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• The Lower Canada rebellions of 1837–38, are used to show that the development of markets reduces the cost of rebelling. • Using data from the 1831 census, we show that the likelihood of rebellions increases with market development (proxied by absolute price difference between one area and the main Atlantic port cities of the colony). • The intensity of rebellions is also affected by the level of market development. • The development of markets appears to act in a manner similar to new information diffusion technologies with regards to helping coordinate rebellions. In 1837–38, the British colonies of Upper and Lower Canada rebelled. The rebellion was more virulent (and better organized) in Lower Canada. The rebellions were also concentrated in the richer areas of that colony. In this paper, we use the census of 1831 and databases of rebellious events to explain how the rebels managed to overcome the problem of collective action. We argue that the rich areas were more prone to rebellion because they were where markets were most developed. These well-developed markets allowed for cheaper coordination of seditious elements. We link our contribution to the literature on the collective action problem inherent to the organization of protests, uprisings and rebellions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]