Search

The phenomenon of collective action and the origin of collective action problems have been extensively and systematically studied in the social sciences. Yet, while we have substantial knowledge about the factors promoting collective action at the local level, we know far less about how these insights travel to large-scale collective action problems. Such problems, however, are at the heart of humanity's most pressing challenges, including climate change, large-scale natural resource depletion, biodiversity loss, nuclear proliferation, antibiotic resistance due to overconsumption of antibiotics, and pollution. In this paper, we suggest an analytical framework that captures the theoretical understanding of preconditions for large-scale collective action. This analytical framework aims at supporting future empirical analyses of how to cope with and overcome larger-scale collective action problems. More specifically, we (i) define and describe the main characteristics of a large-scale collective action problem and (ii) explain why voluntary and, in particular, spontaneous large-scale collective action among individual actors becomes more improbable as the collective action problem becomes larger, thus demanding interventions by an external authority (a third party) for such action to be generated. Based on this, we (iii) outline an analytical framework that illustrates the connection between third-party interventions and large-scale collective action. We conclude by suggesting avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article takes its point of departure in the rapidly expanding field of research focusing on governance of large and complex systems and argues that this research should more explicitly recognize ongoing theoretical debates within contemporary and more mainstream governance research in order to fulfill all of its potential. This includes explicitly recognizing the fundamental and inherently political nature of governance as well as the potential contributions to be made from incorporating more of institutional theory in governance research. In addition, the article shows how research on large, complex systems can inform existing research on governance and institutional theory. Recent research on governance of large and complex systems could, for example, help governance research regain its relevance by explicitly focusing on the "big questions." Focusing on large and complex systems is certainly of paramount real‐world importance, but it also highlights theoretical and empirical puzzles at the core of traditional disciplines such as political science or economics. Finally, the explicit systems perspective with its focus on nonlinearity and limited predictability could also help institutional theory move away from its underlying assumptions about functionalism and voluntarism and could, as such, contribute to existing research on institutional creation, reproduction, and change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Focuses on state capacity in general and on states' efforts to foster collective action and compliance in particular. • Improves our understanding of recent decades' increased militarization of wildlife management. • Builds on unique interview data with park rangers and public officials. • Coercive capacities are necessary but needs to be complemented with cooperative assurances in order to ensure compliance. This article focuses on social control and states' broadcasting of power over inhospitable terrains. It uses the case of conservation of wildlife in two African Peace Parks to explore how the involved states strike the balance between cooperation and coercion in their efforts to mold citizen behavior toward quasi-voluntary compliance. The case of wildlife management highlights pertinent issues related to compliance and collective action and have the potential to contribute substantially to the general literature on state capacity. More specifically, while the increased militarization of wildlife management has been criticized for justifying coercive and repressive policies, it can be seen as a result of the involved states' lack of social control and ensuing inability to foster quasi-voluntary compliance through other means than coercive ones. Yet, while coercion is not a sufficient condition for fostering compliance, it is still important to recognize that it is indeed a necessary one. Building on unique interview data from two major transboundary parks – Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area and Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park – we explore how existing theoretical arguments play out in practice and how the challenge to foster quasi-voluntary compliance is being addressed. The results show that actors given the task to implement wildlife policy certainly show awareness about that coercion needs to be complemented with cooperative assurances in order to foster quasi-voluntary compliance. Furthermore, the study provides insights into how other social organizations such as traditional leaders might challenge the state in terms of being the predominant actors in setting up rules governing wildlife. We thank the Swedish Research Council for supporting this research. We would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the editor for constructive comments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]