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The aim of the study was to test convergent/discriminant validity of two measures of cognitive reflection, cognitive reflection test (CRT) and belief bias syllogisms (BBS) and to investigate whether their distinctive characteristic of luring participants into giving wrong intuitive responses explains their relationships with various abilities and disposition measures. Our results show that the same traits largely account for performance on both non-lure task, the Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT), and CRT and explain their correlations with other variables. These results also imply that the predictive validity of CRT for wide range of outcomes does not stem from lures. Regarding the BBS, we found that its correlations with other measures were substantially diminished once we accounted for the effects of BNT. This also implies that the lures are not the reason for the correlation between BBS and these measure. We conclude that the lures are not the reason why cognitive reflection tasks correlate with different outcomes. Our results call into question an original definition of CRT as a measure of ability or disposition to resist reporting first response that comes to mind, as well as the validity of results of studies showing "incremental validity" of CRT over numeracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we investigated the hypothesis that correct responders are at a metacognitive advantage compared to intuitively incorrect responders because they are aware that there exists an appealing but incorrect response that many would fall for. A total of 169 participants solved three CRT tasks, followed by questions about the perceived difficulty of the tasks and the most probable incorrect response that others gave. Results mainly confirmed the hypothesis: the more correct responses (or the less intuitive responses) participants gave, the more they were correct about the most prevalent incorrect responses of others. Furthermore, the more correct responses (or the less intuitive responses) participants had, the more difficult they found the tasks to be, perhaps due to the awareness of the incorrect but appealing response that would trick many others into giving a wrong response. Interestingly, the number of non-sensical responses (those neither correct nor intuitive) was positively related both to awareness of appealing incorrect responses and to the perceived difficulty of the task. This indicates that even those participants who seemingly gave non-sensical responses to CRT tasks might have a metacognitive advantage over intuitively incorrect responders. We discuss how our results fit into contemporary dual-process theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]