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The rules governing the selection of which sensory information reaches consciousness are yet unknown. Of our senses, vision is often considered to be the dominant sense, and the effects of bodily senses, such as proprioception, on visual consciousness are frequently overlooked. Here, we demonstrate that the position of the body influences visual consciousness. We induced perceptual suppression by using continuous flash suppression. Participants had to judge the orientation a target stimulus embedded in a task-irrelevant picture of a hand. The picture of the hand could either be congruent or incongruent with the participants' actual hand position. When the viewed and the real hand positions were congruent, perceptual suppression was broken more rapidly than during incongruent trials. Our findings provide the first evidence of a proprioceptive bias in visual consciousness, suggesting that proprioception not only influences the perception of one's own body and self-consciousness, but also visual consciousness.

The paradigm of distractor-induced blindness has previously been used to track the transition from unconscious to conscious visual processing. In a variation of this paradigm used in this study, participants (n = 13) had to detect an orientation change of tilted bars (target) embedded in a dynamic random pattern; the onset of the target was signaled by the presentation of a color cue. Occasional orientation changes preceding the cue served as distractors and severely impaired the target's detection. ERPs showed that a frontal negativity was cumulatively activated by the distractors, and early sensory components were not affected. In a control condition, the target was defined by a coherent motion of the bars. Orientation changes preceding the motion target did not affect its detection, and the frontal suppression process was not observed. However, we obtained a significant reduction of the sensory components. The data support the notion that distractors that share the target's features trigger a cumulative inhibition process preventing the conscious representation of the inhibited features. Explorative source modeling suggests that this process originates in the pFC. A top-down modulation of sensory processing could not be observed.

One notion emerging from studies on unconscious visual processing is that different "blinding techniques" seem to suppress the conscious perception of stimuli at different levels of the neurocognitive architecture. However, even when only the results from a single suppression method are compared, the picture of the scope and limits of unconscious visual processing remains strikingly heterogeneous, as in the case of continuous flash suppression (CFS). To resolve this issue, it has been suggested that highlevel semantic processing under CFS is facilitated whenever interocular suppression is attenuated by the removal of visuospatial attention. In this behavioral study, we aimed to further investigate this "CFS-attenuation-by-inattention" hypothesis in a numerical priming study using spatial cueing. Participants performed a number comparison task on a visible target number ("compare number to five"). Prime-target pairs were either congruent (both numbers smaller, or both larger than five) or incongruent. Based on the "CFS-attenuation-by-inattention" hypothesis, we predicted that reaction times (RTs) for congruent prime-target pairs should be faster than for incongruent ones, but only when the prime was presented at the uncued location. In the invisible condition, we observed no priming effects and thus no evidence in support of the "CFS-attenuationby-inattention" hypothesis. In the visible condition, we found an inverse effect of prime-target congruency. Our results agree with the notion that the representation of CF-suppressed stimuli is fractionated, and limited to their basic, elemental features, thus precluding semantic processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate about the scope and limits of unconscious visual processing under continuous flash suppression (CFS) has created a heterogeneous set of divergent findings that are yet to be reconciled. Attention has been suggested as an important factor in modulating the processing of suppressed visual information under CFS. Specifically, Eo et al. (2016) reported that semantic processing under CFS can be significantly facilitated when spatial attention is diverted away from the suppressed stimulus. Based on event-related potential (ERP) findings involving the N400, they proposed that inattention attenuates interocular suppression and thereby makes semantic processing available unconsciously, potentially reconciling conflicting evidence in the literature. In this study, we aimed to further investigate the "CFS-attenuation-by-inattention" hypothesis using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA). We tested whether the decodability of object category increases under CFS when attention is diverted away from the suppressed stimulus in a spatial cueing task. Our results provide no evidence for the "CFS-attenuation-by-inattention" hypothesis, but show higher decoding accuracies for visible stimuli than for invisible stimuli. We discuss the implications of our findings for the important endeavor of trying to reconcile the divergent reports of unconscious processing under CFS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this perspective article, we first outline the large diversity of methods, measures, statistical analyses, and concepts in the field of the experimental study of unconscious processing. We then suggest that this diversity implies that comparisons between different studies on unconscious processing are fairly limited, especially when stimulus awareness has been assessed in different ways. Furthermore, we argue that flexible choices of methods and measures will inevitably lead to an overestimation of unconscious processes. In the concluding paragraph, we briefly present solutions and strategies for future research. We make a plea for the introduction of “best practices,” similar to previous attempts to constitute practicing standards for functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hassin recently proposed the "Yes It Can" (YIC) principle to describe the division of labor between conscious and unconscious processes in human cognition. According to this principle, unconscious processes can carry out every fundamental high-level cognitive function that conscious processes can perform. In our commentary, we argue that the author presents an overly idealized review of the literature in support of the YIC principle. Furthermore, we point out that the dissimilar trends observed in social and cognitive psychology, with respect to published evidence of strong unconscious effects, can better be explained by the way how awareness is defined and measured in both research fields. Finally, we show that the experimental paradigm chosen by Hassin to rule out remaining objections against the YIC principle is unsuited to verify the new default notion that all high-level cognitive functions can unfold unconsciously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies using continuous flash suppression (CFS) have suggested that action-related processing in the dorsal visual stream might be independent of perceptual awareness, in line with the 'vision-for-perception' versus 'vision-for-action' distinction of the influential dual-stream theory. It remains controversial if evidence suggesting exclusive dorsal stream processing of tool stimuli under CFS can be explained by their elongated shape alone or by action-relevant category representations in dorsal visual cortex. To approach this question, we investigated category- and shape-selective functional magnetic resonance imaging-blood-oxygen level-dependent responses in both visual streams using images of faces and tools. Multivariate pattern analysis showed enhanced decoding of elongated relative to non-elongated tools, both in the ventral and dorsal visual stream. The second aim of our study was to investigate whether the depth of interocular suppression might differentially affect processing in dorsal and ventral areas. However, parametric modulation of suppression depth by varying the CFS mask contrast did not yield any evidence for differential modulation of category-selective activity. Together, our data provide evidence for shape-selective processing under CFS in both dorsal and ventral stream areas and, therefore, do not support the notion that dorsal 'vision-for-action' processing is exclusively preserved under interocular suppression. Hum Brain Mapp,36:137-149, 2015. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Visual stimuli can be kept from awareness using various methods. The extent of processing that a given stimulus receives in the absence of awareness is typically used to make claims about the role of consciousness more generally. The neural processing elicited by a stimulus, however, may also depend on the method used to keep it from awareness, and not only on whether the stimulus reaches awareness. Here we report that the method used to render an image invisible has a dramatic effect on how category information about the unseen stimulus is encoded across the human brain. We collected fMRI data while subjects viewed images of faces and tools, that were rendered invisible using either continuous flash suppression (CFS) or chromatic flicker fusion (CFF). In a third condition, we presented the same images under normal fully visible viewing conditions. We found that category information about visible images could be extracted from patterns of fMRI responses throughout areas of neocortex known to be involved in face or tool processing. However, category information about stimuli kept from awareness using CFS could be recovered exclusively within occipital cortex, whereas information about stimuli kept from awareness using CFF was also decodable within temporal and frontal regions. We conclude that unconsciously presented objects are processed differently depending on how they are rendered subjectively invisible. Caution should therefore be used in making generalizations on the basis of any one method about the neural basis of consciousness or the extent of information processing without consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of non-conscious vision benefits from several alternative methods that allow the suppression of an image from awareness. Here, we present and compare two of them that are particularly well-suited for creating sustained periods of invisibility, namely visual crowding and continuous flash suppression (CFS). In visual crowding, a peripheral image surrounded by similar flankers becomes impossible to discriminate. In CFS, an image presented to one eye becomes impossible to detect when rapidly changing patterns are presented to the other eye. After discussing the experimental specificities of each method, we give a comparative overview of the main empirical results derived from them, from the mere analysis of low-level features to the extraction of semantic contents. We conclude by proposing practical guidelines and future directions to obtain more quantitative and systematic measures of non-conscious processes under prolonged stimulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When dissimilar stimuli are presented to the two eyes, only one stimulus dominates at a time while the other stimulus is invisible due to interocular suppression. When both stimuli are equally potent in competing for awareness, perception alternates spontaneously between the two stimuli, a phenomenon called binocular rivalry. However, when one stimulus is much stronger, e.g., due to higher contrast, the weaker stimulus can be suppressed for prolonged periods of time. A technique that has recently become very popular for the investigation of unconscious visual processing is continuous flash suppression (CFS): High-contrast dynamic patterns shown to one eye can render a lowcontrast stimulus shown to the other eye invisible for up to minutes. Studies using CFS have produced new insights but also controversies regarding the types of visual information that can be processed unconsciously as well as the neural sites and the relevance of such unconscious processing. Here, we reviewthe current state of knowledge in regard to neural processing of interocularly suppressed information. Focusing on recent neuroimaging findings, we discuss whether and to what degree such suppressed visual information is processed at early and more advanced levels of the visual processing hierarchy. We review controversial findings related to the influence of attention on early visual processing under interocular suppression, the putative differential roles of dorsal and ventral areas in unconscious object processing, and evidence suggesting privileged unconscious processing of emotional and other socially relevant information. On a more general note, we discuss methodological and conceptual issues, from practical issues of howunawareness of a stimulus is assessed to the overarching question of what constitutes an adequate operational definition of unawareness. Finally, we propose approaches for future research to resolve current controversies in this exciting research area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, substantial progress has been made in the scientific study of perceptual awareness, or synonymously, the contents of consciousness. By many standards, the field of consciousness research is in a phase of unprecedented productivity and progress, with high-impact publications, popular science books, specialized journals, dedicated academic societies, scientific conferences, and, above all, competing cognitive and neurobiological theories of consciousness . In the present review, I highlight a selection of recent fMRI and related behavioral studies that examine the neuronal underpinnings of awareness in higher order and early visual cortex. After the introduction, I also provide a brief overview of the crucial problem of measurement, that is, the fact that any exploration of consciousness depends on some kind of report, which pertains to all studies summarized in this review. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Clinical diagnosis of disorders of consciousness (DOC) caused by brain injury poses great challenges since patients are often behaviorally unresponsive. A promising new approach towards objective DOC diagnosis may be offered by the analysis of ultra-slow (<0.1 Hz) spontaneous brain activity fluctuations measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during the resting-state. Previous work has shown reduced functional connectivity within the "default network", a subset of regions known to be deactivated during engaging tasks, which correlated with the degree of consciousness impairment. However, it remains unclear whether the breakdown of connectivity is restricted to the "default network", and to what degree changes in functional connectivity can be observed at the single subject level. Here, we analyzed resting-state interhemispheric connectivity in three homotopic regions of interest, which could reliably be identified based on distinct anatomical landmarks, and were part of the "Extrinsic" (externally oriented, task positive) network (pre- and postcentral gyrus, and intraparietal sulcus). Resting-state fMRI data were acquired for a group of 11 healthy subjects and 8 DOC patients. At the group level, our results indicate decreased inter-hemispheric functional connectivity in subjects with impaired awareness as compared to subjects with intact awareness. Individual connectivity scores significantly correlated with the degree of consciousness. Furthermore, a single-case statistic indicated a significant deviation from the healthy sample in 5/8 patients. Importantly, of the three patients whose connectivity indices were comparable to the healthy sample, one was diagnosed as locked-in. Taken together, our results further highlight the clinical potential of resting-state connectivity analysis and might guide the way towards a connectivity measure complementing existing DOC diagnosis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We have recently shown that intrinsic fluctuations of ongoing activity during baseline have an impact on perceptual decisions reported for an ambiguous visual stimulus (Hesselmann et al., 2008). To test whether this result generalizes from the visual object domain to other perceptual and neural systems, the current study investigated the effect of ongoing signal fluctuations in motion-sensitive brain regions on the perception of coherent visual motion. We determined motion coherence thresholds individually for each subject using a dynamic random dot display. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), brief events of subliminal, supraliminal, and periliminal coherent motion were presented with long and variable interstimulus intervals between them. On each trial, subjects reported whether they had perceived "coherent" or "random" motion, and fMRI signal time courses were analyzed separately as a function of stimulus and percept type. In the right motion-sensitive occipito-temporal cortex (hMT+), coherent percepts of periliminal stimuli yielded a larger stimulus-evoked response than random percepts. Prestimulus baseline activity in this region was also significantly higher in these coherent trials than in random trials. As in our previous study, however, the relation between ongoing and evoked activity was not additive but interacted with perceptual outcome. Our data thus suggest that endogenous fluctuations in baseline activity have a generic effect on subsequent perceptual decisions. Although mainstream analytical techniques used in functional neuroimaging do not capture this nonadditive effect of baseline on evoked response, it is in accord with postulates from theoretical frameworks as, for instance, predictive coding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Spatial attention is not necessary for triggering the attentional blink. • Spatial attention is not sufficient for triggering the attentional blink. • Conscious perception is necessary for triggering the attentional blink. • Conscious perception is not sufficient for triggering the attentional blink. • Conscious perception of a relevant stimulus is sufficient for triggering a blink. Our ability to perceive two events in close temporal succession is severely limited, a phenomenon known as the attentional blink. While the blink has served as a popular tool to prevent conscious perception, there is less research on its causes, and in particular on the role of conscious perception of the first event in triggering it. In three experiments, we disentangled the roles of spatial attention, conscious perception and working memory (WM) in causing the blink. We show that while allocating spatial attention to T1 is neither necessary nor sufficient for eliciting a blink, consciously perceiving it is necessary but not sufficient. When T1 was task irrelevant, consciously perceiving it triggered a blink only when it matched the attentional set for T2. We conclude that consciously perceiving a task-relevant event causes the blink, possibly because it triggers encoding of this event into WM. We discuss the implications of these findings for the relationship between spatial attention, conscious perception and WM, as well as for the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]