To what extent are lower court judges anticipating how their decisions might be reviewed on appeal? Unfortunately, few empirical analyses concentrate on answering these important questions. This paper contributes to the debate by focusing on the anticipation of Supreme Court responses by judges on the Courts of Appeals. Do judges on the Courts of Appeals guess the preferences of Supreme Court justices when rendering decisions? Additionally, does this anticipatory behavior significantly impact or constrain the ability of these judges to maximize their personal policy preferences? To address these questions, I examine decisions rendered by the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1953 to 1988, and their subsequent treatment by the U.S. Supreme Court, under a strategic choice statistical framework. Initially, the empirical results indicate that Appeals Court judges do anticipate responses from the Supreme Court, and adjust their behavior according to this perceived constraint. However, this constraint is not experienced by all appellate judges. During the Warren Court era it is apparent that the constraint is experienced by all appellate panels, regardless of ideology; yet, the likelihood of the Supreme Court granting certiorari is substantially higher for conservative decisions than for liberal ones. During the Burger Court era it is apparent that more liberal appellate panels experience this constraint to a higher degree that conservative appellate panels (and the likelihood of Supreme Court review increases substantially for liberal decisions). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]