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Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are attracting attention from the research community. One of the key issues is to provide them with privacy protection. In recent years, a huge amount of contributions has been focused on this area. Surveys and literature reviews have also been produced to give a systematic view of the different approaches taken. However, no previous work has focused on privacy models, that is, the set of assumptions made to build the approach. In particular, this paper focuses on this matter by studying 41 papers of the last 5 years. We highlight the great differences appearing among related papers that could make them incompatible to be applied simultaneously. We propose a set of guidelines to build comprehensive privacy models so as to foster their comparability and suitability analysis for different scenarios. This work was supported by the MINECO Grant TIN2013-46469-R (Security and Privacy in the Internet of You (SPINY)) and the CAM Grant S2013/ICE-3095 (Cybersecurity,Data, and Risks (CIBERDINE)), which is cofunded by EuropeanFunds (FEDER). Furthermore, J.M. de Fuentes and L. González-Manzano were also partially supported by the Programa de Ayudas a la Movilidad of Carlos III University of Madrid.

Data provides the basis for emerging scientific and interdisciplinary data-centric applications with the potential of improving the quality of life for the citizens. However, effective data-centric applications demand data management techniques able to process a large volume of data which may include sensitive data, e.g., financial transactions, medical procedures, or personal data. Managing sensitive data requires the enforcement of privacy and access control regulations, particularly, during the execution of queries against datasets that include sensitive and non-sensitive data. In this paper, we tackle the problem of enforcing privacy regulations during query processing, and propose BOUNCER, a privacy-aware query engine over federations of RDF datasets. BOUNCER allows for the description of RDF datasets in terms of RDF molecule templates, i.e., abstract descriptions of the properties of the entities in an RDF dataset and their privacy regulations. Furthermore, BOUNCER implements query decomposition and optimization techniques able to identify query plans over RDF datasets that not only contain the relevant entities to answer a query, but that are also regulated by policies that allow for accessing these relevant entities. We empirically evaluate the effectiveness of the BOUNCER privacy-aware techniques over state-of-the-art benchmarks of RDF datasets. The observed results suggest that BOUNCER can effectively enforce access control regulations at different granularity without impacting the performance of query processing.

Proof-of-Ownership (PoW) can be an efective deduplication technique to reduce storage requirements, by providing cloud storage servers the capability to guarantee that clients only upload and download files that they are in possession of. In this paper, we propose an attribute symmetric encryption PoW scheme (ase-PoW) for hierarchical environments such as corporations, in which (1) the external cloud service provider is honest-but-curious and (2) there is a exible access control in place to ensure only users with the right privilege can access sensitive files. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first such scheme and it is built upon the ce-PoW scheme of Gonzalez-Manzano and Orfila (2015). Ase-PoW outperforms ce-PoW in that it does not suffer from content-guessing attacks, it reduces client storage needs and computational workload. This work was partially supported by the MINECO grant TIN2013-46469-R (SPINY: Security and Privacy in the Internet of You) and the CAM grant S2013/ICE-3095 CIBERDINE-CM (CIBERDINE: Cybersecurity, Data, and Risks) funded by Madrid Autonomous Community and co-funded by European funds. L. Gonzalez and J. M. de Fuentes were also supported by the Programa de Ayudas para la Movilidad of Carlos III University of Madrid, Spain.

International audience; The widespread use of Java EE web applications as a means to provide distributed services to remote clients imposes strong security requirements, so that the resources managed by these applications remain protected from unauthorized disclosures and manipulations. For this purpose, the Java EE framework provides developers with mechanisms to define access-control policies. Unfortunately , the variety and complexity of the provided security configuration mechanisms cause the definition and manipulation of a security policy to be complex and error prone. As security requirements are not static, and thus, implemented policies must be changed and reviewed often, discovering and representing the policy at an appropriate abstraction level to enable their understanding and reenginering appears as a critical requirement. To tackle this problem, this paper presents a (model-based) approach aimed to help security experts to visualize, (automatically) analyse and manipulate web security policies.

Part 2: Web Security; International audience; Security is a critical concern for any information system. Security properties such as confidentiality, integrity and availability need to be enforced in order to make systems safe. In complex environments, where information systems are composed of a number of heterogeneous subsystems, each must participate in their achievement. Therefore, security integration mechanisms are needed in order to 1) achieve the global security goal and 2) facilitate the analysis of the security status of the whole system. For the specific case of access-control, access-control policies may be found in several components (databases, networks and applications) all, supposedly, working together in order to meet the high level security property. In this work we propose an integration mechanism for access-control policies to enable the analysis of the system security. We rely on model-driven technologies and the XACML standard to achieve this goal.

We present a fine-grained security model to enforce the access control on the shared constraint store in Concurrent Constraint Programming (CCP) languages. We show the model for a non-monotonic version of Soft CCP (SCCP), that is an extension of CCP where the constraints have a preference level associated with them. Crisp constraints can be modeled in the same framework as well. In the considered non-monotonic soft version (NmSCCP), it is also possible to remove constraints from the store. The language can be used for coordinating agents on a common store of information that represents the set of shared resources. In such scenarios, it is clearly important to enforce the integrity and confidentiality rights on the resources, in order, for instance, to hide part of the information to some agents, or to prevent an agent to consume too many resources. Finally, we present a bisimulation relation to check equivalence between two programs written in this language.