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Relying on a micro-comparative analysis, mainstream comparative scholarship tends to be of the view that most modern legal systems place limits on both the number and the content of the property rights private parties can create. This paper takes a different angle, arguing that such conclusion, although correct and meaningful, is essentially incomplete, as it does not take account of the implications this ' numerus clausus principle' has for the institutional governance of legal systems. Adopting a macro-comparative approach, the paper analyses this principle from the perspective of its impact on the role of courts and their legal reasoning in modern Germany, England and the US. It concludes that the numerus clausus principle has materially different 'systemic effects' in each of these jurisdictions and that this has important implications both for the understanding of the principle and the development of property law more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparative law and legal history show us that law is dynamic, always in continuous development, change, or mutation. This dynamic dimension has become a central concern for the comparative law scholars. The circulation of legal models in the world (e.g. legal transplant, legal transfer, legal borrowing, legal migration) is an evergreen issue. This phenomenon has provoked numerous doctrinal disputes, which have been encapsulated in complex theories on its possibilities and impossibilities. In the present article, we will not explore the many modern theories regarding legal transplantation (or under other metaphors). Instead, we will go back in time, in the second half of the nineteenth century, to explore an interesting Romanian theory that seems to have anticipated a series of modern ideas regarding the purpose, possibilities, and impossibilities of the circulation of legal models in the world. Following this approach, the main conclusion will be resumed to the idea that the Romanian theory of forms without substance can be integrated within the modern theories of legal transplant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The changes in the legal universe that have been taking place in the last few decades have increased the potential value of different kinds of comparative law information and thereby urged new objectives for the comparative law community. The comparative method, which was earlier applied in the traditional framework of domestic law, is now being adapted to the new needs created by the ongoing globalization process, becoming broader and more comprehensive with respect to both its scope and goals. Associated with this development is a growing interest in the question of transferability or transplantability of legal norms and institutions across different cultures, especially in so far as current legal integration and harmonization processes require reasonably transferable models. This paper critically examines the issue of transferability of laws with particular attention to the theory of legal transplants propounded by Professor Alan Watson, one of the most influential contemporary comparatists and legal historians. It is submitted that the element of relativity imposed by the special relationship of the law to its socio-cultural environment must be taken into consideration when the comparative method is applied. However, the view held by some scholars that legal transplants are impossible betrays an exaggeration of cultural diversity as it contradicts the teachings of history and is at odds with recent trends towards legal integration in certain world regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present paper, I attempt to unearth what I believe to be an extremely valuable, implicit dialogue between legal and economic discourse through an analysis of the contributions by two leading figures in the fields of comparative law and institutional economics, respectively: Rodolfo Sacco and Douglass North. By closely comparing two apparently far removed intellectual trajectories, I will sketch the manner in which the two scholars come to terms with the concept of change in their respective disciplines. How is legal change, on the one hand, and economic change, on the other hand, explained? I will examine how North addresses the question "why do economies perform differently through space and time?" and review Sacco's inquires upon convergence and divergence in legal systems with different institutional premises. Once the distinctive features of the two theses have been outlined against the backdrop of the latter questions, I will identify intellectual meeting points, common threads, and parallel tracks drawing the scholars together. In the spirit of methodological pluralism, I will conclude by suggesting that a combined reading of the theses under scrutiny may provide a practical template for thinking about questions of legal change, legal transplants, and the diffusion of legal consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal changes stimulated by economic liberalisation and European Union governance have led some observers to speak of the ‘Americanisation’ of European law. Focussing on the dynamics of legal change and resistance in European member states, this article questions the extent of trans-Atlantic legal convergence, noting six important differences between European and American law that are unlikely to disappear.European Political Science (2008) 7, 21–31; doi:10.1057/palgrave.eps.2210152 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]