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Doerig et al. evaluate how current empirical theories approach access consciousness, but they neglect how they approach phenomenal consciousness - probably because most theories don't deal with phenomenal consciousness at all. One exception is the sensorimotor theory, but Doerig et al. did not evaluate it as being directed to phenomenal consciousness.

We suggest that within a skill-based, sensorimotor approach to sensory consciousness, two measurable properties of perceivers' interaction with the environment, "corporality" and "alerting capacity", explain why sensory stimulation is experienced as having a "sensory feel", unlike thoughts or memories. We propose that the notions of "corporality" and "alerting capacity" make possible the construction of a "phenomenality plot", which charts in a principled way the degree to which conscious phenomena are experienced as having a sensory quality.

Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual "filling in," visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

Two very fundamental aspects of phenomenal experiences underline the fact that they seem to have “something it’s like.” One aspect is the fact that experiences have a locus: they Can seem “external” (perceptual), “internal” (interoceptive, bodily or emotional) or “mental.” A second fundamental aspect is the imposingness of experiences. They can seem “present” to us in different ways, sometimes seeming displayed before us with “spatiotemporal presence.” Both these aspects of “what it’s like” can be identified with the degree to which we can voluntarily control what we are doing when we engage in an experience. The external/internal/mental dimension is determined by how our voluntary bodily actions can influence the sensorimotor flow of information. The degree of imposingness of experiences and their “spatio-temporal presence” Is determined by how our voluntary actions are impeded or assisted by innate, attention-grabbing mechanisms. By elucidating these two most fundamental aspects of “what it’s like,” and taken together with prior work on inter- and intra-modal differences in experiences, this article suggests a path toward a scientific theory of the “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness, explaining why experiences feel like something rather than feeling like nothing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of understanding how physical processes in the brain could give rise to consciousness has been identified with the 'comparative explanatory gap ', the problem of explaining why different experiences have the differing qualities they do, and the 'absolute explanatory gap ', the problem of explaining why anything can be conscious at all. The main innovation of the sensorimotor theory is that it provides a very appealing way of closing the comparative gap by postulating that the quality of experiences corresponds to objective sensorimotor laws that characterize one's bodily interaction with the environment. Here I expound in greater detail how the approach deals with the absolute gap. I refine my previous efforts at understanding what we mean by 'being conscious of something ' by abandoning my previous hierarchical approach; by introducing the concept of 'mental manipulation and by relying more on a notion of self than I have done previously. I end up with a more variegated notion of consciousness than in previous work, that includes the idea of a complex interwoven patchwork of consciousness with no simple conscious/nonconscious distinction across different species or agents. The approach suggests we need to review the links between consciousness and ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following arguments put forward in my book (Why red doesn't sound like a bell: understanding the feel of consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York, USA, ), this article takes a pragmatic, scientist's point of view about the concepts of consciousness and 'feel', pinning down what people generally mean when they talk about these concepts, and then investigating to what extent these capacities could be implemented in non-biological machines. Although the question of 'feel', or 'phenomenal consciousness' as it is called by some philosophers, is generally considered to be the 'hard' problem of consciousness, the article shows that by taking a 'sensorimotor' approach, the difficulties can be overcome. What remains to account for are the notions of so-called 'access consciousness' and the self. I claim that though they are undoubtedly very difficult, these are not logically impossible to implement in robots. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a response to comments about a proposed framework on vision and visual consciousness called sensorimotor contingency theory. Aspects of the explanatory gap for perceptual consciousness; Position on perceptual experience without action; Role of the brain in consciousness; Conclusion.

The target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man's cognitive access. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An abstract of the article "Skill, Corporality and Alerting Capacity in an Account of Sensory Consciousness," by J. Kevin O'Regan and Erik Myin is presented.