Search

After two decades of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military has shifted to preparing for large-scale combat operations. However, it would be a mistake to discard hard-earned lessons from these conflicts. Despite contemporary advances in technology and important differences between current US competitors and the Soviet Union, irregular warfare will play a prominent role in the new era of strategic competition. It was a prominent form of US-Soviet competition during the Cold War, is already used extensively by the United States and its competitors and remains attractive given concerns about escalation between nuclear-armed powers. Given the continued relevance of irregular warfare, we focus on two main lessons from the US experience. First, since irregular warfare is about influencing populations and achieving political goals without large-scale combat operations, influencing and working alongside the partner is the primary mission. The second lesson follows directly from the first; if irregular warfare is ultimately about achieving policy goals with an economy of military force, IW is a team sport requiring joint and interagency collaboration to be effectively implemented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The counterinsurgency era that dominated American military discussion post-9/11 has passed. The desire to move on, particularly since the loss of Afghanistan in August 2021, has left unsettled a conversation on counterinsurgency that, both among supporters and detractors, was often dangerously narrow. Too hastily embraced and too rapidly abandoned, counterinsurgency generated false promises and then became the scapegoat for poor strategy. This article examines the counterinsurgency era that was and demonstrates how fad-like engagement with the topic in both military and academic circles subverted the supposed learning process taking place. It argues that the lessons from this engagement are mostly misleading or at least incomplete, but it also notes that there is minimal appetite to look deeper into a topic now deemed toxic. Therein lies significant danger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Western militaries, the choice between enemy-centric and population-centric approaches to unconventional warfare is really no choice at all. Contemporary counterinsurgency doctrines are clear on the decisive importance of hearts and minds in delivering success: in these conflicts, the population is the prize. As this article identifies, however, context may limit in important ways the relevance of many hearts and minds activities. Despite the scale of Commonwealth military success against Indonesia during Operation Claret in 1965–66, and despite the declared importance of hearts and mind activities in support of this success, the specific context that existed during the campaign limited the extent to which hearts and minds could exert a decisive impact. In particular, the limited nature of Commonwealth objectives, which did not seek to change the political ownership of the border area, meant that the local population could not, in the long term, be protected from the consequences of choosing to side with Commonwealth forces. Therefore, despite often being well disposed to Commonwealth troops, rational concerns for their own well-being limited the willingness of border villagers to provide overt help. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (CFPJ) is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

South Africa, Namibia, resistance, insurgency, counterinsurgency, irregular warfare Nevertheless, these rebellions, uprisings, insurgencies, and counterinsurgencies have left an indelible mark on this history of South Africa and Namibia. Keywords: South Africa; Namibia; resistance; insurgency; counterinsurgency; irregular warfare EN South Africa Namibia resistance insurgency counterinsurgency irregular warfare 317 327 11 03/23/23 20230115 NES 230115 The idea of counterinsurgency, and for that matter irregular warfare, along with its accompanying terminology, occupies a contested space in South African history. Lacking the appropriate doctrine, force design and institutional expertise to counter the increasing number of threats to the state, the Union government employed a practical approach allowing its counterinsurgency model to evolve organically. [Extracted from the article]

Boko Haram insurgency has presented a peculiar theatre of unconventional warfare. The combat dynamics of the belligerents have oscillated between the asymmetries of hard and soft violence. While the insurgents have been able to sustain their violent campaign mainly through tactical opportunism based on irregular strategies, including suicide terrorism, the government forces have been locked in intractable counter-insurgency operations where their military might has often been demystified and overwhelmed by the irregular strategies of the insurgents. This has resulted in a precarious and protracted counter-insurgency scenario in which the dynamics of violence tend to have put the government forces under sapping pressure, whilst the insurgent forces have prevailed in an asymmetrical advantage. The way out of this intractable violence is for the government to be pragmatic in its current combat-offensive counter-insurgency by adopting a hybrid approach that is capable of countering both the military and non-military dimensions of the terror-insurgency conundrum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In counterinsurgencies, minority groups such as the Sunnis in Iraq are important elements of the "population," the social–political terrain where population-centric counterinsurgency is battled. Yet there has been little systematic analysis of minority groups in unconventional warfare and no investigation of the ways intervening forces, like the United States, have approached in-country allies in an effort to get host nations to address the strategic importance of minorities. Examining new data on alliance politics between the United States and local partners in Vietnam and Iraq, I find that while existing scholarship would suggest that in-country allies will resist U.S. pressure to engage with minority groups, local allies are surprisingly likely to comply, at least in part, in order to avoid U.S. unilateral engagement with local minorities and to influence the policies adopted. This process slowly undermines U.S. counterinsurgency efforts, speaking to the complexities of population-centric approaches and working through local proxies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether the mission is Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, or Counterinsurgency, success is often dependent on an individual's and/or unit's ability to both understand the vulnerabilities of their foreign counterparts on psychological, cultural, and operational levels, and to influence those counterparts in a manner consistent with US military and political objectives. While many of the criteria for assessment and selection, training, and employment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) supporting Special Warfare are skill-based, the conduct of Special Warfare is often relationship-based. In fact, ARSOF Next lists not only empathy as a characteristic of an Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) unit but also love as a desired trait of an ARSOF soldier. These psychological constructs are applicable both internally (toward one's in-group) and externally (toward one's out-group) and are measurable, albeit not easily, and therefore capable of being evaluated in assessment and selection and cultivated during training. However, the spectrum of today's assessment and selection arguably misses the most valuable psychological characteristic, emotional intelligence. For the past 2 years, the Paul Ekman Group (PEG) has provided a specialized version of the Evaluating Truthfulness and Credibility (ETaC) seminar to Special Forces soldiers. These facial micro-expressions, or "micros," are proven to be both cross-cultural and involuntary, and are thus an ideal fundamental skill for ARSOF soldiers. ETaC focuses on understanding the five channels of communication (face, body language, voice, verbal style, and verbal content) and their behavioral manifestations to better assess the credibility of another. The seminars were not only well received by the participants but also, despite a relatively high baseline competency, demonstrated statistically significant performance improvement in a matter of hours. Not only do such results begin to validate the emotional intelligence of this specifically chosen audience, but it helps to demonstrate the capacity of these unique soldiers to develop their cognitive processes to effectively influence their environment. While the sample size is small, the results are promising and are worthy of additional research. This paper presents the background and summary of these seminars, as well as some recommendations for incorporating more emotional components of Special Warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is waging a disinformation campaign against the U.S.-led international system. China uses disinformation to translate its economic power into Great Power prestige and to suppress external and internal criticism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Both objectives are intended to bolster the domestic legitimacy of the party and enhance social stability. By linking stability and prestige with economic expansion, the CCP hopes to avoid the 'Tacitus Trap' – an existential legitimacy crisis caused by losing the confidence of the people. As a third function, disinformation also obscures Beijing's efforts to influence and manipulate foreign policies of global actors with respect to China, thus undermining international transparency and the democratic structures and processes of target states. The U.S. response has been ad hoc and reactive, therefore ineffectual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Preventing mass atrocities is a core national security objective. Despite a series of broad statements in strategy documents, there is a dearth of operational doctrine. This article suggests that mass atrocity prevention operations should be designated as a Special Operations Forces (SOF) Core Activity. This would operationalize long-standing strategy, prevent competitors from capitalizing on power vacuums where mass atrocities are taking place, and provide a direct link between SOF capabilities and great power competition. SOF have the appropriate skill set to engage in mass atrocity prevention. Designation of this Core Activity would not place significant burdens on special operators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of special operations forces is one where the Anglo-American experience dominates the literature. This focus on Anglo-American operations, and specifically those operations deemed successful in a conventional sense, gives a distorted view of special operations forces structures, mission profiles, and capabilities. Furthermore, the current political context is eroding the conventional operational focus of special operations. This development means special operations forces will be deployed in roles that may be inconsistent with their doctrine and training, in the process contributing particular political dynamics that reverberate back and define their role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Militant groups hiding in Myanmar launch cross-border attacks into India, killing soldiers and civilians. The Indian Army has responded by launching cross-border military incursions into Burmese territory. After decades of trial and failure to curb the militants, a reciprocated spirit of cooperation for the first time seems to characterize India and Myanmar’s joint efforts in fighting them. This article analyses the evolution of these efforts and argues that a sum of dovetailing drivers have created space for enhancing countermilitancy cooperation in an ambivalent and distrustful relationship. Central elements are an overall improvement in bilateral relations, India’s need to counter China’s growing influence in its neighbourhood, Myanmar’s urge to diversify its benefactors, the urgency of stabilizing India’s northeast, Myanmar’s domestic security calculations, as well as a large untapped economic cooperation potential. Despite increasing countermilitancy cooperation, difficult challenges remain as Myanmar has ceasefire agreements with India-hostile militants residing on its territory. The relationship is caught in a complex interstate order in a mix of conflict and cooperation, between the use of extraterritorial force and its acceptance.

US military intervention in Afghanistan was decisive and forceful, however, the Taliban's insurgency inevitably transformed U.S. military doctrine and strategy from conventional military intervention into Counterinsurgency's kinetic and non-kinetic operations. U.S. strategic and operational methodology despite exhausting all possibilities; troops' surge, air dominance/surveillance, non-kinetic peace building operations, failed to dislodge the threat of Taliban violence. An effort is made to identify the underlying factors contributory to the failure of the U.S. strategy, tactics and other challenges faced despite having unparalleled military superiority. This paper further probes the U.S. military strategic repositioning, social structure with the warlords and critically examines how the conflict drifted from intervention into Counterinsurgency irregular warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces the value of great power, such as that applied in Israel’s effective national defense strategy, to resolve the conundrum of eliminating global terrorism.

This article takes the current debate between the enemy-centric and the population-centric approaches as a point of departure to make its contribution by shifting the focus from the operational and tactical to the strategic realm. To this end, it traces the meanings of each approach to its historical origins, discussing the theoretical underpinnings as to distill the basic tenets and to evaluate to what extent each is suitable to counter an insurgency. The central argument of this article is that while both approaches have different 'philosophies,' they are two sides of the same coin. Thus, what needs to be taken into account is the strategic dimension and, logically enough, the political, when referring to counterinsurgency as the two will be determinant in which approach is employed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction to the issue is presented which focuses on the U.S. military's approach to conflict in other countries, and its failure as outsiders to conceptualize and implement viable approaches to nation-building.

Since 9/11, the United States has achieved notable gains against al Qaeda, and also Islamic State (IS), all while avoiding another mass-casualty attack at home. Yet, institutionally, culturally, and in its capabilities, the US government remains seriously ill-equipped for the task of countering irregular threats. Partly as a result, Islamist extremism shows no sign of being defeated, having instead metastasized since 9/11 and spread. Why, given the importance accorded to counterterrorism, has the US approach remained inadequate? What is impeding more fundamental reforms? The article evaluates the United States' way of irregular warfare: its troubled engagement with counterinsurgency and its problematic search for lower cost and lower risk ways of combating terrorism. It suggests needed reforms but acknowledges also the unlikelihood of change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is possible for an insurgency to develop from a single cause, for the insurgents to identify and communicate this unifying cause to the population, and for the insurgents to remain steadfastly focused even as counterinsurgents undermine their organization and redress the cause. But often the case that there is no single cause, that popular support is mobilized by appealing to multiple motivations, and that by the time counterinsurgents resolve the initial grievance, the insurgency has found alternative justifications to mobilize popular support. Since insurgent leadership is often competent and adaptive, it would be wise to consider the latter scenario against any counterinsurgency strategy. Yet, even when this is acknowledged in the counterinsurgency literature, the theory is remarkably silent how this affects the choice of operational approach This paper addresses this gap and offers a framework for more accurately mapping, understanding, anticipating, and addressing the multiple causes that draw adherents to insurgency and allow for its perpetuation.

Over the past decade, Western military doctrines concerned with matters of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency have emphasised the requirement for properly ‘understanding’ the social, political and cultural environments in which those militaries may operate; the so-called human and socio-political ‘terrain’. This has led to a number of advancements and initiatives designed to facilitate the way that militaries may enhance that understanding. One of those initiatives has been the emergence from within the British military of a doctrine - JDP 04 ‘Understanding’ - designed for that purpose. Using that doctrine and other subsequent publications as a template, this article will examine the utility of ‘understanding’ for those commanders seeking to match military activities with political ends. It proposes that while any advances in understanding the operating environment are to be applauded, the ‘understanding’ of greatest importance is that relating to the feasibility of the strategic objectives at hand. If those objectives lack inherent feasibility, then the development of subordinate forms of understanding, particularly in relation to the socio-political dynamics of target societies, will likely only serve to slow the process of failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The malaise that the United States, and the West, have experienced in recent campaigns stems in large part from unclear thinking about war, its political essence, and the strategies needed to join the two. Instead, analysis and response are predicated on entrenched theoretical concepts with limited practical utility. The inadequacy of understanding has spawned new, and not so new, terms to capture unanticipated trends, starting with the re-discovery of “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” and leading to discussion of “hybrid threats” and “gray-zone” operations. New terminology can help, but the change must go deeper. Challenging analytical orthodoxy, this article sets out a unifying approach for the study of political violence, or more accurately: violent politics. It provides a conceptual foundation that helps to make sense of recent shifts in warfare. In effect, it offers sorely needed theoretical insights into the nature of strategy and guides the process of responding to nontraditional threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) has become a key political and military actor in the Middle East and in North Africa. This essay aims at outlining ISIS warfare through an analysis of its operations in the frame of hybrid warfare theory proposed by Frank Hoffman. Therefore, the paper deals with: the role of terrorist tactics in ISIS warfare and the relationship between terrorism and insurgency; ISIS use of technology, mainly with regard to suicide attacks and to drones; and the relevance of urban warfare. Finally, the paper highlights how ISIS operates and the most threatening features of its warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil wars are often the product of low-level political violence that escalates, rather than emerging ex nihilo from a peaceful society. Therefore, it is important to focus on what causes the initial pattern of violence and why it escalates. This essay integrates structural and strategic theories of political violence to develop an analytical framework of violence escalation. This framework allows us to identify critical junctures where intervention may limit or halt escalation. The framework is applied to Iraq, 2003–2006 to determine how and why violence escalated, culminating in widespread sectarian civil war in 2006. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are several competing beliefs regarding how political factions at the sub-state level choose to align and realign during a state of armed conflict. This research draws upon current literature to provide a framework for comparing the Anbar and Baghdad Awakenings of 2006–2007. This research concludes that alignment and alliance building is a process based on structural constraints only at the point of institutional maturity, therefore the critical point in the realignment process for the U.S. military is at a point between an individual's realignment and the wider community's perception of their success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 9/11, the United States has achieved notable gains against al Qaeda, and also Daesh, all while avoiding another mass-casualty attack at home. Yet, institutionally, culturally, and in its capabilities, the United States government remains seriously ill-equipped for the task of countering irregular threats. Partly as a result, Islamist extremism shows no sign of being defeated, having instead metastasized since 9/11 and spread. Why, given the importance accorded to counterterrorism, has the US approach remained inadequate? What is impeding more fundamental reforms? The chapter evaluates the United States' way of irregular warfare: its troubled engagement with counterinsurgency and its problematic search for lower-cost and lower-risk ways of combating terrorism. It suggests needed reforms but acknowledges also the unlikelihood of change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last decade of international engagements marks a shift in the way that the American military fights wars and mitigates conflict overseas. Although America has long had an affinity for creative destruction and cycles of force buildup and tear down, it is increasingly apparent that such an approach is not a viable option for the U.S. military’s path ahead. After a decade of costly conflict with large conventional forces and an abundance of direct action operations, the American way of war is evolving towards less muscle, more mind. To this end, the specialized training, mentoring, and capacity building skills that Special Operations Forces (SOF) receive must remain a priority in an era of fiscal austerity and streamlined resources. It is easier to strengthen security forces than to strengthen governance and the drivers that combat instability. As SOF returns to a focus on partner capacity building programs rather than direct action missions, the lessons learned of the last twelve years of international security assistance programs must be embraced and codified rather than allowed to atrophy, as is often the case when the United States military reorients its attention to new policy priorities. Reliance on external nations and allied partners, coupled with the strategic direction to employ innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint indirect approaches to prevent conflict, have made SOF a resource of choice for both Combatant Commanders and military strategists.

This article aims at challenging the notion of a French exception in the realm of irregular warfare, suggesting that it rather amounts to a western variation. Born out of a transatlantic community under British influence, the French irregular experience carried on through the early Cold War challenges, strengthening France’s ties with its Western allies. France’s subsequent involvement in post-colonial counter-insurgencies did contribute to generating some specific strategic features, although never totally disconnected from international circulation. Finally, the post-Cold War order significantly drove French irregular warfare back into its Western fold through the adoption of US- and NATO-sponsored concepts and doctrines, thus enhancing interoperability and some degree of standardisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia’s strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the current changing international context, the worldwide power balance along with its inter-dependencies shows that mankind is facing problems and pressures posed by resources limitation (the oil ones being the most relevant) dramatic climate evolution and a decisive impact of technologies. The approach of the armed forces to the national defense related interests, as well as to the asymmetrical and irregular threats underlines the joint force’s capacity to be the most powerful and adequate tool to address all of these.

This article considers the nature of collusion between the British state and loyalist paramilitary organisations during the conflict in Northern Ireland in the context of British counterinsurgency theory and practices in prior colonial campaigns. It briefly outlines the nature, pattern and logic of collusion in Northern Ireland before examining some of the key works of British counterinsurgency theorists -- Charles Callwell, Charles Gwynn and Frank Kitson -- reflecting on earlier imperial experiences. Collusion is understood as an expedient coercive state practice, premised on a 'doctrine of necessity', designed to remove 'enemies' and induce fear in a target population via a strategy of assassination in which the appearance of adherence to the rule of law is a political end shaping the specific forms of state violence involved. Such a practice, the author argues, is not an aberration in the tradition of British state counterinsurgency violence, it is exemplary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay focuses on the difficulties to define what an irregular conflict is, in order to do so the essay is divided into three sections. The first one presents an overview as complete as possible on the theories about how conflicts have changed since the end of the Cold War. The second section will try to highlights how such theories, while taking the credit for a kind of originality, have many forerunners in last three centuries which face similar tactical and strategic issues. To this end, the essay examines the concept of Counterinsurgency (COIN) as it has developed in the mid-twentieth century and then it analyzes some theories between the eighteenth and nineteenth century colonial conflicts relating to the petite guerre. Third section examines the recent conflict carried out by the Islamic State between Syria and Iraq thus highlighting which aspects of the theoretical debate are more pervasive in modern warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses the effect that leveraging civilian defense force militias has on the dynamics of violence in civil war. We argue that the delegation of security and combat roles to local civilians shifts the primary targets of insurgent violence toward civilians, in an attempt to deter future defections, and re-establish control over the local population. This argument is assessed through an analysis of the Sunni Awakening and ancillary Sons of Iraq paramilitary program. The results suggest that at least in the Al-Anbar province of Iraq, the utilization of the civilian population in counterinsurgent roles had significant implications for the targets of insurgent violence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article argues that the history of irregular warfare provides a valuable analytical and critical perspective for the study of counterinsurgency campaigns and counterinsurgency doctrine. A focus on the history of irregular warfare highlights the close relationship between warfare in Europe and in the colonies. Moreover, it enables us to identify more exactly the intersection of multiple factors that lead to an escalation of violence in small wars. Finally, it also sheds light on the lack of strategic reflection on the use of irregular auxiliaries that is characteristic for many counterinsurgency campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Given the onset of a violent rebellion by an armed non-state group, how do states re-establish intra-state peace and hence fulfill their basic function as providers of internal security? In this article I argue that one way governments perform this core function is by recruiting non-combatants into local self-defense units called civilian defense forces (CDFs). By providing for local security, leveraging their superior local knowledge, and provoking insurgent reprisals against civilians, CDF units facilitate the influx of tactical intelligence as well as isolate insurgents from non-combatant populations physically as well as politically. Consistent with the argument, statistical analyses of two different cross-national data sets of insurgencies from 1944 to 2006 reveal that a state is 53 percent more likely to vanquish a guerrilla threat if the incumbent deploys CDFs. The analyses also cast doubt on a recent claim in the literature that incumbent force mechanization adversely affects the states’ ability to counter insurgent threats. Given that CDF deployment is a more easily manipulable variable than most other elements of state power, CDFs appear to be an effective instrument of counterinsurgency deserving of further academic and policy attention. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the evolution of US irregular warfare (IW) doctrine and practice from 2001 onwards. It argues that, after 9/11, top-tier civilian policymakers in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and across the US government developed a heightened awareness of asymmetric threats and non-conventional forms of warfare, especially those shaped by contemporary globalisation. The result was a gradual turn towards irregular warfare, led by Rumsfeld and the DoD, designed to ensure ‘full spectrum dominance’ across all modes of conflict. This pre-dated the insurgency in Iraq and the promotion of counterinsurgency in the US Army by General David Petraeus and others. Policymakers' reluctance to acknowledge the insurgency in Iraq was not down to a failure to understand the concept of IW, but because they had viewed Iraq in conventional terms for so many years and were reluctant to admit their mistake. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

“Globalized” low-intensity conflicts renew debates about how leading world powers contend with evolving complexities in unconventional warfare. The “foreign entanglements” of America’s imperial present have been compared with the “savage wars of peace” from Britain’s colonial past.1 Beyond the template of Anglo-American civilization, however, military, economic, and cultural manifestations of power must be set in their systemic and structural context for more meaningful comparison. Britain’s variegated experience of unconventional warfare stemmed from its vast colonial milieu of “small wars” and “imperial policing.” America’s experience reflects transformational civil–military responses to both existential and ideological threats, reinforcing the evolution of a massive “way of war” over persistent frontier warfare. Integral to reading these small war traditions is the historical method, emphasizing particularity of causation while underscoring the value of flexible, hybrid approaches against overinstitutionalized “ways in warfare.”2 Operational success, delivered by blending military skills with political savvy and cultural sensitivity, not only secured populations but support and legitimacy, without which even global powers risked defeat. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

I study a model of mobilization and rebel tactical choice. Rebel leaders choose between conventional tactics that are heavily reliant on mobilization, irregular tactics that are less so, and withdrawal from conflict. The model yields the following results, among others. Increased nonviolent opportunity has a nonmonotone effect on the use of irregular tactics. Conflict has option value, so irregular campaigns last longer than the rebels' short-term interest dictates, especially in volatile military environments. By demonstrating lack of rebel capacity and diminishing mobilization, successful counterinsurgencies may increase irregular violence. Conflict begets conflict by eroding outside options, thereby increasing mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Insurgencies in the Northeast of India have been a recurring phenomenon since India's independence in 1947. One of the most significant aspects of the multiple insurgencies has been the use of violence for political goals. By drawing upon three cases of insurgencies in Northeast India, the article offers a conceptual framework on escalation and de-escalation of violence in insurgencies. The article argues that the most critical variables which have a direct bearing on the levels of insurgent violence are: popular support, loss of legitimacy and the state's counter-response. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article reports on the U.S. Air Force which is facing a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors to achieve influence over a given population, known as Irregular Warfare (IW). It informs on Air Force operation- counterinsurgency (COIN) in which military airmen conducted the military tactics Close Air Support (CAS) in Afghanistan. It suggests some available alternatives to the U.S. government like offering aircrafts F-16, F-18 to the partner nations.

The final contribution brings together the main findings of the individual articles, draws conclusions and formulates future research challenges in regards to understanding the escalation and de-escalation of irregular war. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the current changing international context, the worldwide power balance along with its inter-dependencies shows that mankind is facing problems and pressures posed by resources limitation (the oil ones being the most relevant), dramatic climate evolution and a decisive impact of technologies. The approach of the armed forces to the national defense related interests, as well as to the asymmetrical and irregular threats underlines the joint force's capacity to be the most powerful and adequate tool to address all of these. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]