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Language comprehension is left-lateralized but with variable contributions from the right hemisphere. When both hemispheres are stimulated simultaneously using divided visual field presentation, performance may be enhanced or hindered depending on the complexity of the task, and these effects may relate to independent processing in both hemispheres or to information transfer between hemispheres. Simultaneous stimulation of both hemispheres is thought to suppress interhemispheric interactions, but information transfer may nonetheless occur. Studies with simultaneous bilateral displays have demonstrated that semantic information from the contralateral visual field (and hemisphere) can facilitate relatedness judgments and lexical decisions. The current study extends this line of research by assessing semantic information transfer in a bilateral word identification task. Task manipulations involving directed spatial attention and asymmetric primes (e.g., ATOM → BOMB) were used to isolate automatic priming as opposed to top-down processing. The results revealed 2 main findings: (a) interhemispheric priming in the form of improved word recognition occurred specifically in conditions designed to isolate automatic transfer of semantic information, that is, in the attended visual field for the target word in asymmetric prime pairs, and (b) there is evidence for an asymmetrical transfer of semantic information, in that the subordinate left visual field-right hemisphere benefited more from such transfer. Together, these results demonstrate evidence for automatic interhemispheric transfer of semantic information, even under conditions of simultaneous bilateral display. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

We examine the relationship between a measure of intelligence and estimates of conscious and unconscious memory influences derived using Jacoby's (Jacoby, L. L. [1991]. A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from intentional uses of memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 513-541.) process-dissociation procedure. We find a positive relationship between intelligence and conscious memory, and no relationship between intelligence and unconscious influences once the impact of conscious influences are removed (Experiment 1). We also find that when participants cannot engage in conscious strategies, such as when there is insufficient time for learning, the relationships observed in Experiment 1 are eliminated (Experiments 2A and 2B). Our results support the notion that individual differences in intelligence reflect differences in conscious strategic processes (Karis, D., Fabiani, M., & Donchin, E. [1984]. "P300" and memory: Individual differences in the von Restorff effect. Cognitive Psychology, 16, 177-216.) and not differences in mental speed (Eysenck, H. J. (1984). Intelligence versus behavior. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 290-291; Jensen, A. R. [1982]. Bias in mental testing. New York, NY: Free Press).

The pseudoword effect is the finding that pseudowords (i.e., rare words or pronounceable nonwords) give rise to more hits and false alarms than words. Using the retrieving effectively from memory (REM) model of recognition memory, we tested a familiarity-based account of the pseudoword effect: Specifically, the pseudoword effect arises because pseudowords lack distinctive semantic meanings. Because semantics can differentiate orthographically similar words (e.g., horse vs. house), by lacking distinctive semantics, pseudowords have greater interitem similarity than words, and hence more familiarity, which gives rise to the pseudoword effect. Across two sets of simulations, we demonstrate that this account explains the pseudoword effect in addition to accounting for why the pseudoword effect is absent when irregular nonwords are compared with words. Furthermore, our modeling efforts suggest a novel experiment that leads us to the discovery of a new concordant effect. Namely, extremely high-frequency words behave like pseudowords (giving rise to more hits and false alarms than high-frequency words) and also have less distinctive semantics than high-frequency words. We conclude that our work provides strong evidence in favor of the familiarity-based accounts of the pseudoword effect. We discuss the implications of our research with regard to various issues surrounding the pseudoword effect and REM model.

While there is now general agreement that memory gives rise to both conscious and unconscious influences, there remains disagreement concerning the process architecture underlying these distinct influences. Do they arise from independent underlying systems (e.g., Jacoby, 1991) or from systems that are interactive (e.g., Joordens & Merikle, 1993)? In the current paper we present a novel "inside-out" technique that can be used with the process-dissociation paradigm to arrive at more concrete conclusions concerning this central question and demonstrate this technique via a meta-analysis of currently published findings. Our results suggest that the data presented in these studies vary in ways most consistent with the assumption that conscious and unconscious influences behave independently.

Virtual reality (VR) was used to create an ecologically valid spatial-navigation task in hand with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to articulate the neural basis of planning behavior. A virtual version of a traditional planning measure, the Tower of London, was also developed to ascertain convergent and divergent validity in terms of planning behavior and functional neuroanatomy. This VR-fMRI case study experiment was performed at 3.0 Tesla on a young healthy male subject. The obtained image data suggest both convergent and divergent specificity between the two conditions in terms of location and overall intensity of activation. Overall, the present case study provides supportive evidence that the activity of various brain regions associated with planning tasks is largely modulated by the ecological validity of the measure being used. This finding may extend to all domains of inquiry in neuropsychological research and assessment when deductive conclusions are formulated on the results of neuropsychological test measures that could be considered contrived in nature.

In his analysis of the pseudoword effect, [Greene, R.L. (2004). Recognition memory for pseudowords. Journal of Memory and Language, 50, 259–267.] suggests nonwords can feel more familiar that words in a recognition context if the orthographic features of the nonword match well with the features of the items presented at study. One possible account he mentions relies on two assumptions: (1) that items are matched to study only on the basis of the features the item affords, and (2) that the tendency to say old to a test item is proportional to the extent of featural overlap with study items. We find strong support for these assumptions with respect to accounting for the pseudoword effect observed in false alarms. However, our findings also suggest that the pseudoword effect on hits, when observed, reflects a different set of underlying processes, that appear more in line with the discrepancy-attribution notions of [Whittlesea, W.A., & Williams, L.D. (1998). Why do strangers feel familiar, but friends do not? A discrepancy-attribution account of feelings of familiarity. Acta Psychologica, 98, 141–165; Whittlesea, W.A., & Williams, L.D. (2000). The source of feelings of familiarity: The discrepancy-attribution hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 547–565.].

The mixed-list paradox is the finding that high-frequency words show a recall advantage in blocked lists, but that this advantage is reversed or nullified in mixed lists. We argue that this paradox has been poorly defined. Specifically, researchers should investigate random and alternating lists separately. We examine blocked, random, and alternating lists in our experiment. We hypothesize that a low-frequency recall advantage could arise due to asymmetrically strong links between low- and high-frequency words. Supporting our hypothesis, a low-frequency recall advantage is observed in the random list, as is an asymmetry of association. In the alternating list, no recall advantage is observed, and neither is any asymmetry of association. Our results offer a clear challenge to future research to (1) consider the associations between word frequencies and (2) consider random and alternating lists separately.

Unlike other forms of priming, semantic priming appears only to occur at short lags. In apparent contrast to this, S. Becker, M. Moscovitch, M. Behrmann, and S. Joordens (1997) described a theory of priming that predicts long-term effects for all forms of relatedness. This prediction is reconciled with previous failures to observe long-term semantic priming on the basis of 2 claims: (a) that previously used pairs share few semantic features and (b) that tasks typically used to study priming are not especially sensitive to semantic influences. The present experiments provide further support for these claims by demonstrating long-term semantic priming in the lexical-decision task when the stimuli and task are modified in a way that increases semantic involvement. However, the findings' suggest that in addition to the mechanism advocated by Becker et al., a second mechanism is necessary to provide a complete account of semantic priming effects.

A number of reports claim that humans perform lexical decisions faster to words with many meanings than to words with only one meaning. It is a challenge to simulate this ambiguity effect with a parallel distributed processing model because activation of ambiguous words produces competition at the semantic level; this ought to lead to less rather than more efficient processing of ambiguous words. Despite this problem, the present simulations show that it is possible to produce an ambiguity effect when the network settles into a learned semantic pattern through use of a proximity factor. However, competition is not completely countered by proximity as the network fails to settle into a learned semantic pattern for ambiguous words on more than 50% of the trials. Further simulations show that manipulations that increase the proportion of correct settling result in the loss of thi ambiguity effect

Paralleling the recent work by Reichle, Reineberg, and Schooler (2010), we explore the use of eye movements as an objective measure of mind wandering while participants performed a reading task. Participants were placed in a self-classified probe-caught mind wandering paradigm while their eye movements were recorded. They were randomly probed every 2-3 min and were required to indicate whether their mind had been wandering. The results show that eye movements were generally less complex when participants reported mind wandering episodes, with both duration and frequency of within-word regressions, for example, becoming significantly reduced. This is consistent with the theoretical claim that the cognitive processes that normally influence eye movements to enhance semantic processing during reading exert less control during mind wandering episodes.

L. L. Jacoby, J. P. Toth, and A. P. Yonelinas (1993) assume that conscious and unconscious processes make independent contributions to task performance. As an alternative to the independence model, we suggest that a redundancy model based on the assumption that conscious processes are always associated with correlated unconscious processes can also be used to dissociate the separate influences of these processes. Using data reported by L. L. Jacoby et al., we show that each model leads to different but equally plausible estimates of conscious and unconscious influences, following both variations in attention (i.e., focused vs. divided) and in encoding (i.e., read vs. generate)

Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) demonstrated that the probability of calling new test words “old” (i.e., false recognition) is biased by context words. When context words were briefly exposed and subjects were not informed of their presence, new words were called “old” more of ten if the context and test words were identical than if the context and test words were different. When the context words were presented at longer exposure durations and subjects were informed of their presence, the opposite pattern of results occurred. In Experiment 1, we replicated the critical qualitative difference across conditions reported by Jacoby and Whitehouse. In addition, the combined results of Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that the exposure duration of the context words, and not the instructions to the subjects, is the primary factor determining which pattern of false recognition occurs. However, in contrast with the findings of Jacoby and Whitehouse, both patterns of false recognition were associated with significant recognition memory for the context words. The latter finding presents problems for any interpretation of false recognition, which implies that the briefly exposed context words are perceived without awareness.

When memory is contrasted for stimuli belonging to distinct stimulus classes, one of two patterns is observed: a mirror pattern, in which one stimulus gives rise to higher hits but lower false alarms (e.g., the frequency-based mirror effect) or a concordant pattern, in which one stimulus class gives rise both to higher hits and to higher false alarms (e.g., the pseudoword effect). On the basis of the dual-process account proposed by Joordens and Hockley (2000), we predict that mirror patterns occur when one stimulus class is more familiar and less distinctive than another, whereas concordant patterns occur when one stimulus class is more familiar than another. We tested these assumptions within a video game paradigm using novel stimuli that allow manipulations in terms of distinctiveness and familiarity (via similarity). When more distinctive, less familiar items are contrasted with less distinctive, more familiar items, a mirror pattern is observed. Systematically enhancing the familiarity of stimuli transforms the mirror pattern to a concordant pattern as predicted. Although our stimuli differ considerably from those used in examinations of the frequency-based mirror effect and the pseudoword effect, the implications of our findings with respect to those phenomena are also discussed.

Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl's (1983; Libet, 1985) influential work using a clock-watching task suggests that voluntary actions are initiated in motor cortex prior to the point where the participant claims to have initiated that action. Joordens, van Duijn, and Spalek (2002) showed that a bias exists in this task with respect to the participants' reports of initiation times. Joordens et al. assumed that this bias was primarily due to motion cues that are very much like those used to elicit phenomena such as representational momentum. In the present Experiment 1, it is demonstrated that this bias disappears when a mouse-click response is used in place of a temporal-order judgment. This finding, however, is actually more confusing than clarifying given that the procedural parallels with representational momentum are still present and should be supporting a bias. In the three subsequent experiments the view that a bias is indeed present, but that it is opposed by an opposite-acting compensation process, is proposed and tested. Implications for both representational momentum and for the general use of clock-watching tasks (e.g., Libet et al., 1983) are highlighted.

Strayer and colleagues (Grison & Strayer, 2001; Malley & Strayer, 1995; Strayer & Grison, 1999) have reported experiments in which negative priming by ignored stimuli occurred only for stimuli that were repeatedly sampled from small sets. These results were argued to be inconsistent with episodic/mismatch accounts of negative priming. We show here that a dependence of negative priming on multiple repetition is wholly consistent with such theories. Furthermore, we argue that the inhibitory theory proposed by Strayer and colleagues cannot account for major findings regarding negative priming and that anomalies in the data reported by Grison and Strayer are more parsimoniously explained by episodic/mismatch accounts.

When performing a lexical decision task, participants can correctly categorize letter strings as words faster if they have multiple meanings (i.e., ambiguous words) than if they have one meaning (i.e., unambiguous words). In contrast, when reading connected text, participants tend to fixate longer on ambiguous words than on unambiguous words. Why are ambiguous words at an advantage in one word recognition task, and at a disadvantage in another? These disparate results can be reconciled if it is assumed that ambiguous words are relatively fast to reach a semantic-blend state sufficient for supporting lexical decisions, but then slow to escape the blend when the task requires a specific meaning be retrieved. We report several experiments that support this possibility.

In a series of experiments, we examined the effect of requiring subjects to attend to distractors in a test of negative priming. This was accomplished by using a referent size-selection task in which subjects were instructed to name the larger animal and to ignore the smaller animal in a word pair. The result was a quadrupling of the standard negative priming effect, suggesting that negative priming not only occurs for attended distractors, it is actually enhanced. We demonstrated that this enhancement of the effect was not due solely to increased latencies in the referent size-selection task, because neither decreasing base response times in other referent size-selection tasks nor increasing base response times in typical color-selection tasks substantially affected the respective negative priming effects. Although these findings can be accommodated within current theories of negative priming, they challenge the basic assumption that the negative priming effect arises because the critical item was ignored or not attended to on the prime trial.

The notion that inhibitory processes play a critical role in selective attention has gained wide support. Much of this support derives from studies of negative priming. The authors note that the attribution of negative priming to an inhibitory mechanism of attention draws its support from a common assumption underlying priming procedures, together with the procedure that has been used to measure negative priming. The results from a series of experiments demonstrate that selection between 2 competing prime items is not required to observe negative priming. This result is demonstrated across several experiments in which participants named 1 of 2 items in a second display following presentation of a single-item prime. The implications of these results for existing theories of negative priming are discussed, and a theoretical framework for interpreting negative priming and several related phenomena is forwarded.

Do studies of perception without awareness and studies of perception without attention address a similar underlying concept of awareness? To answer this question, we compared qualitative differences in performance across variations in stimulus quality (i.e., short vs. long prime-mask stimulus onset asynchrony) with qualitative differences in performance across variations in the direction of attention (i.e., focused vs. divided). The qualitative differences were based on three different phenomena: Stroop priming, false recognition, and exclusion failure. In all cases, variations in stimulus quality and variations in the direction of attention led to parallel findings. These results suggest that perception with and without awareness and perception with and without attention are equivalent ways of describing the same underlying process distinction.

Negative Priming Without Overt Prime Selection BRUCE MILLIKEN, McMaster University STEVE JOORDENS, University of Toronto at Scarborough Abstract The procedure typically used to demonstrate negative priming requires subjects to respond to one of two simultaneously presented stimuli across two consecutive displays. Negative priming is defined by slower responses to targets in the second display that appeared as distractors in the first display, than to targets in the second display that did not appear in the first display. It is widely assumed that negative priming occurs as a result of the selection that occurs in the first display. In the present article, we show that negative priming can be observed without requiring subjects to respond selectively to one of two items in the first display. We argue that this result is useful for two reasons. First, it points out a fundamental misunderstanding concerning the procedure required to measure negative priming, a misunderstanding that has shaped much of the theoretical work done in this area. Second, we suggest that the procedure introduced here is of considerable utility in evaluating theoretical accounts of negative priming. To demonstrate this utility we report the results of two studies that assess the code co - ordination account of negative priming (Lowe, 1985; Tipper & Cranston, 1985). The priming paradigm is an empirical tool commonly used to examine the state of an internal representation of a recently presented stimulus. In a typical priming study, subjects are asked to identify or categorize visually presented target stimuli as quickly and accurately as possible. On some trials the target stimulus is identical to or semantically related to a stimulus that was displayed previously. On other trials the target is unrelated to previous stimuli. The conventional result obtained in such studies is that less time is required to respond accurately to a target when it follows an identical prime (e.g., Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977; Scarborough, Gerard, & Cortese, 1979) or a semantically related prime (e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Meyer, Schvaneveldt, & Ruddy, 1975) than when it follows an unrelated prime. The cause of priming effects remains a matter of considerable debate (e.g., see Becker, Moscovitch, & Behrmann, 1995; Joordens & Besner, 1992; Masson, 1991; 1995; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992; McNamara, 1992; 1994; Neely, 1991; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988; Whittlesea & Jacoby, 1990). However, the traditional account of priming assumes that the level of activation of an internal representation of a target item increases as a result of prior presentation of an identical or semantically related prime. In the case of repetition priming, this enhanced level of activation is a direct consequence of the previous occurrence of the target item. In the case of semantic/associative priming, the enhanced activation of the target item is assumed to occur as a result of spreading activation from the representation of the prime to representations of its semantic/associative neighbours in memory (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Anderson, 1983). Thus, presentation of 'DOG' speeds a subsequent response to 'CAT' because when 'DOG' becomes active in memory, activation spreads to related items such as 'CAT'. For the present purpose, the critical property of such accounts of priming is that the time required to respond to a target stimulus faithfully reflects the activation state of its internal representation. Thus, the priming effect is determined at the time the prime item is presented and is measured at the time the target is responded to. In contrast to the benefit often observed in such priming studies, several experimenters have described situations in which stimulus repetition leads to slower or more error prone responses (e.g., Kanwisher, 1987; Posner & Cohen, 1984, Tipper, 1985). In the current article, we focus on one of these empirical phenomena, now commonly known as negative priming (Tipper, 1985). …