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This PhD thesis aims at completing and broadening knowledge regarding the resources and practices of interest representatives operating in the European administrative and political field. It deals with “intermittent” interest representatives active in Brussels, namely actors who only occasionally invest in the field of Eurocracy and for whom the representation of interests is not the main professional activity. It questions how actors whose resources are not suited and know- how-to-be and know-how of the representation of interests in Brussels are weak manage to have an impact on the legislation they are subject to. This research work first highlights that this type of actor can act in Brussels by converting resources acquired in other administrative and political fields. Nevertheless, it confirms that in order to obtain results congruent with their preferences, it is necessary for them to hold resources and implement practices in line with the expectations of European administrative and political actors. It then tackles the repertoires of action to which actors mobilizing in Brussels resort. It thus brings to light the complementarity of protest actions (strikes, stop-work, blockades, demonstrations) and bureaucratized forms of action. The former allows the latter to bear fruit and the actors deploying them to take a place in the decision-making process that they would not have obtained by resorting only to the latter. Finally, it shows that the legislative agenda and the results of previous mobilizations condition the investment of interest groups in Brussels. This research also reveals elements regarding the negotiation logics and voting attitudes of MEPs and Member State representatives in the negotiation spaces of the Parliament and the Council. It reveals that although MEPs can table amendments that go against the political line of their group, they tend to respect group discipline during votes in parliamentary committees and plenary sessions. It also shows that the Member State holding the Council Presidency and the culture of compromise shape the Council's negotiating position. Finally, this research provides data on inter-institutional negotiations. It exposes the competition between the institutions to define the general interest, as well as the contestation of the legitimacy of the Parliament to state the general interest by the administrative and political staff of the Commission.; Cette thèse entend compléter et étendre les connaissances relatives aux propriétés sociales et aux pratiques des représentants d’intérêts agissant dans l’espace administratif et politique européen. Ce travail de recherche s’intéresse aux « intermittents » de la représentation d’intérêts à Bruxelles, c’est-à-dire des acteurs qui n'investissent le champ de l'eurocratie qu'occasionnellement, et pour lesquels la représentation d'intérêts ne constitue pas l'activité professionnelle principale. Il interroge comment des acteurs dépositaires de ressources faiblement européanisées et maîtrisant mal les savoir-être et les savoir-faire de la représentation d’intérêts à Bruxelles réussissent pourtant à peser sur la législation dont ils font l’objet. Ce travail met dans un premier temps en évidence que ce type d’acteurs peuvent agir à Bruxelles en convertissant des ressources acquises dans d’autres espaces administratifs et politiques. Néanmoins, il confirme qu’afin d’obtenir des résultats allant dans le sens de leurs préférences, il est nécessaire qu’ils détiennent des ressources et mettent en oeuvre des pratiques adaptées aux attentes des acteurs administratifs et politiques européens. Il revient ensuite sur les répertoires d’action auxquels les acteurs se mobilisant à Bruxelles recourent. Il met ainsi au jour la complémentarité des actions contestataires (grèves, arrêts de travail, blocages, manifestations) et des formes bureaucratisées d’action. Les premières permettent aux secondes de porter leurs fruits et aux acteurs les déployant de s’arroger une place dans le processus décisionnel qu’ils n’auraient pas obtenue en ne recourant qu’aux secondes. Il montre enfin que l’actualité législative ainsi que les résultats de précédentes mobilisation conditionnent l’investissement des groupes d’intérêts à Bruxelles. Ce travail de recherche dégage également des éléments relatifs aux logiques de négociation et aux attitudes de vote des députés européens et des représentants des États membres dans les espaces de négociation du Parlement et du Conseil. Il révèle que si les députés européens peuvent déposer des amendements allant à rebours de la ligne politique de leur groupe, ils tendent à respecter la discipline de groupe lors des votes en commission parlementaire et en séance plénière. Par ailleurs, il expose que l’État membre assurant la Présidence du Conseil ainsi que la culture du compromis façonnent la position de négociation du Conseil. Ce travail de recherche offre enfin des données concernant les négociations interinstitutionnelles. Il expose la concurrence entre les institutions pour définir l’intérêt général ainsi que la contestation, par le personnel administratif et politique, de la Commission de la légitimité du Parlement à dire l’intérêt général.

peer-reviewed Little is known about the effects of the inter-institutional linkages created through the establishment of the codecision procedure on decision-making in the Council of the European Union. After a review of the existing literature and theories on this topic, we examine to what extent the codecision procedure leads to more involvement of ministers in Council decision-making and to a more powerful position of the Presidency in the internal negotiation process of the Council. The results show that the initially positive effect of codecision on the politicization of Council decision-making has been offset in recent years by a growing lack of transparency in inter-institutional proceedings caused by the use of informal trialogue negotiations to conclude the procedure early. However, our study also suggests that the country holding the Presidency does not occupy a more privileged position in the Council's internal co-operation network as a result of these developments. Thus, with respect to the Council, informal inter-institutional negotiation practices seem to decrease the transparency of the decision-making process and the accountability of the actors involved, but they may not have as adverse an effect on who gets what in terms of policy as previously thought. ACCEPTED peer-reviewed

There is surprisingly little knowledge about the informal ‘trilogues’ that play a pivotal role in almost 90 per cent of European Union legislation. This article maps out previously uncharted practices and explores their role in constituting the Parliament and Council as legislators. It proceeds by taking stock of the knowl- edge that actors in Parliament, the Council and the Commission have acquired and use to make sense of, and act in, trilogues. Our findings qualify the widespread belief that trilogues have drawn Parliament into unfamiliar territory of diplomatic culture, at a cost to political efficacy and democratic functions. Trilogues today are under- pinned by norms, standard operating procedures and practices linking formal and informal institutions. They have imparted Parliament with a sharpened conscious- ness of its role and identity as a ‘normal’ parliament, while leaving the Council fru- strated and less confident. Parliament has seen in norms of public accountability a means to develop leverage over the Council.