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Advancements in the neurocognitive science of individuals with antisocial personality disorder might be of great significance for the application of insanity and similar defences in Law (Malatesti & McMillan 2010). However, so far, the investigation of whether psychopathic offenders or other individuals with antisocial personality disorders should be exculpated has reached stumbling blocks (Jalava & Griffiths, 2017 ; Jurjako & Malatesti, 2018). In this paper, to overcome these difficulties, we motivate and frame a proposal for a biocognition- informed recategorization of antisocial personality disorders aimed at differentiating accountable from not accountable offenders. We argue that we should not use syndrome-based categories for this task. These categories, as those used in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), are based on observed behaviour and inferences about unobservable characteristics and personality traits without aetiological considerations. The categories of this kind for antisocial personality disorder are problematic. In fact, they have delivered small or no advances in treatment, they have low validity, they cover heterogeneous groups of people, include comorbidity, with low prospects of integration with neuroscience, genetics, and neuropsychological paradigms (Lilienfeld, 2014). In our paper, we offer instead a Research domain criteria (RDoC) type of approach for the legal case and discuss some of the conceptual problems it must address. In psychiatry, RDoC research aims at providing valid measures of disorders by integrating the data on the genetic, neural, cognitive, and affective systems underlying psychiatric conditions (Lilienfeld, 2014). The goal is to use bottom-up neurobiological data to rebuild psychiatric categories (see Brazil et al., 2018). Similarly, we propose to rethink bottom-up certain legal categories, that are needed for insanity or similar types of defences, for a more effective use of available neuroscientific data and further research. Such an approach does not need to be reductive (Jurjako, Malatesti, Brazil 2020). However, it must strike a balance between the legal categories that are determined top-down by cognitive-behavioural classifications, and specific legal normative constraints, and neurocognitive bottom-up revisions of them. Specifically, our proposal needs to address the difficult interface problem of relating folk/psychological notions and explanations embedded in the legal formulation of defences and the data offered by neurocognitive science (Francken & Slors 2018). References Brazil, I. A., van Dongen, J. D. M., Maes, J. H. R., Mars, R. B., & Baskin-Sommers, A. R. (2018). Classification and treatment of antisocial individuals: From behavior to biocognition. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 91, 259–277. Francken, J. C., & Slors, M. (2018). Neuroscience and everyday life: Facing the translation problem. Brain and Cognition, 120(Supplement C), 67–74. Jalava, J., & Griffiths, S. (2017). Philosophers on Psychopaths: A Cautionary Tale in Interdisciplinarity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 24(1), 1– 12. Jurjako, M., & Malatesti, L. (2018). Neuropsychology and the Criminal Responsibility of Psychopaths: Reconsidering the Evidence. Erkenntnis, 83(5), 1003–1025. Jurjako, M., Malatesti, L., & Brazil, I. A. (2020). Biocognitive classification of antisocial individuals without explanatory reductionism. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 15(4), 957– 972. Lilienfeld, S. O. (2014). The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC): An Analysis of Methodological and Conceptual Challenges. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 62, 129–139. Malatesti, L., & McMillan, J. (Eds.). (2010). Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. Oxford University Press

Are psychopathic offenders (completely) criminally responsible for their crimes? (Kiehl & Sinnott-Armstrong 2013). Some argue that certain neuropsychological evidence shows that psychopathic offenders are not criminally responsible or are less criminally responsible for their crimes.(Morse 2008 ; Focqueaert, Glenn and Raine, 2015 ; Siffred and Hirstein 2003). We maintain that the current neurological evidence cannot support the conclusion that psychopaths are not criminally responsible or less criminally responsible for their crimes.

We argue that philosophy has an important role to play in bridging certain social practices with certain scientific advancements. Specifically, we describe such a role by focusing on the issue of how and whether neuropsychological data concerning psychopathic offenders reflect on their criminal culpability. We offer some methodological requirements for this type of philosophical application. In addition, we show how it might help in addressing the problem of determining the criminal responsibility of psychopathic offenders.

This thesis investigates, from a philosophical perspective, whether high-functioning autists are legally responsible for their crimes, with a focus on the legal defense by insanity. According to the Croatian Criminal Code, but also criminal codes adopted in many other countries, the legal responsibility of the person is undermined due to insanity when two conditions are satisfied. The first can be called the incapacity requirement. It states that a person, at the moment of committing the crime, exhibits cognitive or volitional incapacities, which are relevant for criminal responsibility. The second, let us call it the mental disorder requirement, states that the exculpatory incapacities are due to the presence of a mental disorder. Regarding the application of the mental disorder requirement to high-functioning autists, the philosophical challenge is that of offering a satisfactory account of mental disorder. I argue that mental disorder requirement is a justified legal condition of exculpation. Thus, addressing the issue whether functioning autists can be excused due to insanity requires investigating whether they have a mental disorder. I argue that Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction theory of mental disorder is a plausible account of mental disorder to be used in this investigation. I argue that the list of basic psychological capacities offered to George Graham adequately clarifies the notion of harm that is left rather underdeveloped in the Wakefield account. I argue that the question of whether high-functioning autism is a disorder should be decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on an assessment of the harm caused by it. Regarding the application of the incapacity requirement to high-functioning autists, the philosophical challenge is that of explaining how the empirical neuropsychological data about high-functioning autists can be related to legal requirements concerning exculpating incapacities. I use the theory of criminal responsibility offered by Hirstein et al., which is based on executive functions to bridge these two domains. I thus claim that criminal responsibility of autists may be diminished due to impairments in executive functions but that they cannot be excused. I argue that the notion of duress, elaborated by Carl Elliott in the discussion of the moral responsibility of the people with volitional disorders, can also be applied in cases of criminal responsibility of autists., Ovaj rad iz filozofske perspektive istražuje jesu li visokofunkcionalni autisti kazneno odgovorni za svoje zločine s naglaskom na obranu neuračunljivošću. Prema hrvatskom Kaznenom zakonu, ali i kaznenim zakonima usvojenim u mnogim drugim državama, kaznena odgovornost osobe je podrivena uslijed neuračunljivosti kada su zadovoljena dva uvjeta. Prvi uvjet može se nazvati zahtjevom za nesposobnošću. U njemu se navodi da osoba u trenutku počinjenja zločina iskazuje kognitivne ili voljne nesposobnosti relevantne za kaznenu odgovornost. U drugom, nazovimo ga zahtjevom za mentalnim poremećajem, navodi se da ispričavajuće nesposobnosti postoje uslijed mentalnog poremećaja. Što se tiče primjene uvjeta mentalnog poremećaja na visokofunkcionalne autiste, filozofski je izazov ponuditi zadovoljavajuću teoriju mentalnog poremećaja. Argumentiram da je zahtjev za mentalnim poremećajem opravdan zakonski uvjet ekskulpacije. Bavljenje pitanjem mogu li autisti biti oslobođeni odgovornosti zbog neuračunljivosti tako zahtjeva istraživanje imaju li oni mentalni poremećaj. Argumentiram da je Wakefieldova teorija mentalnog poremećaja kao štetne disfunkcije uvjerljiva u svrhu tog istraživanja. Argumentiram da popis osnovnih psiholoških sposobnosti koji je ponudio George Graham adekvatno razjašnjava pojam štete koji je u Wakefieldovoj teoriji ostao prilično nerazrađen. Argumentiram da se o pitanju je li visokofunkcionalni autizam poremećaj treba odlučivati od slučaja na temelju štete koju uzrokuje. Što se tiče primjene zahtjeva za nesposobnošću na visokofunkcionalne autiste, filozofski je izazov objasniti kako empirijski neuropsihološki podaci o visokofunkcionalnim autistima mogu biti povezani sa zakonskim zahtjevima koji se tiču ispričavajućih nesposobnosti. Upotrebljavam teoriju kaznene odgovornosti koju su ponudili Hirstein et al., koja se temelji na izvršnim funkcijama kako bih povezao ove dvije domene. Tako tvrdim da kaznena odgovornost autista može biti smanjena uslijed oštećenja izvršnih funkcija, ali da ne mogu biti oslobođeni odgovornosti. Argumentiram da pojam prisile, koji je razradio Carl Elliott u raspravi o moralnoj odgovornosti osoba s voljnim poremećajima, također može biti primijenjen i u slučajevima kaznene odgovornosti autista.