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Objectives To map travel policies implemented due to COVID-19 during 2020, and conduct a mixed-methods systematic review of health effects of such policies, and related contextual factors. Design Policy mapping and systematic review. Data sources and Eligibility Criteria for the policy mapping, we searched websites of relevant government bodies and used data from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker for a convenient sample of 31 countries across different regions. For the systematic review, we searched Medline (Ovid), PubMed, EMBASE, the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials and COVID-19 specific databases. We included randomized controlled trial, non-randomized studies, modeling studies, and qualitative studies. Two independent reviewers selected studies, abstracted data and assessed risk of bias. Results Most countries adopted a total border closure at the start of the pandemic. For the remainder of the year, partial border closure banning arrivals from some countries or regions was the most widely adopted measure, followed by mandatory quarantine and screening of travelers. The systematic search identified 69 eligible studies, including 50 modeling studies. Both observational and modeling evidence suggest that border closure may reduce the number of COVID-19 cases, disease spread across countries and between regions, and slow the progression of the outbreak. These effects are likely to be enhanced when implemented early, and when combined with measures reducing transmission rates in the community. Quarantine of travelers may decrease the number of COVID-19 cases but its effectiveness depends on compliance and enforcement and is more effective if followed by testing, especially when less than 14 day-quarantine is considered. Screening at departure and/or arrival is unlikely to detect a large proportion of cases or to delay an outbreak. Effectiveness of screening may be improved with increased sensitivity of screening tests, awareness of travelers, asymptomatic screening, and exit screening at country source. While four studies on contextual evidence found that the majority of the public is supportive of travel restrictions, they uncovered concerns about the unintended harms of those policies. Conclusion Most countries adopted full or partial border closure in response to COVID-19 in 2020. Evidence suggests positive effects on controlling the COVID-19 pandemic for border closure (particularly when implemented early), as well as quarantine of travelers (particularly with higher levels of compliance). While these positive effects are enhanced when implemented in combination with other public health measures, they are associated with concerns by the public regarding some unintended effects.

During the investigation of a pet shop outbreak of severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) with probable hamster-to-human transmission, the environmental and hamster samples in epidemiologically linked pet shops were found positive for SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant AY.127 strains which are phylogenetically closely related to patient and reported European strains. This interspecies spill-over has triggered transmission chains involving 58 patients epidemiologically linked to three pet shops. Incidentally, three dwarf hamsters imported from Netherlands and centralized in a warehouse distributing animals to pet shops were positive for SARS-CoV-2 spike variant phylogenetically related to European B.1.258 strains since March 2020. This B.1.258 strain has almost disappeared since July 2021. While no hamster-to-human transmission of B.1.258-like strain was found in this outbreak, molecular docking showed that its spike receptor binding domain (RBD) has similar binding energy to human ACE2 when compared with that of Delta variant AY.127. Therefore, the potential of this B.1.258-related spike variant for interspecies jumping cannot be ignored. The co-circulation of both B.1.258-related spike variants with Delta AY.127 which originated in Europe and was not previously found in Hong Kong suggested that hamsters in our wholesale warehouse and retail pet shops more likely have acquired these viruses in Netherlands or stopovers during delivery by aviation than locally. The risk of human-to-hamster reverse zoonosis by multiple SARS-CoV-2 variants leading to further adaptive spike mutations with subsequent transmission back to human cannot be underestimated as outbreak source of COVID-19. Testing of imported pet animals susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 is warranted to prevent future outbreaks.

Aim To describe the nosocomial transmission of Air, multidrug-resistant, Acinetobacter baumannii, nosocomial, COVID-19 Acinetobacter baumannii (MRAB) in an open-cubicle neurology ward with low ceiling height, where MRAB isolates collected from air, commonly shared items, non-reachable high-level surfaces and patients were analysed epidemiologically and genetically by whole-genome sequencing. This is the first study to understand the genetic relatedness of air, environmental and clinical isolates of MRAB in the outbreak setting. Findings Of 11 highly care-dependent patients with 363 MRAB colonization days during COVID-19 pandemic, 10 (90.9%) and nine (81.8%) had cutaneous and gastrointestinal colonization, respectively. Of 160 environmental and air samples, 31 (19.4%) were MRAB-positive. The proportion of MRAB-contaminated commonly shared items was significantly lower in cohort than in non-cohort patient care (0/10, 0% vs 12/18, 66.7%; P

Background:Extensive environmental contamination by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has been reported in hospitals during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. We report our experience with the practice of directly observed environmental disinfection (DOED) in a community isolation facility (CIF) and a community treatment facility (CTF) in Hong Kong.Methods:The CIF, with 250 single-room bungalows in a holiday camp, opened on July 24, 2020, to receive step-down patients from hospitals. The CTF, with 500 beds in open cubicles inside a convention hall, was activated on August 1, 2020, to admit newly diagnosed COVID-19 patients from the community. Healthcare workers (HCWs) and cleaning staff received infection control training to reinforce donning and doffing of personal protective equipment and to understand the practice of DOED, in which the cleaning staff observed patient and staff activities and then performed environmental disinfection immediately thereafter. Supervisors also observed cleaning staff to ensure the quality of work. In the CTF, air and environmental samples were collected on days 7, 14, 21, and 28 for SARS-CoV-2 detection by RT-PCR. Patient compliance with mask wearing was also recorded.Results:Of 291 HCWs and 54 cleaning staff who managed 243 patients in the CIF and 674 patients in the CTF from July 24 to August 29, 2020, no one acquired COVID-19. All 24 air samples and 520 environmental samples collected in the patient area of the CTF were negative for SARS-CoV-2. Patient compliance with mask wearing was 100%.Conclusion:With appropriate infection control measures, zero environmental contamination and nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to HCWs and cleaning staff was achieved.

Universal masking for healthcare workers and patients in hospitals was adopted to combat coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), with compliance rates of 100% and 75.9%, respectively. Zero rates of nosocomial influenza A, influenza B, and respiratory syncytial virus infection were achieved from February to April 2020, which was significantly lower than the corresponding months in 2017–2019.

Background:The role of severe respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)–laden aerosols in the transmission of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) remains uncertain. Discordant findings of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in air samples were noted in early reports.Methods:Sampling of air close to 6 asymptomatic and symptomatic COVID-19 patients with and without surgical masks was performed with sampling devices using sterile gelatin filters. Frequently touched environmental surfaces near 21 patients were swabbed before daily environmental disinfection. The correlation between the viral loads of patients’ clinical samples and environmental samples was analyzed.Results:All air samples were negative for SARS-CoV-2 RNA in the 6 patients singly isolated inside airborne infection isolation rooms (AIIRs) with 12 air changes per hour. Of 377 environmental samples near 21 patients, 19 (5.0%) were positive by reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assay, with a median viral load of 9.2 × 102 copies/mL (range, 1.1 × 102 to 9.4 × 104 copies/mL). The contamination rate was highest on patients’ mobile phones (6 of 77, 7.8%), followed by bed rails (4 of 74, 5.4%) and toilet door handles (4 of 76, 5.3%). We detected a significant correlation between viral load ranges in clinical samples and positivity rate of environmental samples (P < .001).Conclusion:SARS-CoV-2 RNA was not detectable by air samplers, which suggests that the airborne route is not the predominant mode of transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Wearing a surgical mask, appropriate hand hygiene, and thorough environmental disinfection are sufficient infection control measures for COVID-19 patients isolated singly in AIIRs. However, this conclusion may not apply during aerosol-generating procedures or in cohort wards with large numbers of COVID-19 patients.

Objective:To describe the infection control preparedness measures undertaken for coronavirus disease (COVID-19) due to SARS-CoV-2 (previously known as 2019 novel coronavirus) in the first 42 days after announcement of a cluster of pneumonia in China, on December 31, 2019 (day 1) in Hong Kong.Methods:A bundled approach of active and enhanced laboratory surveillance, early airborne infection isolation, rapid molecular diagnostic testing, and contact tracing for healthcare workers (HCWs) with unprotected exposure in the hospitals was implemented. Epidemiological characteristics of confirmed cases, environmental samples, and air samples were collected and analyzed.Results:From day 1 to day 42, 42 of 1,275 patients (3.3%) fulfilling active (n = 29) and enhanced laboratory surveillance (n = 13) were confirmed to have the SARS-CoV-2 infection. The number of locally acquired case significantly increased from 1 of 13 confirmed cases (7.7%, day 22 to day 32) to 27 of 29 confirmed cases (93.1%, day 33 to day 42; P < .001). Among them, 28 patients (66.6%) came from 8 family clusters. Of 413 HCWs caring for these confirmed cases, 11 (2.7%) had unprotected exposure requiring quarantine for 14 days. None of these was infected, and nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV-2 was not observed. Environmental surveillance was performed in the room of a patient with viral load of 3.3 × 106 copies/mL (pooled nasopharyngeal and throat swabs) and 5.9 × 106 copies/mL (saliva), respectively. SARS-CoV-2 was identified in 1 of 13 environmental samples (7.7%) but not in 8 air samples collected at a distance of 10 cm from the patient’s chin with or without wearing a surgical mask.Conclusion:Appropriate hospital infection control measures was able to prevent nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV-2.

Background The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Omicron variant BA.2 sublineage has increased rapidly in Europe and Asia since January 2022. Here, we report the epidemiological and genomic analysis of a large single-source BA.2 outbreak in a housing estate. Methods We analyzed the epidemiological information on a community outbreak of BA.2 (STY outbreak). We performed whole viral genome sequencing using the Oxford Nanopore MinION device. We calculated the doubling time of the outbreak within a housing estate. Results The STY outbreak involved a total of 768 individuals as of 5 February 2022, including 432 residents, visitors, or staff (56.3%) from a single housing estate (KC Estate). The outbreak at the KC Estate had a short doubling time of 1.28 days (95% confidence interval: .560–1.935). The outbreak was promptly controlled with the lockdown of 3 buildings within the housing estate. Whole-genome sequencing was performed for 133 patients in the STY outbreak, including 106 residents of the KC Estate. All 133 sequences from the STY outbreak belonged to the BA.2 sublineage, and phylogenetic analysis showed that these sequences cluster together. All individuals in the STY cluster had the unique mutation C12525T. Conclusions Our study highlights the exceptionally high transmissibility of the Omicron variant BA.2 sublineage in Hong Kong, where stringent measures are implemented as part of the elimination strategy. Continual genomic surveillance is crucial in monitoring the emergence of epidemiologically important Omicron sublineages.

Airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has been increasingly recognized in the outbreak of COVID-19, especially with the Omicron variant. We investigated an outbreak due to Omicron variant in a restaurant. Besides epidemiological and phylogenetic analyses, the secondary attack rates of customers of restaurant-related COVID-19 outbreak before (Outbreak R1) and after enhancement of indoor air dilution (Outbreak R2) were compared. On 27th December 2021, an index case stayed in restaurant R2 for 98 min. Except for 1 sitting in the same table, six other secondary cases sat in 3 corners at 3 different zones, which were served by different staff. The median exposure time was 34 min (range: 19-98 min). All 7 secondary cases were phylogenetically related to the index. Smoke test demonstrated that the airflow direction may explain the distribution of secondary cases. Compared with an earlier COVID-19 outbreak in another restaurant R1 (19th February 2021), which occurred prior to the mandatory enhancement of indoor air dilution, the secondary attack rate among customers in R2 was significantly lower than that in R1 (3.4%, 7/207 vs 28.9%, 22/76, p0.001). Enhancement of indoor air dilution through ventilation and installation of air purifier could minimize the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the restaurants.

Without the implementation of mandatory vaccination, it was difficult to increase the influenza vaccination rate among healthcare workers. We described the strategy of personal coaching and assess its impact in increasing the influenza vaccination rate among healthcare workers in Hong Kong.Personal coaching of individual staff led by the infection control officer (ICO) and senior nursing officer (SNO) from infection control team could overcome barriers and promote on-site vaccination. The influenza vaccination rates among different categories of staff in 2016/2017 (year 1, baseline), 2017/2018 (year 2, promotion using social media), and 2018/2019 to 2020/2021 (year 3-5, promotion using personal coaching) were analysed in a healthcare region with 8490 ± 206 staff during the study period.With the implementation of personal coaching, the influenza vaccination rates increased significantly among medical (65.0% vs 57.0%, p = 0.048), nursing (30.6% vs 21.1%, p 0.001), allied health (37.0% vs 27.4%, p 0.001), care-related supporting staff (37.7% vs 27.3%, p 0.001), and non-professional staff (27.3% vs 22.3%, p 0.001) in year 3 compared with year 2, and also significantly increased among all staff in year 4 (38.0% vs 34.7%, p 0.001) and year 5 (45.2% vs 38.0%, p 0.001) when compared with the preceding year. The increase in vaccination rate was not apparent with social media promotion alone (26.4%, year 2 vs 25.6%, year 1, p = 0.305).Personal coaching led by ICO and SNO significantly increased the vaccination rates among healthcare workers in 3 consecutive years. This model could be promulgated to unit heads to establish a hospital culture conducive to vaccination.

ObjectivesImplementation of effective infection prevention and control (IPC) measures is needed to support global capacity building to limit transmission of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and mitigate its impact on health systems. We assessed the perceptions of healthcare workers on the current global IPC preparedness measures for COVID-19.MethodsA cross-sectional survey using an electronic survey was circulated between February 26, 2020, and March 20, 2020, to IPC professionals during COVID-19 pandemic. The survey addressed the presence of COVID-19 guidelines as well as specific IPC preparedness activities in response to the outbreak.FindingsIn total, 339 IPC professionals spanning 63 countries in all 6 World Health Organization (WHO) regions, mostly from tertiary care centres participated. Of all participants, 66·6% were aware of the existence of national guidelines to prevent COVID-19. A shortage of PPE supplies was reported by 48% (ranging from 64·2% in low-income countries to 27·4% in high-income countries); 41·5% of respondents considered that the media had an impact on guideline development and 63·6% believed that guidelines were based on maximum security rather than on evidence-based analyses. 58·5% and 72·7% of participants believed that healthcare facilities and community settings respectively were not sufficiently prepared.ConclusionResults revealed lack of guidelines and concerns over insufficient PPE supply in both high- and low-income countries. Our findings should alert national health authorities to ramp up the implementation of IPC measures and focus on long-term preparedness and readiness for future pandemics, likely requiring government funds rather than reliance on healthcare institutions.

Background:Nosocomial outbreaks leading to healthcare worker (HCW) infection and death have been increasingly reported during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.Objective:We implemented a strategy to reduce nosocomial acquisition.Methods:We summarized our experience in implementing a multipronged infection control strategy in the first 300 days (December 31, 2019, to October 25, 2020) of the COVID-19 pandemic under the governance of Hospital Authority in Hong Kong.Results:Of 5,296 COVID-19 patients, 4,808 (90.8%) were diagnosed in the first pandemic wave (142 cases), second wave (896 cases), and third wave (3,770 cases) in Hong Kong. With the exception of 1 patient who died before admission, all COVID-19 patients were admitted to the public healthcare system for a total of 78,834 COVID-19 patient days. The median length of stay was 13 days (range, 1–128). Of 81,955 HCWs, 38 HCWs (0.05%; 2 doctors and 11 nurses and 25 nonprofessional staff) acquired COVID-19. With the exception of 5 of 38 HCWs (13.2%) infected by HCW-to-HCW transmission in the nonclinical settings, no HCW had documented transmission from COVID-19 patients in the hospitals. The incidence of COVID-19 among HCWs was significantly lower than that of our general population (0.46 per 1,000 HCWs vs 0.71 per 1,000 population; P = .008). The incidence of COVID-19 among professional staff was significantly lower than that of nonprofessional staff (0.30 vs 0.66 per 1,000 full-time equivalent; P = .022).Conclusions:A hospital-based approach spared our healthcare service from being overloaded. With our multipronged infection control strategy, no nosocomial COVID-19 in was identified among HCWs in the first 300 days of the COVID-19 pandemic in Hong Kong.

Summary Background A cruise ship is a closed-off environment that simulates the basic functioning of a city in terms of living conditions and interpersonal interactions. Thus, the Diamond Princess cruise ship, which was quarantined because of an onboard outbreak of COVID-19 in February, 2020, provides an opportunity to define the shedding pattern of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and patient antibody responses before and after the onset of symptoms. Methods We recruited adult (≥18 years) passengers from Hong Kong who had been on board the Diamond Princess cruise ship docked in Yokohama, Japan in February, 2020. All participants had been found to be negative for SARS-CoV-2 by RT-PCR 4 days before disembarking and were transferred to further quarantine in a public estate in Hong Kong, where they were recruited. Participants were prospectively screened by quantitative RT-PCR (RT-qPCR) of nasopharyngeal and throat swabs, and serum IgG and IgM against internal nucleoprotein and the surface spike receptor-binding protein (RBD) of SARS-CoV-2 at baseline (upon entering quarantine) and on days 4, 8, and 12 of quarantine. Findings On Feb 22, 2020, 215 adults were recruited, of whom nine (4%; 95% CI 2–8) were positive for SARS-CoV-2 by RT-qPCR or serology and were hospitalised. Of these nine patients, nasopharyngeal swab RT-qPCR was positive in eight patients (89%; 57–99) at baseline. All nine patients were positive for anti-RBD IgG by day 8. Eight (89%; 57–99) were simultaneously positive for nasopharyngeal swab RT-PCR and anti-RBD IgG. One patient who was positive for anti-RBD IgG and had a negative viral load had multifocal peripheral ground-glass changes on high-resolution CT that were typical of COVID-19. Five patients (56%; 27–81) with ground-glass changes on high-resolution CT were found to have higher anti-nucleoprotein-IgG OD values on day 8 and 12 and anti-RBD IgG OD value on day 12 than patients without ground-glass changes. Six (67%; 35–88) patients remained asymptomatic throughout the 14-day quarantine period. Interpretation Patients with COVID-19 can develop asymptomatic lung infection with viral shedding and those with evidence of pneumonia on imaging tend to have an increased antibody response. Positive IgG or IgM confirmed infection of COVID-19 in both symptomatic and asymptomatic patients. A combination of RT-PCR and serology should be implemented for case finding and contact tracing to facilitate early diagnosis, prompt isolation, and treatment. Funding Shaw Foundation Hong Kong; Sanming-Project of Medicine (Shenzhen); High Level-Hospital Program (Guangdong Health Commission).

Background To describe the infection control strategy to achieve zero nosocomial transmission of symptomatic coronavirus disease (COVID-19) due to SARS-CoV-2 during the prepandemic phase (the first 72 days after announcement of pneumonia cases in Wuhan) in Hong Kong. Methods Administrative support with the aim of zero nosocomial transmission by reducing elective clinical services, decanting wards, mobilizing isolation facilities, providing adequate personal protective equipment, coordinating laboratory network for rapid molecular diagnosis under 4-tier active surveillance for hospitalized patients and outpatients, and organizing staff forum and training was implemented under the framework of preparedness plan in Hospital Authority. The trend of SARS-CoV-2 in the first 72 days was compared with that of SARS-CoV 2003. Results Up to day 72 of the epidemic, 130 (0.40%) of 32,443 patients being screened confirmed to have SARS-CoV-2 by reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction. Compared with SARS outbreak in 2003, the SARS-CoV-2 case load constituted 8.9% (130 SARS-CoV-2/1458 SARS-CoV) of SARS-CoV infected cases at day 72 of the outbreak. The incidences of nosocomial acquisition of SARS-CoV per 1,000 SARS-patient-day and per 100 SARS-patient-admission were 7.9 and 16.9, respectively, which were significantly higher than the corresponding incidences of SARS-CoV-2 (zero infection, P Conclusions Administrative support to infection control could minimize the risk of nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV-2.

Key Points Question What was the prevalence and clinical presentation of coronavirus disease 2019 among health care workers with self-reported fever or respiratory symptoms in 2 Dutch hospitals within 2 weeks after the first patient with coronavirus disease 2019 was detected in the Netherlands? Findings In this cross-sectional study that included 1353 health care workers with self-reported fever or respiratory symptoms, 6% were infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. Most health care workers with coronavirus disease 2019 experienced mild disease, and only 53% reported fever. Meaning The high prevalence of mild clinical presentations, frequently not including fever, suggests that the currently recommended case definition for suspected coronavirus disease 2019 should be used less stringently., This cross-sectional study examines the prevalence and clinical presentation of coronavirus disease 2019 among health care workers in the Netherlands with self-reported fever or respiratory symptoms., Importance On February 27, 2020, the first patient with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was reported in the Netherlands. During the following weeks, at 2 Dutch teaching hospitals, 9 health care workers (HCWs) received a diagnosis of COVID-19, 8 of whom had no history of travel to China or northern Italy, raising the question of whether undetected community circulation was occurring. Objective To determine the prevalence and clinical presentation of COVID-19 among HCWs with self-reported fever or respiratory symptoms. Design, Setting, and Participants This cross-sectional study was performed in 2 teaching hospitals in the southern part of the Netherlands in March 2020, during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic. Health care workers employed in the participating hospitals who experienced fever or respiratory symptoms were asked to voluntarily participate in a screening for infection with the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. Data analysis was performed in March 2020. Main Outcomes and Measures The prevalence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 infection was determined by semiquantitative real-time reverse transcriptase–polymerase chain reaction on oropharyngeal samples. Structured interviews were conducted to document symptoms for all HCWs with confirmed COVID-19. Results Of 9705 HCWs employed (1722 male [18%]), 1353 (14%) reported fever or respiratory symptoms and were tested. Of those, 86 HCWs (6%) were infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (median age, 49 years [range, 22-66 years]; 15 [17%] male), representing 1% of all HCWs employed. Most HCWs experienced mild disease, and only 46 (53%) reported fever. Eighty HCWs (93%) met a case definition of fever and/or coughing and/or shortness of breath. Only 3 (3%) of the HCWs identified through the screening had a history of travel to China or northern Italy, and 3 (3%) reported having been exposed to an inpatient with a known diagnosis of COVID-19 before the onset of symptoms. Conclusions and Relevance Within 2 weeks after the first Dutch case was detected, a substantial proportion of HCWs with self-reported fever or respiratory symptoms were infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, likely as a result of acquisition of the virus in the community during the early phase of local spread. The high prevalence of mild clinical presentations, frequently not including fever, suggests that the currently recommended case definition for suspected COVID-19 should be used less stringently.