Search

This paper analyses opinions of political self-sacrifice amongst Tibetan refugees, and explores their meaning for wider debates on the evolving relationship between religion and politics in the Tibetan national struggle. This is a particularly pertinent question at present, given the recent prevalence of self-immolation in Tibet and connected debates about whether such protests are religious or political issues. Does the increase of self-sacrificial political methodology indicate a secularisation process of the Tibetan movement, as some have suggested, or is it simply reflective of the natural fluidity of religion's political influence? This paper supports the latter position and seeks to explore the nature of this dynamic relationship, including the positioning within it of the Dalai Lama. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rationale behind this paper is to stimulate reflection, open a debate and provide its readers with some much overlooked perspectives, perceptions and approaches from China, India and the Tibetan émigrés in India as regards the Tibet issue. These are formulated on the basis of author's interviews and enquiries with the representatives of the Dalai Lama's Tibetan Government in Exile, the leaders of Tibetan Youth Congress, the representatives of Students for a Free Tibet, as well as the Tibetan émigré in India and ordinary Indians. Besides, the paper also throws light on major differences and contradiction between India and China over Tibet issue; the future course of the Tibetan movement; and explores the possibilities of establishing a mechanism between India and China on Tibet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years what has been witnessed is that Indians have been encouraged to study contemporary China not only due to the cultural richness of that civilization, but also because of China's already significant influence on world events. In fact, with the incorporation of Tibet into the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1950 and the Government of India's oft-repeated official acknowledgement of Tibet as an autonomous region of China, the PRC ceased to be a ‘distant neighbour’ and became as proximate to India as the states of the Indian subcontinent itself. Obviously, for Indian scholars whose prime focus is South Asia, there is an imperative to study China as well. Tibet, which has been one of the key areas of China studies, needs to be researched comprehensively so as to gauge the extent of its influence on China studies in India in general and India-China relations in particular. It is in this context that this paper seeks to examine how academics, journalists, policy makers, politicians and China studies experts in India have viewed Tibet so far as its influence on India-China relations in the broader context is concerned. It also highlights the viewpoints of Chinese scholars on such issue, besides examining whether Tibet would continue to be an important factor impacting China Studies in India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Dalai Lama is apolitical and spiritual leader who, like Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr before him, has voiced strong opposition to violence and oppression while also calling for resistance to injustice. Unlike Gandhi and King, the Dalai Lama has not been on site with his people to protest oppression. In a unique move necessitated by exile from Tibet, he has taken to the world stage to expose the suffering of the Tibetan people while advocating justice, for preservation of Tibetan culture, and for a peaceful solution to the Tibet-China conflict. This paper analyzes the Dalai Lama's understanding of violence as grounded in afflictive emotions that create suffering both in the spiritual as well as in the political realm. The Dalai Lama `s analysis of "anger-hatred" as a destructive afflictive emotion requiring spiritual attention underwrites his moral argument for nonviolent resistance. This paper argues that the Dalai Lama not merely examines violence as a problem of spiritual affliction but that he addresses peace and nonviolence as an ethic. Rather than seeking public validation in terms of religious particulars, the Dalai Lama presents an ethic that can be universalized, that is benevolent and other-regarding, and that employs the language of normative action guides and rational principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents information on a visit by Thubten Gyatso, the thirteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet, to Peking, China from September 30 to December 1908. Why the Dalai Lama visited Peking; Reference to relations between Tibet and Britain; Refusal by the Chinese to ratify a 1904 treaty between the British and the Tibetan government.

Tibet represents one of the unresolved issues of the world. It represents an area which the nature intended to be peaceful but man had ensured that peace has eluded this area for last sixty years. On the one hand are the Tibetans led by the Dalai Lame who claim that Tibet was an independent nation which was annexed by a stronger neighbour i.e. China. They also claim that their efforts of finding a solution through peaceful negotiations am not being reciprocated by China. They fear that China is pursuing the policy of total assimilation of Tibetan people and their culture, ruthelessly suppressing opposition and waiting for the demise of the Dalai Lama. They also diem that Autonomous Tibetan Region (ATR) in China does not enjoy real autonomy. The Chinese on the other hand claim that Tibet has always been an integral part of China, TAR enjoys real autonomy and the Tibetan people have been benefiting from education and economic development since 1950. Any resistance to Chinese authority by Tibetans is termed by China as a revolt by traditional religious forces. The strategy of Tibetans led by the Dalai Lama so far has been to pressurise the Chinese government through international community to respect human rights of Tibetans and to negotiate with the Dalai Lame on granting meaningful autonomy to TAR. This strategy has so far failed to bring peace in Tibet. The paper makes a case for adoption of Gandhian method for achieving lasting peace in Tibet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious pluralism characterized Tibetan Buddhism by the eleventh or twelfth century, allowing for the development of many schools and sects with little differentiation in religious products. The early Ming dynasty (1368-1424) saw a significant shift in policy on Tibetan affairs compared to the Mongolian Yuan dynasty (1271-1368). Relative disengagement from Tibet translated into a liberalization of local politics, resulting in a shift from secular politics and clan wealth to ecclesiastical monastic institutions. The Geluk sect formed during this period, introducing superior technology in its organizational characteristics—celibacy, ordained abbots, casuistical adherence, scholastic training, and doctrinal orthodoxy—that distinguished it from other schools and sects. With the loss of its major Tibetan patron, the Gelukpa faced a serious challenge from its fiercest competitor, the Karmapa, and raised the stakes by introducing the incarnate position of the Dalai Lama and his labrang (financial estate). This allowed the Gelukpa to directly compete with the Karmapa for wealthy patrons. By forming an alliance with the Mongols, the Gelukpa were willing to counter violence with violence to become the monopoly religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Foro Internacional is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article presents an analysis on the impact of Tibetan unrest in March 2008 and the response of India to such unrest. It says that the Tibetan unrest emphasized the need for China to engage the Dalai Lama in looking for a peaceful and negotiated solution of the said problem. It mentions that India responded to China's sensitivites with restraint and caution during and after the unrest, even though there has been no change in India's Tibet policy in the aftermath of the Tibetan tangle.

This article analyzes the rhetoric that the Fifth Dalai Lama Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho (1617-1682) employs to describe various forms of violence. In particular, I explore the justifications he offers or implies for various types of violence to which he seems to grant his approval. I focus on his 1643 Song of the Queen of Spring, written immediately after a broadranging war that culminated in his own ascent to political rule over Tibet. Concentrating on his assessment of Gushri Khan, the Mongolian strongman responsible for installing the Dalai Lama in power, I conclude that the Dalai Lama attempts to legitimize Gushri Khan's violence by representing the khan as a transcendent agent of benefit, a bodhisattva whose own goodness permits him to perform actions that would be condemned if performed by a less exalted actor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A situation of asymmetric stalemate exists when neither side can force a unilateral resolution of a conflict even though one side is significantly stronger than the other. Although a standoff can persist indefinitely, the only path to resolution of conflict is negotiation. Even though the conflict between China and the Dalai Lama regarding Tibetan autonomy is not one between sovereign states, it fits the pattern of asymmetric stalemate. Current discussions between China and the Dalai Lama illustrate the importance of recognition of autonomy on the part of the stronger side and of deference on the part of the weaker side in resolving asymmetric stalemate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A plethora of criss-crossing complexities confronts over 100,000 Tibetan refugees in India and their central administration, headed by the Dalai Lama. The endeavour of the Tibetans to protect their cultural and religious identity has so far faced minimal opposition from their Indian hosts, barring a few minor incidents. However, as the number of Tibetan refugees swells, the administration faces the growing challenges of not only looking after the settlement of these refugees, but also preserving their religious identity from the onslaught of the forces of modernity in India. These challenges pose a serious problem for the Tibetans. In the days and years to come, such challenges are poised to enter a more critical phase. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]