Search

• Why do some locals choose to assist rangers and report on poachers, while others refrain from doing so? • We surveyed residents in and near the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) in Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. • People that are afraid of rangers and perceive them as corruptible are less willing to assist in information-sharing. • Seeing poaching as condemnable increases people's propensity to report on illegal activities. • To effectively involve locals in rule enforcement, policy needs to change how communities perceive both officials and rules. Conservation rules – e.g. protected area regulations that aim to reduce wildlife poaching – often have an inherent challenge: while relying on that locals should share intelligence about observed crime to authorities, such rules tend to be weakly supported by these communities. Enforcement officials of conservation authorities (such as rangers) are seldom trusted, and this in turn raises doubts about whether locals will provide sufficient information about conservation crime, which is not the least needed in all those settings where a small number of rangers are tasked to monitor vast areas. The case of wildlife poaching in African countries illustrates this tension, where rangers are few, sometimes have a dubious record, and where offenders often are on good terms with locals. This article asks: Why do some locals choose to assist rangers and report on poachers, while others refrain from doing so? We conducted a survey in the years 2017–2018 directed towards 2300 residents in and near the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park in Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, where a major challenge is both subsistence and commercial forms of poaching. Our focus was primarily on subsistent poaching. We also conducted in-depth interviews with rangers and park officials to corroborate that our quantitative insights point to the same description of the situation. Our survey demonstrates that people that are afraid of rangers and perceive them as corruptible are less willing to assist in information-sharing. Seeing poaching as condemnable increases people's propensity to report on illegal activities. In contrast, individuals' stakes in conservation and perceptions of wildlife as threatened do not predict our outcome. Our findings suggest that to achieve a more thorough involvement of locals in the enforcement of conservation laws, policy needs to change how communities perceive both officials and rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Focuses on state capacity in general and on states' efforts to foster collective action and compliance in particular. • Improves our understanding of recent decades' increased militarization of wildlife management. • Builds on unique interview data with park rangers and public officials. • Coercive capacities are necessary but needs to be complemented with cooperative assurances in order to ensure compliance. This article focuses on social control and states' broadcasting of power over inhospitable terrains. It uses the case of conservation of wildlife in two African Peace Parks to explore how the involved states strike the balance between cooperation and coercion in their efforts to mold citizen behavior toward quasi-voluntary compliance. The case of wildlife management highlights pertinent issues related to compliance and collective action and have the potential to contribute substantially to the general literature on state capacity. More specifically, while the increased militarization of wildlife management has been criticized for justifying coercive and repressive policies, it can be seen as a result of the involved states' lack of social control and ensuing inability to foster quasi-voluntary compliance through other means than coercive ones. Yet, while coercion is not a sufficient condition for fostering compliance, it is still important to recognize that it is indeed a necessary one. Building on unique interview data from two major transboundary parks – Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area and Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park – we explore how existing theoretical arguments play out in practice and how the challenge to foster quasi-voluntary compliance is being addressed. The results show that actors given the task to implement wildlife policy certainly show awareness about that coercion needs to be complemented with cooperative assurances in order to foster quasi-voluntary compliance. Furthermore, the study provides insights into how other social organizations such as traditional leaders might challenge the state in terms of being the predominant actors in setting up rules governing wildlife. We thank the Swedish Research Council for supporting this research. We would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the editor for constructive comments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]