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• Characterization of opinion dynamics during agents switching between different social networks. • Determination of consensus condition and weight property in such opinion dynamics that agents switch between different social networks. • Seed selection of targeted marketing in switching social networks. • Design of targeted marketing strategy for networks of agents with switching topology under competition. The boom of social network platforms has greatly enriched people's platform choices for social interactions, which may cause people to switch frequently in different social networks to chase hot points. Meanwhile, as an advertisement integrator, the social network platform enables firms to implement targeted marketing campaigns to steer people's opinions in their own favor. Identifying the seed set and devising targeted marketing strategies emerge as the key points for firms' success. To tackle such a problem, we develop a game-theoretical framework for targeting marketing resources to network agents with switching topology based on their competitive opinion dynamics. In the framework, the dynamics of agents' opinions are driven by not only the targeted marketing behaviors of competing firms but also the social interactions of agents with switching topology. With capturing these features, we determine the consensus condition and weight property in such dynamics. On this basis, the optimal targeted marketing strategies are derived that firms only need to invest the overlapped opinion leaders of switching networks. And specifically, such a leader with more weight in consensus will gain more marketing resources from firms. Besides that, we further carry out comparative static analysis of relevant factors and discuss the equilibrium strategies with no consensus. Finally, two examples are presented to illustrate our theoretical results. In spite of the mathematical characterization, our paper additionally provides some insights into marketing management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent advances in information technology and the boom in social media provide firms with easy access to the data of consumers' preferences and their social interactions. To characterize marketing resource allocation in networks, this paper develops a game theoretical model that allows for each firm's own utility, action strategies of other firms and the inner state (self-belief and opinions) of consumers. In this model, firms can sway consumers' opinions by spending marketing resources among consumers under budget and cost constraints. Each firm competes for the collective preference of consumers in a social network to maximize its utility. We derived the equilibrium strategies theoretically in a connected network and a dispersed network from the constructed model. These reveal that firms should allocate more marketing resources to some of consumers depending on their initial opinions, self-belief and positions in a network. We found that some structures of consumer networks may have an innate dominance for one firm, which can be retained in equilibrium results. This means that network structure can be as a tool for firms to improve their utilities. Furthermore, the sensitivities of budget and cost to the equilibria were analyzed. These results can provide some reference for resource allocation strategies in marketing competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]