Search

Cooperative game theory provides an appropriate framework to assess the likelihood of conflict resolution, encourage cooperation among parties, and determine each party's share in resource sharing conflicts. In calculating the fair and efficient allocation of the incremental benefits of cooperation, cooperative game theory methods often do not consider the exogenous bargaining powers of the players based on factors, that are external to the game, such as their political, economic, and military powers. This study reformulates three well-known cooperative game theory methods, namely, Nash-Harsanyi, Shapley, and Nucleolus, to account for the exogenous bargaining powers of the players in cooperative games. Using the Caspian Sea international conflict as an example, this paper shows how the negotiators' exogenous bargaining power can change the outcome of resource sharing games. The proposed weighted cooperative game theory approach can help determine practical resolutions for real-world conflicts in which the exogenous powers of players can have a significant influence on the outcome of negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hydropolitical conflicts between the Eastern Nile countries over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) are systematically analyzed at three points in time: just before the announcement of construction by Ethiopia on April 11, 2011, before the negotiations in early January 2014, and late August 2014. Hypergame theory, as developed within the framework of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution for handling misperceptions, is used to gain strategic insights into these conflicts and to ascertain the possible resolutions of the disputes. In all of three conflicts, the key decision makers are Egypt and Sudan, the downstream countries, and Ethiopia, the upstream nation. The findings from the analyses demonstrate the significant utilization of strategic surprise, a decisive act in which a decision maker intentionally exercises a course of action in the dispute that is hidden to its opponents in order to attempt to reach a more desirable outcome for itself. In particular, both Egypt and Sudan were caught by surprise when Ethiopia publicly announced on April 11, 2011 that it was going to build GERD, since no prior notification was given. Because Ethiopia was aware of Egypt and Sudan's misperception this dispute is modeled as a second level hypergame. The conflict investigations also show that the geopolitical and economic changes in Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia allowed Ethiopia to construct the dam without any harsh confrontation with Egypt and Sudan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary Reservoir systems with multiple operators can benefit from coordination of operation policies. To maximize the total benefit of these systems the literature has normally used the social planner’s approach. Based on this approach operation decisions are optimized using a multi-objective optimization model with a compound system’s objective. While the utility of the system can be increased this way, fair allocation of benefits among the operators remains challenging for the social planner who has to assign controversial weights to the system’s beneficiaries and their objectives. Cooperative game theory provides an alternative framework for fair and efficient allocation of the incremental benefits of cooperation. To determine the fair and efficient utility shares of the beneficiaries, cooperative game theory solution methods consider the gains of each party in the status quo (non-cooperation) as well as what can be gained through the grand coalition (social planner’s solution or full cooperation) and partial coalitions. Nevertheless, estimation of the benefits of different coalitions can be challenging in complex multi-beneficiary systems. Reinforcement learning can be used to address this challenge and determine the gains of the beneficiaries for different levels of cooperation, i.e., non-cooperation, partial cooperation, and full cooperation, providing the essential input for allocation based on cooperative game theory. This paper develops a game theory–reinforcement learning (GT–RL) method for determining the optimal operation policies in multi-operator multi-reservoir systems with respect to fairness and efficiency criteria. As the first step to underline the utility of the GT–RL method in solving complex multi-agent multi-reservoir problems without a need for developing compound objectives and weight assignment, the proposed method is applied to a hypothetical three-agent three-reservoir system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In game theory, potential resolutions to a conflict are found through stability analysis, based on stability definitions having precise mathematical structures. A stability definition reflects a decision maker's behavior in a conflict or game, predicts how the game is played, and suggests the resolutions or equilibria of the dispute. Various stability definitions, reflecting different types of people with different levels of foresight, risk attitude, and knowledge of opponents' preferences, have been proposed for resolving games. This paper reviews and illustrates six stability definitions, applicable to finite strategy strategic non-cooperative water resources games, including Nash Stability, General Metarationality (GMR), Symmetric Metarationality (SMR), Sequential Stability (SEQ), Limited-Move Stability, and Non-Myopic Stability. The introduced stability definitions are applied to an interesting and highly informative range of generic water resources games to show how analytical results vary based on the applied stability definitions. The paper suggests that game theoretic models can better simulate real conflicts if the applied stability definitions better reflect characteristics of the players. When there is a lack of information about the types of decision makers, the employment of a range of stability definitions might improve the strategic results and provide useful insights into the basic framework of the conflict and its resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Game theory provides a useful framework for studying Multi-Criteria Decision Making problems. This paper suggests modeling Multi-Criteria Decision Making problems as strategic games and solving them using non-cooperative game theory concepts. The suggested method can be used to prescribe non-dominated solutions and also can be used as a method to predict the outcome of a decision making problem. Non-cooperative stability definitions for solving the games allow consideration of non-cooperative behaviors, often neglected by other methods which assume perfect cooperation among decision makers. To deal with the uncertainty in input variables a Monte-Carlo Game Theory (MCGT) approach is suggested which maps the stochastic problem into many deterministic strategic games. The games are solved using non-cooperative stability definitions and the results include possible effects of uncertainty in input variables on outcomes. The method can handle multi-criteria multi-decision-maker problems with uncertainty. The suggested method does not require criteria weighting, developing a compound decision objective, and accurate quantitative (cardinal) information as it simplifies the decision analysis by solving problems based on qualitative (ordinal) information, reducing the computational burden substantially. The MCGT method is applied to analyze California’s Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta problem. The suggested method provides insights, identifies non-dominated alternatives, and predicts likely decision outcomes. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Summary: Managing water resources systems usually involves conflicts. Behaviors of stakeholders, who might be willing to contribute to improvements and reach a win–win situation, sometimes result in worse conditions for all parties. Game theory can identify and interpret the behaviors of parties to water resource problems and describe how interactions of different parties who give priority to their own objectives, rather than system’s objective, result in a system’s evolution. Outcomes predicted by game theory often differ from results suggested by optimization methods which assume all parties are willing to act towards the best system-wide outcome. This study reviews applicability of game theory to water resources management and conflict resolution through a series of non-cooperative water resource games. The paper illustrates the dynamic structure of water resource problems and the importance of considering the game’s evolution path while studying such problems. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]