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The article deals with the general requirements for proper proof established by the European Court of Human Rights under para. 1, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms based on the practice of criminal case resolution. The above requirements include the implementation of adversarial trial model; parties equality in proof; applicability of evidence in the court; judgment reasoning. The observance of the requirements in fact-finding process in Ukrainian criminal procedure is studied. The need in harmonization of Ukrainian criminal procedure with the European standards is identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the authors' contend that fitness to stand trial must become a general principle of European criminal law. It offers a general overview of the concept of fitness to stand trial and its practice, and an outline of the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It discusses the competency of the European Union (EU) to introduce and approximate the law. It analyzes the case of law of the ECtHR, EU law, and EU documents to derive accepted core elements for developing a general European principle of fitness to stand a trial. It suggests several rights to be included in the general principle of European criminal law.

The article presents the author's views on balancing protection, participation and proof in criminal proceedings affecting child victims and witnesses. It discusses children's right to participate in trials as mandated in the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child and other legal instruments. It explores the value of a child's testimony in the U.S., how to balance the interests of child victims and witnesses and to prevent secondary victimisation to challenge it. It discusses how child testimony is handled in the U.S. and Europe. It details the dilemma using the case of law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the model decision on the standing of victims in criminal procedures.

This review discusses the thesis advanced by Sarah Summers in her recent book. In particular it examines the three radical claims that structure her argument. First, that the commonly used analytical distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial traditions in criminal procedure should be abandoned. Secondly, that since the Continental reforms of the 19th century, criminal procedure can best be understood in terms of a single European procedural tradition. Thirdly, that the European Court of Human Rights has misconstrued the logic of that single European procedural tradition by failing to understand that it involves the rejection of a `determinative' pre-trial phase. Each of Summers' three arguments is subjected to critical analysis and ultimately rejected as innovative and stimulating but flawed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]