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People can engage in prolonged thought processes, such as when they are facing an important decision or when they are working on a scientific discovery. Such thought processes can take months or even years. We argue that while people engage in such thinking, they make progress not only when they consciously think but also sometimes when they are consciously thinking about something else-that is, while they think unconsciously. We review the literature on unconscious thought (UT) processes and conclude that there is indeed quite some evidence for UT. Conceptualized as a form of unconscious goal pursuit, UT is likely to be especially fruitful for thought processes that are complex, important, or interesting to the thinker. In addition, we discuss other characteristics of the UT process. We end with proposing Type 3 processes, in addition to Type 1 and Type 2 (or Systems 1 and 2) processes, to accommodate prolonged thought processes in models on thought., (© The Author(s) 2015.)

Objective. To show that despite the enormous efforts of M. Heidegger, he failed to find a new way of thinking. Scientific novelty. It is shown that the meeting of two different streams of historical thinking – the destructive thinking of Heidegger, who never stood on the ground of the Pre-Socratics (although he strived for this all his life), and the Pre-Socratic, which gradually lost its vitality in subsequent European culture, never took place. The different streams of thinking – the ancient Greeks and Heidegger – never crossed. The early Greeks sought to understand the nature of essence, that is, they were looking, according to Heidegger, for the first beginning of thinking (and for this they tried to use the tools of openness of thinking, but did not understand its reasons), while Heidegger, who consistently went through a long path of liberation from all the European ones known to him methods of understanding nature, on the contrary, sought to find ways to understand the true nature of human existence, that is, he looked for the second principle of thinking (but also failed to reveal its origins). It was found that European culture throughout its history has stopped between these two extreme streams of thinking – aimed, on the one hand, at the world of things (essence) and, on the other, at the inner world of man (existence), but in both of these streams there are genuine the beginnings of thinking remained unheard. The analysis shows that throughout his life, Heidegger was looking, in fact, not even for being, but for the being of thinking; more precisely, he was looking for thinking that could exist synchronously with the thought of the ancient Greeks, which allowed him, on the one hand, – to reveal the fall of European culture, and on the other hand, to try to find the motives for future thinking.In our opinion, Heidegger heard the main problem of European culture: logos does not illuminate thinking, does not carry either natural or divine light, it is only similar to a given (often artificial) logical scheme. All ancient religions spoke about this. The ancient Greeks knew this; Plato and Aristotle replaced the true divine light with a system of ideas, concepts, categories and logic. It seems that the concealment of the true light (nature and gods) is the path of the fall of European culture, about which Nietzsche, Wagner and Heidegger wrote. Thinking exists only where consciousness disintegrates in the spatio-temporal topos of its existence. And logos, as this study shows, can only exist in a split consciousness. Based on this, it is increasingly clear that we have not learned to think like the Greeks and, moreover, in our selfishness we may finally lose this opportunity. On my own behalf, I would like to add: what Heidegger failed to achieve can be clarified along the paths of contact between Western and Eastern thought.

Objective. To show that despite the enormous efforts of M. Heidegger, he failed to find a new way of thinking. Scientific novelty. It is shown that the meeting of two different streams of historical thinking – the destructive thinking of Heidegger, who never stood on the ground of the Pre-Socratics (although he strived for this all his life), and the Pre-Socratic, which gradually lost its vitality in subsequent European culture, never took place. The different streams of thinking – the ancient Greeks and Heidegger – never crossed. The early Greeks sought to understand the nature of essence, that is, they were looking, according to Heidegger, for the first beginning of thinking (and for this they tried to use the tools of openness of thinking, but did not understand its reasons), while Heidegger, who consistently went through a long path of liberation from all the European ones known to him methods of understanding nature, on the contrary, sought to find ways to understand the true nature of human existence, that is, he looked for the second principle of thinking (but also failed to reveal its origins). It was found that European culture throughout its history has stopped between these two extreme streams of thinking – aimed, on the one hand, at the world of things (essence) and, on the other, at the inner world of man (existence), but in both of these streams there are genuine the beginnings of thinking remained unheard. The analysis shows that throughout his life, Heidegger was looking, in fact, not even for being, but for the being of thinking; more precisely, he was looking for thinking that could exist synchronously with the thought of the ancient Greeks, which allowed him, on the one hand, – to reveal the fall of European culture, and on the other hand, to try to find the motives for future thinking. In our opinion, Heidegger heard the main problem of European culture: logos does not illuminate thinking, does not carry either natural or divine light, it is only similar to a given (often artificial) logical scheme. All ancient religions spoke about this. The ancient Greeks knew this; Plato and Aristotle replaced the true divine light with a system of ideas, concepts, categories and logic. It seems that the concealment of the true light (nature and gods) is the path of the fall of European culture, about which Nietzsche, Wagner and Heidegger wrote. Thinking exists only where consciousness disintegrates in the spatio-temporal topos of its existence. And logos, as this study shows, can only exist in a split consciousness. Based on this, it is increasingly clear that we have not learned to think like the Greeks and, moreover, in our selfishness we may finally lose this opportunity. On my own behalf, I would like to add: what Heidegger failed to achieve can be clarified along the paths of contact between Western and Eastern thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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We use the logic of the spiritual Principles of Universal Mind, Consciousness, and Thought to describe two often overlooked ingredients for the resolution of traumatic memories – the power of Thought and innate mental health. We first review the three Principles and use their logic to explain why these two typically unrecognized ingredients can improve and sustain treatment outcomes for people experiencing traumatic memories. Then, we use the logic of the Principles to speculate why the prevailing "gold standard" interventions for resolving traumatic memories – cognitive-behavior therapy, and eye movement desensitization and reprocessing – are effective to the degree they are. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Nowadays, it is much debated among philosophers, psychologists, linguists and artificial intelligence scientists what the mind actually is, where it exists and how it works. Chomsky, the great philosopher and the leading exponent of the cognitive revolution tries to sketch the description of the mind, its nature, mental processes, structure, and its relation with its other cognitive modules. It also examines innate knowledge of the mind. In this paper, the author proposes that the capacities of the mind are different from their ability and other faculties. This paper also describes the theories that are connected with the field of mind, mind and language, linguistic mentalism, Modular mind, Cartesian mind, the mind-body problem, Philosophical grammar, and thought processes like reasoning and perceptions. Firstly, the paper addresses the question of whether Chomsky considers the mind different from the brain, consciousness and thought. Secondly, the paper explores whether Chomsky believes the mind as a separate concept or just as the constituent of language only. Thirdly, arises the question of how Chomsky responds to rationalists and empiricists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the nature and neurobiological mechanisms of subjective time. Subjective time is shown to be a consequence of the functioning of consciousness. Subjective time is generated by consciousness and is one of its natural properties. A formal model is constructed providing explanations of the psychophysiological mechanisms of subjective time and the still mysterious phenomena which it generates. The qualitative characteristics of subjective time are formulated and are in good correspondence with extensive experimental data on the perception of short time intervals (stimulus durations and interstimulus intervals) and unusual phenomena occurring only episodically. Subjective time is a separate entity not directly dependent on physical time, though it may be associated with it via the intensity of the subject's mental activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wakefulness is the real presentation of life. All the time, the neural mechanism of wakefulness has been the focus of its researches. With the development of single cell labeling and detection technologies and their wide application in the field of neurosciences, the mechanism of neural circuit for wakefulness has been continuously updated and improved. In recent years, more evidence demonstrates that except the classical cholinergic and monoamine neurotransmitter systems, other neurotransmitters are also the important components involved in the regulation of wakefulness, such as neuropeptides, glutamate and γ-aminobutyric acid. There is a new idea that wakefulness involves not only the wakefulness-promoting systems, but also the brain function network innervated by the systems. Only if the damage to the wakefulness-promoting system or to the core functional brain network itself, would not wakefulness occur. Therefore, from the perspective of the functional needs of the brain, we will better understand the nature of wakefulness.

In the period between Turing's 1950 "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" and the current considerable public exposure to the term "artificial intelligence (AI)", Turing's question "Can a machine think?" has become a topic of daily debate in the media, the home, and, indeed, the pub. However, "Can a machine think?" is sliding towards a more controversial issue: "Can a machine be conscious?" Of course, the two issues are linked. It is held here that consciousness is a pre-requisite to thought. In Turing's imitation game, a conscious human player is replaced by a machine, which, in the first place, is assumed not to be conscious, and which may fool an interlocutor, as consciousness cannot be perceived from an individual's speech or action. Here, the developing paradigm of machine consciousness is examined and combined with an extant analysis of living consciousness to argue that a conscious machine is feasible, and capable of thinking. The route to this utilizes learning in a "neural state machine", which brings into play Turing's view of neural "unorganized" machines. The conclusion is that a machine of the "unorganized" kind could have an artificial form of consciousness that resembles the natural form and that throws some light on its nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What should advocates of phenomenal intentionality say about unconscious intentional states? I approach this question by focusing on a recent debate between Tim Crane and David Pitt, about the nature of belief. Crane argues that beliefs are never conscious. Pitt, concerned that the phenomenal intentionality thesis coupled with a commitment to beliefs as essentially unconscious embroils Crane in positing unconscious phenomenology, counter-argues that beliefs are essentially conscious. I examine and rebut Crane's arguments for the essential unconsciousness of beliefs, some of which are widely endorsed. On the way I sketch a model of how belief states could participate in the stream of consciousness. I then consider Pitt's position, arguing in reply, along Freudian lines, that we should posit not just dispositional but occurrent unconscious beliefs. This result, I argue, indeed requires advocates of phenomenal intentionality to posit unconscious qualia to fix these unconscious occurrent thoughts, and I defend the coherence of the notion of unconscious qualia against some common attacks. Ultimately, I claim, the combination of taking seriously the occurrent unconscious, and a commitment to phenomenal intentionality, should lead us to expand William James's conception of the stream of consciousness to encompass, additionally, a stream of unconscious mental life—or, perhaps better, to posit a single partly conscious partly unconscious qualia-stream of mental goings-on. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article demonstrates that certain issues of philosophy of mind can only be explained via strict observance of the logical law of identity, that is, use of the term “consciousness” in only one meaning. Based on the understanding of consciousness as space in which objects distinguished by the subject are represented, this article considers problems such as the fixation of the consciousness level, correlation between consciousness and thought, between the internal and the external, and between consciousness and the body. It demonstrates the insufficiency of the reactive conception of action for the resolution of the hard problem of consciousness and the necessity of a transition to an active paradigm in which many issues in philosophy of mind would be formulated differently.

Power enthusiasts are engaged in two projects: (1) developing a decent metaphysical account of powers, and (2) applying that account in order to make progress on various other philosophical issues, ranging from narrowly related topics such as causality to further removed ones such as free will, reasoning, or perception. I argue that an intermediate step may be taken, one that explores 'varieties of power' while still staying within the realm of (1), of 'pure' powers metaphysics. Taking this intermediate step provides a much more interesting basis for those involved in project (2), 'applied' powers metaphysics. I articulate four such varieties of power by exploring various dimensions in which the explanatory profile of a power can be extended. I then briefly survey how these relate to various further metaphysical issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In this section, Bibler once again explicates the meaning of the term "culture." He first defines it as a form of simultaneous being and communication among people of different cultures and eras. The second definition he gives is that culture is a form of self-determination in the horizon of personhood, the self-determination of life, knowledge, and thought. The third is that culture is the world "for the first time." Culture allows us, author and reader, viewer, and audience, an ability as if to recreate the world of objects—on the surface of a picture or the pages of a literary work—and this world is, at the same time, perceived in its absolute objectivity, in its independence from me. A work of culture is not destroyed or consumed but retains its significance for centuries. The world and objects begin to be understood as if they were works of art. Bibler also considers the style of communicating among people at each of the thresholds of culture. He emphasizes that the author always addresses his work. In this section, he also gives a brief description of the modes of thought of antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the modern era. He characterizes communication among cultures as one of the facets of the idea of a dialogue of logics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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I argue for a new delimitation of what Kant means by 'cognition [Erkenntnis]', on the basis of the intermediate, transitional place that Kant gives to cognition in the 'progression [Stufenleiter]' of our representations and our consciousness of them. I show how cognition differs from mental acts lying earlier on this progression—such as sensing, intuiting, and perceiving—and also how cognition differs from acts lying later on this progression—such as explaining, having insight, and comprehending. I also argue that cognition should not be confused with 'knowledge [Wissen]', insofar as knowledge represents the culmination of a separate orthogonal progression of acts of 'holding-true'. Along the way, I show how having in focus the specific progression from representation, to consciousness, to cognition (and beyond) allows us to better appreciate the architectonic significance of the progression of Kant's analysis in the first Critique (and beyond), and also helps to illuminate the unity of Kant's account of cognition itself across its variety of (empirical, mathematical, philosophical) forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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В статье доказывается безосновательность достаточно широко распространенного взгляда на буддийскую пластику как лишенную динамики, индивидуальных черт лица и человеческих эмоций. На примере творчества философа и художника Дзанабадзара показывается, что лики и позы будд и бодхисаттв отражают уровень сознания, который намного превосходит человеческий. Их мысль способна двигаться с бесконечной скоростью, а сознание одновременно фиксировать многие события в мире и влиять на них. Этого невозможно достичь без преодоления сугубо человеческих страстей и эгоистических желаний. Земным подтверждением реальности столь высокого уровня сознательного бытия является Хамбо-лама Итигэлов, вошедший в состояние глубокого самадхи в 1920-е годы и доселе сохранивший свое тело нетленным.

The purpose of the current paper is to analyse, in parallel, the works of two American brothers, William and Henry James, who influenced the psychological and literary standards of the twentieth century. William theorised the concept of consciousness and coined the term "stream of consciousness"; Henry pictured it in his novels by imitating the stream of consciousness of his characters. The wide variety of Thematic Progression and lexical repetition throughout the latter's novel, The Ambassadors, is accompanied by numerous literary devices which attempt to reconstruct the movements of thought and the psychological processes related to it. In this regard, the paper aims to analyse Henry James's skilful use of the Theme and Rheme pattern in The Ambassadors, which seems intended to increase the complexity of the narrative thread, as well as the lexical repetition present throughout the novel, accompanied by numerous literary devices which, in turn, attempt to reconstruct the movements of thought and the psychological processes related to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose. The purpose of research consists in that: having plunged into depths of primitive consciousness (using the recipe of many thinkers of non-classical philosophy), to reveal contradiction of the European thought (at its sources) in Ancient Greek thought and show resources of mythological thinking on the way of overcoming of these contradictions. Methodology. All methodological installations, using possibilities, borderlines and effects of non-classical consciousness, have appeared insufficiently effective for adequate understanding of essence of the person. The generalised method, which is used by us, leans on deep resources of high-energy consciousness and on decoding of possibilities of anthropological time that it presumes to open new horizons of human existence. Originality. Addressing to modern representations about the changed conditions of consciousness, we have tried to see the historically generated discursive practices of understanding reality by the consciousness (including the historical one). Thus, using the consistently conducted destruction we are aimed at reaching the first sources of consciousness and revealing the deep historical mechanisms of temporal consciousnesses formation (as far as it possible in the modern conditions). Conclusions. It is shown that the use of the basic ideas of Ancient Greek thought leads scientific consciousness to deadlocks of contradictions, which were consistently revealed during subsequent history of philosophy and culture. The analysis of ancient mythological texts allows concluding, that the Greek thought is not a source of modern scientific thought. That is to understand the scientific thought one should address to the more ancient archaic thinking. Thus, to overcome the contradictions of modern scientific and philosophical thought it is necessary to search new alternative (more ancient) sources of understanding of the historical reality, first of all, connected with deepening into ancient (mythological) thought.

Three principles correctional counseling (3PCC) posits that people in prison have inner mental health they have obscured to varying degrees with their own thinking. 3PCC further posits that people in prison can rekindle and sustain this inner health via understanding how three psychospiritual principles-Universal Mind, consciousness, and thought-coalesce to form people's psychological experience. We review the three principles and explain how exposure to these principles can lead to improved mental health and improved behavior. Then, we describe 3PCC and distinguish it from prevailing correctional counseling methods. Finally, we present a preliminary study that examines the efficacy of 3PCC for improving the mental health and behavior of people in an English prison. Our findings show that participants exposed to 3PCC showed a significant improvement in mental well-being and purpose in life, significant reductions in anxiety and anger, and improved behavior in the prison community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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We discuss four interconnected issues that we believe have hindered investigations into how language may affect thinking. These have had a tendency to reappear in the debate concerning linguistic relativity over the past decades, despite numerous empirical findings. The first is the claim that it is impossible to disentangle language from thought, making the question concerning influence pointless. The second is the argument that it is impossible to disentangle language from culture in general, and from social interaction in particular, so it is impossible to attribute any differences in the thought patterns of the members of different cultures to language per se. The third issue is the objection that methodological and empirical problems defeat all but the most trivial version of the thesis of linguistic influence: that language gives new factual information. The fourth is the assumption that since language can potentially influence thought from not at all to completely, the possible forms of linguistic influence can be placed on a cline, and competing theories can be seen as debating the actual position on this cline.We analyse these claims and show that the first three do not constitute in-principle objections against the validity of the project of investigating linguistic influence on thought, and that the last one is not the best way to frame the empirical challenges at hand. While we do not argue for any specific theory or mechanism for linguistic influence on thought, our discussion and the reviewed literature show that such influence is clearly possible, and hence in need of further investigations.

The title of the present paper is unique and challenging for Ștefan Odobleja's conception because a mechanistic, physicist, even reductionist approach on the human psyche, as we find in the Romanian thinker's work, does not leave any room, apparently, for such a relationship where consciousness is an epiphenomenon, without any relevance for the psychic or neuropsychic machine, and the unconscious does not exist. There is no need for consciousness to realize an implementation structure, a feed-back; so, it is understandable that this process is automatic, unconscious, even if the unconscious is repudiated by the author. Odobleja wrote about consciousness and unconscious in his Consonantiste Psychology, but approached them separately. His conception on the two instances of the human soul is the prerogative of a physiological, neurophysiological vision, and that is why the above mentioned author, when speaking about consciousness, refers rather to the state of conscience, behavior being a result of consciousness. We can speak about levels of consciousness, but high level consciousness is a complicated process that can be studied not only from an informational, physiological point of view, but it also includes, undoubtedly, the psychological aspect, and, especially, the philosophical one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last chapter of Vygotsky’s last book,Thinking and Speech, is a compressed argument about the construction of consciousness through the internalisation of language. This article comments on Vygotsky’s analysis of the ‘voyage into the interior’ undertaken by oral speech as it is internalised and abbreviated into ‘inner speech’, and then further concentrated as non-verbal thought. The article focuses on the part that literature and especially poetry play in Vygotsky’s argument in this chapter, and suggests that in exploring the condensed semantics of inner speech Vygotsky is implicitly describing how poets turn private thoughts into ‘symbols for others’. It concludes with a commentary on Vygotsky’s use of Mandelshtam’s poem ‘The Swallow’, from which he draws his epigraph. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction presents a state of the art of philosophical research on cognitive phenomenology and its relation to the nature of conscious thinking more generally. We firstly introduce the question of cognitive phenomenology, the motivation for the debate, and situate the discussion within the fields of philosophy (analytic and phenomenological traditions), cognitive psychology and consciousness studies. Secondly, we review the main research on the question, which we argue has so far situated the cognitive phenomenology debate around the following topics and arguments: phenomenal contrast, epistemic arguments and challenges, introspection, ontology and temporal character, intentionality, inner speech, agency, holistic perspective, categorical perception, value, and phenomenological description. Thirdly, we suggest future developments by pointing to four questions that can be explored in relation to the cognitive phenomenology discussion: the self and self-awareness, attention, emotions and general theories of consciousness. We finalise by briefly presenting the six articles of this Special Issue, which engage with some of the topics mentioned and contribute to enlarge the discussion by connecting it to different areas of philosophical investigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In proposing to tell a Lamarckian story about evolution, Samuel Butler not only put into question the good sense of the neo-Darwinian approach which presupposes the adequacy of the modern conception of of good reasoning. Modelled on systematic (e.g., logico-mathematical) ratiocination, this conception, he intimates, bespeaks a sick culture that actually betrays reason by elevating techno-scientific ingenuity to a god-like status. Evidence for this serious charge is afforded by neuroscientists who maintain, for instance, that consciousness can be `explained' in terms of electro-chemical events in material brains. This reductive approach to the great themes of Life and Thought degrades the complex relationships between living and thinking. In this paper I propose to show that Butler's approach to naturalistic story-telling can be extended in such a way as to illustrate what Owen Barfield calls a `living reason'; that is, a vitalistic form of reasoning that may help remedy a cultural malaise that is threatening the long-term health of this civilization, if not the entire world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Novelty and emergence in the quest for foundations. The search for firm foundations for a given knowledge, notably in the case of a formalized one, can be seen as a particular case of the search for deeper intelligibility. It generally brings to modifying the structural elements of the received knowl-edge (this having to do with questions of ontological relativity and epistemological holism), letting appear new elements of thought and of ‘reality’, emergent conceptual structures on the ground of the preceding ones. We propose to show the link between the emergence of new kinds of knowledge, non thinkable previously, which enlarge the field of possible knowledge, and the effective “forward” motion of the search for foundations.

Living organisms appear to have agency, the ability to act freely, and humans appear to have free will, the ability to rationally decide what to do. However, it is not clear how such properties can be produced by naturalistic processes, and there are indeed neuroscientific measurements that cast doubt on the existence of free will. Here I present a naturalistic theory of agency, consciousness, and free will. Elementary forms of agency evolved very early in the evolution of life, utilizing an extension of the basic Darwinian scheme that combines and entangles deterministic and stochastic causation. The extension effectively produces an active form of causation, as well as meaning intrinsic to the organism. Consciousness arose when animals evolved advanced nervous systems and social lifestyles that enabled communication mutually affecting each animal's intrinsic meaning. I argue that various forms of agency that subsequently arose in evolution, preconscious, conscious, intelligent, symbolic, and rational agency, still coexist in humans. This coexistence, combined with the fact that agency is not instantaneous but takes time to build up, makes simple interpretations of neuroscientific results on free will (taken here as rational, symbolic agency) problematic. The conclusion of the study is that conscious free will, including a form of agent causation, is fully consistent with a naturalistic world-view and can be produced by the specific processes discussed. The result closely resembles existing approaches to life and mind that are inspired by phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We discuss four interconnected issues that we believe have hindered investigations into how language may affect thinking. These have had a tendency to reappear in the debate concerning linguistic relativity over the past decades, despite numerous empirical findings. The first is the claim that it is impossible to disentangle language from thought, making the question concerning "influence" pointless. The second is the argument that it is impossible to disentangle language from culture in general, and from social interaction in particular, so it is impossible to attribute any differences in the thought patterns of the members of different cultures to language per se. The third issue is the objection that methodological and empirical problems defeat all but the most trivial version of the thesis of linguistic influence: that language gives new factual information. The fourth is the assumption that since language can potentially influence thought from "not at all" to "completely," the possible forms of linguistic influence can be placed on a cline, and competing theories can be seen as debating the actual position on this cline. We analyze these claims and show that the first three do not constitute in-principle objections against the validity of the project of investigating linguistic influence on thought, and that the last one is not the best way toframe the empirical challenges at hand. While we do not argue for any specific theory or mechanism for linguistic influence on thought, our discussion and the reviewed literature show that such influence is clearly possible, and hence in need of further investigations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the relationship between understanding the psycho-spiritual principles of Universal Mind, Consciousness, and Thought, and perceived dependence on mindfulness techniques to realize improved mindfulness/mental health. Participants exposed to the intervention grounded in these principles also reported practicing meditation and/or mindfulness-based intervention techniques. The results from this preliminary study appear to support our prediction that as participant’s understanding of these principles increases, their perceived dependence on mindfulness techniques to realize improved mindfulness/mental health will decrease, and as participant’s perceived dependence on mindfulness techniques decreases, their ability to maintain well-being during unpleasant mood states will increase. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Insights from the recent wealth of popular books on neuroscience are offered to suggest a strengthening of theory in information science. Information theory has traditionally neglected the human dimension in favour of 'scientific' approaches often derived from the Shannon-Weaver model. Neuroscientists argue in excitingly fresh ways from the evidence of case studies, non-intrusive experimentation and the measurements that can be obtained from technologies that include electroencephalography, positron emission tomography (PET), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and magnetoencephalography (MEG). The way in which the findings of neuroscience intersect with ideas such as those of Kahneman on fast and slow thinking and Csikszentmihalyi on flow, is tentatively explored as lines of connection with information science. It is argued that the beginnings of a theoretical underpinning for current web-based information searching, as opposed to established information retrieval methods, can be drawn from this. It is proposed that collaborative research programmes between neuroscientists and information scientists could be extremely revealing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]