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We evaluated 3 systems (ELIZA, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) in a randomized, controlled, and preregistered Turing test. Human participants had a 5 minute conversation with either a human or an AI, and judged whether or not they thought their interlocutor was human. GPT-4 was judged to be a human 54% of the time, outperforming ELIZA (22%) but lagging behind actual humans (67%). The results provide the first robust empirical demonstration that any artificial system passes an interactive 2-player Turing test. The results have implications for debates around machine intelligence and, more urgently, suggest that deception by current AI systems may go undetected. Analysis of participants' strategies and reasoning suggests that stylistic and socio-emotional factors play a larger role in passing the Turing test than traditional notions of intelligence., Comment: 23 pages, 13 figures

We evaluated GPT-4 in a public online Turing test. The best-performing GPT-4 prompt passed in 49.7% of games, outperforming ELIZA (22%) and GPT-3.5 (20%), but falling short of the baseline set by human participants (66%). Participants' decisions were based mainly on linguistic style (35%) and socioemotional traits (27%), supporting the idea that intelligence, narrowly conceived, is not sufficient to pass the Turing test. Participant knowledge about LLMs and number of games played positively correlated with accuracy in detecting AI, suggesting learning and practice as possible strategies to mitigate deception. Despite known limitations as a test of intelligence, we argue that the Turing test continues to be relevant as an assessment of naturalistic communication and deception. AI models with the ability to masquerade as humans could have widespread societal consequences, and we analyse the effectiveness of different strategies and criteria for judging humanlikeness., Comment: 28 pages, 21 figures

How well do language models deal with quantification? In this study, we focus on 'few'-type quantifiers, as in 'few children like toys', which might pose a particular challenge for language models because the sentence components with out the quantifier are likely to co-occur, and 'few'-type quantifiers are rare. We present 960 English sentence stimuli from two human neurolinguistic experiments to 22 autoregressive transformer models of differing sizes. Not only do all the models perform poorly on 'few'-type quantifiers, but overall the larger the model, the worse its performance. This inverse scaling is consistent with previous work suggesting that larger models increasingly reflect online rather than offline human processing, and we argue that the decreasing performance of larger models may challenge uses of language models as the basis for natural language systems., Comment: Accepted to Findings of ACL 2023

Are the predictions of humans and language models affected by similar things? Research suggests that while comprehending language, humans make predictions about upcoming words, with more predictable words being processed more easily. However, evidence also shows that humans display a similar processing advantage for highly anomalous words when these words are semantically related to the preceding context or to the most probable continuation. Using stimuli from 3 psycholinguistic experiments, we find that this is also almost always also the case for 8 contemporary transformer language models (BERT, ALBERT, RoBERTa, XLM-R, GPT-2, GPT-Neo, GPT-J, and XGLM). We then discuss the implications of this phenomenon for our understanding of both human language comprehension and the predictions made by language models., Comment: Accepted at CoNLL 2022

Humans can attribute beliefs to others. However, it is unknown to what extent this ability results from an innate biological endowment or from experience accrued through child development, particularly exposure to language describing others' mental states. We test the viability of the language exposure hypothesis by assessing whether models exposed to large quantities of human language display sensitivity to the implied knowledge states of characters in written passages. In pre-registered analyses, we present a linguistic version of the False Belief Task to both human participants and a Large Language Model, GPT-3. Both are sensitive to others' beliefs, but while the language model significantly exceeds chance behavior, it does not perform as well as the humans, nor does it explain the full extent of their behavior -- despite being exposed to more language than a human would in a lifetime. This suggests that while statistical learning from language exposure may in part explain how humans develop the ability to reason about the mental states of others, other mechanisms are also responsible.

Some languages allow arguments to be omitted in certain contexts. Yet human language comprehenders reliably infer the intended referents of these zero pronouns, in part because they construct expectations about which referents are more likely. We ask whether Neural Language Models also extract the same expectations. We test whether 12 contemporary language models display expectations that reflect human behavior when exposed to sentences with zero pronouns from five behavioral experiments conducted in Italian by Carminati (2005). We find that three models - XGLM 2.9B, 4.5B, and 7.5B - capture the human behavior from all the experiments, with others successfully modeling some of the results. This result suggests that human expectations about coreference can be derived from exposure to language, and also indicates features of language models that allow them to better reflect human behavior., Comment: Accepted at COLING 2022

More predictable words are easier to process - they are read faster and elicit smaller neural signals associated with processing difficulty, most notably, the N400 component of the event-related brain potential. Thus, it has been argued that prediction of upcoming words is a key component of language comprehension, and that studying the amplitude of the N400 is a valuable way to investigate the predictions we make. In this study, we investigate whether the linguistic predictions of computational language models or humans better reflect the way in which natural language stimuli modulate the amplitude of the N400. One important difference in the linguistic predictions of humans versus computational language models is that while language models base their predictions exclusively on the preceding linguistic context, humans may rely on other factors. We find that the predictions of three top-of-the-line contemporary language models - GPT-3, RoBERTa, and ALBERT - match the N400 more closely than human predictions. This suggests that the predictive processes underlying the N400 may be more sensitive to the surface-level statistics of language than previously thought., Comment: Accepted

Despite being designed for performance rather than cognitive plausibility, transformer language models have been found to be better at predicting metrics used to assess human language comprehension than language models with other architectures, such as recurrent neural networks. Based on how well they predict the N400, a neural signal associated with processing difficulty, we propose and provide evidence for one possible explanation - their predictions are affected by the preceding context in a way analogous to the effect of semantic facilitation in humans.

We investigate the extent to which word surprisal can be used to predict a neural measure of human language processing difficulty - the N400. To do this, we use recurrent neural networks to calculate the surprisal of stimuli from previously published neurolinguistic studies of the N400. We find that surprisal can predict N400 amplitude in a wide range of cases, and the cases where it cannot do so provide valuable insight into the neurocognitive processes underlying the response., Comment: To be presented at CoNLL 2020