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Binding theories claim that features of an episode are bound to each other and can be retrieved once these features are re-encountered. Binding effects have been shown in task-switching studies with a strong focus on bindings of observable features such as responses. In this study, we aimed to investigate whether task rules, translating stimulus information into motor output can be bound and subsequently retrieved even if they act independently from specific response codes. To address this question, we utilized a task-switching paradigm with varying visual context features. Unlike previous studies, tasks in the present study did not differ in their response options, and sequential response repetitions were eliminated by design. In three experiments, we observed larger task-switch costs on trials repeating the context of the previous trial than on context-change trials. According to binding accounts, this suggests that response-independent task rules adopted in the previous trial became bound to the context feature and were retrieved upon re-encountering the context feature in the current trial. The results of this study generalize previous findings indicating that binding processes can include response-independent control to task-switching situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hundred years ago, Kurt Lewin published a series of articles in which he vehemently argued against the idea that associations between stimuli and responses motivate behavior. This article reviews his empirical work and theory and the cogency of Lewin's conclusion according to modern standards. We conclude that Lewin's criticism of the contiguity principle of associationism is still valid, and is now supported by a broad range of theories on learning, motivation, and action control. Implications for modern dual-system theory and modern theories on motivated action and (instructed) task sets are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that conflict detection triggers control adjustments has been considered a basic principle of cognitive control. So far, this "conflict-control loop" has mainly been investigated in the context of response conflicts in single tasks. In this theoretical position paper, we explore whether, and how, this principle might be involved in multitasking performance, as well. We argue that several kinds of conflict-control loops can be identified in multitasking at multiple levels (e.g., the response level and the task level), and we provide a selective review of empirical observations. We present examples of conflict monitoring and control adjustments in dual-task and task-switching paradigms, followed by a section on error monitoring and posterror adjustments in multitasking. We conclude by outlining future research questions regarding monitoring and control in multitasking, including the potential roles of affect and associative learning for conflict-control loops in multitasking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to recent theorizing, cognitive control and affective processing are closely linked. Specifically, it has been suggested that negative affect acts as a driving force for attentional adjustment. Empirical support comes from a study by van Steenbergen et al. (Psychol Sci 20:1473–1477, 2009) demonstrating that negative stimuli increase the congruence sequence effect (CSE), a behavioural marker that indexes attentional adjustment. In this research, we provide a theoretical analysis that identifies motivational orientation (approach vs. avoidance) as a potential moderator. To test this, we replicated the study by van Steenbergen et al. (2009) and additionally manipulated the motivational orientation of participants. Participants either gained extra money after task completion (gain-focused group) or lost money after task completion (loss-focused group). Results showed that negative stimuli boost attentional adjustment, but only in the loss-focused group. This finding highlights the role of motivation for recent theorizing on emotion-driven control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers in psychology and neuroscience want to know whether conflict and control scale up. Conflict and control mechanisms share many similarities across different levels of analysis. However, empirical evidence does currently not support a unified perspective on action control. We identify two major challenges for theoretical integration: a vertical challenge that requires conflict at different levels of abstraction to be linked, and a horizontal challenge that requires control of conflict at different points in time to be linked. We present a new integrative framework in which we propose that the difference between conflicts can best be understood along the dimension of complexity (i.e., amount of information). We propose that differences in conflict complexity go together with specific costs and benefits and that a normative account of hierarchical conflict control needs to take into account both. People regularly encounter various types of conflict. Here, we ask if, and, if so, how, different types of conflict, from lab-based Stroop conflicts to everyday-life self-control or moral conflicts, are related to one other. We present a framework that assumes that action–goal representations are hierarchically organized, ranging from concrete actions to abstract goals. The framework's key assumption is that conflicts involving more abstract goals (e.g., self-control/moral conflict) are embedded in a more complex action space; thus, to resolve such conflicts, people need to consider more associated goals and actions. We discuss how differences in complexity impact conflict resolution mechanisms and the costs/benefits of resolving conflicts. Altogether, we offer a new way to conceptualize and analyze conflict regulation across different domains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) has influenced research on action and perception across the past two decades. It integrates several seminal empirical phenomena and it has continued to stimulate novel experimental approaches on the representational foundations of action control and perceptual experience. Yet, many of the most notable results surrounding TEC originate from an era of psychological research that relied on rather small sample sizes as judged by today's standards. This state hampers future research aiming to build on previous phenomena. We, therefore, provide a multi-lab re-assessment of the following six classical observations: response-effect compatibility, action-induced blindness, response-effect learning, stimulus–response binding, code occupation, and short-term response-effect binding. Our major goal is to provide precise estimates of corresponding effect sizes to facilitate future scientific endeavors. These effect sizes turned out to be considerably smaller than in the original reports, thus allowing for informed decisions on how to address each phenomenon in future work. Of note, the most relevant results of the original observations were consistently obtained in the present experiments as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do emotional stimuli change the way we control our behavior? The interaction between emotion and behavior-shaping, cognitive control mechanisms remain little understood in psychological science. The present meta-analysis addresses this controversy by means of a quantitative review. We analyzed data from 71 studies published through December 2018 that investigated control in conflict tasks, like the Stroop, Simon, and/or flanker tasks, which are well-known tools for psychologists in various subdisciplines used to probe cognitive control mechanisms. We considered studies that experimentally manipulated emotional stimulus presentation and asked how perception of emotional stimuli modulates the size of the congruency effect (CE), as an index of control. Results of two primary meta-analyses found no clear evidence that emotional stimuli modulate cognitive control in general. Yet, moderator analysis suggested that specific aspects of the task, stimuli, and testing conditions show reduced CE for emotional stimuli. Thus, at a theoretical level, emotional stimuli can facilitate control under specific conditions, supporting views that attribute enhanced control either to overload of perceptual distractor processing or to increased amplification of target information and/or suppression of distractor information. Public Significance Statement: This meta-analysis shows that emotional stimuli have only a very small if at all existing influence on cognitive control in general. The effects are stronger for fully attended and verbal emotional stimuli, suggesting that emotional stimuli can increase control under specific conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emotional information receives prioritized processing over concurrent cognitive processes. This can lead to distraction if emotional information has to be ignored. In the cognitive domain, mechanisms have been described that allow control of (cognitive) distractions. However, whether similar cognitive control mechanisms also can attenuate emotional distraction is an active area of research. This study asked whether cognitive control (triggered in the Color Stroop task) attenuates emotional distraction in the Emotional Stroop task. Theoretical accounts of cognitive control, and the Emotional Stroop task alike, predict such an interaction for tasks that employ the same relevant (e.g., color-naming) and irrelevant (e.g., word-reading) dimension. In an alternating-runs design with Color and Emotional Stroop tasks changing from trial to trial, we analyzed the impact of proactive and reactive cognitive control on Emotional Stroop effects. Four experiments manipulated predictability of congruency and emotional stimuli. Overall, results showed congruency effects in Color Stroop tasks and Emotional Stroop effects. Moreover, we found a spillover of congruency effects and emotional distraction to the other task, indicating that processes specific to one task impacted to the other task. However, Bayesian analyses and a mini-meta-analysis across experiments weigh against the predicted interaction between cognitive control and emotional distraction. The results point out limitations of cognitive control to block off emotional distraction, questioning views that assume a close interaction between cognitive control and emotional processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Standing compared to sitting, for instance at work, is associated with positive physical and mental health consequences. Indeed, studies suggest that performance in cognitive conflict tasks (e.g., Color Stroop tasks) is improved when subjects perform the task while standing compared to sitting (Rosenbaum et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2019). However, a recent study failed to replicate these findings in five attempts (Caron et al., 2020). We aimed to shed light on these discrepant results by means of two conceptual replications and a meta-analysis. Replication experiments showed typical congruency effects in the Color Stroop task, but failed to find any influence of posture on the Stroop effect even when we subjected data to a more sensitive analysis that controlled for individual variances between participants. Additionally, an explorative Bayesian analysis confirmed that both replications provided strong evidence against an interaction between body posture and the Stroop effect. Meta-analytic results showed that the confidence interval of the overall effect size for a modulation of the Stroop effect by body posture includes the null. Together, our results question whether standing modulates the Stroop effect in Color Stroop tasks and points out limitations of the influence of body posture on cognitive control tasks. • Prolonged time spent seated increases chronic health conditions. • Standing is associated with physical and mental health consequences. • Studies reveal conflicting results on the effect of standing on cognitive control. • A meta-analysis shows limitations of an influence of standing on cognitive control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]