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China’s Tibet policy is a subject of intense and diametrically opposed representations. While the Tibetans portray the Chinese take-over in 1950 as an invasion and continuing rule as a repressive occupation, Beijing calls it “liberation” of a historically “integral” part of China from imperialists and Tibetan feudal forces and emphasise its modernising mission and records. In such a politically charged context, dispassionate analyses of Beijing’s Tibet policy are few and far between. This paper addresses the question: what drives Chinese policies in Tibet and positions towards the Dalai Lama? It hypothesises that insecurity drives Beijing’s Tibet policy. Tibet, with its combination of a restive domestic population and an active Diaspora, led by a charismatic and internationally engaged leader, the Dalai Lama, induces insecurities that relate to the territorial, institutional, ideational (ideology and national identity) and regime components of the Party-State. In security studies parlance, China’s insecurities in Tibet fall under political security, societal security and military security. China’s state building drive in Tibet (integrating Tibet with China economically, politically and culturally) in the Communist and reform era has been efforts to mitigate these insecurities. China’s state building in Tibet is analytically organised around infrastructure-building, institution-building and nation-building. This paper finds that while China has had considerable, yet qualified, success on the infrastructural and institutional sides, nation building, i.e. making the Tibetans feel Chinese, has largely failed in the face of a strong Tibetan national identity. While China’s policies inside Tibet can be characterised as positive state building in that they push forward the integration of Tibet with China, its positions vis-à-vis the Dalai Lama are intended to prevent the reversal of the gains made in state building in Tibet since 1950. This paper, therefore, explains China’s policies inside Tibet and positions towards the Dalai Lama. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The flare up in pro-Tibet sentiments during the lead up to the summer Olympics has many in the international community scratching their heads. Had not China’s Tibet been modernized, enriched, and pacified? Had not the Dalai Lama’s star faded into benign ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SYNOPSISRESOLUTION OF TIBET ISSUE:MAIN ISSUES IN DALAI LAMA?S MIDDLE PATHColonel Virendra Sahai Verma (Retired)Research Scholar Jawaharlal Nehru University, New DelhiTibet issue, after Taiwan, is one of the most ticklish issue with China and also the one which is not intractable giving the adequate mutual trust and little more mutual accommodation. In 1979 Deng Xiaoping had said, ?Except for independence, all issues could be resolved through negotiations.? On 15 June 88, the Dalai Lama had announced in European Parliament what are known as Strasbourg Proposals, which in brief, ?envisage that Tibet enjoy genuine autonomy within the frame work of the People?s Republic of China(PRC).? ?Under the autonomy proposal, the Government of People,s Republic of China would remain responsible for Tibet?s foreign policy. However, Tibet would be governed by its own constitution or basic law; the Government of Tibet would comprise a popularly elected Chief Executive, a bicameral legislature and an independent legal system.? Since re-establishment of direct contact in 2002, there have been series of talks but there does not appear to be any headway. Chinese still continue to call the Dalai Lama as a ?splitist out to separate the motherland? The Chinese official press continues to blame him for harbouring a ?hidden agenda.?The autonomy and self government is being gradually recognized to assure democratic pluralism. It is to ensure respect and esteem for the ethnic identity, culture and human rights to an individual and community as a whole. It is a flexible concept which permits pragmatic political structures. It provides an option to the marginal societies to attain cultural and political identity. There are differences in the interpretations. The Dalai Lama?s genuine autonomy draws from liberal principles while Chinese autonomy theories drive from Marxist and Confucian principles where local elections are ruled out and political structures have dominant central authority. The Strasbourg proposal has two parts. The part one deals with history that Tibet was an independent country before it was occupied by PRC. The second part is forward looking and deals with future. China finds it difficult to agree with Part 1 and reject the whole package. Dalai Lama has himself stated, ?We should not be bogged down by history. It might be a futile exercise.? PRC blames that the Dalai Lama is internationalizing the issue. Dalai Lama should have first discussed the proposal with them. There is also a view that some senior members of the Chinese Communist Party have been inclined in favour of Dalai Lama?s proposal. ?It is the internal power struggle within the party which has withheld the resolution of the dispute.? They present a great ?achievement of Chinese autonomy.? They are reluctant to accept the idea of Chief Executive being elected rather than appointed. Chinese position is that Dalai Lama may return as the ?spiritual head of the Lamaist faith but not as a secular leader.? The Dalai Lama has himself number of times stated that he will go to Tibet only as a religious leader. The provincial government at Lhasa would be elected by the people. The old feudal system would not be brought back. Tibetans also suspect that Chinese may dispatch Dalai Lama to mainland under some pretext as was done for Xth Panchen Lama. There may not be multiparty democracy in Tibet as elsewhere in PRC. The Chinese Communist Party would remain in place in Tibet even with the Dalai Lama at Potala as a religious leader. Present xiv Dalai Lama, with his vision and pragmatic approach, would be able to co adjust and set the precedents for the future. Afterwards the difficulties would mount. The resolution of dispute post Dalai Lama would be complicated as voices of dissidents who advocate full freedom would be surfaced. There is scope of discussion and negotiation on the type of autonomy and governance in Tibet... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]