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The rotating EU presidency's relevance for EU politics has decreased since the introduction of a permanent council president. However, news salience and framing of the own government acting as the EU presidency can amplify publicity for EU affairs. We, therefore, evaluate the visibility and framing of the EU presidency in 12 Austrian newspapers for 2009–2019. We conduct an automated text analysis of 22 presidencies over 11 years, testing several hypotheses statistically, and qualify results via manually coded frames of the Austrian EU presidency in 2018. The results confirm the crucial importance of the domestication of EU politics, underscoring the potential of the presidency to serve as a window of opportunity for public debate. We discuss our findings with reference to the EU's democratic deficit.

The power of individual EU Member States has been changing over the past decades as a result of revisions to the voting systems and the enlargements of the European Union. The present article analyses the development of the voting power of individual Member States in the Council of the European Union before and after the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union. We use the calculation of the standardized Banzhaf power index to calculate the legislative power of the Member States. The calculations recorded in the table point to changes in the weights of national votes caused by Brexit. The article pays special attention to the Visegrad Group, which we define within the European Union as an informal group consisting of four Central European states - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. The results indicate a significant growth of the voting power in Poland and more moderate growth in the other three Visegrad Group countries which contributes to the shift in the voting equilibrium within the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union.

Regional parliaments have only limited formal possibilities to engage in the European Union’s (EU’s) multi-level system of governance. Our paper focuses on networking activities of regional members of parliaments (MPs) as informal attempts to make agency claims and as a main driver for perceived collective agency. We employ a relational perspective, taking into account the various stakeholders and environments which regional parliaments have to deal with in the EU. Engaging in such networks can enhance collective agency since such activity is linked to recognition and can open doors to new resources and networks. We use data from a survey of regional deputies in Austria, Germany, Spain, and the Czech Republic to investigate these associations. The results point to the importance of such activities for the perceived influence of regional parliaments on political decision-making in the region and for perceptions about the future role of regions in the EU. Contacts with European actors prove to be crucial in this respect since they can lead to new, agency-enhancing contacts and resources., Historical Social Research Vol. 48, No. 3 (2023)

This article attempts to analyse the situation in Ukraine in the face of ongoing Russian aggression and increasing pressure from the Kremlin towards Eastern European states. The armed confl ict taking place in Ukraine means that the geostrategic situation of Eastern Europe has changed. In this context, the Eastern Partnership, which was meant to be one of the key instruments shaping international relations with the states neighbouring the EU in the East, is quite often seen as an ineffective or even obsolete tool. There can be no doubt that the greatest problem for the Eastern Partnership is that the project is seen in geopolitical categories – thinking of the countries of the Eastern Partnership in the context of the necessity for them to choose between the European Union and Russia (listening to statements by the EU’s political decision-makers, it can often seem that those states have no other option). The key research question is whether we will be dealing with an assertive EU policy in tandem with current US policy, or whether there will be another reset in relations between the West and the Russian Federation.

As a result of the euro crisis, EU economic governance has been reformed and EU institutions have gained new competences regarding national budgets, with the European Semester (the annual cycle of economic surveillance of the member states) being the most prominent example. With the Commission and the Council being the main actors, and the European Parliament playing only a minor role, a debate about the democratic legitimacy of the Semester and the role of national parliaments (NPs) in this regard has unfolded. This thematic issue, therefore, addresses the question of how parliamentary accountability of the European Semester has evolved: Have NPs met the challenge by adapting to the new situation in a way that allows them to hold the executive accountable? While the contributions to this thematic issue show significant variation across NPs, overall they reveal a rather pessimistic picture: Despite several institutional innovations concerning the reforms of internal rules and procedures, the rise of independent fiscal institutions, inter-parliamentary cooperation, and hearings with the European Commissioners, NPs have remained rather weak actors in EU economic governance also ten years after the Semester’s introduction. Whether recent changes linked to the establishment of the Recovery and Resilience Facility introduced in response to the Covid-19 crisis will change the picture significantly remains to be examined.

This article analyses the interactions between the members of the Polish parliament with the European commissioners in the context of the European Semester, the annual cycle of economic coordination. The Commission drafts crucial documents in this process which assess the implementation of the Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs): the Annual (Sustainable) Growth Survey and the Country Reports. The goal of this article is to assess how the Commission is held to account by a national parliament and how this affects the level of implementation of CSRs. The findings suggest that the Commission is accountable to this national parliament, even if the form of accountability taken is rather innovative and its policy impact limited, at both the EU (the CSRs tend to be immune to Members of [national] Parliament’s contestation) and the national level, as the implementation of CSRs seems to be independent of the level of their scrutiny.

The European Semester is an EU procedure, designed to facilitate coordination between national and EU actors in planning and implementing economic and fiscal policies and contribute to sustained economic convergence and employment in the EU. Scholars have highlighted this procedure as a crucial area of EU politics for national parliaments since its introduction in 2011. However, national parliaments participate differently in the European Semester. This article investigates which factors (institutional, political, economic) are more likely to intensify parliamentary engagement at the national stage of the procedure, based on a comparative quantitative analysis of parliamentary scrutiny activities across 35 parliaments/chambers in the EU over the 2014–2017 period. The article offers new insights about prospects for greater parliamentary accountability in the European Semester in practice.

With Lisbon, the European Parliament formally acquired an equal standing to that of the Council of the EU in the making of policies in the AFSJ (area of freedom, security and justice). However, the growing political salience of policy issues at stake and bottom-up politicisation in the AFSJ has had the unintended effect of undermining the European Parliament’s internal unity even under consultation procedures. To show how this played out in practice during Europe’s migration and refugee crisis, this article analyses the European Parliament’s role, preferences, and bargaining position in the making of two Refugee Relocation Decisions (Council Decisions 2015/1523 and 2015/1601) under consultation procedure. To do so, this article exploits Putnam’s two-level framework (level I and II politics throughout the policy-making process) to explore early agenda-setting attempts and groups’ positions on issues of refugee relocation and burden-sharing, as they were formally stated in their position papers and expressed at the LIBE Committee and at plenary. This article shows that the high domestic salience and politicization of the issues at stake left MEPs torn between competing principals at home and within their European Parliament political groups and had the effect of weakening overall unity on the issue of refugee relocation.

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was the last policy field to be placed under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure and its2013 reform was the first to be decided under this rule. This article analyses how rule changes following the Lisbon Treatyhave shaped policy outcomes related to ‘greening,’ i.e., making agricultural policy more environmentally friendly. Measuringthe policy ambitions of amendments during the different phases of the legislative process (the processing phase within theParliament and the negotiating phase during trilogues), we find that the European Parliament weakened the Commission’sgreening proposals—but did so to support an alternative greening agenda built on different policy instruments. This meansthat rule change has altered the power balance between the institutions, making the Commission more dependent on theEuropean Parliament. In the 2013 reform, this new balance of power came at the cost of greening the CAP

In this article, the author touches on the evolution of the European integration process, trying to capture the essence of the idea of federalisation on the way to the creation of the European Union. The theoretical narrative within federal thoughts is complemented by contemporary limitations both in the formal acceptance of the idea of federalisation of the European Union and in the informal “pole organizing the imagination” as mentioned by T. Mazowiecki. The main narrative, therefore, concerns the division of the field of EU integration between the analysis of structural limitations of the idea of federalisation of the European Union, including the system and jurisdictions of nation states, as well as ideational limitations, individual approach of the Member States to the integration process or the electoral success of Eurosceptics.

This article presents a Finnish perspective on harmonization within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The article analyses results from a study of the judgments and experiences of Finnish civil servants concerning the harmonization of the CEAS. The year 2015 constitutes a shift in asylum policies in many European countries, and a key question is how this shift has influenced the process of harmonization of asylum policies and practices. Senior civil servants working in the state administration of asylum and migration issues in Finland were interviewed anonymously as part of a comparative European research project (CEASEVAL). The interviews indicate that EU‐wide administrative cooperation has developed into a broad and diverse cooperation in recent years. The interviewees in Finland generally found harmonization of the asylum system to be necessary, which was connected to a need for greater predictability of the outcomes of the system. The results of the study suggest that Finnish asylum administration is developing toward harmonized practices involving transnational and supranational administrative cooperation in the field of asylum. The results support the conclusion of previous research that there is a process of horizontal Europeanization in which administrative practices develop organically within national asylum administration, independently of political disagreements at the EU level. This is relevant both to the framing of political issues and to research on Finnish migration and asylum policies, which need to take into account the ongoing European harmonization of policies and administrative practices.

The provision of high‐quality reception conditions and the effective inclusion of refugees are permanent challenges in the implementation of the European asylum agenda. The EU legal framework for the reception of refugees has evolved over time through various legislative reforms, notably including those launched in 2016 and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum proposed in 2020. The European Union has also tried to reinforce its non‐binding integration policy with the adoption of the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021–2027. While this plan is intended to promote an alternative “social resilient” integration model for refugees that emulates community sponsorship in Europe, it also generates great bottom‐up expectations to provide better integration. These legislative reform proposals and their programmatic framework are theoretically intended to consolidate the European reception and integration system, but in practice have increased the dichotomous tension between utopia and dystopia. Drawing on a political interpretation of both concepts, this article critically analyses the real nature of the changes proposed in the legislative CEAS reforms and in the action plans. Both visions are useful to evaluate the desirability, viability, and achievability of these transformative changes in the future asylum system.

This paper aims to provide an empirical analysis of EU policy towards the South Caucasus in the framework of the CFSP and CSDP along with perspectives of further development, taking in to consideration Russia’s military and ideological intervention in this region, and to address the issue of the EU’s role in shaping Common European Security. Methodologically, the research is based on qualitative techniques of analysis, key assumptions are raised through a comprehensive review of existing studies/primary sources and, more specifically, presents a case study of August 2008’s Georgia–Russia military confrontation and creeping occupation. The comprehensive review continues with Russia’s disinformation campaign and series of anti-government protests in Georgia (after the so-called “Gavrilov’s Night”), testing several theoretical explanations such as the democratic peace theory and the Europeanization Conflict concept concerning the EU’s confl ict resolution instruments’ evaluation and offensive realism to explain Russia’s involvement/intervention in South Caucasus territorial conflicts. As for its structure, the paper includes an introduction, with two important stages of model building – conceptualization and operationalization, an interpretation part – an overview of EU Foreign and Security Policy instruments, relationships with other global/regional actors, conflicts in the South Caucasus, specifi cally the, Georgia case, and, finally, a summarizing part, where key findings are highlighted.

In this thematic issue, the question whether EU decision making might be characterised by an excess of transparency stands central. This contribution addresses an issue that precedes such questions of quantity: that of transparency’s qualities, i.e., its specific shape. From an early point in time, transparency in the EU has been equated with the narrow and legalistic notion of ‘access to documents.’ Although since then, transparency has become associated with a wider range of practices, the Union has not managed to shake off the concept’s association with bureaucracy, opacity, and complexity. This remains the case, in spite of the fact that administrations and decision-makers across the world increasingly utilise the possibilities of technological innovation to communicate more directly with their electorates. In this changing communicative context, this commentary considers whether EU transparency as access to documents is still fit for purpose. It does so by exploring access policy from the vantage point of legal developments, administrative practices, political dynamics, and technological innovations. The commentary concludes that while improvements are needed, the access to documents concept endures. However, access to documents needs to be complemented by constructive (rather than predatory) public justification and contestation, to remain viable.

This article assesses the political and power dynamics of the Ordinarily Legislative Procedure (OLP) in social Europe and the likely impact of the UK’s departure in the field for future integration. It provides a detailed analysis of the OLP in social Europe during two recent periods of integration in the field—the first Barroso Commission (2004–2009) and the Juncker Commission (2014–2019). It finds the dynamics of the OLP have shifted from intergovernmental deadlock during the Barroso Commission to the characteristics of a new intergovernmental core state power during the Juncker Commission, even though the policy area is not a core state power per se. Despite the use of qualified majority voting policy agreements can only be achieved when there is near unanimity support in the Council, the Commission remains a neutral broker, and the Parliament shifts its position to that of the Council. As a result, continued opposition to integration in social Europe by Northern and Eastern Members means the removal of UK political agency will have only a marginal impact on the slow and piecemeal approach to integration in the field.

First published online: 27 January 2021 What are the implications of Brexit for the nature, role, and potential of Franco-German leadership in the EU? Brexit, we contend, is both an expression and a further cause of two broader underlying developments in the contemporary EU: First, a stronger and more prominent German part and position, and second, disintegrative tendencies in several EU policy fields and the EU polity as a whole. This, in turn, has major implications for Franco-German bilateralism and for Franco-German leadership in the EU. In light of a stronger Germany, a relatively weaker France, and significant centrifugal forces, the two largest EU member states must not only realign their bilateral relationship but must also act as a stabilizer in and for the EU. We show that during the EU’s recent crises, not least during the Brexit negotiations and the recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic, France and Germany did exercise joint leadership. We also show, however, that major discrepancies persist between the two countries in particular policy fields and with regard to longer-term European objectives. Brexit, with its numerous calamities and implications, thus once again moves Franco-German leadership—and its shortcomings—to center stage in Europe. When it comes to leadership in the EU, there remains no viable alternative to the Franco-German duo. Yet, in order to provide constructive leadership and successfully shape the EU, the two countries must bridge substantial differences and be ready to carry disproportionately high burdens.

This article examines the role of interest mobilization in strengthening or weakening congruence between elected representatives and citizens on EU policy issues. It argues that the relationship between public opinion, interest groups and elected politicians can be theorized as a selective transmission process. We expect interest groups to strengthen congruence between citizens and elected representatives who share their ideological views. To test our hypotheses we conducted a content analysis of statements made in eight European news outlets on a sample of 13 policy issues and combined this with Eurobarometer polls. Our results indicate that elected representatives from leftist parties are more congruent with left-wing voters when civil society mobilizes, while the prevalence of corporate lobby groups strengthens congruence between rightist politicians and their constituents. These findings contribute to our understanding of the role of interest groups in political representation and democratic governance. publishedVersion

After the end of the Cold War, a decade started within which the idea of European unity gained considerable traction. The Maastricht Treaty transformed the Economic Community into the European Union and the scope of collaboration between its member states widened to include justice and home affairs. By the end of the decade, it had become clear this was not enough to address the challenges caused by refugee migration. Thus the Amsterdam Treaty aimed at proper joint policy and law‐making in the sphere of migration and asylum. This ought to be done with full respect to the 1951 Refugee Convention. By 2004, when the Union was joined by ten new member states, the essence of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) had been formulated and turned into Regulations and Directives as part of the Union’s body of common law. The system was further fine‐tuned during the next decade, but during the 2015 “refugee crisis” the system collapsed for lack of solidarity and solid agreements on responsibility‐sharing between the member states. Since then, the single goal member states share is that asylum seekers and refugees are best kept from finding a way into Europe—for once they arrive political stress is the unavoidable consequence. Paradoxically, precisely the ideal of a CEAS has introduced practices that deviate from the EU’s norms regarding international protection. This thematic issue reviews some of those issues but also finds examples of harmonization and good practices.

The recent history of the Greater Region has been strongly characterised by fossil fuels. The area thus faces significant challenges as a model region in terms of the cross-border activities necessary to meet the requirements of climate protection and the energy transition. Based on the targets defined in Europe, this paper presents examples of approaches to action and projects undertaken in the field of energy in the Greater Region. Experiences gathered in the area - including those of the authors - reveal the need for action, firstly in relation to the implementation of structures and networks, and secondly to the potential development of research excellence in the field of energy/climate protection. As relevant actors in the energy transition, the municipalities have a particular role to play here.

This article explores the temporal dimension of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) by exposing its teleological character and the effects of the latter on the governance of asylum in the European Union. Drawing on EU policy documents, the article shows how the CEAS has been presented since its inception as a teleology, that is, a process that is inexorably unfolding towards a specific outcome to be reached in an indefinite time in the future. The outcome consists in the establishment of a common area of protection constituted by a level playing field in which asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection will be treated alike regardless of the place of residence. Such a teleological narrative informing the CEAS paves the way to overly optimistic expectations on the possibilities of implementation, which in turn result in an overestimation of the potential of harmonisation. By discussing the limitations of harmonisation in relation to the reception of asylum seekers, this article calls into question the possibility of a homogeneous area of protection where equivalent conditions are offered to all asylum seekers across the EU. Such a homogeneous space is utopian because harmonisation does not aim to eradicate differences but rather to mitigate them, thus tolerating diverse arrangements. The article, therefore, argues that the level playing field projected by the CEAS constitutes a promise that has two key effects: First, it depoliticises the CEAS itself by framing problems as technical issues, requiring technical solutions; second, it paves the way to further EU intervention in this field.

This paper presents an introduction to forms of cooperation on European, intergovernmental, federal state, regional and municipal levels. The EU Community Initiative INTERREG is described as a significant funding instrument for cross-border cooperation. This excursus thus provides background knowledge for many of the papers in this volume.

On August 15, 2022, the final contingent of Operation Barkhane crossed the border into Niger putting an end to almost a decade of French military intervention in Mali. The security void left by France in the country has now become the main means of competition between jihadist groups particularly in the tri-border area between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Violent extremism together with community conflict over the access of natural resources, inter-ethnic violence, and the increasing number of internally displaced persons (IDP) continues to spill over towards the Gulf of Guinea, through the northern areas of Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast, and Ghana. While the number of fatalities show no sign of lowering, it seems unsuitable for France and its European counterparts to entirely desist their efforts in West Africa. At a time when the withdrawal of French forces from Mali has brought upon a new spin in the region's conflict dynamics, this paper offers insights into the future of European engagement in the Sahel. It will do so by addressing the evolution of French intervention since 2013, assessing the current developments of the Sahel crisis after French involvement in Mali, and aiming at providing several entry points whereby the shift in paradigm could turn into an opportunity for French and European security and defence policies in the region.

As part of the EU Green Deal initiative in 2019, the EU Commission decided to develop a proposal to include emissions from shipping in the EU Emissions Trading System. This occurred only one year after the Commission had heralded the emissions reduction agreement negotiated in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as a significant step forward – thereby signalling support for the IMO process. We apply a Multi-Level Reinforcement perspective to explain this apparent policy volte-face, resulting in a Commission proposal in July 2021 which is now moving through the EU institutions. Such a perspective notes the “friendly” competition for leadership among central actors at various levels in the EU – particularly the Commission, the European Parliament and leading member-states. We find, first, that the inclusion of shipping is in line with the broadening ambitions of the Commission since the start of the ETS. Second, until 2019, the Parliament carried the regulatory torch. A turning point in the policymaking process was the inclusion of the shipping issue in Ursula von der Leyen’s programme for getting accepted by the Parliament and elected as Commission leader in 2019. From then on, the Commission again took the lead. Third, despite the 2018 IMO Agreement, progress there was deemed slow, which further motivated EU policymakers to act unilaterally. On the Process of Including Shipping in EU Emissions Trading: Multi‐Level Reinforcement Revisited

"The book examines whether EU competition policy is applied fairly and consistently to EU and non-EU firms despite persistent political pressure from member states for a relaxation of the rules and deals with the dilemma of regional organisations in the global political economy. Focussing on the EU's desire to achieve balance between the promotion of market competition and the enhancement of international competitiveness, the book explores the validity of its attempts successfully to ensure a 'stringent competition policy' which is nationality-blind and comparatively strict. Finally, it shows that the competition-competitiveness dilemma remains unresolved because the EU's capability to set global regulatory standards is constrained by competition and the need to engage in multilateral forums, such as the WTO and the International Competition Network. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of European Union studies, EU competition law and policy, EU external action and more broadly to global governance, international political economy and international relations"

This article explores the issues faced by the EU in developing its international roles post-Brexit, using a combination of discursive analysis and role theory to investigate the development and performance of roles in a number of linked arenas. Central to this analysis is the assumption that whatever form Brexit takes, the EU and the UK will remain closely entangled, and thus that the post-Brexit role assumed by the UK will shape the evolution of EU external action. But a key task for analysis is to place the impact of Brexit into the array of wider forces affecting EU external action, and this is a key aim of the article. The article begins by exploring the discourses of globalism characteristic of UK and EU foreign policies, as focused by the debates about ‘global Britain’ and EU global strategy since 2015. It then introduces a simple framework for considering the roles conceived and performed by the EU, and their potential impact in the post-Brexit world. The article then considers three areas of EU external action, and the ways in which they might be shaped by a post-Brexit world: trade and development, transatlantic relations and security and defence policy. The conclusion discusses the implications of the cases, especially in relation to the conversion of discursive role constructs into performable roles—a problem central to EU external action—and concludes that whilst the impact of Brexit will be significant, it is likely to be less fundamental than the impact of the challenges faced by the EU in the global arena more broadly.

Integration within the European social dimension, understood as the EU’s competence in the field of employment and social policy, has been fraught with obstacles. Divisions between the EU’s Member States have limited integration and resulted in a complex and piecemeal system of governance that is low down on the EU’s list of priorities. The UK is often regarded as a major obstacle limiting the scope of integration in the field and this is not without good reason. Historically, the UK has formed coalitions to block policy negotiations within the European Council and has pushed for minimal neoliberal obligations in the field. The UK’s departure from the EU could result in a step-change for the European social dimension. However, as this article will argue, the UK’s departure from the EU will do little to alter the current dominance of a neoliberal market-led ideology, as it currently transcends the political agency of the UK.

When the Lisbon Treaty entered into effect, the European Parliament became a core player in the decision-making processes of the EU's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its external dimensions. This new role suggested a shift towards stronger politicization in what had previously been a rather technocratic policy field. However, the CFP is not yet marked by a clear and consistent level of politicization. I use the concept of 'layered politicization' to explain this pattern. Although it is not comparable to the degree of political controversy shaping fully politicized policy fields, some similar political dynamics can be observed. Among them is a transformation in the policy process due to higher ratification requirements; a higher likelihood of political deadlock resulting from an increasing number of veto-players; and a strengthening of the contested legitimacy of EU decision-making. An empirical test of these theoretical propositions is provided here in the form of two case studies; the negotiation of Fisheries Partnership Agreements with Morocco and Mauritania.

This article examines the origins and current operation of the EU’s lobbying transparency register and offers a critical review of the drivers and politics associated with lobbying reform in Brussels. The analysis considers the dynamics of political communication in EU institutions and draws on concepts of the fourth estate, the public sphere and monitory democracy to illustrate the particular challenges around lobbying transparency and opening up governance processes to wider scrutiny, and wider participation, at the EU level. This article draws upon interviews, official data and participant observation of some of the deliberations on lobbying transparency dating back to the 2005 ETI. The analysis is brought up to date by examining the data within the Transparency Register itself, both substantively in terms of the kinds of information disclosed and in relation to trends around disclosures and registration, since the register was launched over a decade ago. The article concludes with a critical appraisal of the evolving issue culture relating to lobbying transparency in Brussels as well as recommendations for the development of the Transparency Register itself.

Nach dem Brexit will das Vereinigte Königreich (VK) sich unter dem Leitmotiv "Global Britain" als eigenständige Führungsmacht mit globaler Reichweite positionieren. Das unterstreicht die Integrated Review vom 16. März 2021. Praktisch wird dieser Anspruch sichtbar in dem ambitionierten Programm für den dies­jährigen Vorsitz der G7 und der Klima­konfe­renz COP26 sowie erhöhten Verteidigungs­ausga­ben. Damit will London auch die neue US-Administration von seinem stra­te­gi­schen Wert überzeugen. Eine institutionalisierte Zu­sam­menarbeit mit der Europäischen Union (EU) in der Außen- und Sicherheits­politik lehnt die Regierung von Boris Johnson hin­gegen ab; stattdessen setzt sie auf flexible For­mate mit einzelnen EU-Staa­ten. Das stellt Deutsch­land vor einen Ziel­konflikt: Einer­seits will es London in euro­pä­ische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik ein­binden, anderer­seits darf dies nicht auf Kosten der EU und europäischer Geschlos­sen­heit gehen. Angesichts der aktuell belasteten Bezie­hungen zwischen der EU und dem VK scheint eine institu­tio­na­lisierte Kooperation erst lang­fristig möglich. Mittel­fristig sollte der Fokus auf infor­mellen bi- und multi­lateralen Formaten liegen. (Autorenreferat)

Supporting the rule of law has been central to the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy since 2009. There has been very limited success in this, however. The EU’s core problem is what is usually its strength: addressing a highly politicized area through a technical approach. EU policymakers need to acknowledge that their political silence is permitting ruling elites in EaP countries to block progress in the rule of law and that the EU is failing to call out pervasive systems of informality there.

Die Rückkehr ausreisepflichtiger Migrantinnen und Migranten hat einen hohen Stellenwert auf der politischen Agenda Deutschlands und der EU. Neben dem Ziel, die Rückkehrzahlen zu steigern, haben verstärkte rückkehrpolitische Bemühungen auch eine symbolische Funktion: Sie dienen dazu, die Durchsetzungskraft des Rechtsstaats zu demonstrieren, und gelten als wichtiges Mittel, das weitere Erstarken rechtsextremer Parteien zu verhindern. In der Praxis erweist es sich allerdings als schwierig, die Ausreisepflicht durchzusetzen - im europäischen Durchschnitt gelingt dies nur in etwa einem Drittel der Fälle. Als einer der zentralen Gründe hierfür wird die mangelnde Kooperationsbereitschaft der Herkunftsländer genannt. Auf europäischer Ebene finden derzeit dynamische Entwicklungen in der internen und externen Dimension statt, was die Frage der Rückkehr be­trifft. Ziel ist es, die Zusammenarbeit mit Herkunftsländern zu verbessern sowie innereuropäische Abläufe effektiver zu gestalten. Die fortwährenden Bemühungen, die Rückkehrzahlen zu erhöhen, gehen mit entwicklungs-, außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Kosten einher, die oft nicht hinreichend beachtet werden. So kann der Druck zur rückkehrpolitischen Kooperation demokratische Transitionsprozesse in Herkunftsländern gefährden oder europäische Verhandlungsmacht in anderen Bereichen schwächen. Die Studie plädiert dafür, diese Zielkonflikte systematischer als bisher in eine umfassende Kosten-Nutzen-Abwägung von Rückkehrpolitik einzu­beziehen. Auf Basis dieser Abwägung sollten europäische Regierungen pragmatisch über Alternativen zu Rückkehr nachdenken. (Autorenreferat)

[Einleitung ...] Mit diesem Positionspapier aus der ARL möchten wir einen Beitrag zur Debatte um die möglichen raumbezogenen Auswirkungen des Brexits leisten. Wir betrachten diese Auswirkungen aus einer eher deutschen Perspektive heraus. Das heißt: Andere raumbezogene Auswirkungen bzw. Problemlagen, wie zum Beispiel das komplizierte Verhältnis zwischen der EU, der Republik Irland und Nordirland (als Teil des VK) bleiben bewusst außen vor, weil sie den Rahmen dieses Papiers sprengen würden. Wir skizzieren dazu Entwicklungen in sieben Handlungsfeldern, die in besonderer Weise die räumliche Entwicklung beeinflussen werden. Die Betrachtung in den jeweiligen Teilkapiteln fokussiert auf das jeweilige Handlungsfeld selbst, und es werden, je nach Daten- und Informationslage, Ausblicke zur Situation nach dem Brexit vermittelt. Das Positionspapier schließt mit einer Diskussion möglicher Szenarien des zukünftigen Handelsverhältnisses zwischen VK und EU.

South Africa's migration policy and practice mirror developments in other countries of destination for migrants: South Africa faces increased immigration and growing anti-migrant sentiments, leading policymakers to adopt policies that prefer deterrence over inclusivity. Just like other major migration magnets, South Africa is open to free movement in principle, but is wary of the impact it would have on its domestic job market. Since all these challenges are familiar to European policymakers, they should look more closely at the migration successes (and failures) of their "other" African neighbor.

Returning migrants without legal residence status to their countries of origin is high on the political agenda of Germany and the European Union. As well as seeking to increase the number of returns, policy efforts in this area also serve a symbolic function: They demonstrate that the state is upholding the rule of law and are regarded as an important means for stemming the growing popularity of political parties of the extreme right. In practice it is difficult to enforce the obligation to leave. Across Europe, governments succeed in only about one-third of cases. The lack of co­operation by countries of origin is regarded as one of the central reasons for this. The European Union is currently witnessing dynamic developments in the internal and external dimensions of return policy. The objective is to improve cooperation with countries of origin and make European processes more effective. The development, foreign policy and security costs associated with on­going efforts to increase the number of returns are often not adequately accounted for. For example pressure to cooperate on readmissions can endanger democratic transition processes in countries of origin and weaken European bargaining power in other areas. The study calls for a comprehensive cost/benefit analysis of return policy that addresses these potential trade-offs in a systematic manner - and that provides the basis for pragmatic discussions about alternatives to return. (author's abstract)

This article is a qualitative analysis of the Lisbon Treaty and its institutional and political implications for the international political identity of the European Union as a global actor. The Lisbon Treaty makes an institutional-political effort for integration of the European foreign policy capacities, followed by the installation of the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy institutions. This Treaty also constitutes the single legal personality of the EU which differs for the EU on the international political scene in relation to others. With the integration of the EU’s foreign policy capacities and the fusion of the (former) three pillars, the Lisbon Treaty makes some sort of rationalization of the institutions in terms of providing efficient and simplified decision-making, suitable for implementing a coherent foreign policy. Thus, considering the prerogatives and credentials of the aforementioned institutions, regarding their contribution to the international political identity of the EU and its decision-making, we conclude that the Lisbon Treaty does not represent a finalité politique of the EU integration process, but just a step towards its achievement.

By analyzing the impact of the economic crisis on the Western Balkan (WB) countries, the paper concludes that their export, inflow of remittances, and FDI have suffered due to the crisis. Regarding the rapid credit growth in years before the crisis, it spurred an increase in imports, which in the context of relatively uncompetitive economies, led to increased current account deficits despite significant remittances and FDI inflows. The impact of the crisis in the region can be explained mainly by their degree of European integration. But, the European Union (EU) is more uncertain to embrace the economically weaker countries, causing loss of EU credibility. It seems that the EU integration is a double-edged sword for the WB: in good times EU delivers its prosperity, but at a time of crisis, it is creating instability.

Trotz der Auswirkungen der Corona-Krise und der anhaltend hohen Migrations­dynamik zeichnet sich in Venezuela kein Ende der politischen Konfrontation ab. Das politisch-militärische Regime unter der Führung von Präsident Nicolás Maduro erweist sich als sehr resilient. Um sich finanziell am Leben zu halten, stützt es sich immer mehr auf illegale und kriminelle Öl- und Goldgeschäfte. Die internationale Sanktionspolitik hat bislang nicht die erwünschten Brüche im Machtapparat herbei­geführt, auf die viele internationale Akteure und Oppositionsmitglieder gesetzt hatten. Mit Blick auf die für den 6. Dezember 2020 vorgesehenen Parlamentswahlen hat das politische Ränkespiel Maduros erneut begonnen. Mithilfe legalistischer Tricks versucht das Regime die politische Opposition zu schwächen, indem ihre gewählten Repräsentanten abgesetzt und dadurch ihre Wahlchancen reduziert werden. Das politische Spektakel drängt die humanitäre Krise des Landes und den Kollaps des Gesundheitssystems in den Hintergrund - obwohl hierauf die Hauptaufmerksamkeit der internationalen Gemeinschaft liegen sollte. (Autorenreferat)

Agenda 2030 is the most comprehensive and ambitious agenda for development the world has ever seen. Culture forms part of this agenda. The Sustainable Development Goals provide pathways for culture to flourish, but culture also helps to drive the SDGs. The European Union and its 27 member states have pledged to deliver on the global agenda. Europe has much to contribute, and much to learn. The purpose of this study is twofold. Its first objective is to take stock of the European Union’s progress in reaching the cultural goals and targets of Agenda 2030. Five years after the adoption of Agenda 2030, where does the EU find itself? With only ten years left to realise the SDGs, where is the EU heading? Secondly, the paper will explore a limited number of potential policy priorities. How can the EU and EU member states maximise their impact? Where should the EU focus its efforts?, ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy

Die Europäische Union ist gezeichnet von einem Jahrzehnt der Krisen. Diskussionen über Reformen in zentralen Politikfeldern sind blockiert. Die neue Kommissions­präsidentin Ursula von der Leyen hat nun für 2020 ambitionierte Vorhaben versprochen, die Klima und Digitalisierung ebenso betreffen wie die globale Positionierung der EU. Zugleich soll eine Konferenz zur Zukunft der EU ins Leben gerufen werden. Wahrscheinlich ist jedoch, dass die fortschreitende Fragmentierung im Europäischen Parlament sowie verhärtete Fronten zwischen Mitgliedstaaten und instabile Machtverhältnisse in mehreren dieser Staaten nur wenige konkrete Fortschritte erlauben. Statt eines neuen (geopolitischen) Auftretens der Union ist eine zusehends stärkere Ausdifferenzierung ihrer Handlungsfähigkeit nach Politikfeldern zu beobachten. Die deutsche Ratspräsidentschaft könnte dem entgegenwirken, indem sie die Suche nach "Paketlösungen" über einen ressortgetriebenen Ansatz in der EU-Politik priorisiert. (Autorenreferat)

Hungary and Poland are threatening to veto the EU's new budgetary arrangements if other governments apply the rule of law mechanism to them. It is becoming clear, however, that the new EU financial framework, and the much-heralded recovery fund, are more vital to Eastern Europe than to Europe's South and that time is not on the side of the former. Awareness of this fact allows for a cool assessment of the pair's bargaining positions - and of the precedent that any hasty resolution to the crisis will set.

Die Entwicklung der Arbeitsmarktpolitik auf europäischer Ebene hat durch die Krisen der letzten Jahre immer wieder neue Impulse erhalten, die als Lernprozesse charakterisiert werden können. Mit den Initiativen für eine europäische Arbeitslosenversicherung, für ein europäisches Mindestlohnniveau und gegen Jugendarbeitslosigkeit ist die EU im Bereich der Arbeitsmarktpolitik mittlerweile ein Akteur, der die nationalen Aktivtäten zu ergänzen und zu unterstützen versucht. Die Covid-19-Krise könnte ein Gelegenheitsfenster sein, den Europäischen Sozialfonds um bestimmte Elemente der Arbeitsversicherung weiter zu entwickeln. Das Ziel sollte nicht nur darin bestehen, in europäischer Solidarität auf zyklische Krisen des Arbeitsmarkts zu reagieren, sondern auch die nationalen Kapazitäten zu stärken, um Einkommensrisiken im gesamten Erwerbsverlauf abzusichern. The crises of recent years, which have repeatedly given momentum to the development of labour market policy at the European level, can be characterised as learning processes. With the initiatives towards a European unemployment insurance scheme, a European minimum wage level and against youth unemployment, the EU has become an actor in the field of labour market policy that attempts to complement and support national activities. The Covid-19 crisis could be a window of opportunity to further develop the European Social Fund (ESF) through certain elements of employment insurance. The aim should not only be to respond in European solidarity to cyclical labour market crises, but also to enhance the national capacities for social protection against income risks throughout the whole work-life course.

Hydrogen is a highly versatile source of energy that has attracted growing interest among policymakers and industry players within the context of energy and climate policy. By drawing up its own strategy, the German government wants to promote the future use of this energy carrier in various sectors of the economy. However, a German hydrogen strategy cannot be drawn up independently from what is happening at the EU level and in other member states; rather, it must be conceived as an integral part of a Europe-wide policy. Since Germany currently imports more than 70 per cent of its primary energy sources, the market roll-out of hydrogen will inevitably have interna­tional dimensions. Therefore, it is important that this policy be anchored accordingly. In order to gradually create a market for hydrogen, the EU and Germany should push ahead with forming bilateral partnerships and developing multilateral governance. (author's abstract)

Seit Anfang 2020 haben die EU-Institutionen mit einer Reihe von Sondermaßnahmen auf die Corona-Pandemie reagiert, um die Eindämmungsbestrebungen der Mitgliedstaaten zu koordinieren und europäische Mittel für einen gemeinsamen Wieder­aufbau zur Verfügung zu stellen. Mit dem EU-Wiederaufbaufonds werden Weichen gestellt, welche die europäische Integration prägen werden. Dennoch ist das Euro­päische Parlament trotz seiner Haushaltsrechte bei den meisten dieser Entscheidungen Zuschauer geblieben, wie bei Euro- und Flüchtlingskrise. Um die demokratische Legitimation und die europäische Perspektive zu stärken, sollte das EP kurz­fristig intensiver in den EU-Wiederaufbaufonds eingebunden werden und langfristig eine Mitentscheidungsrolle bei EU-Kriseninstrumenten bekommen. (Autorenreferat)

While the magnitude of the current pandemic is still unknown, Eastern Europe might be facing a major regional catastrophe. The six countries of the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) have dysfunctional health-care systems and lack resources and protective equipment for their doctors and hospitals. The European Commission’s offer of immediate assistance is good news. However, much more will be needed to help the EU’s eastern partners fight the coronavirus and mitigate the socioeconomic impact of this crisis.

Brexit talks have entered extra time. If the UK is to leave the EU in an orderly manner, it needs a deal in the next four weeks. The trouble is that, as the prospect of leaving becomes more concrete, the government has finally recognized that it needs to honor the promises it has made to voters. Prime Minister Boris Johnson is struggling to reconcile his vague pledges with real world constraints - both internationally and domestically.

Together with its further widening and deepening, the character of the EU has changed fundamentally during the last two decades. Acknowledging this development, the politics-dimension has become visibly more relevant in research on the EU. This "politics turn" is accompanied by an increased interest in research on political behavior of individual and collective actors - voters, parties, interest groups, executive agencies, mass and social media - in the EU multi-level system. The objectives of this thematic issue are to conceptually, empirically, and methodologically capture the different facets of this newly emerged interest in actors' political behavior in the EU multi-level system. To this end, the thematic issue strives to highlight the connections between political processes and behavior at the European level and other political layers in the EU Member States' multi-level systems. In particular, we aim to broaden the scope of research on political behavior in the EU and its strong focus on electoral politics across multiple levels of government. To this end, the thematic issue links research on voting behavior with work on party competition, electoral campaigns, public opinion, protest politics, responsiveness, (interest group) representation, government and opposition dynamics, and parliamentary behavior more broadly to the multi-layered systems within EU Member States.

While the ECB has already taken bold steps, the EU member states need to support its efforts by committing to underwrite together some of the fiscal costs of the COVID-19 Pandemic. The best option would be to launch a Corona Fund with the power to mobilize 1 trillion EUR - support for such a fund need not be unanimous.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Europe is headed for a recession that will dwarf the economic downturn after the 2008 financial crisis. The impact on national defense sectors could be devastating. But as crisis and responses are still in the early stage, governments can still take measures to mitigate the effect on defense. To safeguard political and defense priorities, EU and NATO States need to act jointly and decisively.

Wie alle anderen europäischen Länder wurden auch die Visegrád-Staaten von der Covid-19-Pandemie erfasst. Anders als in Süd- und Teilen Westeuropas ließ sich hier aber eine explosionsartige Verbreitung des Virus verhindern. Mit diesem Erfolg im Rücken und den sozialökonomischen Konsequenzen der Pandemie vor Augen haben sich Polen, Tschechische Republik, Slowakei und Ungarn nun in der EU positioniert. Obwohl sie Differenzen hinsichtlich der Brüsseler Finanzpakete haben, werden sie durch die Kri­senbewältigung nicht strategisch auseinanderdividiert. Für Deutschland wird es weiter von Bedeutung sein, die vier Länder europapolitisch einzubinden und überdies gemein­sam Wege zu finden, um das wirtschaftliche Fundament der Beziehungen zu sichern. (Autorenreferat)

Blame games between governing and opposition parties are a characteristic feature of domestic politics. In the EU, policymaking authority is shared among multiple actors across different levels of governance. How does EU integration affect the dynamics of domestic blame games? Drawing on the literatures on EU politicisation and blame attribution in multi-level governance systems, we derive expectations about the direction and frequency of blame attributions in a Europeanized setting. We argue, first, that differences in the direction and frequency of blame attributions by governing and opposition parties are shaped by their diverging baseline preferences as blame avoiders and blame generators; secondly, we posit that differences in blame attributions across Europeanized policies are shaped by variation in political authority structures, which incentivize certain attributions while constraining others. We hypothesize, inter alia, that blame games are “Europeanized” primarily by governing parties and when policy-implementing authority rests with EU-level actors. We test our theoretical expectations by analysing parliamentary debates on EU asylum system policy and EU border control policy in Austria and Germany.