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Autonoetic consciousness is the awareness that an event we remember is one that we ourselves experienced. It is a defining feature of our subjective experience of remembering and imagining future events. Given its subjective nature, there is ongoing debate about how to measure it. Our goal was to develop a framework to identify cognitive markers of autonoetic consciousness. Across two studies (N = 342) we asked young, healthy participants to provide written descriptions of two autobiographical memories, two plausible future events, and an experimentally encoded video. Participants then rated their subjective experience during remembering and imagining. Exploratory Factor Analysis of this data uncovered the latent variables underlying autonoetic consciousness across these different events. In contrast to work that emphasizes the distinction between Remember and Know as being key to autonoetic consciousness, Re-experiencing, and Pre-experiencing for future events, were consistently identified as core markers of autonoetic consciousness. This was alongside Mental Time Travel in all types of memory events, but not for imagining the future. In addition, our factor analysis allows us to demonstrate directly - for the first time - the features of mental imagery associated with the sense of autonoetic consciousness in autobiographical memory; vivid, visual imagery from a first-person perspective. Finally, with regression analysis, the emergent factor structure of autonoetic consciousness was able to predict the richness of autobiographical memory texts, but not of episodic recall of the encoded video. This work provides a novel way to assess autonoetic consciousness, illustrates how autonoetic consciousness manifests differently in memory and imagination and defines the mental representations intrinsic to this process., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The author(s) declared no potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2024. Published by Elsevier B.V.)

Ever since Tulving's influential 1985 article 'Memory and consciousness', it has become traditional to think of autonoetic consciousness as necessary for episodic memory. This paper questions this claim. Specifically, it argues that the construct of autonoetic consciousness lacks validity and that, even if it was valid, it would still not be necessary for episodic memory. The paper ends with a proposal to go back to a functional/computational characterization of episodic memory in which its characteristic phenomenology is a contingent feature of the retrieval process and, as a result, open to empirical scrutiny. The proposal also dovetails with recent taxonomies of memory that are independent of conscious awareness and suggests strategies to evaluate within- and between-individual variability in the conscious experience of episodic memories in human and non-human agents. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Autonoetic consciousness (ANC), the ability to re-experience personal past events links episodic memory and self-consciousness by bridging awareness of oneself in a past event (i.e., during its encoding) with awareness of oneself in the present (i.e., during the reliving of a past event). Recent neuroscience research revealed a bodily form of self-consciousness, including the sense of agency (SoA) and the sense of body ownership (SoO) that are based on the integration of multisensory bodily inputs and motor signals. However, the relation between SoA and/or SoO with ANC is not known. Here, we used immersive virtual reality technology and motion tracking and investigated the potential association of SoA/SoO with ANC. For this, we exposed participants to different levels of visuomotor and perspectival congruency, known to modulate SoA and SoO, during the encoding of virtual scenes and collected ANC ratings 1 week after the encoding session. In a total of 74 healthy participants, we successfully induced systematic changes in SoA and SoO during encoding and found that ANC depended on the level of SoA experienced during encoding. Moreover, ANC was positively associated with SoA, but only for the scene encoded with preserved visuomotor and perspectival congruency, and such SoA-ANC coupling was absent for SoO and control questions. Collectively, these data provide behavioral evidence in a novel paradigm that links a key subjective component of bodily self-consciousness during encoding, SoA, to the subjective reliving of those encoded events from one's past, ANC., Competing Interests: The authors declare no competing financial interests., (Copyright © 2024 Meyer et al.)

This study investigated the ability of individuals with disordered gambling to imagine future events. Problem gamblers (n=35) and control participants (n=35) were asked to imagine positive and negative future events for three temporal distances (one week, one year, 5-10years). Then, a variety of phenomenological aspects of their future thoughts (e.g., sensory and contextual details, autonoetic consciousness) were rated. Compared to control subjects, problem gamblers generated fewer positive and negative events across all temporal distances, an impairment that was correlated to verbal fluency scores. Furthermore, problem gamblers rated imagined events as containing fewer sensory and contextual details, and lacking autonoetic consciousness. These findings demonstrate that problem gambling is associated with a reduced future-oriented mental time travel ability and, in particular, with diminished autonoetic consciousness when imagining future events., (Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Although autonoetic experience-a sense of mental time travel-has been considered as the hallmark of episodic future thinking, what determines this subjective feeling is not yet fully understood. Here, we investigated the role of autobiographical knowledge by manipulating the relevance of imagined events for personal goals. Participants were asked to imagine three types of events (goal-related future events, experimenter-provided future events, and atemporal events) and to assess various characteristics of their mental representations. The results showed that the three types of events were represented with similar levels of detail and vividness. Importantly, however, goal-related future events were associated with a stronger autonoetic experience. Furthermore, autonoetic experience was significantly predicted by the importance of imagined events for personal goals. These findings suggest that the subjective feeling of pre-experiencing one's personal future in part depends on the extent to which imagined events can be placed in an autobiographical context., (Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Unlabelled: A growing number of studies have highlighted impairments in the ability of individuals with autism spectrum disorders to recall specific, personally experienced material. These difficulties have been related to underlying problems with autonoetic consciousness, namely the subjective awareness of one's own existence in subjective time. The current paper describes the manifestation of these difficulties in three individuals diagnosed with Asperger syndrome. For the people described, lifelong collecting and hoarding behaviours appeared to serve the function of constituting and maintaining aspects of their sense of self, particularly the sense of continuity and agency over time. On the basis of this clinical information and previous research into self-related processes in people with autism spectrum disorders, an initial model of collecting and hoarding behaviours amongst individuals with Asperger syndrome was formulated. The implications of this formulation for both clinical practice and future research are discussed., Key Practitioner Message: People with Asperger syndrome can have problems in developing a functional sense of self. Collecting and hoarding behaviour by people with Asperger syndrome may reflect such underlying difficulties in their sense of self rather than being symptoms of comorbid mental illness. Interventions need to take account of the function of such behaviours rather than solely regarding them as discrete pathological signs., (Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

\nIntroduction: Beyond the memory deficits classically observed in individuals with alcohol use disorder (IwAUD), research has recently focused on the study of autobiographical memory (AM) processes in IwAUD by analysing the content of AM narratives, and the implications for self-conception have been discussed. However, little is known about how IwAUD subjectively experience autobiographical recall. Methods: Thirty-seven IwAUD and 37 control participants were invited to perform an AM task that involved recalling memories for 4 life periods (2 important memories per period). Then, they assessed their subjective experience during AM recall using 6 phenomenological scales evaluating emotional valence, emotional intensity, sensory details, distancing, sharing, and vividness. Anxiety and depression symptoms, interoceptive sensibility, and difficulties in emotion regulation were also measured. Results: The IwAUD experienced greater distancing during AM recall, except during childhood AM recall, indicating that IwAUD are more prone to feeling that the person they are today is different from the person in their retrieved AMs. Very few intergroup differences were observed for AMs from childhood, adolescence-young adulthood, and adulthood, and a greater number of differences were observed for AMs from the last year: the IwAUD experienced AMs with a more negative valence, greater emotional intensity, fewer sensory details, greater distancing, and less sharing. A positive correlation was observed between distancing and interoceptive sensibility in the IwAUD group. Conclusion: Although these results suggest good preservation of autonoetic consciousness in IwAUD, except for more recent AMs, it is insufficient for IwAUD to experience a sense of self-continuity. This difficulty in maintaining a continuous sense of self may constitute a risk for AUD relapse. Beyond the memory deficits classically observed in individuals with alcohol use disorder (IwAUD), research has recently focused on the study of autobiographical memory (AM), which is the memory of personal experiences and facts about the self. By analysing the content of AM narratives in IwAUD, recent studies have reported a degradation of AMs content that may impact the self-conception of IwAUD. However, little is known about how IwAUD subjectively experience autobiographical recall. Thirty-seven IwAUD and 37 control participants were invited to perform an AM task that involved recalling memories for 4 life periods (2 important memories per period) and to assess their subjective experience during AM recall using 6 phenomenological scales. Anxiety and depression symptoms, interoceptive sensibility, and difficulties in emotion regulation were also measured. The IwAUD were more likely to feel that the person they are today is different from the person in their retrieved AMs (greater distancing), except during childhood AM recall. Very few intergroup differences were observed for AMs from childhood, adolescence-young adulthood, and adulthood, and a greater number of differences were observed for AMs from the last year: the IwAUD experienced AMs with a more negative valence, greater emotional intensity, fewer sensory details, greater distancing, and less sharing. A positive correlation was observed between distancing and interoceptive sensibility in the IwAUD group, indicating that the greater their interoceptive sensibility was, the more the IwAUD felt that they were a different person from the person in their AMs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Episodic memories are experienced as belonging to a self that persists in time. We review evidence concerning the nature of human episodic memory and of the sense of self and how these emerge during development, proposing that the younger child experiences a persistent self that supports a subjective experience of remembering. We then explore recent research in cognitive architectures for robotics that has investigated the possibility of forms of synthetic episodic and autobiographical memory. We show that recent advances in generative modeling can support an understanding of the emergence of self and of episodic memory, and that cognitive architectures which include a language capacity are showing progress towards the construction of a narrative self with autobiographical memory capabilities for robots. We conclude by considering the prospects for a more complete model of mental time travel in robotics and the implications of this modeling work for understanding human episodic memory and the self in time. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last years' achievements in neuroscience are key for a philosophical analysis focused on the mind-body problem, such as the phenomenological approach. The digital evolution, on the one hand, faces us with the interaction between the world of reality and the world of possibility. This means more than a mere coexistence between these two dimensions. Rather, a concrete feedback occurs among them, and this brings out unprecedented and unavoidable issues with regard to perceptual processes. On the other hand, the digital evolution allows for analyzing data and monitoring environmental systems, thus reasoning in a predictive way, anticipating problems, and checking ex ante their evolution and outcomes. Neuroscience, for its part, with the experiments of Libet and their subsequent interpretations, has highlighted a consciousness of the unconscious made of ballistic and automatic processes, which constitutes the starting phase of our decisions and actions. This further confirmed that sequential and linear thinking is unable to address the brain-environment relationship that is key in understanding any cognitive process. This analysis confirms the relevance of different aspects of Husserl's phenomenology. There is, however, a "but," which significantly reduces the extent of adherence to his point of view. Husserl assumed that an implicit horizon precedes or accompanies the acts of conscience. This is the material, impressional, passive, receptive, and, in some way, tacit dimension, strictly connected to the issue of genesis, i.e. the process of constitution of the analyzed entities. Thus, he drew a clear dividing line between this dimension and the phases of the self-controlling, vigilant conscience and its activity. In fact, his approach to the phenomenological problem is mainly oriented toward these phases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do our bodies influence who we are? Recent research in cognitive neuroscience has examined consciousness associated with the self and related multisensory processing of bodily signals, the so-called bodily self-consciousness. A parallel line of research has highlighted the concept of the autobiographical self and the associated autonoetic consciousness, which enables us to mentally travel in time. The subjective re-experiencing of past episodes is described as re-living them from within or outside one's body. In this brief perspective, I aim to explore the underlying characteristics of self-consciousness and its relation to bodily signals and episodic memory. I will outline some recent behavioral and neuroimaging evidence indicating that bodily cues play a fundamental role in autobiographical memory. Finally, I will discuss these emerging concepts regarding the current understanding of bodily-self, autobiographical-self, their links to self-consciousness, and suggest directions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Autobiographical memory is vital for our well‐being and therefore used in therapeutic interventions. However, not much is known about the (neural) processes by which reliving memories can have beneficial effects. This study investigates what brain activation patterns and memory characteristics facilitate the effectiveness of reliving positive autobiographical memories for mood and sense of self. Particularly, the role of vividness and autonoetic consciousness is studied. Participants (N = 47) with a wide range of trait self‐esteem relived neutral and positive memories while their bold responses, experienced vividness of the memory, mood, and state self‐esteem were recorded. More vivid memories related to better mood and activation in amygdala, hippocampus and insula, indicative of increased awareness of oneself (i.e., prereflective aspect of autonoetic consciousness). Lower vividness was associated with increased activation in the occipital lobe, PCC, and precuneus, indicative of a more distant mode of reliving. While individuals with lower trait self‐esteem increased in state self‐esteem, they showed less deactivation of the lateral occipital cortex during positive memories. In sum, the vividness of the memory seemingly distinguished a more immersed and more distant manner of memory reliving. In particular, when reliving positive memories higher vividness facilitated increased prereflective autonoetic consciousness, which likely is instrumental in boosting mood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study was to highlight the underlying process responsible for the age-related deficit in recollection. Through two experiments using the Remember-Know-Guess procedure (Gardiner, J. M., & Richardson-Klavehn, A. [2000]. Remembering and knowing. InThe Oxford handbook of memory(pp. 229–244). New York, NY: Oxford University Press) in recognition, we manipulated the opportunity to update bindings between target items and their encoding context, in young and older adults. In the first experiment we impaired the binding updating process during the encoding of items, while in the second we supported this process. The results indicated that the “Remember” responses in the younger group were specifically reduced by the impairment of the binding updating process (Exp. 1), suggesting that this ability is useful for them to encode a specific episode. Conversely, only the “Remember” responses in the older group were improved in accuracy by supporting the binding updating process (Exp. 2), suggesting that their weakness in this ability is the source of their failure to improve the accuracy of their memories. The overall results support the hypothesis that the age-related decline in episodic memory is partly due to a greater vulnerability to interference on bindings, impairing the ability to update content-context bindings as and when events occur. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Based on an interdisciplinary perspective, we discuss how primary-process, anoetic forms of consciousness emerge into higher forms of awareness such as knowledge-based episodic knowing and self-aware forms of higher-order consciousness like autonoetic awareness. Anoetic consciousness is defined as the rudimentary state of affective, homeostatic, and sensory-perceptual mental experiences. It can be considered as the autonomic flow of primary-process phenomenal experiences that reflects a fundamental form of first-person "self-experience," a vastly underestimated primary form of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that this anoetic form of evolutionarily refined consciousness constitutes a critical antecedent that is foundational for all forms of knowledge acquisition via learning and memory, giving rise to a knowledge-based, or noetic, consciousness as well as higher forms of "awareness" or "knowing consciousness" that permits "timetravel" in the brain-mind. We summarize the conceptual advantages of such a multi-tiered neuroevolutionary approach to psychological issues, namely from genetically controlled primary (affective) and secondary (learning and memory), to higher tertiary (developmentally emergent) brain-mind processes, along with suggestions about how affective experiences become more cognitive and object-oriented, allowing the developmental creation of more subtle higher mental processes such as episodic memory which allows the possibility of autonoetic consciousness, namely looking forward and backward at one's life and its possibilities within the "mind's eye." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: posited that the capacity to remember is one facet of a more general capacity—autonoetic (self-knowing) consciousness. Autonoetic consciousness was proposed to underlie the ability for “mental time travel” both into the past (remembering) and into the future to envision potential future episodes (episodic future thinking). The current study examines whether individual differences can predict autonoetic experience. Specifically, the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI, ) was administered to 133 undergraduate students, who also rated phenomenological experiences accompanying autobiographical remembering and episodic future thinking. Scores on two of the five subscales of the ZTPI (Future and Present-Hedonistic) predicted the degree to which people reported feelings of mentally traveling backward (or forward) in time and the degree to which they reported re- or pre-experiencing the event, but not ten other rated properties less related to autonoetic consciousness. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Objectively measuring the experiential phenomenon of “reliving” a personal memory without relying on the retrieval of specific contents such as richness/vividness of perceptual details is difficult. There are, however, some circumstances in which an indirect measure that does not require conscious retrieval or deliberate assessment of such information, would be quite useful (e.g., in very young children, in patients with poor fluency or inappropriate use of rating scales). Here, we examined the use of the historical present (HP), defined as a present tense that refers to a past action, in autobiographical narratives. The HP indexes a sense of reliving because the memory of the event is vividly re-experienced as occurring again in the current moment. We compared the use of the HP in narratives from neurologically intact controls and from patients with unilateral temporal lobe excisions or epilepsy (TLE). Results indicate that patients used fewer instances of the HP than healthy controls. Also, the use of the HP correlated positively with other measures of recollection, such as the total number of perceptual details contained in a narrative. We provide the first empirical evidence that a linguistic construct can be used to assess the conscious experience that accompanies recollection. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Previous studies exploring mental time travel paradigms with functional neuroimaging techniques have uncovered both common and distinct neural correlates of re-experiencing past events or pre-experiencing future events. A gap in the mental time travel literature exists, as paradigms have not explored the affective component of re-experiencing past episodic events; this study explored this sparsely researched area. The present study employed standardized low resolution electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) to identify electrophysiological correlates of re-experience affect-laden and non-affective past events, as well as pre-experiencing a future anticipated event. Our results confirm previous research and are also novel in that we illustrate common and distinct electrophysiological correlates of re-experiencing affective episodic events. Furthermore, research from this experiment yields results outlining a pattern of activation in the frontal and temporal regions is correlated with the time frame of past or future events subjects imagined. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Previous results from research on individuals with Asperger syndrome (AS) suggest a diminished ability for recalling episodic autobiographical memory (AM). The primary aim of this study was to explore autobiographical memory in individuals with Asperger syndrome and specifically to investigate whether memories in those with AS are characterized by fewer episodic ‘remembered’ events (due to a deficit in autonoetic consciousness). A further aim was to examine whether such changes in AM might also be related to changes in identity, due to the close relationship between memory and the self and to the established differences in self-referential processes in AS. Eleven adults with AS and fifteen matched comparison participants were asked to recall autobiographical memories from three lifetime periods and for each memory to give either a remember response (autonoetic consciousness) or a know response (noetic consciousness). The pattern of results shows that AS participants recalled fewer memories and that these memories were more often rated as known, compared to the comparison group. AS participants also showed differences in reported identity, generating fewer social identity statements and more abstract, trait-linked identities. The data support the view that differences in both memory and reported personal identities in AS are characterized by a lack of specificity. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In recent years there has been an expansion of scientific work on consciousness. However, there is an increasing necessity to integrate evolutionary and interdisciplinary perspectives and to bring affective feelings more centrally into the overall discussion. Pursuant especially to the theorizing of Endel Tulving (1985, 2004, 2005), Panksepp (1998a, 2003, 2005) and Vandekerckhove (2009) we will look at the phenomena starting with primary-process consciousness, namely the rudimentary state of autonomic awareness or unknowing (anoetic) consciousness, with a fundamental form of first-person ‘self-experience’ which relies on affective experiential states and raw sensory and perceptual mental existences, to higher forms of knowing (noetic and autonoetic) and self-aware consciousness. Since current scientific approaches are most concerned with the understanding of higher declarative states of consciousness, we will focus on these vastly underestimated primary forms of consciousness which may be foundational for all forms of higher ‘knowing consciousness’. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This study used the Remember/Know (R/K) procedure combined with signal detection analyses to assess recognition memory in 20 elders with amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI), 10 patients with probable Alzheimer’s disease (AD) as well as matched healthy older adults. Signal detection analyses first indicated that aMCI and control participants were comparable on general recognition performance. As regards AD patients, they were impaired relative to both aMCI and healthy elders. When assessing Remember and Know responses the aMCI group showed diminished sensitivity for Remember responses but intact Know responses compared to healthy elders. In contrast, AD patients showed decreased sensitivity for both Remember and Know responses compared to control and aMCI participants. The response bias index revealed that AD patients were more liberal than aMCI and control participants when providing Know responses. On the other measures, response bias was comparable between the groups. Overall, this study indicates that the R/K procedure can characterize different aspects of recognition memory performance in persons with aMCI or AD. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Recent research on autonoetic consciousness indicates that the ability to remember the past and the ability to project oneself into the future are closely related. The purpose of the present study was to confirm this proposition by examining whether the relationship observed between personality and episodic memory could be extended to episodic future thinking and, more generally, to investigate the influence of personality traits on self-information processing in the past and in the future. Results show that Neuroticism and Harm Avoidance predict more negative past memories and future projections. Other personality dimensions exhibit a more limited influence on mental time travel (MTT). Therefore, our study provide an additional evidence to the idea that MTT into the past and into the future rely on a common set of processes by which past experiences are used to envision the future. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This study aims to investigate autonoetic consciousness associated with episodic autobiographical memory in patients who had undergone unilateral medial temporal lobe resection for intractable epilepsy. Autonoetic consciousness, defined as the conscious feeling of mentally travelling back in time to relive a specific event, was assessed using the Remember/Know (R/K) paradigm across different time periods as proposed in the autobiographical memory task developed by Piolino et al. (TEMPau task). Results revealed that the two patient groups (left and right temporal resection) gave reduced sense of reliving (R) responses and more familiarity (K) responses than healthy controls. This poor autonoetic consciousness was highlighted when patients were asked to justify their Remember responses by recalling sensory-perceptive, affective or spatiotemporal specific details across all life periods. These results support the bilateral MTL contribution to episodic autobiographical memory covering the entire lifespan, which is consistent with the multiple trace theory of MTL function [7,9]. This study also demonstrates the bilateral involvement of MTL structures in recalling specific details of personal events characterized by autonoetic consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is ongoing theoretical debate regarding episodic memory and how it can be accurately measured, in particular if the focus should be content-based recall of episodic details or something more experiential involving the subjective capacity to mentally travel back in time and "re-live" aspects of the original event. The autonoetic subscale of the Episodic Autobiographical Memory Interview (EAMI) is presented here as a new test instrument that attempts to redress theoretical and methodological shortcomings in autobiographical memory assessment. The EAMI merges a phenomenological detail-based approach with an assessment of autonoetic consciousness, departing considerably from traditional Remember/Know paradigms used within this field. We present findings from an initial pilot study investigating the potential markers of autonoetic consciousness that may accompany episodic retrieval. Key behavioural indices of autonoetic consciousness, notably those of viewer perspective, visual imagery, and emotional re-experiencing, emerged as being inextricably bound with the level of phenomenological detail recalled and the overall re-living judgment. The autonoetic subscale of the EAMI permits conceptually refined assessment of episodic personal memories and the accompanying subjective experience of mental re-living, characteristic of episodic memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Episodic thoughts of the past and future rarely occur in either N2 sleep or REM sleep. • In contrast, episodic thought is a common feature of waking spontaneous thought. • Episodic thoughts in wakefulness tend to be future-focused and involve planning. • Autonoetic consciousness may differentiate spontaneous thoughts in sleep and wake. Evidence suggests continuity between cognition in waking and sleeping states. However, one type of cognition that may differ is episodic thoughts of the past and future. The current study investigated this across waking, NREM sleep and REM sleep. We analyzed thought reports obtained from a large sample of individuals (N = 138) who underwent experience-sampling during wakefulness as well as serial awakenings in sleep. Our data suggest that while episodic thoughts are common during waking spontaneous thought, episodic thoughts of both the past and the future rarely occur in either N2 or REM sleep. Moreover, replicating previous findings, episodic thoughts during wakefulness exhibit a strong prospective bias and frequently involve autobiographical planning. Together, these results suggest that the occurrence of spontaneous episodic thoughts differs substantially across waking and dreaming sleep states. We suggest that this points to a difference in the way that human consciousness is typically experienced across the sleep-wake cycle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Episodic memory (EM) is classically conceived as a memory for events, localized in space and time, and characterized by autonoetic consciousness (ANC) allowing to mentally travel back in time and subjectively relive an event. Building on recent evidence that the first-person visual co-perception of one's own body during encoding impacts EM, we used a scene recognition task in immersive virtual reality (VR) and measured how first-person body view would modulate peri-encoding resting-state fMRI, EM performance, and ANC. Specifically, we investigated the impact of body view on post-encoding functional connectivity in an a priori network of regions related either to EM or multisensory bodily processing and used these regions in a seed-to-whole brain analysis. Post-encoding connectivity between right hippocampus (rHC) and right parahippocampus (rPHC) was enhanced when participants encoded scenes while seeing their body. Moreover, the strength of connectivity between the rHC, rPHC and the neocortex displayed two main patterns with respect to body view. The connectivity with a sensorimotor fronto-parietal network, comprising primary somatosensory and primary motor cortices, correlated with ANC after - but not before - encoding, depending on body view. The opposite change of connectivity was found between rHC, rPHC and the medial parietal cortex (from being correlated with ANC before encoding to an absence of correlation after encoding), but irrespective of body view. Linking immersive VR and fMRI for the study of EM and ANC, these findings suggest that seeing one's own body during encoding impacts the brain activity related to EM formation by modulating the connectivity between the right hippocampal formation and the neocortical regions involved in the processing of multisensory bodily signals and self-consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]