bias, while others do not. Overall, our regression results indicate a high degree of heterogeneity. In conclusion, we show that the expectation formation process is not the same among all economists polled. Our findings carry importance for macroeconomic modelling: The assumption of rational agents forming homogeneous expectations is not supported by our results.

We examine 120 Nasdaq and Over-the-Counter buy recommendations made by Internet sites from April 1999 to June 2001. The stock picks show substantial short- and long-run price and liquidity gains, although no new information is revealed about them. For example, liquidity one year after the pick day remains higher for these stocks than for a sample matched according to size, book-to-market value, and liquidity in the preceding year. In addition, after controlling for fundamental and microstructure factors, we find that stocks with lower initial liquidity have greater improvements in liquidity on the pick day. Further, stocks with lower initial liquidity and higher pick-day liquidity have higher pick-day excess returns. These results suggest that stocks have multiple liquidity equilibria, and that the stock picks, by coordinating uninformed trading activity, push initially illiquid stocks to a higher liquidity equilibrium. Finally, we find that stocks with higher initial media exposure enjoy greater liquidity gains and lower excess returns on the pick day.

Die Berücksichtigung der zukünftigen Entwicklung des Wechselkurses ist sowohl für internationale Unternehmen als auch für international tätige Investoren unabdingbar. Allerdings ist die Erstellung von Wechsel- kursprognosen schwierig, da bis zum heutigen Zeitpunkt kein allgemein anerkanntes Wechselkursmodell verfügbar ist. Es bietet sich daher an, bei der Erstellung einer Wechselkursprognose sich an den Einschtäzung schätzungen Spezialisten zu orientieren. Eine Möglichkeit sich über die Einschätzungen von Spezialisten zu informieren ist die Beachtung sogenannter Marktprognosen, die die durchschnittlichen Einschätzungen von befragten Analysten widerspiegeln. Die Auswertung der Marktprognosen zeigt jedoch, dass ihre Fähigkeit zukünftige Wechselkurse treffend vorherzusagen sehr gering ist. Anhand mehrer Kriterien zur Beurteilung der Prognosequalität wird gezeigt, dass die Verwendung von Marktprognosen generell zu schlechteren Ergebnissen führt als die Verwendung einer naiven Random Walk Prognose. Auch die Verwendung des Terminkurses als Prognose für die zukünftige Wechselkursentwicklung führt zu besseren Ergebnissen. Das schlechte Abschneiden der Marktprognosen ist vor allem auf zwei Faktoren zurückzuführen, die Merkmale für die Anwendung einer Verankerungs- und Anpassungsheuristik sind. Zum einen orientieren sich die befragten Analysten im Durchschnitt zu stark an der aktuellen Kursentwicklung. Diese stellt für die Analysten eine Richtgröße dar, von der sie sich bei der Erstellung der Prognose nicht lösen können. Zum anderen erfolgt die Anpassung der Prognose ausgehend vom Ankerwert aktueller Kurs meist in Richtung des Fundamentalkurses. Die Analysten rücken also bei der Erstellung ihrer Prognosen eine fundamentale Analyse in den Vordergrund, die im spekulativen Umfeld des Devisenmarktes auf kurze bis mittlere Sicht wenig Erfolg versprechend ist, da kurzfristig die Entwicklung von Wechselkursen durch Trends und Stimmungen determiniert wird.

This paper looks at the role of both commercial and investment banks in providing merger advisory services. In this area, unlike some areas of investment banking, commercial banks have always been allowed to compete directly with investment banks. In their dual role as lenders and advisors to firms that are the target or the acquirer in a merger, banks can be viewed as serving a certification function. However, banks acting as both lenders and advisors face a potential conflict of interest that may mitigate or offset any certification effect. Overall, we find evidence supporting the certification effect for target firms. In contrast, conflicts of interest appear to dominate the certification effect when banks are advisors to acquirers. In particular, the target earns higher abnormal returns when the target's own bank certifies the (more informationally opaque) target's value to the acquirer. In contrast, we do not find a certification role for acquirers. There are two possible reasons for these different outcomes. First, it is the target firm, not the acquirer, that must be priced in a merger. Second, acquirers predominantly use commercial bank advisors to obtain access to bank loans that may be used to finance the merger. Thus, we find that acquirers tend to choose their own banks (those with prior lending relationships to the acquirer) as advisors in mergers. However, this choice weakens any certification effect and creates a potential conflict of interest because the acquirer's advisor negotiates the terms of both the merger transaction and future loan commitments. Moreover, the advising bank's recommendations may be distorted by considerations related to credit exposure incurred in both past and future lending activity. The market prices these conflicts of interest; we find significantly negative abnormal returns for bank advisors when they advise their own loan customers in acquiring other firms.

According to the prospect theory financial investors tend to sell winners too early and ride losers too long. Therefore, demand for financial advise should be high in a bull market and low in a bear market. Thus, we test the hypothesis whether the demand for business magazines is somehow related to the performance of the stock market. It turns out that the sales of these magazines are positively correlated with the stock market index. Due to the fact that the information provided in business magazines seem to be already reflected in stock prices, trading on those kind of data will be just like trading on noise. In conclusion, we are able to isolate a major influence factor for the expectation formation process of noise traders.

Im Oktober 1998 befragte das ZEW rund 250 Finanzexperten aus Banken, Versicherungen, Kapitalanlagegesellschaften und großen Industrieunternehmen nach ihren Empfehlungen zur Gestaltung eines Vermögensportfolios zur Altersvorsorge. Dieses Papier untersucht in einem ersten Schritt, ob in Abhängigkeit der Branchenzugehörigkeit des befragten Experten signifikante Unterschiede in der Struktur seiner Anlageempfehlungen bestehen. Die Unterschiede äußern sich vor allem in der Aufteilung der Anlagen auf europäische Aktien und deutsche Immobilien. Während z.B. Teilnehmer aus Versicherungen und der Industrie mit einem höheren Renten- bzw. Immobilienanteil eher zu den vorsichtigen Anlageberatern gehören, weisen Banken und vor allem Kapitalanlagegesellschaften einen höheren Aktienanteil auf. Das Musterportfolio aus allen Empfehlungen kann somit in unterschiedliche für bestimmte Expertengruppen spezifische Portfolioempfehlungen aufgeteilt werden. This study analyzes portfolio recommendations of financial experts, finding significant differences in portfoliostructure depending on the experts' institutional background. The recommendations stem from a survey of 250 financial experts from banks, insurance companies, investment funds and industrial enterprises. The respondents were asked to construct a portfolio of retirement savings using the following assets: European and foreign stocks and bonds, real estate and money market funds. The main differences in asset allocation are found for the shares of European stocks and real estate. Five portfolios constructed from the recommendations are compared using different performance and risk measures.