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Given the complexity of the current nuclear age and the absence of work on deterrence under true multipolarity, interdisciplinary models can provide new perspectives on tailored deterrence. Drawing from recent findings in the life sciences, this article offers a cultural neuroscience approach to deterrence decision-making, with special attention given to the ways in which culture interacts with cognition and the security environment to shape behavioral outcomes during conflict. Since North Korea remains largely a "black box" in international relations, a cultural neuroscience perspective can provide valuable insight into the effects of cultural conditioning on perception and cognition within the context of nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Through an analysis of the bureaucratic and military structures, leadership characteristics, and institutional landscapes shaping North Korean strategic culture, this article examines the influences of historical memory and cultural values, such as collectivism, honor, and face-saving, on political decision-making in Pyongyang.

The establishment of the European Defence Fund (EDF) marks a significant shift in how EU Member States approach the integration of the defence industry as it aims to systematically promote inter-European defence-industrial cooperation across national defence sectors. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence of the actual dynamics regarding EDF implementation. While there are accounts of EU countries' varying political positions on defence integration, including its industrial aspect, it remains unclear whether Member States' actual participation in integration projects aligns with these positions. Are national motives consistent once effective defence-industrial integration is underway? The findings, based on Masson's (2024) data on by-country distribution of EDF project financing (2021--2022), present a more nuanced picture of EU countries' effective engagement with defence-industrial integration than anticipated by the political perspective. While there is a positive relationship between participation in the EDF and defence market size, strategic culture does not influence EU members' involvement in the Fund. Furthermore, while liberal economicindustrial governance is negatively associated with national participation in EDF projects, a country's institutional quality has a significant positive relationship with it. This article reveals more complex dynamics of EDF implementation than suggested by the political perspective on defence-industrial integration pre-EDF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the national security strategies of EU member states in the 2009–2018 period, and conceptualizes three security strategies EU member states have adopted toward Russia – flexible accommodation, cooperative deterrence, and calibrated confrontation. It tests strategic culture hypotheses against those of realism and commercial liberalism to explain the variation of EU member states' security strategies toward Russia. While a realist explanation would predict EU member states geographically proximate to Russia would possess more confrontational security strategies, geographic proximity and confrontational security strategies toward Russia are not positively correlated. Bilateral economic interdependence with Russia, the presence of populist parties in EU member states governing coalitions, and EU member states' alignment or status as an occupied state during the Cold War also do not explain EU member states' security strategies toward Russia. A more consistent explanation of the variance in EU member states' policy on Russia revolves around the strategic culture of the state in question. States with a more Atlanticist perspective tend to be more confrontation with Russia than their more Europeanist counterparts, regardless of geographic proximity or economic interdependence with Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amidst the complex, dynamic and highly relevant landscape of the European Union (EU) - Africa relations, the partnership on peace and security constitutes a pivotal aspect, with the EU being an active supporter and substantial funder of national, regional and continental initiatives within this domain. While the vast majority of current research and debates frame the EU-Africa partnership on peace and security within the context of global power competition, this article explores the potential explanatory role of the strategic culture approach on this topic. Therefore, it looks at the main events and trends influencing the partnership after 2022, assessing whether the EU's security actions in Africa reflect a coherent strategic culture. The article concludes that the strategic culture framework helps understand European preferences, constraints and effectiveness regarding its security behaviour in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of SIRIUS - Zeitschrift fur Strategische Analysen is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The aim of the article is to reveal the intention of “strategic culture”, which has a significant cognitive potential for studying the political course of the main players in the modern world. In modern-day Russia, the study of this phenomenon is characterized by inconsistency and ambiguity, which has disorienting consequences and makes it difficult to use the concept to identify political phenomena and processes. The situation is further complicated by the lack of clarity about what a political strategy is. The article gives the author’s vision of the strategy and reveals how the strategic culture is determined by the historical past of the nation, including its military experience. Therefore, the concept of “strategic culture” refers to the dependence of the subject’s political behavior on their perception of security. This perception is determined by the historical experience of the use of military force and the attitude towards it. Therefore, in practice, strategic culture is expressed in preferences when choosing ways and means of the subject’s response to changes in the environment.The comprehension of a specific strategic culture is complicated by the fact that, while existing and being insufficiently studied and explained, it can be perceived as an irrational phenomenon. Understanding the strategic culture requires the perception of value meanings, symbols, and motives of political players. It leads to increased requirements for the choice of methodology and research methods. The study of strategic culture and related phenomena involves the complex use of applied and specific methods. Among them, discourse analysis and content analysis, cross-cultural, semantic and semiotic analysis, study of documents, analysis of performance results should be singled out.

The article reconsiders the notion of strategic culture using fundamental categories of general and social semiotics, which make it possible to systematise and instrumentalise this concept while preserving its broad scope. The proposed framework suggests a relationalist reconceptualisation of strategic culture based on Charles Peirce's semiotic theory, thereby helping to transcend the existing controversy about how culture-as-ideas, culture-as-artefacts, and culture-as-behaviour are related to each other in strategic culture. The suggested approach helps to clarify the problematic aspects of the notion of strategic culture by redefining strategic culture as a logonomic system (a system of rules of meaning-making) that constrains interactions in strategic affairs. Such reconceptualisation helps to study how strategic cultures are reproduced not only through verbal discourse but also through other artefacts and actions. Semiotic categories also make it possible to account for important distinctions between various elements of strategic culture and formulate principles that can guide the studies of this phenomenon. The article provides some examples from the Russian strategic culture to demonstrate how the proposed framework can be applied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia is using the Black Sea as a diplomatic tool in its foreign policy to achieve its maritime and foreign policy objectives, which are also linked with the country's strategic culture. This research investigates the significance of the Black Sea in Russia's Maritime Strategy for achieving its foreign policy objectives by using the balance of interest theory. This research employs two conceptual schemas. Firstly, with the help of maritime diplomacy, it analyses a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives in the waters. Secondly, the research uses the concept of strategic culture, which helps explore the diplomatic importance of the Black Sea in Russian foreign policy through the perspective of history and attitudes of decision-makers. This research highlights the case of the Black Sea for Russian maritime strategy, which also has a great economic significance for the region and world. It also highlights the importance of the Black Sea in the Russian maritime doctrine (2022) and links between maritime strategic culture and foreign policy objectives. It concludes that Russia is successfully pursuing its cooperative, coercive, and persuasive maritime diplomacy in the Black Sea region by providing humanitarian assistance, blocking Ukrainian access, and operating a stronghold at Sevastopol port as its naval base. In conclusion, this paper argues that strategic culture plays a vital role in employing the three diplomatic dimensions for achieving maritime objectives in the Black Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Turkish Yearbook of International Relations is the property of Ankara Universitesi, Faculty of Political Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of this study is to examine the correlation between changes in North Korea's foreign policy stance and the citation frequencies of the previous generations' discourse in the state-run media, based on the theoretical framework of strategic culture. As the methodologically most parsimonious and conspicuous means, this study selected Kim Il Sung's memoir, With the Century, for the key text of the country's strategic culture by referring to previous research; investigated Rodong Sinmun's citation frequencies of the memoir; and derived a relation between the number of citations and the country's annual nuclear and missile activities. Two variables' Pearson correlation coefficient (r) was .88 during the second half of Kim Jong Un's reign (2016-2020), allowing notable comparison with the coefficient of -.41 in the first half of the regime (2011-2015). The significant positive correlation suggests the possibility that Pyongyang has internalized a specific foreign policy perception frame since 2016, which includes maintaining a hanging-tough posture as a default from the previous generations, and entering into negotiations or dialogue defying the conventional wisdom. This logic may serve as a background element of resilience that makes the country return to the hardline attitude upon the occurrence of any slight change in situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2011, while the principles of foreign policy "independent, active, and non-aligned" under the respective governments under the Union Solidarity and Development Party and the National League for Democracy have remained the same, the foreign policy approaches – including the concept of non-alignment – of the two leaders of these governments have been quite different. This article describes the survival and foreign policy of the small country of Myanmar beyond the great power lens, arguing that the impact of strategic culture on the two governments since 2011 has differed because of the different levels of legitimacy enjoyed by the two leaders. The cornerstones of Myanmar's strategic culture are (1) that it shall never tolerate foreign interference, (2) that it shall always pursue self-reliance in its diplomacy, and (3) that the very nature of Myanmar is to be independent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Geography, culture and history play a central role in shaping a nation's perceptions, biases and images of adversaries. The combination of these factors constitutes strategic culture. Strategic communities tend to adopt diverse approaches to interpreting, analysing and reacting to a given situation. They may incline to pick peculiar strategic choices, such as using force or relying on external alliances, while not opting for a range of others. Decisions and choices are affected by patterns of thinking that evolved over the years. Strategic culture has evolved and generated significant discussion on theoretical frameworks and potential applications in a regional and international security context. Pakistan-India strategic equation is a complex phenomenon, fraught with hostility and mistrust, impregnated with conventional and non-conventional hazards. India views Pakistan as a stumbling block in realising her power ambition, while Pakistan considers India an existential threat. The article analyses the effect of strategic culture on inter-state relations with emphasis on Pakistan-India relations. Unique historical events, geography, the influence of dominant strategic strata and perception biases shape respective strategic cultures. It further analyses strategic culture based on Hofstede's Model, besides pondering upon symbols and philosophical influences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cultural assets are equally important for COIN effectiveness. Despite the significant impact of culture on COIN outcomes, the extant literature pays too much attention only to strategic culture, not the inherent roles for culture to play. This paper examines what made South Korean COIN forces successful in Vietnam. First, they benefitted from cultural harmony driven by the shared belief in communalism culture, a common ground between both societies. Second, their own Jeong culture, which is part of the communalism-oriented idea, motivated South Korean soldiers to develop creative remedies to win the hearts and minds of the local population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses the Polish government’s recently published National Security Strategy in an attempt to discern the broad outlines of the strategic culture within Poland’s strategic community. The article adopts a ‘fourth generation’ approach to the conception of strategic culture, which posits that there are often rival subcultures within strategic communities, which can often result in dramatic shifts in a state’s security policies over time. There is a brief discussion of how conflicting subcultures can be identified in Poland’s foreign policies in the past before the article discusses what Poland’s current Strategy reveals about the strategic culture of today’s decision-makers. It broadly argues that there are obvious continuities in Poland’s security policies, notably in terms of how the Russian Federation is regarded as a hostile state and the degree to which NATO and the EU serve to strengthen Poland’s security. It is also possible to see more minor shifts in Poland’s security policies in recent years, such as a renewed emphasis on territorial defence and a willingness to align itself with several states which are relatively antagonistic towards the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The perceived threat posed to Russia from so-called colored revolutions–popular uprisings attributed by Moscow to malign sponsorship by external forces–has become a central theme in Russian security discourse. This article analyses how colored revolutions came to be characterized as a specific threat to national security and how they continue to shape Russian thinking about the changing character of conflict. It explores Russian perceptions of the threat from colored revolutions, using the concept of strategic culture as a framework to analyze these perceptions through an analysis of the Russian military theoretical literature and strategic documents. The article establishes that concerns about non-military means of destabilization reflect continuities in Russian strategic assumptions about adversaries and how they seek to achieve their national objectives. It also reveals the perpetuation of specific narratives about the country's vulnerability to foreign interference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zarqa Journal for Research & Studies in Humanities is the property of Zarqa Journal for Research & Studies in Humanities and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores the discourse and practices of Indonesian foreign policy under President Yudhoyono (2004-2014) by using the lens of strategic culture. Based on Ole Waever's idea of discursive structure, and by combining these with Neumann and Heikka's idea on strategic culture as the interplay between discourse and practices, this article seeks to comprehend the effort to reconstruct Indonesia identity that was articulated during Yudhoyono regime. Therefore, the conduct of foreign policy during Yudhoyono, especially the doctrine of navigating the turbulent ocean, was used as a tool to further examine the actual discourse and practice of Indonesian strategic culture at the time. Using the Hansenian methods of poststructuralist discourse analysis, we gathered the speeches made by Yudhoyono and his officials during the timeline of the research. We then charted the emerging patterns of Yudhoyono's policies, compared the actual policies with the discursive rhetoric and narratives from the official sources, before finally assessed the appropriateness of the discursive patterns by looking at the initial and historical ideas (and practices) of Indonesian strategic culture. Based on our findings, we argue that the initial discursive structures of Indonesian strategic culture, formulated during the history of the nation (as argued by Sulaiman in 2016), limited the choices for foreign policies during Yudhoyono's regime. This limitation forced Yudhoyono to cling into more inward-looking foreign policy rather than his initial aim for outward-looking options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why is there no balancing behavior in Southeast Asia vis‐à‐vis what many observers see as a "Chinese threat," especially in the case of Indonesia? Despite all the concerns regarding the stability of the region, Indonesia is neither strengthening its power projection capability nor building a coalition to address China's growing power in the South China Sea. Indonesia's underbalancing behavior is the result of a strategic culture that influences its military and foreign policy thinking on threat perceptions and economic considerations, limiting the options that Indonesia can take vis‐à‐vis China. As a result, China as a state is not seen as a major, direct, and immediate threat that would warrant immediate action that may in turn jeopardize Indonesia's larger interest. Instead, domestic politics and security—especially public perceptions of how the government's friendship with China may benefit or hurt the government—remains the focus and the priority of the government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Review of International Affairs (04866096) is the property of Institute of International Politics & Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article investigates how strategic culture influenced the decision-making of Australia and Poland regarding the global coalition against the Islamic State. In the coalition, Australia has followed its tradition of active participation in United States-led operations, while Poland has embarked on a more cautious line, thereby breaking with its previous policy of active participation. The article examines how Australian and Polish responses to the coalition were shaped by five cultural elements: dominant threat perception, core task of the armed forces, strategic partners, experiences of participating in coalitions of the willing, and approach to the international legality of expeditionary operations. It finds that Australia and Poland differed on all five elements but that the major differences are found in dominant threat perception and core task of the armed forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this research paper is to provide a better understanding of the challenges that a modern state faces in the current security environment. Given the emerging threat environment with innovative state and non-state actors willing to confront a modern state across a spectrum of activities, it is of vital importance to provide a clear picture for civil servants/employees of the state to best use the tools of good governance. Without a more robust employment of the whole-of-government resources and a holistic approach of the national security the modern state will not be able to counter such threats and seize, retain or exploit the strategic initiative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Strategic culture plays a significant role in shaping current practices of maritime security in Indonesia. Rooted in the history and experiences of the military and the state itself, Indonesian maritime strategic culture shapes the perceived roles and responsibilities of the Indonesian primary and most capable maritime security agency, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut. Albeit institutional, doctrinal reform and weapons modernisation, the navy appears to be reluctant to relinquish its long‐standing law enforcement and internal security roles resulting in overlap of roles and responsibilities among the various maritime security agencies in Indonesia. This article argues that the historically shaped strategic culture, particularly the blurred distinction between ‘defence’ or sovereignty protection and ‘security’ or law enforcement, has not allowed the Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut to focus on the increasingly demanding traditional military roles. An understanding of Indonesian strategic history and culture as well as its civil‐military relations is thus essential to comprehend this problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is often portrayed as benign and peaceful. Yet, its assertive disposition on the South China Sea territorial disputes appears to contradict the "peaceful rise" narrative. China's relentless quest in strengthening features under its control and turning them into artificial islands equipped with military facilities have stoke fear of expansionism among the Southeast Asian claimant states and threatened the maritime influence and interests of the US in the region. This paper focuses on China's strategic culture to explain its policy considerations and Malaysia's approach in responding to changing developments following the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Tribunal ruling. The paper argues that firstly, China's strategic stance is two-fold - to neutralize US's regional dominance and to dissuade Southeast Asian states from their reliance on the US; and secondly, Malaysia's preference for a nonconfrontational approach that gives precedence to dialogues and consultations are insufficient in defending its sovereign interests and must therefore be aptly backed up by a more emphatic strategic posture both on the ground and in its diplomatic language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Middle Eastern Studies / Ortadoğu Etütleri is the property of Turkmen Cooperation & Cultural Foundation Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (CFPJ) is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The ideational definition of culture has hindered a meaningful debate of the role that culture plays in the discipline of International Relations. Focusing on the behavior side of culture instead, this paper proposes the Cultural Constructivist approach that takes account of both the cultural and the social in interstate relations. Academic puzzles in contemporary China's relations with Japan, the former Soviet Union, and the United States are better explained by taking into account China's cultural behavior pattern and its role in the country's identity construction of these other states. Cultural Constructivism is a falsifiable theory that enables us to see under which circumstances culture intervenes in a country's foreign policy making. A cultural behavior pattern has complicated the PRC's relations with Japan and the former Soviet Union, but material constraints and cultural differences prevented its ascendance to the main stage of Sino- US relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Academic Inquiries / Akademik Incelemeler Dergisi is the property of Akademik Incelemeler Dergisi (Journal of Academic Inquiries) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper takes as its starting point the possibility of empirical and theoretical cross-fertilization between strategic culturalists and realists. Indeed, recent neoclassical realist writings indicate that there is currently a move away from the more abstract theorizing of Waltzian neorealism. In order to conduct detailed foreign policy analysis, these authors have included an increasing array of variables including nonmaterial factors. The paper argues that much can be gained from examination of the alternative explanations of state behavior provided by strategic culture and neoclassical realism. Yet the benefits of competitive collaboration depend upon the particular conception of strategic culture under consideration. The paper identifies four main conceptions of strategic culture and examines the type of collaboration with neoclassical realism that is possible for each one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conventional account of American diplomacy in the modern era is marked by a cultural tension between realist and idealist themes symbolized by the statecraft of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. However, a revisionist account has emerged to challenge and even reverse the conventional account of Roosevelt and Wilson. This poses an intriguing empirical puzzle that is essentially psychological, as it pertains to the belief systems of these two presidents. In order to investigate this puzzle and its implications for U.S. strategic culture, we employ an automated content analysis of the public statements by the two leaders regarding their operational code beliefs about the nature of the political universe and the best approach to effective political action. The results reveal similarities and differences in their belief systems and illustrate how psychological models can provide insights into the psychocultural origins of U.S. diplomacy that remain relevant to the present day. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article contributes to the debate about the emergence of a European strategic culture to underpin a European Security and Defence Policy. Noting both conceptual and empirical weaknesses in the literature, the article disaggregates the concept of strategic culture and focuses on four types of norms concerning the means and ends for the use of force. The study argues that national strategic cultures are less resistant to change than commonly thought and that they have been subject to three types of learning pressures since 1989: changing threat perceptions, institutional socialization, and mediatized crisis learning. The combined effect of these mechanisms would be a process of convergence with regard to strategic norms prevalent in current EU countries. If the outlined hypotheses can be substantiated by further research the implications for ESDP are positive, especially if the EU acts cautiously in those cases which involve norms that are not yet sufficiently shared across countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany was the first country to issue a categorical refusal to support the US-led war in Iraq. Some have interpreted this as the result of a clash between the strategic cultures of Germany and the USA, others as a sign that a more nationalistic and assertive Germany is emerging. This article explains the apparently contradictory aspects of Germany's stance on Iraq by identifying two competing strands within Germany's strategic culture. It concludes that the German refusal signals neither a reversion to a pacifist stance nor that Germany is in a process of shedding the bonds and alliances that have so far framed the reunified Germany's military policy, Iraq simply showed that Germany, like most other countries, has conditions that have to be met - in Germany's case, conditions flowing from the coexistence of two competing schools of thought within Germany's strategic culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Finnish post-Cold War foreign policy has usually been approached as a change from a policy of cautious neutrality to one of enthusiastic integration within the core of Europe. This article suggests that instead of looking at Finnish post-Cold War grand strategy as evidence of a change, we could think about it as a sign of continuity. By tracing the evolution of Finnish strategic culture over the centuries, the article shows that there is a powerful element of continuity in Finnish strategic thinking. This continuity is interpreted through a revised version of Martin Wight's vocabulary, and suggests that Finnish strategic culture has always been based on a republican understanding of Finland's role in defending an anti-hegemonic security order in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article produces a model for empirical study of the security and defence policies of states, with a starting point in the literature on strategic culture (e.g. Gray, Klein, Johnston) and grand strategy (e.g. Kennedy, Posen, Kier). We identify two key problems with the literature. First, it only superficially touches base with the social sciences grouped around the concept of culture for a century, namely cultural anthropology and, to a lesser degree, sociology. The literature on strategic culture consequently operates with a reified concept of culture that is outdated elsewhere in the social sciences. Second, in sticking to a reified concept of culture, the literature has not (yet) come up with the kind of dynamic and specific framework for empirical analysis that we are looking for. Instead, it is bogged down in the debate begun in the 1950s on whether behaviour should or should not be treated as part of culture. In order to rectify this, we refashion the concept of strategic culture as a dynamic interplay of potential grand strategy, on the one hand, and specific practices such as doctrines, civil-military relations and procurement on the other. The key source of inspiration for this reconceptualization is the so-called `practice turn' in anthropology and sociology (e.g. Bourdieu, Swidler, Schatzki). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article amines the evolution of Swedish strategic culture during the twentieth century and up to the present. Although Sweden is the only Scandinavian country that has stayed out of war since the age of Napoleon, it still has proud military traditions stemming from Sweden's age of empire (1561-1721) and from the Cold War period, when this non-aligned country became partly self-sufficient in modern military technology, producing its own fighter-jets, tanks and submarines, even planning to acquire nuclear weapons in the 1950s. On paper, Sweden maintained an impressive number of armed forces (850,000 men after mobilization), although at the end of the Cold War their equipment and training left much to be desired. Only around the year 2000 did this huge Cold War defence complex begin to be dismantled. In line with the Swedish administrative-political culture (which is often traced back to the seventeenth-century statesman Axel Oxenstiema), the military enjoyed a high degree of autonomy compared with most other Western countries. This made it possible for the Army, the most influential of the services, to preserve its size rather than modernize gradually. Also, like other sectors of Swedish society, national defence was adopted by well- organized popular movements with corporatist traits, movements such as voluntary defence organizations with hundreds of thousands of members and by defence industry. Sweden was the first country in the world to abolish the system of professional NCOs in the 1980s, creating a unified corps of enlisted officers. The tension between the ideals of popular defence and broad democratic participation - hailed in Swedish society at large - and the demands of military professionalism, and Sweden's national self-image as an advanced industrial country, increased towards the end of the Cold War. Only after the end of the Cold War did academization of officers' training, the adoption of an official military doctrine and advanced thinking about network-centric warfare bring about much-needed modernization of the Swedish armed forces. Today, however, the mental gap is wide between the military elite on the one hand - which sees international operations as the primary mission in the future - and public opinion and large segments of the officers' corps, on the other, which still consider defence as defending national territory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is an interdisciplinary study of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) military decision making at the outset of the civil war. The historical phenomenon of the Communists' invocation of "Madrid" is studied in the context of the Chinese civil war in Manchuria, particularly the battle of Sipingjie. The strategic culture of the Communist leaders is discussed thematically in terms of their desire for a decisive battle, their expectation of a short war, and their propensity for preemptive strikes. Analyzing newly released primary documents, the author argues that norms, beliefs, and material conditions work in tandem in the making of strategy in a way that the realist premise fails to explain. He concludes that the interaction of normative and material factors, symbolized by the Madrid concept, heightened the CCP policy makers' acceptance of risk in 1946, which foreshadowed the open general war in China over the following three years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]