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This article explores the concerns and issues surrounding the use of generative AI in relation to copyright infringement on literary works. The Authors Guild has expressed concerns about copyrighted books being used to train AI models without permission or compensation. There are debates about whether generative AI can infringe on copyright, as it lacks human creativity and authorship. The fair use doctrine is complex in the context of generative AI and could potentially hinder AI progress or disenfranchise human authors. Authors also worry about the power of large corporations that own generative AI models and the lack of protection and remedies available to them under current copyright law. The U.S. Copyright Office is conducting an inquiry to address these issues and hopes to develop comprehensive guidance on the intersection of generative AI and copyright law. [Extracted from the article]

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems, together with text and data mining (TDM), introduce complex challenges at the junction of data utilization and copyright laws. The inherent reliance of AI on large quantities of data, often encompassing copyrighted materials, results in multifaceted legal quandaries. Issues surface from the unfeasible task of securing permission from each copyright holder for AI training, further muddled by ambiguities in interpreting copyright laws and fair use provisions. Adding to the conundrum, the clandestine practices of data collection in proprietary AI systems obstruct copyright owners from detecting unauthorized use of their materials. The paper explores the exceptions to copyright laws for TDM in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Japan, recognizing their crucial role in fostering AI development. The EU has a two‐pronged approach under the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, with one exception catering specifically to research organizations, and another, more generalized one, that can be restricted by rightsholders. The UK allows noncommercial TDM research without infringement but rejected a broader copyright exception due to concerns from the creative sector. Japan has the broadest TDM exception globally, permitting the nonenjoyment use of works without permission, though this can potentially overlook the rights of copyright owners. Notably, the applicability of TDM exceptions to AI‐produced copies remains unclear, creating potential legal challenges. Furthermore, an exploration of the fair use doctrine in the United States provides insight into its potential application in AI development. It focuses on the transformative aspect of usage and its impact on the original work's potential market. This exploration underscores the necessity for clear, practical guidelines. In response to these identified challenges, this paper proposes a hybrid model for TDM exceptions emerges, along with recommended specific mechanisms. The model divides exceptions into noncommercial and commercial uses, providing a nuanced solution to complex copyright issues in AI training. Recommendations incorporate mandatory exceptions for noncommercial uses, an opt‐out clause for commercial uses, enhanced transparency measures, and a searchable portal for copyright owners. In conclusion, striking a delicate equilibrium between technological progress and the incentive for creative expression is of paramount importance. These suggested solutions aim to establish a harmonious foundation that nurtures innovation and creativity while honoring creators' rights, facilitating AI development, promoting transparency, and ensuring fair compensation for creators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") has been a flashpoint during most of its twenty-five-year existence. One of the most controversial parts of the DMCA is section 1201. Among other things, section 1201 prohibits third parties from circumventing certain controls to copyrighted content or trafficking in tools that enable circumvention of technological controls. However, despite its nearly quarter-of-a-century lifespan, we know very little about section 1201 empirically. While empiricists have assessed parts of the DMCA, they have left section 1201 largely untouched. Our understanding of section 1201 is largely based on anecdotal evidence, in the form of leading opinions from historically prominent copyright circuits. In this Article, we seek to bolster these anecdotes with greater empirical evidence for ongoing discussions about how section 1201 is performing and whether it needs revising. To do so, we conducted a broad-based search of Westlaw to collect every issued opinion, whether reported or not, where a court purported to apply some part of section 1201. We then reviewed these cases to glean as much information about section 1201 as possible. This review led to a number of important and, in some cases, surprising results. First, section 1201 opinions are a relative rarity. In the nearly quarter of a century since the DMCA's enactment, we could find only a little over 200 opinions, with only about sixty of those being published. The average number of opinions during the DMCA's existence has been around nine annually, which pales in comparison to other types of copyright cases. Second, despite the Second Circuit receiving much attention in anecdotal accounts of section 1201, courts within it issue section 1201 opinions infrequently. The Ninth Circuit is the dominant section 1201 court, both in terms of citations to its opinions and overall number of opinions, and the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits both issue more section 1201 opinions than the Second Circuit. This result stands in contrast to other types of copyright litigation, where the Second Circuit is a behemoth. Third, the most common subject matter in dispute in section 1201 cases is computer software, followed distantly by audiovisual material such as movies. Music stands in last place, showing up in only a couple issued opinions. Debates at the time of the DMCA's enactment were informed by widespread fears of copyright infringement relating to digital music and other types of digital content. Yet section 1201 litigation has resulted in but few written opinions involving those subject matters. Fourth, suits and defaults against individuals happen relatively frequently in the section 1201 context, with courts often assessing large statutory damages against those individuals. As we discuss in this Article, this result raises important equity issues. Fifth, despite section 1201 including a number of statutory exemptions, these exemptions basically never make their way into issued opinions. Fair use, too, only infrequently enters courts' section 1201 discussions. This means, effectively, that the primary way to escape section 1201 liability is through administrative exemptions granted by the Library of Congress on a triennial basis. But as we shall see, this process has significant holes. Finally, plaintiffs disproportionately win section 1201 cases. This result is somewhat bloated because of the frequency of defaults against individuals. Setting these aside, plaintiffs still enjoy tremendous success under section 1201. However, when looking at opinions only outside of the Ninth Circuit, win rates become mostly even. I conclude with several calls for DMCA reform. These include bolstering statutory exemptions and more closely tying section 1201 to copyright infringement. Pursuing these reforms will more faithfully align section 1201 with its purported objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Synchronization (sync) licenses are required for works in which music is synchronized to video and generally have high transaction costs because they must be individually negotiated. Traditionally, sync licenses were obtained by sophisticated parties for movies, television, commercials, and the like. But digital platforms like TikTok have brought sync licenses from obscurity into the hands of every person with a smartphone. This transformative innovation has created new issues for copyright law. First, usergenerated content (UGC) created by individuals and shared on the internet via social media platforms or websites may require sync licenses that are cumbersome to negotiate and overinclusive. Private agreements between platforms like TikTok and record labels and publishers usually fill the gap, allowing most users to play music with their videos free from concern about copyright infringement. However, these licenses do not account for copyright's fundamental balance between access and exclusivity because they are overinclusive: Some content on TikTok may be covered by the doctrine of fair use, in which case no license is required. Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement that permits the defendant to use the copyrighted work without paying the rightsholder. Second, TikTok's agreements with labels and publishers could be eroding fair use. The ex-post nature of fair use means that risk-averse parties, when confronted by a situation in which the viability of their claim is unclear, are likely to obtain a license not required by law. This in turn can narrow the scope of fair use because the existence of an active licensing market makes it less likely that a court will find a use is fair. Future parties then become less likely to rely on an increasingly dubious fair use defense. In the TikTok context, doctrine about fair use and sync is especially uncertain. The scant precedent in UGC fair use cases appears to be highly fact-dependent, there are few cases that specifically deal with sync rights, and none of those have decided fair use as applied to sync. This Note proposes a blanket, compulsory license for noncommercial UGC sync as an imperfect solution to help correct the balance of copyright in the digital platform era. The compulsory license would return review of public copyright law back to Congress and courts and prevent private ordering from curtailing fair use. Further, valuable creativity would be protected because rightsholders would not be able to withhold permission for use of copyrighted material. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The legislative report titled "Protecting Lawful Streaming Act of 2020" discusses the Act's goal of combatting unlawful streaming of copyrighted material by increasing criminal penalties. It allows the Department of Justice to bring felony charges against those who illegally stream copyrighted material for commercial advantage or financial gain. The report emphasizes the need for public education about the consequences of digital piracy and illegal streaming. It examines previous acts and legal frameworks related to copyright infringement and acknowledges the challenges of keeping up with evolving technology. The report suggests a combined approach of legal measures and educational initiatives to create a cultural shift and reduce the demand for pirated content. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the intersection of generative artificial intelligence (AI) and copyright law, particularly in the context of architectural works. It explores how generative AI technologies are reshaping the creative landscape and the legal challenges they pose in terms of copyright infringement. It is reported that the rise of generative AI has led to a cascade of class actions against AI companies, raising questions about authorship, rights allocation, and fair use.

The article explores the application of copyright protections to architectural works in the metaverse, a virtual world where users create and interact with online personas. It argues that existing copyright laws can be applied to virtual buildings in the metaverse, including original and recreated virtual buildings, as well as hybrid buildings that combine virtual and real-world elements. The article discusses the requirements for establishing copyright infringement and the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders. It also addresses the issue of fair use and the application of copyright protections to virtual and hybrid buildings. The article concludes that current copyright protections are sufficient and do not require significant changes to accommodate the metaverse. [Extracted from the article]

Three copyright doctrines focus more than any others on the contributions of authors to visual artworks: originality, substantial similarity, and fair use. Questions regarding the aesthetics of works of authorship filter into judicial determinations under each of these doctrines. This Article comments on a trend among courts hearing visual arts cases to de-emphasize substantial similarity analyses and shift infringement determinations almost entirely to the fair use defense. The trend has troubling procedural fairness consequences. Without a full evidentiary record about the artworks they encounter in infringement cases, courts' ability to properly evaluate whether the use of appropriated material in a second work is justified, or whether expression has been taken from the first work for some other (infringing) purpose, is compromised. If courts fail to properly understand works because they do not fully analyze basic infringement claims, it can also affect later users and owners of artworks. Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith illustrates the conflicts appellate courts face when they are forced to analyze cases solely through the lens of fair use. This Article embraces Warhol's majority opinion but suggests that the dissent's concerns about judicial reluctance to engage with and understand creative works aesthetically are not entirely misplaced. Such engagement should happen earlier in the infringement inquiry, however--not merely as part of a fair use analysis. This Article expands the 2022 Meyer Lecture delivered by this Author shortly after oral arguments concluded in the Warhol litigation. It urges that to ensure the best outcomes for all artists, courts should apply a procedurally conscious approach to analyzing copyright infringement cases involving visual artworks. Specifically, district courts should establish a solid record that the first work is original; then inquire whether the second work infringes, applying the test for substantial similarity. Only if they find infringement should courts consider the affirmative defense of fair use. Following the proper procedural path is crucial to balancing all parties' interests--particularly when the works of two artists are involved. Allowing both the first and the second artists equal voice in representing the originality of their contributions is necessary to ensure an adequate factual record in copyright litigation. Courts require this record to anticipate the impact of their rulings on future litigants and the art world at large. These goals are consistent with copyright jurisprudence, which encourages creativity and original contributions to the creative lexicon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last few years, due largely to breakthroughs in deep learning technologies, artificial intelligence (AI) has begun to step into the shoes of human content generators and make valuable creative works at scale. Before the end of the decade, a significant amount of art, literature, music, software, and web content will likely be created by Al rather than traditional human authors. Yet the law lags behind this technological evolution by prohibiting copyright protection for AI-generated works. The predominant narrative holds that even if AI can automate creativity, this activity is not the right sort of thing to protect, and that protection would even harm human artists. AI-generated works challenge beliefs about human exeeptionalism and the normative foundations of copyright law, which until now have offered something for everyone. Copyright can be about ethics and authors and protecting the sweat of a brow and personality rights. Copyright can also be about the public interest and offering incentives to create and disseminate content. But copyright cannot have it all with AI authors-there is valuable output being generated, but by authors with no interests to protect. This Article argues that American copyright law is, and has traditionally been, primarily about benefiting the public interest rather than benefiting authors directly. As a result, AI-generated works are precisely the sort of thing the system aims to protect. Protection will encourage people to develop and use creative Al which will result in the production and dissemination of new works. Taken further, attributing authorship to Al that functionally does the work of a traditional author will promote transparency, efficient allocations of rights, and even counterintuitively protect human authors. AI-generated works also promise to radically impact other fundamental tenets of copyright law such as infringement, protection of style, and fair use. How the law should respond to AI activity has lessons more broadly for thinking about what rules should apply to people, machines, and other sorts of artificial authors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research is a peer-reviewed journal that welcomes research articles from scholars around the world. The journal uses Digital Object Identifier (DOI) for each article and is published four times a year. The editorial review process relies on the cooperation of authors and reviewers. The journal has policies in place for retraction of articles, digital preservation, handling complaints, conflicts of interest, publication ethics, and peer review. The double-blind review process is used, and referees are selected based on their expertise in the field. The acceptance or rejection of a manuscript is based on the evaluations of the referees. The journal also accepts comments on previously published articles, and there are technology-based quality assurance measures in place, such as readability tests, plagiarism detection, and appropriate citation formats. Contributors are encouraged to perform word count, spelling, and grammar checks before submission. [Extracted from the article]

The article offers information on the challenges Artificial Intelligence (AI) presents under existing laws in the USA and the EU, particularly in the context of Copyright Law, focusing on the recognition of AI as an "author." Topics include the characteristics of AI systems and their creative capabilities, the impact of quantum computing on AI, and the question of whether AI can be considered an author under the Copyright Act.

This article explores the topic of intellectual property rights for artworks generated by artificial intelligence (AI). It discusses the advancements in AI technology that allow for the creation of art pieces that imitate the styles of famous artists. The article highlights the popularity of AI art technologies among the general public and the challenges that arise in terms of copyright protection. It examines the requirements for copyright protection in the United States, including originality and fixation, and discusses the issue of authorship in relation to AI-generated art. The article also explores how other countries are addressing these issues within their own copyright laws. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Critique of Law: Independent Legal Studies / Krytyka Prawa: Niezalezne Studia nad Prawem is the property of Akademia Leona Kozminskiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the U.S. Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit's reversal of a district court decision in McGucken v. Pub Ocean Ltd., highlighting the challenge of analyzing fair use, particularly the impact of transformativeness on the analysis of the other factors. Topics include the Copyright Act's aim to protect artists and scientists, the fair use doctrine's role in safeguarding the interests of secondary creators, and the tension between copyright law's goal of promoting science.

Copyright law seeks to encourage creativity and the creation of new works of authorship. To facilitate this creativity, the law allows authors to use portions of preexisting copyrighted materials when the new use survives a "fair use" analysis. In adjudicating the fair use question, courts apply a multifactor test which includes consideration of the new work's market effect. This market effect consideration asks how the new work influences sales of the original copyright materials. The scholarship analyzing this market effect is incomplete because this inquiry requires empirically measuring how consumers react to the third-party reuse of a copyrighted work. Thus, courts and authors are currently ill equipped to accurately forecast ex ante market effects because these empirical determinations occur only after the work has been reused--i.e., ex post to creation of the putative fair use. Building from this recognition, we provide a more robust theoretical framework for categorizing and analyzing market effects. This Article builds from our expanded theory by empirically measuring the effect of reusing copyrighted material in subsequent works. We use a novel experimental design with one type of third-party reuse (music sampling) and find that the market reception of a new work that incorporates copyrighted material can impact perceptions about the original work (and thus, influence the original's market). We find evidence that if the new work is a failure, this in turn has a negative impact on the original work's perception. Accordingly, our study points to a negative spillover effect that may harm perceptions of the underlying copyrighted work. Because this recognition expands the foundation for courts considering a new work's market effect, we argue that these insights are crucial to making efficient and effective fair use determinations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Academic research and publishing are facing a crisis. The importance of access to academic literature in an interconnected world, the ever-growing cost of subscriptions to this literature, different revenue models of journals, and reduced or stagnant library budgets are pushing the academic community to find alternatives for research publications. In its 25 years of existence, the Open Access Movement and models which sought to contain the crisis have become the subject of considerable criticism. At the same time, a significant portion of academic literature remains locked behind steep paywalls. This has led to the growth of pirate websites and shadow libraries, which have been met with forceful legal retribution by publishers using copyright laws. Using the Sci-Hub case, a current copyright infringement case brought by a group of publishers before the Delhi High Court, this Paper evaluates the Open Access Movement, fair dealing in copyright law, academic piracy, and court cases in the United States, India, and other countries within the broad meaning of the right to research. The Paper concludes that a purposive interpretation of copyright law may have an answer enabling a just outcome.† [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fair use doctrine is an important affirmative defense to copyright infringement when a particular use does not interfere with copyright law's primary goal of promoting creativity for the public good. Artists and songwriters frequently experiment with copyrighted music without permission before seeking licensing approval from the original rights holders to "sample" or "replay" the work. In Chapman v. Maraj--a copyright infringement suit brought by Tracy Chapman against Nicki Minaj--the United States District Court for the Central District of California held that experimenting with a copyrighted musical composition for the purpose of creating a new work with an intent to seek licensing approval constitutes fair use and thus does not infringe the original copyright holder's exclusive right to prepare derivative works. This Note explores why the holding in Chapman v. Maraj is vital for the protection of songwriting and the music business as well as the continuation of innovation and creativity in music, analyzing this importance in light of the established goals of copyright law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of artificial intelligence draws heavily on training data which may be comprised of copyright works. Utilization of copyright works as such raises questions on copyright infringement as well as the possibilities of the usage being excused under the existing law. There are also concerns with respect to accessing copyright works in digital formats that are commonly protected by digital rights management tools. Restrictions on such usage may hamper the research and development of artificial intelligence applications. This paper examines the said issues with specific focus on first, the applicability of a seemingly Americanized fair dealing exception to copyright infringement under the Malaysian Copyright Act 1987; and second, the exceptions to legal protection of digital rights management. In doing so, the paper studies the existing models of the United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union. It ends with suggestions as to how copyright law may respond to the emerging needs and provide adequate latitude with the aim to promote research and development of artificial intelligence which would ultimately benefit the public at large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Copyright fair use is an attractive starting point for public health applications of patent law and necessary to achieve the objectives of copyright law. It mentions public interest has become a more important factor for judges to consider in the context of patent infringement. It also mentions how courts that consider injunctive relief in patent infringement cases already implement a fair use-like analysis.

Copyright law recognizes fair use as a general limitation. It is assumed that fair use provides breathing room above and beyond the determination of infringement to facilitate the creation of new works of expression. This conventional account presupposes that fair use matters--that is, fair use provides greater leeway to a defendant than the test of infringement. Despite its commonsense appeal, this assumption has not been empirically tested. Except for fair uses involving exact copies (for which infringement would otherwise exist), it has not been proven that fair use makes much, if any, difference in results. Indeed, in one sector, the music industry, defendants have avoided pursuing fair use as a defense in most infringement cases (except parodies) decided under the 1976 Copyright Act. This fair use avoidance is surprising given that musicians now face a spate of lawsuits due to a predicament we call copyright clutter, which occurs when copyrights protect numerous subelements of many works in a field of creation, thereby making it difficult for people to create a new work in that field without facing exposure to copyright liability simply based on a similar subelement. If fair use provides breathing room, why do musicians avoid it? This Article provides the first empirical testing of the significance of fair use as a defense. In an experimental study involving approximately 500 subjects, we found that fair use does make a difference: subjects found no liability more frequently under fair use than the test of infringement when examining the same case. And greater knowledge of music or law resulted in higher findings of no liability under fair use. These findings provide a better conceptual understanding of how fair use operates and practical information for litigants that call into question the predominant strategy of musicians avoiding fair use as a defense. Such a strategy may result in greater findings of liability where fair use would have otherwise been found. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internet memes have become popular artifacts of mass communication in digital culture. They are, by definition, reiterative as they remix already existing content to produce new communicative statements. This theoretical study, which lies at the intersection of media technologies, society, and media law, explores the legal implications of such memetic appropriation vis-à-vis the U.S. copyright law. With the help of legal research analysis and theoretical framework of remix culture and internet memes, the study shows how and why memes deserve legal protection as transformative work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses legal issues on fair use doctrine as an affirmative defense to copyright infringement by analyzing the ruling of the U.S. Seventh Circuit in the case Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation. Other topics include the four-factor test for fair use under the Copyright Act, the case Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., and the issues in the enforcement of copyright law.

The article analyzes the Music Modernization Act (MMA) and finds that the act realigns music copyright for those within the music industry, but fails to address a gap in music copyright for those not in the music industry. It mentions statutory presumption of fair use for these types of work, which will allow them to remain on internet platforms and further the goals of copyright law. It also mentions online enforcement realities, readily take down works with copyrighted work.