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Recognition is a normative concept. By recognizing someone as having certain characteristics or capabilities, we recognize their normative status and we are taking responsibility for treating them in a certain way. Non-recognition, in this case, can mean deprivation of rights and marginalization; in a democracy may preclude individuals or groups from enjoying the democratic egalitarian ideal, for example. Over the past three decades, reflection on this category has deepened and taken on greater importance in the debate between liberalism and communitarianism parallel to the demands, sometimes for the achievements, of groups and minorities (LGBTQIA, people with special needs, feminist, indigenous, ethnic, etc.) who feel unrecognized and engage in political movements through struggles for recognition. We will return here to the development of Axel Honneth's concept of "ethical life" in Struggle for Recognition (1992), a fundamental work for reflection on the theme. The author places his theory in the middle between Kantian morality and communitarian ethics: his conception is formal for he understands that universal norms are conditions of some possibilities, but they are substantive for they are guided by the end of human self-realization. O reconhecimento é um conceito normativo. Ao reconhecermos alguém como portador de determinadas características ou capacidades, reconhecemos seu status normativo e estamos assumindo responsabilidade por tratar este alguém de determinada forma. O não reconhecimento, neste caso, pode significar privação de direitos e marginalização; em uma democracia pode impossibilitar indivíduos ou grupos de desfrutar o ideal igualitário democrático, por exemplo. Nas últimas três décadas, a reflexão sobre esta categoria se aprofundou e assumiu maior importância no debate entre liberalismo e comunitarismo em paralelo às demandas, por vezes pelas conquistas, de grupos e minorias (LGBTQIA, portadores de necessidades especiais, feministas, indígenas, étnicos, etc.) que se sentem não reconhecidos e se engajam em movimentos políticos através de lutas por reconhecimento. Retomaremos, aqui, o desenvolvimento do conceito de “eticidade” empreendido por Axel Honneth em Luta por reconhecimento (1992), obra fundamental para a reflexão sobre o tema. O autor situa sua teoria no meio termo entre a moral kantiana e as éticas comunitaristas: sua concepção é formal por entender que normas universais são condições de algumas possibilidades, mas é substantiva por se orientar pelo fim da autorrealização humana.

International audience; Axel Honneth and Jacques Rancière are two of the most renowned European philosophers writing today, each representing in eminent fashion the two traditions of German and French post-Marxist philosophy. Axel Honneth has become famous for his philosophical critique of modern society centered on the concept of recognition. Jacques Rancière for his part has elaborated an influential theory and critique of modern politics based on the notion of disagreement. Underpinning their thinking lays a shared concern towards the logics of exclusion and domination that structure contemporary societies. Their prominence and the many points of overlap and divergence between their thoughts make a comparative study an obvious task, and yet very little has been done to date in this direction. This volume is a significant step towards addressing this gap. At its heart, the book features a fascinating discussion between the two philosophers, following a meeting that took place in Frankfurt a few years ago. In this critical, lively but always respectful encounter, each of the thinkers addresses questions and challenges to the other, before they engage in a direct exchange over key aspects of their approaches. The conversation is preceded by substantive presentations from the editors, which set the stage for the discussion. In the last section of the book, Honneth and Rancière propose original texts, which deepen the understanding of their current thinking in important ways. This encounter between two major thinkers of our time, framed and complemented by contributions from two experts in the field and concluded by an up-to-date bibliography, significantly extends the scholarship in contemporary critical theory and political theory.

Horkheimer and Adorno laid the foundations of Critical Theory from three basic disciplines: economics, psychology and studies around the culture. The second generation of Frankfurtians authors (Habermas) clearly prioritizes the philosophy of language at the expense of other disciplines, such as psychology. However, with Axel Honneth, Critical Theory gets back two elements of the first generation that had been forgotten in the second: first, the discipline of psychology in the analysis of society and, secondly, emancipatory dimension of work. In contrast to Habermas deliberative model, Honneth articulates a conception of democracy based on the ethical ideal of individual liberty. Beyond the participation of citizens in deliberative processes –so we can summarize their proposal– democracy must guarantee individual freedom that is inherent in other two areas of ethical life: personal relationships and labor relations, Horkheimer i Adorno estableixen els fonaments de la Teoria Crítica a partir de tres disciplines bàsiques: l’economia, la psicologia i els estudis envers la cultura. La segona generació d’autors francfortians (Habermas) prioritza clarament la filosofia del llenguatge en detriment d’altres disciplines com la psicologia. Tanmateix, amb Axel Honneth, la Teoria Crítica recupera dos elements de la primera generació que havien estat oblidats en la segona: d’una banda, la disciplina de la psicologia en l’anàlisi de la societat i, de l’altra, la dimensió emancipadora del treball. A diferència del model deliberatiu de Habermas, Honneth articula una concepció de la democràcia basada en l’ideal ètic de la llibertat individual. Més enllà de la participació de la ciutadania en processos de deliberació –així es pot resumir la seva proposta–, la democràcia ha de garantir la llibertat individual que és inherent a les altres dues esferes de l’eticitat: les relacions personals i les relacions laborals

En la primera sección me ocupo de aquellas limitaciones inherentes a la “ética discursiva” que son objeto de una recepción crítica en la obra de Axel Honneth; sólo desde esta base es posible apreciar en su justa medida las influencias del Sistema de la Eticidad hegeliano en la “ética del reconocimiento” –segunda y tercera sección-. De los impedimentos existentes a un verdadero reconocimiento ético da cuenta la cuarta sección del artículo. En la quinta y última parte analizo la respuesta de Honneth ante las críticas de procedencia althusseriana donde el reconocimiento es equiparado a “ideología”., In the first section I deal with those limitations inherent in the “discourse ethics” which are object of a critical reception in Axel Honneth’s work, only from this basis one can see in perspective the influences of the hegelian System of Ethical Life in “ethics of recognition” –second and third sections-. About existing impediments to a true ethical recognition realizes the fourth section of the article. In the fifth and last part I analyze Honneth’s response to althusserian criticism in which recognition is equated to “ideology”.

This paper reconstructs the argument of Axel Honneth’s recent book Das Recht der Freiheit as a theory of the institutionalization of freedom in modern society. In particular, it looks at Honneth’s argument for the realization of freedom in law and morality that is proposed as a contemporary re-interpretation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Then I discuss Honneth’s argument for the reality of freedom in the ethical spheres of civil society, in particular in the family, the market and in democracy. Finally, the paper proposes some critical remarks to Honneth’s theory.