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The article informs about Classical liberalism, a belief system that links prosperity, both material and immaterial, to respect for the individual, safeguarded under the rule of law. Topics include classical liberals favor an institutional environment of economic freedom; and cornerstones of personal choice, voluntary exchange, open markets, and clearly defined and enforced property rights.

A growing number of studies explore the determinants of economic freedom. Very few of them consider constitutional design. We study entrenchment, that is, the extent to which constitutions are more costly to change than ordinary policies and institutions. We utilize 1970–2017 data and study episodes where countries adopted meaningfully more entrenched constitutions. Using matching methods, we construct plausible counterfactuals against which to compare their post‐treatment changes in economic freedom. We report no significant effects on overall freedom. There is some evidence that entrenchment leads to smaller government size, more regulation, and weaker property rights. However, none of these results are robust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constitutional scholars emphasize the importance of an enduring, stable constitutional order, which North and Weingast (1989) argue is consistent with credible commitments to sustainable fiscal policies. However, this view is controversial and has received little empirical study. We use 19th-century US state-level data to estimate relationships between constitutional design and the likelihood of a government default. Results indicate that more entrenched and less specific constitutions are associated with a lower likelihood of default. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: It is widely accepted that good institutions caused modern economic prosperity. But what caused good institutions? In this article we challenge recent explanations that favor state capacity, pointing instead to the polycentric governance structures of medieval Europe. Methods: We develop a novel theory of constitutions, which we call "polycentric sovereignty," based on political property rights. We use this theory to reinterpret the historical evidence concerning the relationship between the medieval patrimony and good governance. Results: Our analysis suggests the de facto balance of power among the "owners of the realm" in medieval Europe are crucial in explaining the rise of pro‐growth institutions, especially those that respect and uphold the rule of law. Conclusion: Medieval institutions set the background conditions for good governance. We cannot understand the bounty of economic modernity without reference to the received political‐economic traditions from medieval Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Great Enrichment of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries involved unprecedented increases in living standards across Europe and its offshoots. I argue that McCloskey's characterization of the emergence of a bourgeois ethics and dignity as exogenous to the institutional environments is not convincing. Rather, the constitutional development of the selfgoverning medieval city was a necessary condition for the ethical and rhetorical change that McCloskey emphasizes. Furthermore, a bourgeois ethics and dignity were likely emerging in European cities as early as the twelfth century as a result of constitutional bargains. Given that literacy was largely confined to the clergy during the High Middle Ages, a paucity of premodern evidence for this emergence is not surprising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]