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In the past few years the literature on international conflict and foreign policy has seen a renewed interest in systematically examining the role of domestic institutions. Yet, the revived interest has excluded the influence of national courts on the pol ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to offer a starting point for building an understanding of the factors that influence public confidence in the courts of nations that are undergoing a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By considering temporal changes in judicial influence in a number of cases in Eastern Europe and Latin America, we explain when the courts become viable political actors and why some courts assume an important policy-making role faster than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a study which examined the struggle between the legislative and judicial branches from a different perspective by focusing specifically on attempts by U.S. Congress to constrain the behavior of federal judges. Overview of previous research on legislative-judicial interactions; Analysis of principal agent relationships in political science; Research design and methodology used; Impact of statutory constraint and individual ideology on appointment of judges.

Does the hierarchical relationship between the district courts and the courts of appeals influence decision-making at the trial level? Stated another way, are district court judges constrained by the appeals courts, according to the tenets of principal agency theory? Do these judges anticipate responses by appellate panels and condition their decisions based on these expectations? Using an original dataset of foreign policy cases from 1946-2000 and incorporating a strategic choice statistical framework to analyze a formal model, I discover that the District Courts are not constrained by the anticipated responses of the Appeals Courts. Whether one examines District Courts in isolation from other tribunals or within a hierarchical structure, conclusions regarding ideological voting remain consistent: Democratic judges are more likely to rule in favor of civil liberties than their Republican colleagues. Thus, the hierarchical structure of the federal judiciary does not appear to be a significant constraint to the District Courts as it seemingly is for the Courts of Appeals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the literature on U.S. foreign policy and judicial decision making by focusing on the role of the federal appellate courts since World War II. Specifically, the paper addresses the question whether appeals court judges are defenders of civil liberties or champions of national security. Using an original dataset of 300 cases randomly selected from 1946-2000 in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, I test whether specific institutional characteristics, legal challenges or case issues significantly affect whether appellate judges rule in favor of federal government interests or civil liberties claims. The empirical results indicate that for a majority of cases appellate judges support the interests of the federal government to the detriment of civil liberties. However, certain institutional characteristics will induce the courts of appeals to curtail federal interests. If Democratic judges dominate an appellate panel or if the lower courts ruled in favor of civil liberties, then the appeals courts will render decisions against the interests of the federal government. However, if judges must resolve a threshold issue or contend with a national security defense then the ruling will most likely favor federal interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the last decade, observers of the judiciary have witnessed an increased politicization of the courts within several countries, accompanied by a diverse range of public responses concerning the "judicialization of politics" (Tate and Vallinder 1995). Several scholars (see in particular Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998) have examined this phenomenon; yet, a majority of the literature is based on studies of established democracies. Less attention has been paid to emerging democracies where a lack of citizen support may create or reinforce a pervasive cycle of distrust. We argue that it is essential for scholars to focus on these areas to determine whether hypotheses generated by research conducted in established democracies remain consistent.Our paper, consequently, expands on this literature by examining judicial confidence among countries in Africa. We argue that an African perspective on this question is vitally important for two major reasons. First, since public perceptions toward procedural fairness in the judicial system affect overall feelings toward government (Rohrschneider 2005), it is essential to examine a region where political instability has been more the norm than the exception. Second, several scholars note the importance of the 'rule of law' to democratic transition and consolidation (see Ginsburg 2003). Consequently, it is important to examine public perceptions on the efficacy of the rule of law in a region where democratic consolidation has been relatively fragmented and inconsistent. Data for this analysis comes from seventeen (17) sub-Saharan countries surveyed by the Afrobarometer. To examine perceptions of confidence in the judicial branch we focus on the linkages between judicial legitimacy, institutional support, and public opinion. We test specific hypotheses about these linkages using data collected in three waves (2000, 2002, and 2005), combined with relevant country-specific data on democratic performance and consolidation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent are lower court judges anticipating how their decisions might be reviewed on appeal? Unfortunately, few empirical analyses concentrate on answering these important questions. This paper contributes to the debate by focusing on the anticipation of Supreme Court responses by judges on the Courts of Appeals. Do judges on the Courts of Appeals guess the preferences of Supreme Court justices when rendering decisions? Additionally, does this anticipatory behavior significantly impact or constrain the ability of these judges to maximize their personal policy preferences? To address these questions, I examine decisions rendered by the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1953 to 1988, and their subsequent treatment by the U.S. Supreme Court, under a strategic choice statistical framework. Initially, the empirical results indicate that Appeals Court judges do anticipate responses from the Supreme Court, and adjust their behavior according to this perceived constraint. However, this constraint is not experienced by all appellate judges. During the Warren Court era it is apparent that the constraint is experienced by all appellate panels, regardless of ideology; yet, the likelihood of the Supreme Court granting certiorari is substantially higher for conservative decisions than for liberal ones. During the Burger Court era it is apparent that more liberal appellate panels experience this constraint to a higher degree that conservative appellate panels (and the likelihood of Supreme Court review increases substantially for liberal decisions). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are state supreme court judges influenced by the model of contingent discretion, similar to their federal colleagues? Stated another way, do these judges render decisions purely in accordance with their sincere ideological preferences, or do legal factors - specifically the language of relevant state statutes - constrain their ability to vote according to their preferences? Numerous existing studies of judicial behavior focus on this tension between the attitudinal and legal models to determine the extent to which judges make decisions according to their individual ideological preferences or are constrained by legal factors.This paper contributes to the literature on judicial politics by incorporating a continuous empirical measure of legal constraint on judicial behavior. We posit that legal influences and ideological influences work in tandem among state supreme court judges. These judges are influenced by the model of contingent discretion and, occasionally, the traditional tension exists and statutory language constrains the judges from voting ideologically. However, in other instances these two influences operate in a more dynamic and interdependent manner and we observe statutory language facilitating the expression of ideological voting among the judges. Using data from the Brace and Hall State Court Database, we examine whether institutional differences across state high courts interact with potential statutory constraints (from both the state and federal level) to affect judicial behavior. By examining state court behavior we can draw inferences about the influence of statutory language on the judiciary across several institutional structures and legal environments. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]