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Since January 2020, European countries have implemented a wide range of restrictions to contain the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet governments have also implemented democratic compensators in order to offset the negative impacts of restrictions. This article aims to account for the variation of their use between Belgium, the Netherlands and France. We analyse three drivers: the strength of counterpowers, the ruling parties’ ideological leanings and political support. Building on an original data set, our results distinguish between embedded and ad hoc compensators. We find that ad hoc compensators are championed mainly by counterpowers, but also by ideology of the ruling coalitions in Belgium and the Netherlands and used strategically to maintain political support in France. Evidence on the link between embedded compensators and counterpowers is more ambiguous.

The Constitution of the French Fifth Republic offers very little room for citizens to demand a strong accountability of people voted in power. Recently, the Yellow Vests movement has unexpectedly revived the debates on the introduction of a recall mechanism in France, an option already defended by some candidates to the 2017 presidential election. This chapter analyses the French experience of recall mechanisms in four directions. First, it recalls the origins and historical diffusion of the idea of recall, introduced during the French Revolution as imperative mandate. Second, it analyses current constitutional provisions and discusses their compatibility with some forms of recall processes. Third, it examines the various social demands for recall, especially focusing on the one which has emerged out of the Yellow Vests movement. Lastly, the chapter ends with a discussion of the possible design a recall process could take in France.

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