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We use the occurrence of the London bombings on July 7, 2005, during the fieldwork period of the British Social Attitudes Survey to analyze the dynamics of public support for measures curbing core freedoms. We observe little change in public attitudes toward counterterrorist policies in the first week after the attack. Approval of infringements on privacy and procedural rights surges in the following weeks before stabilizing at an increased level in the medium run. Our findings indicate that, when it comes to restrictive counterterrorist measures, the public adopts a wait-and-see attitude rather than reacting in fear. Ancillary analyses suggest that the media may be the source of attitudinal changes on policies curtailing civil liberties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Countering violent extremism (CVE) is one of the central focuses of the government of Pakistan. This article examines the current CVE policy framework and questions the existing paradigm of CVE policies in Pakistan. The article employs R. Kim Cragin's model of "resisting violent extremism" to suggest the need for a paradigm change in Pakistan's CVE policy framework, especially after the launch of another military operation in 2017. After a decade of security-centric counterterrorism policies, such a change requires balancing security-, development-, and prevention-centric policies in order to redefine Pakistan's policy framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the politics of response to the 7 July 2005 London bombings, by analysing UK counter-terrorism institutional campaigns in the three years following the attack. By drawing on the interpretive category of community/immunity, the semiotic analysis of counter-terrorism campaigns aims to describe their representation of the political community and citizen in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks. The article argues that the counter-terrorism discourse relies on two contrasting tendencies: on the one hand, the unifying force that brings people together in the name of common values; and on the other, the necessity to weaken communitarian bonds in order to allow the citizen to control and check-up on others, reporting “anything suspicious” to authorities. In these texts, the figure of the citizen surveillant clearly emerges. Surveillance activities are shaped around the representation of the terrorist event, from the image of the terrorist in normal everyday life to the actual attacks. Paradoxically this brings about a mimicry effect. The surveillance action carried out by the citizen and the imagined actions of the preparation of a terrorist attack partially overlap in the way they are described and visually represented. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For more than a decade, 'radicalization' has been a keyword in our understanding of terrorism. From the outset, radicalization was conceived of as an intellectual process through which an individual would increasingly come under a spell of extremist ideas. This ideological understanding of radicalization still prevails. In a 2015 speech on extremism, British Prime Minister David Cameron, for instance, claimed that the 'root cause of the threat we face is the extremist ideology itself'. But the way we understand radicalization has specific consequences for the way we manage and fight the scourge of terrorism. Considering recent events, including the November 2015 Paris attacks, the present article sets out to reassess the above-mentioned intellectualist understanding of radicalization and come up with new suggestions as to how radicalization may be understood today. Initially, the article suggests that ideology is not necessarily a precondition for violence, but that a prior experience with violence is more often a precondition for engaging an extremist ideology. Such experience with violence can be both domestic and international, obtained in Europe or Syria and other conflict zones. In the second part of the article it is argued that although radicalization is often conceived of as an individual process, pathways towards terrorism are inherently social and political. Finally, the article argues that by stressing the importance of ideology and ideological processes, concepts of radicalization have abstracted away from another factor that is pivotal for understanding pathways towards terrorist violence: the skills and capacities of the body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 7/7 bombings of July 2005, Britain has experienced a domestic terror threat posed by a small minority of young Muslims. In response, Britain has initiated ‘Prevent’, a preventative counter-terrorism programme. Building on previous, general critiques of Prevent, this article outlines and critically discusses the ways in which Prevent has approached young Muslims and their educational institutions. The article argues that, rather than trust in broader and non-stigmatizing processes of anti-extremist education, the police-led Prevent has ‘engaged’ with and surveilled young Muslims. Within Prevent there is little evidence of educational processes that explicitly build youth resilience against extremism. Instead, Muslim youth are viewed as both a risk to society and at risk of catching the terrorist disease, with the contested model of ‘radicalisation’ and child protection concepts utilized to portray risks of exploitation by Islamist extremists that necessitate a deepening process of education-based surveillance. The article identifies non-stigmatizing alternatives to the approach of Prevent, approaches of anti-extremism education that learn from previously problematic anti-racist educational efforts with white young people. This enables the article to advocate for enhanced human rights-based approaches of citizenship education (admittedly, in themselves contested) withallyoung people as the most effective way of building individual and collective youth resilience against terrorist ideologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a qualitative analysis of nation-state population “resiliency” to several spectacular and/or highly symbolic terrorist assaults that were watershed events. It draws heavily from qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) frameworks to isolate and identify the presence of what Goertz calls the “secondary dimensions” of a “primary concept” such as resiliency to terrorist assaults. In turn, the presence of those secondary dimensions and their strength presuppose and derive from “tertiary indicators” that are the basic metrics and concrete manifestations of those secondary dimensions. The nation-states under consideration include the London bombings of 2005, the United States for 9/11, the Madrid bombings of 2004, the first suicide bombings within pre-1967 boundaries of Israel, and the Russian Federation in the case of the 2002 terrorist assault against the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow. The results serve as the basis for the development of a “resiliency continuum” of nation-states where placement of those countries on the continuum reflect “nonresilient,” “semiresilient,” and “resilient” conditions, themselves defined by the number of secondary dimensions found in each case study. In the process, the analysis illuminates possible interconnections between “context specific” factors, such as a country’s historical experience with terrorism and population characteristics (e.g., education levels, degree of heterogeneity) to the resiliency or nonresiliency condition, and describes possible links between exogenous “systems factors” such as war and power ranking to the resiliency condition. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study presents experimental findings on the impact of media framing of the 2005 London bombings. A total of 371 American participants were exposed to one of two frames to test their effect on public attitudes towards civil liberties and Muslims, and support for counterterrorism policies. Results show that the “domestic homegrown” frame produces greater increases in fear than the “international” frame. This leads to greater support for restricting civil liberties of Muslims and, under certain circumstances, general feelings of negativity toward Muslims. The study also finds support for the hydraulic effect of framing in that the domestic homegrown frame suppresses party identification in attitude formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Counter-terrorism is not a completely new arena of activity in the European Union. The Member States have cooperated since the early seventies, when terrorism was rife in various countries. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have propelled the issue back onto the policy agenda, and joint efforts have been amplified by the attacks in Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005). Recently, concerns have been voiced over the resurgence of violent right-wing extremism. In contrast to the seventies, the EU can now encourage intensive cooperation between the jurisdictions of the Member States, as it is has established an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In this article, we discuss the three main planes of cooperation, namely the strategic, the regulatory and the agency level of cooperation. Finally, we analyze how nation states have responded to the call for European cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The London bombings in 2005 led to the perception that the terrorist threat had changed from external to internal. This became conceptualized shortly after as 'homegrown terrorism.' This article deals with the meaning and scope of this phenomenon. We begin by tracing an ambiguity in the term 'homegrown,' which is both about belonging in the West and autonomy from terrorist groups abroad. A quantitative study of Islamist terrorism in the West since 1989 reveals an increase in both internal and autonomous terrorism since 2003 and that most plots are now internal-but not autonomous. Finally we suggest that an increase in autonomous terrorism is a transitory phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Islamist militants frequently lack a talent for tradecraft. In recent attacks in Britain and Spain, terrorists made numerous mistakes: receiving traffic citations while traveling in 'enemy' territory, acting suspiciously when questioned by the police, and traveling together during missions. Militants' preference toward suicide operations restricts their ability to acquire practical experience, particularly when they lose their lives during attacks. And their unyielding devotion to their cause blinds them to opportunities to improve their operations. This is good news for counterterrorism officials. Terrorists' poor tradecraft provides alert law enforcers with critical leads they can use to identify their attackers, unravel their plots, and-sometimes-disrupt their operations before they cause additional harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the suicide bomb attacks on four London transportation targets on 7 July 2005 and the plot to bomb simultaneously at least seven American and Canadian passenger airliners as they departed from London's Heathrow Airport. American, British, and Pakistani authorities thwarted this planned attack in August 2006. Both incidents are among the most important Al Qaeda operations in recent years. Initially, they were dismissed by the authorities, pundits, and the media alike as the work of amateur terrorists—untrained “bunches of guys” acting entirely on their own with no links to Al Qaeda. Subsequent evidence, however, has come to light, which reveals clear links to senior Al Qaeda commanders operating in Pakistan's lawless frontier border area with Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 7/7 terrorist attacks demonstrated that there were some clear deficiencies with the organisation of the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism intelligence community. In the aftermath of the attacks, there were moves to develop a more robust 'counter-terrorism network' in the United Kingdom that would facilitate better communication and intelligence sharing. While recent developments are to be welcomed, the reforms have not addressed some of the fundamental cultural, institutional and technological issues at the heart of the problem. The creation of an effective counter-terrorism network demands that information flows more freely through the intelligence community and that institutional boundaries are broken down. Until these obstacles have been overcome, the new counter-terrorism network will continue to be hampered by the same old problems of intelligence sharing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 7/7 London suicide bombings of July 2005 and numerous subsequent Islamist terror plots have highlighted the reality of an 'internal' threat to Britain. One governmental response has been the 'Preventing Violent Extremism' (PVE) programme. Whilst the educational aspect of its focus on Muslim young people is to be welcomed, there are serious concerns as to whether PVE policy, as currently designed, is falling between two stools. To date, the programme focuses exclusively on Muslim communities in flat contradiction to the integration policy priority of community cohesion, so risking further defensiveness from Muslim communities and resentment from white working class communities. Whilst ignoring the right-wing extremism growing in some of those white communities, PVE work with young people is actually failing to engage openly and robustly with the real political issues driving Muslim anger and minority extremist support. The confidence, understanding and skills of educational practitioners are vital here. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Madrid and London train-bombings, perceptions of the sources of Islamic terrorism changed. The British response to domestic jihadism was to apply community-policing principles to counter-terrorism enforcement. This essay describes the origins and intentions of the community-based policing of terrorism and partnership programmes with Muslim faith organisations. Collaboration with Muslim partners has helped to build confidence within government agencies that Muslim leaders are keen to curb terrorism, but has failed to build trust among the general Muslim public. The application of community-policing principles is, it is argued, an effort to bridge steep trade-offs between effective prevention and the social and political integration of Britain's Muslims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the bombings in London of July 2005, the Prime Minister, Tony Blair warned that ‘the rules of the game are changing’. The proposed changes have primarily related to foreign suspects of terrorism and engage rules relating to asylum, deportation and nationality. The Terrorism Act 2006 and the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, which give effect to the proposals, are examined and analysed with reference to the policy choices in regard to counter-terrorism strategy, to the weighting of rights against policy, and to choices between rights, including the treatment of absolute rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent bombings in London and Madrid raise the specter of episodic terror attacks in the United States that fall short of the "mushroom cloud" scenarios discussed in the aftermath of 9/11 and the run-up to the Iraq war. Despite the smaller scale of these attacks, they have the potential to generate widespread fear and anger. This article builds on new work in behavioral law and economics to show how these emotional responses can generate systematic biases that motivate and direct counterterrorism policy. These biases should be cause for concern, not least when they lead us to adopt policies that are more burdensome on others instead of those that are most effective at preventing further attacks. Not surprisingly, policies which impose burdens on others—and therefore appear less costly-tend to interfere with civil liberties, particularly those of noncitizens. Recent psychological studies offer an unprecedented opportunity to recognize and understand these biases, and to take action to correct them. One process-oriented corrective that I propose here is to conduct systematic human rights impact assessments during the formulation of counterterrorism law and policy. These assessments should lead to measures more protective of both liberty and security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the politics of anti-terrorism after the July 7, 2005 terrorist bombings in London, England. The bombings last July 7, 2005 resulted in the most lethal way of one aspect of globalization, where anti-terrorism legislation has been developed, multiculturalism has come under aggress and Muslim racial discrimination has evolved throughout the British society. There arise the political debate between racism, terrorism and legislation of terrorism act amidst the processes of globalization.

One of the paradoxical effects of the 7 July bombings in London was to expose the ambivalence in the British government's attempt to wage war on terror by forcefully prosecuting war against those who resort to jihad abroad, actively participating in coalitions of the willing whether in Afghanistan or Iraq, while affording some of Islamism's key ideologists and strategists a high degree of latitude in the United Kingdom itself. This indicates a number of contradictions in official policy that simultaneously recognizes the globalized threat from violent Islamic militancy while, under the rubric of multiculturalism, tolerating those very strains of Islamist radicalism, some of which draw upon the interdependent and transnational character of conflict, to render the UK vulnerable to those very same violent forces. Consequently, the British authorities displayed a studied indifference towards this developing transnational phenomenon both during the 1990s and in some respects even after the London bombings. To explore the curious character of the government's response to the Islamist threat requires the examination of the emergence of this radical ideological understanding and what it entails as a reaction to modernization and secularism in both thought and practice. The analysis explores how government policies often facilitated the non-negotiable identity politics of those promoting a pure, authentic and regenerated Islamic order both in the UK and abroad. This reflected a profound misunderstanding of the growing source and appeal of radical Islam that can be interpreted as a consequence of the slow-motion collision between modernity in its recent globalized form and an Islamic social character, which renders standard western modernization theory, and indeed, the notion of a ‘social science’ itself, deeply questionable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the implications brought about by the 2005 terrorist attacks in London, England by The Secret al-Qaeda Jihad Organization. Tough intelligence and law enforcement efforts, and the implementation of more intrusive counter-terrorist legislation have been introduced around Europe. The attacks, according to the article, attracted more recruits for jihadists which further proved that continued attacks against Europe is key to their growth in the continent.