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This thesis presents an analysis of the August 1991 Soviet coup from a command, control and communications (C3) perspective. Through the use of C3 modeling and functional decomposition, the C3 systems developed by the State Committee for the State of the Emergency (SCSE) and the reformist opposition to the coup are examined and the most significant strengths and weaknesses are identified. The comparative model developed for the study, the Coup Operations Process Model (COPM), is an extrapolation of C3 military operations process models. Toe COPM incorporates the C3 characteristics of crisis management and introduces the concept of a controllable interface separating the immediate and extended operational environments. Specific political, military and media events preceding this coup are examined to determine critical developmental factors which influenced the structure and operational dynamics of C3 systems employed at the start of the coup. Analysis of the development and execution of the coup substantiates the importance of C3 in the conduct of crisis operations and identifies the key C3 functions which directly affected the outcome of the coup. http://archive.org/details/thesovietcoupcom1094524041 Lieutenant, United States Navy Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis contains a brief overview of past developments in command and control, and applies organizational theory to the design of systems for tactical command and control, specifically within the context of the Fleet Battle Group. By applying Ashby's theory of requisite variety and Mintzberg's five coordinating mechanisms, a general model of tactical warfare is provided. The author proposes a balanced application of the five coordinating mechanisms to the problems of command and control within the battle group, or other tactical combatant organization. http://archive.org/details/commandndcontrol1094521712 Lieutenant, United States Navy Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis will address the relative ability of the command and control systems of the United States and Soviet Union to support a protracted nuclear war. It will address the organizations as well as the various systems used to support the respective National Command Authorities. This includes the threat warning and attack assessment equipment used to determine strategic and tactical warning, the communications equipment used to alert forces of increased readiness and the contribution of these systems in the conduct of nuclear strikes, if required. It also includes a review of the technical factors associated with the performance of C 3 in a nuclear environment. The result is a net assessment of the two command and control systems that highlights the strengths and weaknesses inherent in each. Specific recommendations, such as better aircraft support schemes and more robust command and control systems, are developed to help enhance the United States' position regarding this vital national security issue. http://archive.org/details/usndsovietstrate1094526326 Lieutenant, United States Navy Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.