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The vehicle-road collaborative intelligence approach has become an industry consensus. It can efficiently tackle the technical hurdles and reduce the performance requirements and costs of on-board perception and computing devices. There is a need for in-depth quantitative studies to optimize the allocation of vehicle-road intelligent capabilities for collaborative intelligence. However, current research tends to focus more on qualitative analysis, and there is little research on the redistribution of vehicle and roadside intelligent capabilities. In this paper, we present a model for distributing perception and computing capabilities between vehicle-side and roadside, ensuring to meet the needs of various autonomous driving levels. Meanwhile, the collaborative intelligence approach will also introduce the costs of intelligent infrastructure deployment, energy, and maintenance. Different roads have varying scene characteristics and usage intensities. It is necessary to conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis of the intelligent deployment of different road types. A vehicle-road cost allocation model is developed based on the lifecycle traveled distance of vehicles and the lifecycle traffic flow of various roads to evaluate the function-cost effectiveness. Our study presents several vehicle-road intelligent schemes that meet the needs of various autonomous driving levels and selects Beijing for case analysis. The results indicate that primary intelligent infrastructure can reduce the lifecycle cost of the vehicle-side intelligent scheme for intermediate autonomous driving from ¥65,301 to ¥37,703, and advanced intelligent infrastructure can reduce the lifecycle cost for advanced autonomous driving from ¥126,938 to ¥42,180. Considering the distributed cost of vehicle-side and roadside, urban roads in Beijing have higher function-cost effectiveness compared to highways, especially urban expressways, which are expected to generate 43.3 times the vehicle-function-cost benefits after the advanced intelligent upgrades. The corresponding research findings can serve as a reference for city managers to make decisions on intelligent road deployment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes capacity restricted cooperative purchasing (CRCP) situations in which a group of cooperating purchasers face two suppliers with limited supply capacity. To minimize the total purchasing costs, we show that two extreme policies have to be compared: order everything at one supplier and the possible remainder at the other. Interestingly, as order quantities increase, various policy switches can occur. To find suitable cost allocations of the total purchasing costs, we model a CRCP-situation as a cost sharing problem. As increasing order quantities also imply concavity breaks due to a forced change in supplier, the corresponding cost function is piecewise concave. For cost sharing problems with concave cost functions, we show that the serial cost sharing mechanism satisfies two desirable properties, unit cost monotonicity (UCM) and monotonic vulnerability for the absence of the smallest player (MOVASP). However, these properties are lost in the setting of piecewise concave cost functions. We develop a new context specific class of piecewise serial rules based on claims rules. We show that the proportional rule is the only claims rule for which the corresponding piecewise serial rule satisfies UCM. Moreover, the piecewise serial rule corresponding to the constrained equal losses rule satisfies MOVASP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internalization of costs of religious preferences fits the religious self-perception and ideology of many religious communities and is in their long-term interest. It also strengthens the external value of religious communities, norms, and institutions for the wider society. Many forces press religious communities to reduce the costs of religious preferences. Within a community, costs are reduced by limiting the available choices or shifted to its weaker members; outside the community, costs are shifted to other groups or the state. Incentives influence the allocation of costs, which in turn shape internal communal choices and the religious vitality and sustainability of the community. The allocation of costs also affects the external relations of communities. This article suggests that the allocation of costs is yet another aspect of religious and ideological communities in liberal states that deserves investigation at the constitutional, legal, and regulatory levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Truck platooning consists of one or several trucks driving very closely behind the platoon leader with the help of technology. Platooning reduces fuel consumption, carbon emissions and congestion while increasing road safety and the productivity of trucks and drivers. This article focuses on the advance planning of platoons. First, we study platoon formation from a system-wide optimization perspective. We formalize the underlying optimization problem and we propose exact and approximate solution approaches that appear to perform very well in instances of practical size. Second, we posit that truck platooning is much more likely to develop efficiently among multiple operators. This involves a shift in business relations between freight operators through cost sharing. We make use of cooperative game theory to study cost allocations among players. Our analysis shows that a compromise is needed among existence, stability and computational efficiency. However, we propose cost allocation rules for cooperative platooning games that perform very well in practice with regard to their stability. Finally, we propose an illustrative example based on the settings of the Port of Rotterdam and we provide a series of insights. • We study platoon formation from a system-wide optimization perspective. • We formalize the optimization problem and propose exact and approximate solution approaches. • We make use of cooperative game theory to study cost allocations among players. • We propose an illustrative example based on the Port of Rotterdam. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How to share the cost of an improvement in a condo? In France, as in most European civil law countries, the law does not provide any precise method for answering this question. This vagueness of the law calls for further investigation. Focusing on how to distribute costs that are collectively incurred by a group of players, cooperative game theory is a priori an appropriate framework for dealing with this topic. In this theory, the Shapley value is a widely used cost-sharing method. We analyze the interest of using this concept to solve our problem by considering the case of a three-storey condo. We show that taking into account the legal requirement that any decision concerning improvements be made by a majority of the votes affects the characteristic function of the game. We then identify a pitfall of the Shapley value: it almost never receives an affirmative vote from the co-owner association. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Effective and efficient care of hospital patients relies on well-coordinated resource allocation. Determining the number of beds and nurses in clinical units depends, among other considerations, on admission volumes, lengths of stay, and staffing availability, all of which are stochastic in practice. Given these uncertainties, this paper develops two robust optimization models to help plan the most effective bed and nurse resource allocation in terms of costs and access in a single clinical unit while allowing resources to be shared between units for flexibility. Ellipsoidal, budgeted, and data-driven formulations are compared for "conservatism," a measure of costs incurred to achieve robustness. In addition to existing formulations we develop uncertainty sets based on least-squares ellipsoidal fitting, which produces better solutions in our application. A case study involving different patient types and care levels reduces the number of patients that cannot be admitted (non-admissions) by up to 85% for the budgeted model and up to 100% for the data-driven model, with resource sharing reducing costs by 1% and 2%, respectively, compared to the non-sharing models. While the least-squares ellipsoidal model increases costs from the current scenario by 2% to achieve robustness, the budgeted and data-driven counterparts increase costs by 54% and 57%, respectively. These results have important implications for how uncertainty sets are formed when applying robust optimization to healthcare problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Freight consolidation is a logistics practice that improves the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of transportation operations, and also reduces energy consumption and carbon footprint. A "fair" shipping cost-sharing scheme is indispensable to help establish and sustain the cooperation of a group of suppliers in freight consolidation. In this paper, we design a truthful acyclic mechanism to solve the cost-sharing problem in a freight consolidation system with one consolidation center and one common destination. Applying the acyclic mechanism, the consolidation center decides which suppliers' demands ship via the consolidation center and their corresponding cost shares based on their willingness to pay for the service. The proposed acyclic mechanism is designed based on bin packing solutions that are also strong Nash equilibria for a related noncooperative game. We study the budget-balance of the mechanism both theoretically and numerically. We prove a 2-budget-balance guarantee for the mechanism in general and better budget-balance guarantees under specific problem settings. Empirical tests on budget-balance show that our mechanism performs much better than the guaranteed budget-balance ratio. We also study the economic efficiency of our mechanism numerically to investigate its impact on social welfare under different conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Problem definition: We consider capacity sharing through demand allocation among firms with multiple demand sources and multiple service facilities. Firms decide on the allocation of demand from different sources to different facilities to minimize delay costs and service-fulfillment costs possibly subject to service-level requirements. If firms decide to operate collectively as a coalition, they must also decide on a scheme for sharing the total cost. Academic/practical relevance: We study capacity sharing through demand allocation in service systems in the presence of service-fulfillment costs. Our problem is motivated by service collaboration in healthcare involving public–private partnerships. Methodology: We formulate the problem as a cooperative game and identify a cost allocation that is in the core. Results: The cost-allocation scheme we identify is price-directed, and the cost of each firm consists of three components: (1) the delay cost incurred within the firm; (2) a cost paid for the capacity used by the firm at facilities owned by other firms; and (3) a payment received for fulfilling demand of other firms at facilities owned by the firm. Interestingly, we show that the cost-allocation scheme is equivalent to a market equilibrium—that is, it can be implemented in a decentralized fashion. We extend our analysis to settings where the capacity of each facility is endogenously determined and to settings where a service-priority policy is deployed. Our results are robust to a variety of generalizations: partial sharing, partial transfer, facilities modeled as general queueing systems, and convex delay costs. Managerial implications: Our findings provide guidelines for and insights into how to carry out demand allocation and cost sharing among different firms in the presence of service-fulfillment costs to foster service collaboration. In particular, the equilibrium market prices can be viewed as the prices/subsidies for service collaboration in a public–private partnership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Holding inventory of spare parts is critical to assure safety and production. In order to save costs, different producers may collaborate through an inventory pool. We consider an inventory pool of spare parts, subject to a service level constraint, where the members of the pool may have different target service levels, so that they represent different demand classes. The pool is implemented either by round-up or rationing policies. The members should agree on how to share the costs. Based on cooperative game theory concepts, we show the important effects that different targets can have in the core stability for this problem. We perform a computational study in a large number of instances, providing insights on the emptiness of the core and the performance of seven allocation methods. We also propose the novel Minimum Deviation from Service Level Referential Cost Method (MIND). This method looks for a stable allocation such that the maximum difference between a cost allocated to a player and its service level referential cost is minimised. The MIND allocation is the solution to a linear programming model and is core guaranteed, in the sense that if the core is not empty, the allocation belongs to the core. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this study, we consider different cities located along a tram line. Each city may have one or several stations and information is available about the flow of passengers between any pair of stations. A fixed cost (salaries of the executive staff, repair facilities, or fixed taxes) must be divided among the cities. This cost is independent of the number of passengers and the length of the line. We propose a mathematical model to identify suitable mechanisms for sharing the fixed cost. In the proposed model, we study, and characterize axiomatically, three rules, which include the uniform split, the proportional allocation and an intermediate situation. The analyzed axioms represent the basic requirements for fairness and elemental properties of stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the Core of a competitive market economy with private commodities as well as (non-Samuelsonian) collective goods that are provided through an endogenous social division of labour. Our approach is founded on the hypothesis that every agent is a "consumer–producer"—producing private commodities as well as consuming collective and private goods. We develop the σ -Core concept, assuming that collective goods are scalable with community size. We show that the σ -Core can be founded on deviations of coalitions of arbitrary size, extending the seminal insights of Vind and Schmeidler for pure exchange economies. Our analysis also shows that self-organisation in a social division of labour can be incorporated into the Edgeworthian barter process directly. This is formulated as an equivalence of the σ -Core and a structured σ -Core concept based on blocking coalitions that use internal divisions of labour. Furthermore, Grodal's theorem is extended, allowing applications of metrics that express productive similarities between agents making up blocking coalitions. Finally, we consider the equivalence of the σ -Core and the set of cost share equilibrium allocations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To clean up the pollutants in cross-boundary rivers needs the collaborative actions among different agents involved. In our paper, we deal with the river pollution problem in a cooperative situation. We first introduce the adjacent downstream compensation method by considering the bargaining behavior between any two neighbour agents, which reconciles two famous doctrines in the international disputes, i.e., the Absolute Territorial Sovereignty theory and the Unlimited Territorial Integrity theory. Then we prove the coincidence of the adjacent downstream compensation method and the Shapley value of the corresponding responsibility game. By studying the concavity of the river pollution cost sharing game, we illustrate the stability of the adjacent downstream compensation method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of frivolous and abuse of process claims has gained a significant traction in the deliberations of the UNCITRAL Working Group III. In light of this focus, this article examines existing approaches of the arbitral tribunals to identifying frivolous and abuse of process claims and allocating costs for these types of claims. The article reveals inconsistencies in shifting the costs, and concludes that current rules on cost allocation are unlikely to create ex ante deterrence in filing of such claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of SDU Journal of Engineering Sciences & Design / Mühendislik Bilimleri ve Tasarım Dergisi is the property of Journal of Engineering Sciences & Design and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Firms that operate combined heat and power (CHP) plants in Sweden face strong incentives to let their district heating (DH) customers subsidize the sales of electricity. This study investigates whether firms exploit the variation in competitive intensity across the two markets and 1) shift costs from electricity to DH, and 2) pass on any cost increase to consumers. A major empirical challenge is that firms endogenously decide whether to operate a CHP plant or not. Two different matching procedures are used to circumvent this problem. The results show that 1) compared with a similar non-CHP firm, the average CHP firm reports a DH cost that is 20-25% higher, 2) the extra cost that CHP firms report is fully passed on to consumers and 3) with reported costs, the price-cost margin is 8% for both groups and with imputed costs the margin increases to 30-35% for the CHP firms. The results are consistent with the presence of strategic cost shifting, which can be tackled through either stricter accounting rules or DH price regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A minimum cost spanning tree problem analyzes the way to efficiently connect individuals to a source. Hence the question is how to fairly allocate the total cost among these agents. Our approach, reinterpreting the spanning tree cost allocation as a claims problem defines a simple way to allocate the optimal cost with two main criteria: (1) each individual only pays attention to a few connection costs (the total cost of the optimal network and the cost of connecting himself to the source); and (2) an egalitarian criteria is used to share costs. Then, using claims rules, we define an egalitarian solution so that the total cost is allocated as equally as possible. We show that this solutions could propose allocations outside the core, a counter-intuitive fact whenever cooperation is necessary. Then we propose a modification to get a core selection, obtaining in this case an alternative interpretation of the Folk solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the interest in both collaborative logistics and location‐routing has grown considerably, horizontal cooperation in location‐routing problems remains fairly unattended. This article studies several variants of the location‐routing problem using a cooperative game‐theoretic framework. The authors derive characteristics in terms of subadditivity, convexity, and non‐emptiness of the core. Moreover, for some of the game variants, it is shown that for facility opening costs substantially larger than the costs associated with routing, the core is always nonempty. The theoretical results are supported by numerical experiments aimed at illustrating the properties and deriving insights. Among others, it is observed that, while in general it is not possible to guarantee core allocations, in a huge majority of cases the core is nonempty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Port, carriers and many other departments are involved in the whole water transportation service system, and these departments tend to have conflicts of interest in the process of service, which results in a difficult coordination phenomenon. We propose an integrated contract that combines the revenue sharing and service cost allocation to coordinate the port service chain. We explore the effects of the contract decision variables in the different scenarios. The results show that two sharing factors exist "blind zone," but the improved contract reveals that revenue sharing and cost allocation contract combining with the fixed payment mechanism can be more effective to coordinate the port service chain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Briata, F. and Fragnelli, V. [2017] Free-riding in common facility sharing, in Transaction on Computation Collective Intelligence XXVII, pp. 129–138. dealt with the inefficiency and the free-riding situations that may arise from sharing the maintenance cost of a facility among its potential users and from dividing the cost of a check to assess who the users are among the agents that asked for it.They introduced two mechanisms for reducing the free-riding behaviors and considered the possibility that the check provides also information on the level at which the facility is used by each agent. In this paper, we improve the profitability of the check, introducing a TU-cost game for determining the quota of the total cost assigned to each agent in order to satisfy as many agents as possible. Two solutions are proposed and analyzed and the balancedness of the TU-cost game is studied and characterized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a multi-actor perspective on the realization of new infrastructures, motivated by the necessity for infrastructures to support the ongoing climate and energy transition in general, and CO2 transport infrastructures for carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) in particular. We develop a general model to represent infrastructures that allows for a unique decomposition into 'elementary infrastructure components' based on heterogeneous user requirements. Notably, it incorporates a cost function with a very generic and adaptable structure, for which we can still explicitly determine the costs of each individual component. As a direct consequence an intuitive cost allocation rule is obtained: equal component cost sharing. This allocation rule is in line with existing game-theoretic concepts and satisfies the desirable properties of advantageous scaling and coalitional rationality. Advantageous scaling guarantees that the costs allocated to each existing user do not increase if the number of users grows larger and coalitional rationality ensures that there is no subgroup of infrastructure users that would have a financial reason to object to the cost allocation. Additionally, we examine the application of our model to a prospective CO2 transport infrastructure for CCUS in the port of Rotterdam and the adjoining industry area. • Infrastructures and corresponding costs are modeled in a component-based manner. • Elementary infrastructure components account for heterogeneous user requirements. • Equal component cost sharing satisfies desirable properties and enables cooperation. • Case study demonstrates CO2 transport infrastructures are a suitable application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game theory approach, we prove the coalitional stability of any cost allocation which is such that the unit shares are a non-decreasing function of the floor level. Second, we show that the two surplus allocations induced, respectively, by the de facto cost-sharing rule used in France and the equal cost-sharing rule may fail to be coalitionally stable. By insisting that the cost sharing must depend on the relative individual advantages provided by an improvement, French law increases the risk of disputes between neighbors, compared to other sharing rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with an economic aspect of distributed generation systems which rural energy cooperatives may mainly support, since they can effectively coordinate the different stakeholders within an energy access initiative. Members of a rural energy cooperative would share the costs of deploying a distributed generation system, so that each of them can benefit from it. To minimise the overall investment cost, such a cooperative must consider both technical sizing and cost allocation among its members. For the latter, an important issue to take into account is the so-called willingness-to-pay. For obtaining the design of the distributed generation system we propose to use facility location covering (FALCO) models. The solution of the FALCO model provides both the structure of the distributed generation system and the investment cost to be covered by the members of the cooperative. We take advantage of the structure of the primal and dual optimal solutions of the FALCO model to endogenously determine the minimum and maximum willingness-to-pay of the cooperative members and then to apply rationing techniques to obtain the final allocation of costs to each member. Thus, our approach optimises the generator locations and minimises the total system cost, while assigning to each member at least her minimum willingness-to-pay. From our point of view, this method may help the beneficiaries to accept the investment cost allocation. Finally, a case study based on real data from a rural village in Maharashtra, where a group of farmers wanting to buy and share an energy system to pump water for irrigating their fields, is used to illustrate the working of the proposed cost allocation methodology. • Fair cost allocation methods and game theory can support distributed generation planning. • Each user minimum willingness-to-pay serves as reference for defining fair shares. • Technical and topographical conditions are critical for both system sizing and cost allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows that cooperative grey game theory can help us to establish a fair cost share between private organizations for supporting the temporary housing problem by using facility location games under uncertainty. Temporary accommodation might be a method that ought to get started before a tragedy happens, as a preventative preplanning. In spite of being temporary constructions, the housing buildings are one of the most essential parts to produce in emergency situations, to contribute to the reconstruction and to recover better. Our study is based on a default earthquake in Izmir of western Turkey. A number of tents are being built in three cities near Izmir. Two companies are selected to distribute the tents in a fair way between the three cities. For this purpose, we use cooperative grey game theory to help us define a fair cost allocation between private organizations for supporting the housing problem by using facility location games under uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we consider a Jackson network of independent service stations. To improve upon the total expected queue length, the stations may redistribute the total arrival rate of customers over all queues. We investigate this situation by means of arrival rate games. These are cooperative TU cost games in which the stations are the players and the total cost of a coalition is linear in the total expected queue length. We show that these games are totally balanced; cooperation is beneficial to all stations. Further, we provide a tailor-made cost allocation rule that belongs to the core of the game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Users share the cost of unreliable non-rival projects (items). For instance, industry partners pay today for R&D that may or may not deliver a cure to some viruses, agents pay for the edges of a network that will cover their connectivity needs, but the edges may fail, etc. Each user has a binary inelastic need that is served if and only if certain subsets of items are actually functioning. We ask how should the cost be divided when individual needs are heterogenous. We impose three powerful separability properties: Independence of Timing ensures that the cost shares computed ex ante are the expectation, over the random realization of the projects, of shares computed ex post. Cost Additivity together with Separability Across Projects ensure that the cost shares of an item depend only upon the service provided by that item for a given realization of all other items. Combining these with fair bounds on the liability of agents with more or less flexible needs, and of agents for whom an item is either indispensable or useless, we characterize two rules: the Ex Post Service rule is the expectation of the equal division of costs between the agents who end up served; the Needs Priority rule splits the cost first between those agents for whom an item is critical ex post, or if there are no such agents between those who end up being served. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the effect of agricultural cost sharing for cover crops on the acres of three conservation practices. A survey of farmers from Maryland is used to estimate the direct effect of cover crop cost sharing on the acres of cover crops, and the indirect effect of cover crop cost sharing on the acres of two other practices: conservation tillage and contour/strip cropping. A two-stage simultaneous equation approach is used to correct for voluntary self-selection into cost-sharing programs, and to account for substitution effects among conservation practices. Using model parameters from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Chesapeake Bay Program, the estimated effects of cost sharing are then translated to pollution reduction in order to quantify water quality benefits. The results indicate that the large cover crop cost sharing effort in Maryland had considerable effects on cover crop acreage, substantially reducing nitrogen and phosphorus runoff. Moreover, after accounting for the indirect effects on conservation tillage, the cost per pound of phosphorus abatement in the Chesapeake Bay decreased by between 60-67%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the influence of cost-sharing mechanism on the disruption prevention investment in a supply chain with unreliable suppliers. When a supply chain faces considerable loss following a disruption, supply chain members are motivated toward investing in manners that reduce their disruption probability. In improving supply chain reliability, the cost-sharing mechanism must be set appropriately to realize the efficiency of the disruption prevention investment. In a supply chain where the focal manufacturing company has its own subsidiary supplier and an outsourcing supplier, we analyze different forms of cost-sharing mechanisms when both suppliers confront disruption risks. Through the cost-sharing mechanisms presented in this study, supply chain members can improve their reliability via disruption prevention investments without considerably increasing the total supply chain cost. We present two concepts, the cost-sharing structure and the cost-sharing ratio, in this study. As the two key components of cost-sharing mechanism, these two elements constitute a practicable cost allocation mechanism to facilitate disruption prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider the problem of allocating costs of a regional transit system to its users, who employ shortest path routes between all pairs of nodes in the system network. We provide an axiomatic set of conditions that a solution should satisfy and use cooperative game theory to model the cost allocation problem. We provide an allocation, called the equal cost share solution, which is efficient to compute and is the unique solution that satisfies the conditions. In addition, we show not only that the cost allocation game has a nonempty core, but further, that the game is concave, meaning that the Shapley value allocation, which coincides with the equal cost share solution, always lies in the core of the game. We provide an application of the equal cost share solution to the Washington, D.C. Metro transit network and compare it to the existing fare pricing structure. As compared to equal cost share pricing, the Metro overcharges for short downtown trips and undercharges for very long commutes. The equal cost share solution is easy to update in real time as the cost data and user distribution change, or when the transit network expands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang (2007) we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule , which takes into account these limits in distributing costs “fairly” and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We study the collaborative DNDP under sustainability considerations. • We develop a multi-objective optimization model for the DNDP problem. • We develop two meta -heuristics to solve large problems. • We consider different collaboration scenarios and study the cost allocation problem. • We apply our model to a real-life distribution network in France. • An extensive numerical study has been conducted to obtain managerial insights. This paper addresses the problems of distribution network design and gain sharing in a collaborative context. We propose mathematical models to compare the performance of three scenarios based on several sustainability indicators: logistics costs, CO 2 emissions, created job opportunities, noise level, and accident risk. The scenarios assume multi-period transportation planning, performed by a heterogeneous fleet of vehicles. Mathematical models are used to determine the number of hubs, their capacities, and their locations, as well as the links between network nodes, the quantities transported, the quantities delayed, the inventory level, and the number and type of vehicles used in each period. Single-objective optimization is performed in an exact manner for small instances, while the genetic algorithm is used to solve large instances. Multi-objective resolution is performed using the ε-constraint method for small instances and the non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm II for large instances. We use a distribution network located in France for our numerical experiments. The costs of collaboration were shared by three approaches: egalitarian approach, volume method, and Shapley value. Experimental results and sensitivity analysis reveal some interesting findings: (1) it is always beneficial to design a collaborative distribution network; (2) relaxing delivery times and increasing the number of available vehicles further improve collaborative performance; and (3) cooperative game-theoretic approaches are most appropriate for sharing costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We ask how to share the cost of finitely many public goods (items) among users with different needs: some smaller subsets of items are enough to serve the needs of each user, yet the cost of all items must be covered, even if this entails inefficiently paying for redundant items. Typical examples are network connectivity problems when an existing (possibly inefficient) network must be maintained. We axiomatize a family cost ratios based on simple liability indices , one for each agent and for each item, measuring the relative worth of this item across agents, and generating cost allocation rules additive in costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider networks of queues in which the independent operators of individual queues may cooperate to reduce the amount of waiting. More specifically, we focus on Jackson networks in which the total capacity of the servers can be redistributed over all queues in any desired way. If we associate a cost to waiting that is linear in the queue lengths, it is known from the literature how the operators should share the available service capacity to minimize the long run total cost. This paper deals with the question whether or not (the operators of) the individual queues will indeed cooperate in this way, and if so, how they could share the cost in the new situation such that each operator never pays more than his own cost without cooperation. For the particular case of a tandem network with two or three nodes it is known from previous work that cooperation is indeed beneficial, but for larger tandem networks and for general Jackson networks this question was still open. The main result of this paper gives for any Jackson network an explicit cost allocation that is beneficial for all operators. The approach we use also works for other cost functions, such as the server utilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fertile application of cooperative game techniques to cost sharing problems on networks has so far concentrated on the Stand Alone core test of fairness and/or stability, and ignored many combinatorial optimization problems where this core can be empty. I submit there is much room for an axiomatic discussion of fair division in the latter problems, where Stand Alone objections are not implementable. But the computational complexity of optimal solutions is still a very severe obstacle to this approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A review of the literature on cost sharing solutions for the minimum cost spanning tree problem is proposed, with a particular focus on the folk and Kar solutions. We compare the characterizations proposed, helped by some equivalencies between sets of properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we explain why the field of cost allocation problems with a coalition structure is a wide and promising unexplored research direction. In particular, we pose some open questions for airport games with a coalition structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of Public & Cooperative Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper studies the performance of delegated decision-making schemes in a two-stage, multidivision capital budgeting problem for a shared investment with an inherent abandonment option. Applying both robust goal congruence and sequential adverse selection frameworks, we show that the optimal capital budgeting mechanism entails a capital charge rate above the firm's cost of capital in the first stage but below the cost of capital in the second stage. Further, the first-stage asset cost-sharing rule depends only on the relative divisional growth profiles, and equal cost sharing can be optimal even when the divisions receive significantly different benefits from the shared investment project. In the presence of an adverse selection problem, all agency costs are incorporated into the second-stage budgeting mechanism, leaving the first-stage capital charge rate and asset-sharing rule unaffected even though the agency problem induces capital rationing at both stages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Firms routinely allocate the costs of common corporate resources down to divisions. The main insight of this paper is that any efficient allocation rule must reflect the firm's underlying cost structure. We propose a new allocation rule (the polynomial rule), which achieves efficiency and approximate budget balance. Welfare losses due to linear allocation rules increase with firm size, so polynomial allocation rules dominate linear rules for larger firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We describe the construction and analysis of asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms, in which a variety of axioms are applied to subsets of the agents/goods. We show that the analysis can be quite subtle as apparently similar axiomatizations lead to significantly different results; in particular, combinations of symmetric mechanisms can be extremely asymmetric and biased. In addition, we characterize some interesting mixed mechanisms. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article focuses on the costs associated with public interest litigation in Canada. Topics include cost allocation of legal representation, adverse costs, and protective cost orders. Information is provided on fee-shifting regulations, recovery of attorney's fees, and the disbursement of awards post trial.

The article discusses the cost-and-free allocation practice in the international investment arbitration. It looks into the scholarship on cost allocation, the variable application of a steady costs-allocation, and the cost-shifting practices between arbitral parties. It also explores the effects of the arbitral settlement uncertainty including the reluctance to initiate arbitration by claimants, governmental regulation issues, and the arbitral fees and legal costs in an adverse cost award.

Abstract: This study examines the relationship between performance levels and the levels of cross-subsidy attained by local exchange carriers in the United States telecommunications industry. These cross-subsidies have been obtained by firms via their engagement in a separations mechanism, based on a cost allocation process, which telecommunications sector regulatory authorities use. Non-market strategies have assumed primacy in the activities of several sectors world-wide. Thus, understanding non-market strategic choices is important in the analysis of firms’ behavior and performance. Active engagement in the separations process is an important non-market strategy in the telecommunications industry, as a firm relatively successful in this activity can gain large cross-subsidies. The analysis establishes that less profitable firms obtain greater cross-subsidies. Once the profitability variable is decomposed into its two main components, which are productivity and price recovery, the impact of the profitability variable reduces. Firms which are relatively unproductive, as well as those unable to recover higher output prices, obtain relatively greater cross-subsidies. These results are inconsistent with the postulates of the strategic cost-allocation and behavior literatures but are consistent with x-inefficiency and rent-seeking perspectives of firms’ strategic actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study a multicast game in non-cooperative directed networks in which a source sends the same message or service to a set of r receiving users and the cost of the used links is divided among the receivers according to a given cost sharing method. By following the approach recently proposed by Chen et al. (Proceedings of the 19th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pp. 854–863, ), we analyze the performances of a family of methods satisfying certain desiderata, namely, weak and strong budget-balance, fairness and separability. We show that any fair method may require an arbitrary number of selfish moves in order to converge to a pure Nash equilibrium, hence we focus on the solutions obtained after one round of selfish moves. We evaluate their quality according to two global social functions: the overall cost of the solution and the maximum shared cost of users. The only method satisfying all the properties is the well-known Shapley value for which we show an approximation ratio of the solutions reached after a one round walk equal to Θ( r2). We then prove that relaxing the strong budget balance and separability properties (we call feasible any method satisfying weak budget balance and fairness) leads to improved performances since we determine a feasible method achieving an approximation ratio of the solutions reached after a one round walk equal to O( r). This bound is asymptotically optimal since we also show that any method satisfying weak budget balance cannot achieve an approximation ratio of the solutions reached after a one round walk smaller than r. Finally, we prove the NP-hardness of computing the sequence of moves leading to the best possible global performance and extend most of the results to undirected networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information on the assessment of cost shifting for electronic discovery in the U.S. It states that the trends in cost shifting may be explained as a judicial reaction to the emergence of electronic discovery expenses. It mentions that the 2006 electronic discovery amendments appear to have restricted cost shifting to appropriate cases, although it does not bring uniformity to cost shifting.

Cost spanning tree problems concern the construction of a tree which provides a connection with the source for every node of the network. In this paper, we address cost sharing problems associated to these situations when the agents located at the nodes act in a non-cooperative way. A class of strategies is proposed which produce minimum cost spanning trees and, at the same time, are strong Nash equilibria for a non-cooperative game associated to the problem. They are also subgame perfect Nash equilibria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we model cost allocations for airport problems by using cooperative game and noncooperative game approaches. We relate the cost allocations given by the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation to those given by the Nash outcomes of the noncooperative game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cost-sharing is a health care cost-containment technique in which health care services are partially paid for by patients out of pocket. Cost-sharing can reduce non-cost-effective care, but it can also undermine the financial protection and access values of health insurance. We review the empirical evidence published since the mid-1980s about cost-sharing's effect on utilization, expenditures, health, and adverse consequences, including how the effects vary by form of care, by health status, and by sociodemographic characteristics. Some cost-sharing, such as emergency department copayments, reduces utilization without any harmful effects, whereas other cost-sharing reduces valuable care such as maintenance drug use among the chronically ill. Cost-sharing should be used judiciously, with attention taken not to reduce highly cost-effective care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]